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One of the main tasks of the international human rights system in 
this field is to make societies aware of the contradiction between 
their self-professed values and their application (or rather their 
non-application or misapplication) in the context of disability. 
 
Quinn and Degener (2002) 23 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about understandings, how those understandings shape the 
law and how the law helps to shape those understandings.  Its first premise is 
that law is not neutral: it is formed and functions within a complex and 
dynamic socio-political context from which it is inseparable.  From that 
premise, the thesis argues that partial understanding of the context in which 
the law has been formed may result in mis- or partial understandings, and 
thus mis- or partial application, of the law itself.  The argument is made 
through political discourse analysis of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and implementation in England of Article 
19, the right to live independently and be included in the community.  
The CRPD is seen as emancipatory law, offering a re-description of the world 
and of disabled people’s place in it, and requiring for its full implementation 
transformative paradigm change.  Whether the Convention-drafters’ 
hegemonic project succeeds will depend in part on the understandings 
already circulating in national settings.  Turning to the United Kingdom, the 
thesis identifies resistance on the part of successive governments to 
international understandings of economic, social and cultural rights, and their 
consequent invisibility in domestic discourse, as potential barriers to 
realisation of the CRPD’s emancipatory purpose. 
The remainder of the thesis investigates the extent to which this mis-
understanding currently affects implementation in England of CRPD Article 
19.  Independent living policy, legislation, decision-making and redress are 
examined for evidence of CRPD-compatible change. The thesis concludes 
that the exclusion of international economic, social and cultural rights 
standards from domestic discourse results in mis- and partial 
understandings, and thus in mis- or partial application, of Article 19.  This in 
turn undermines implementation of the Convention as a whole, and frustrates 
its drafters’ purpose in the English domestic sphere. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDINGS 
  
Introduction 
This thesis is about understandings, about how those understandings shape 
the law, and about how the law helps to shape those understandings.  Its first 
premise is that law is not neutral: it is formed and functions within a complex 
and dynamic socio-political context from which it is inseparable.1  As such, 
law may both reflect and influence social understandings, structures and 
identities.  This premise is explored through political discourse analysis of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its 
implementation in the UK.   
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the 
Convention/CRPD) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006, came 
into force in 2008 and was ratified by the UK in 2009.  This thesis will argue 
that it is an emancipatory human rights treaty.  It presents a re-description of 
the world, where disabled people are no longer excluded recipients of welfare 
but active, valued and equal rights-holders; where impairment is no longer 
seen as an aberration to be ‘othered’, but as universal human variation to be 
accepted, respected and accommodated.  Realisation of this new world 
requires deep reconstruction2 of understandings, structures and identities – 
transformative ‘paradigm change’ from exclusion to inclusion and from 
                                                 
1
 See for instance O’Cinneide C, ‘Extracting Protection for the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities from Human Rights Frameworks: Established Limits and New Possibilities’ in 
Arnandóttir OM and Quinn G (eds) The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 168  
2
 Stein MA, ‘Disability Human Rights’ (2007) 95(1) California Law Review 75; Lawson A, 
Lawson A, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: New 
Era or False Dawn?’  (2006-2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 
563  
 2 
 
welfare to rights.3  Part 1 of the thesis traces events leading to adoption of 
the Convention and examines its text.  The indivisibility and interdependence 
of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights is identified as a key 
element of the Convention’s understandings, purpose and structure.   
 
Realisation, however, will depend not only on the Convention’s capacity to 
bring about a new agenda, but also on understandings already circulating in 
national settings.   Part 2 of the thesis turns to the UK.  Examination of the 
constructive dialogue with the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights reveals successive UK governments’ strong resistance to any 
domestic recognition of these rights as rights, or to any enforcement of their 
more durable human rights dimensions.  Instead, economic, social and 
cultural rights are re-articulated as welfare entitlements.  The thesis explores 
the consequences of this re-articulation through examination of policy, law, 
administration and redress in England relating to CRPD Article 19, the right 
to live independently and be included in the community.  It concludes that 
failure to fully grasp the full importance of economic, social and cultural rights 
in this context results in partial application of Article 19 and threatens 
realisation here of the Convention’s re-description of the world. 
 
Chapter 1 positions the thesis within the disciplines of law and disability 
studies.  It introduces the key concepts on which the thesis is built, and the 
language used to discuss the development and implementation of the law.  
Elements of political discourse theory are explained, illustrated with examples 
relevant to the focus of the thesis.  This theory provides both the ‘viewpoint’ 
and the language used to discuss development and implementation of the 
law in context.  The place of law in that context, and its role as ‘expressive’ or 
                                                 
3
 See Quinn, G & Degener, T, with Bruce, A, Burke, C, Castellino, J, Kenna, P, Kilkelly, U, 
Quinlivan, S, ‘Human Rights and Disability: the current use and future potential of United 
Nations human rights instruments in the context of disability’, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2002 HR/PUB/02/1, Chapter 1; Lawson A, ‘The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: New Era or False Dawn?’  (2006-2007) 34 Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce 563; Stein MA and Lord JE, ‘Future Prospects 
for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ in Arnandóttir 
OM and Quinn G (eds) The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 
 
 3 
 
‘emancipatory’ are then considered.  Santos’ ‘cartography of law’ and 
‘interlegality’ are introduced, before the structure and content of the thesis 
are outlined.  The Chapter begins with some context on ‘disability’. 
 
Disability 
 
Estimates of the number of disabled people in the world vary.  According to 
the United Nations, around 650 million people live with impairment, about 10 
per cent of the world’s population.4   This figure is said to be increasing 
through population growth, medical advances and the ageing process,5 with 
forecasts of around 800 million by 2015.6   If the members of those people’s 
families are included, almost a third of the world’s population7  is directly 
affected by disability.8   More recent estimates are higher still, with more than 
a billion people9 estimated to live with some form of disability.10 
 
Needless to say, these broad brush statistics, like any attempt to categorise 
human beings, conceal untold complexities.11    Statistical results depend on 
design of research and questions,12 including how the researchers define 
disability.  This varies across cultures and systems, 13  and, as Goodley 
explains, ‘[o]fficial definitions of disability reflect the organisational 
                                                 
4
 United Nations Enable Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities, 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/toolaction/pwdfs.pdf  accessed 2.1.11.   
5
 World Health Organisation ‘World Report on Disability’ (2011) 
http://www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/report/en/index.html accessed 5.7.11 
6
 Peters, S, Wolbers, K and Dimling, L, ‘Reframing global education from a disability rights 
movement perspective’, in Gabel, S and Danforth (eds) Disability and the International 
Politics of Education (Peter Lang 2008) 291-310, cited in Goodley D, Disability Studies: an 
interdisciplinary introduction (Sage 2010) 
7
 Around two billion people 
8
 UN Enable Factsheet, supra 
9
 About 15% of the world’s population 
10
 World Health Organisation (2011) 
11
 See United Nations Disability Statistics Compendium (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs Statistical Office1990) http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesy/seriesy_4e.pdf  
last accessed 7.1.11 
12
 See for instance the 1984 Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) question: 
‘Does your health problem/disability prevent you from going out as often or as far as you 
would like?’ and compare to the alternative suggested by Oliver (1990): ‘What is it about the 
local environment that makes it difficult for you to get about in your neighbourhood?’ 
13
  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesy/seriesy_4e.pdf  accessed 2.1.11; 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1515 accessed 5.1.11 
 4 
 
requirements of governments, their institutions and key welfare 
professionals’14 rather than the experience of those living with impairment.15   
In a dominant culture which identifies difference as an individual, medical 
‘problem’ to be fixed, figures may be influenced by multiplying labels for the 
diagnosis of ‘dis-ease’ such as autism, ADHD or ‘baby flat head syndrome’, 
‘mixed anxiety depression’, or ‘temper dysregulation disorder’.16  They may 
reflect the (un)availability of ‘welfare’ resources,17 or the pragmatic political 
needs of a particular government.18   Furthermore, ‘disability’ is not a static 
event: human beings, in the course of their life, may fall into, or out of, 
whichever definition is being used from one day to the next.19  Statistics will 
therefore only ever be a rough guide to the incidence of impairment; they 
may, on closer scrutiny, tell us more about the motives, assumptions and 
cultures of the researchers.   
 
By contrast, this thesis understands the differences of ‘impairment’ as part of 
universal human experience.  We are each born with our individual 
combination of abilities, limitations and potential.  During our life span, we 
acquire further abilities and further limitations; we develop and express our 
potential in different ways and in our diverse and dynamic social 
relationships.  As Birkenbach et al explain, ‘disability is not a human attribute 
                                                 
14
 Goodley D, Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction (Sage 2010) 5; see also 
Stone D, The Disabled State (MacMillan 1984); Liachovitz C, Disability as a Social 
Construct: legislative roots (University of  Pennsylvania Press 1988) 
15
 Though this may be just beginning to change: work is ongoing at the UN to improve the 
quality of disability statistics: ‘Assembly resolution 63/150 requests the Secretary-General to 
give higher priority to the concerns of, and issues related to, persons with disabilities, as well 
as their inclusion within the work programme of the United Nations system in order to ensure 
that the 2010 World Programme on Population and Housing Censuses is inclusive of the 
perspective of persons with disabilities.’ http://www.un.org/disabilities/  accessed 5/1/11.  
See also the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (IFDH-2), which 
‘attempts to bridge the medical and social models [of disability] by providing a 
biopsychosocial model’ (World Health Organisation 2001) 
16
 See e.g. American Psychiatric Association, ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders’, 5
th
 ed (2010) 
17
 For instance, changes to eligibility for Disability Living Allowance, see M Oliver, The 
Politics of Disablement (Palgrave Macmillan 1990)  
18
 Such as the transfer of claimants from unemployment benefit to incapacity benefit by the 
Thatcher government in the early 1990s. See also some current (2012) media portrayal of 
disabled people as ‘benefit cheats’ etc. e.g. the Sun: ‘Human Right to Benefits’ 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/politics/4424527/Human-right-to-benefits.html  
accessed 13.7.12 
19
 T Burkhardt, ‘The Dynamics of Being Disabled’, CASE paper 036 (Centre for Analysis of 
Social Exclusion  2000); T Burchardt, ‘Being and Becoming: social exclusion and the onset 
of disability’ CASE Report 21 (Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 2003) 
 5 
 
that demarks one portion of humanity from another; it is an infinitely various 
but universal feature of the human condition.’20 
 
Of the 10% of global population identified as disabled by the UN, 80 per cent 
or more 21  live in the world’s poorest countries, overwhelmingly in rural 
areas.22  It may seem unsurprising, then, that statistics also show a strong 
correlation between disability and poverty, with 20 per cent of the world’s 
poorest people living with impairment and being regarded as the most 
disadvantaged in their community.23  This is not, however, simply a ‘poor 
country’ issue.  Many people living with impairment in the wealthy countries 
of the world also experience a lower standard of living than their peers, with 
the multiple disadvantages summed up by the expression ‘social exclusion’.24   
As the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognised in 
1994, ‘there is no country in the world in which a major policy and 
programme effort is not required’25 to address these inequalities. 
 
The exclusion of disabled people is not only economic.  A substantial body of 
evidence relates to disabled people’s wider marginalisation in societies.  
                                                 
20
 J.E.Birkenbach, S Charrerji, E M Badley, T B Ustun, ‘Models of Disablement, Universalism 
and the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps’ (1999) 48 
Social Science & Medicine 1173, 1182, cited in O’Cinneide C, ‘Disability Discrimination’ in 
Bamforth N, Malik M and O’Cinneide C, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context, 1
st
 ed 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 
21
 80% according to the UN Development Programme (UN Enable Factsheet, supra); 88% 
according to Marks, D, Disability: Controversial Debates and Psychological Perspectives, 
London, Routledge, 1999, cited in Goodley (2010) supra 
22
 90% according to Marks (1999) supra 
23
 See also World Health Organisation World Disability Report, supra Chapter 2; and 
Beresford P ‘Poverty and Disabled people: challenging dominant debates and policies’ 
(1996) 11(4) Disability & Society 553 
24
 See for instance O’Grady A, Pleasence P, Balmer NJ, Buck A and Genn H, ‘Disability, 
social exclusion and the consequential experience of justiciable problems’ (2004) 19(3) 
Disability & Society 259; Burchardt T ‘Being and Becoming: Social exclusion and the onset 
of disability’ CASE Report 21 (ESRC Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
(CASE) 2003.  M Howard, A Garnham, G Finnister, J Veit-Wilson Poverty: the Facts  (CPAG 
2001); B Hughes (2002) Bauman’s Strangers: Impairment and the invalidation of disabled 
people in modern and post-modern cultures, in 17 Disability and Society, p 571 and p 580; 
Beresford P, Green D, Lister R and Woodard K, Poverty First Hand: Poor people speak for 
themselves’ (Child Poverty Action Group 1999).  For international data see e.g. International 
Disability Rights Monitor, IDRM International Disability Rights Compendium, (Centre for 
International Rehabilitation 2003) and website of Disability Awareness in Action 
http://daa.org.uk/  last accessed 30.8.12.   
25
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 5: Persons 
with Disabilities, 9/12/94; see also Disability Rights Commission ‘Disability Briefing’ (DRC 
2006) 
 6 
 
Typically, a recent International Disability Rights Monitor report on the 
Americas found that ‘many people with disabilities face involuntary 
institutionalisation in countries throughout the region resulting in some of the 
most blatant and abusive human rights violations’. 26   Although the 
experiences of most disabled people in the UK may be relatively acceptable 
by comparison, disability hate crime, including murder,27  and incidents of 
systemic abuse in care homes 28  continue here too. ‘Do not resuscitate’ 
notices are used without consent; and people diagnosed with mental health 
issues continue to be detained and treated against their will. 29   Many, 
particularly older people, are placed in institutional care against their 
wishes; 30  and public debates around disability focus on assisted suicide, 
‘mercy killing’ and avoidance of the ‘tragedy’ of impairment through pre-natal 
testing and abortion.  
 
Disabled people have mobilised to challenge their oppression. 31  They have 
turned traditional medical and moral understandings 32  on their head by 
identifying disability as a social construct.33  Rather than being sited in the 
individual, disability results from the failure of society to accommodate those 
                                                 
26
 International Disability Rights Monitor, IDRM: Regional Report of the Americas, 
(International Disability Network and the Centre for International Rehabilitation 2004).  See 
also International Disability Rights Monitor, IDRM: Regional Report of Asia, (IDRM 2005); 
International Disability Rights Monitor, ‘The United Kingdom’ in IDRM: Regional Report for 
Europe (IDRM 2007); and Light R, ‘Review of Evidence contained on the DAA Human Rights 
Database’ (DAA 2003) 
27
 Disability Now Hate Crime Dossier, http://www.disabilitynow.org.uk/the-hate-crime-dossier 
last accessed 12.10.11; Sherry M, Disability Hate Crimes: does anyone really hate disabled 
people? (Ashgate 2010) 
28
 For instance, see Commission for Social Care and Healthcare Commission, Joint 
Investigation into the provision of services for people with learning disabilities at Cornwall 
Partnership NHS Trust, July 2006; and Winterbourne View: BBC Panorama ‘Undercover 
Care: the Abuse Exposed’ BBC1, 31 May 2011 
29
 Mental Health Act 1983 ss2 & 3; Mental Health Act 2007 
30
 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, ‘Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People’, January 
2005; and Department of Health ‘Vision for Adult Social Care: Capable Communities and 
Active Citizens’, 16 November 2010, Gateway reference 14847 
31
 Campbell J and Oliver M, Disability Politics: Understanding Our Past, Changing Our Future 
(Routledge 1996);  Barnes C, ‘A Legacy of Oppression’ in Barton L, Oliver M, Disability 
Studies: Past Present and Future (The Disability Press 1997);  Charlton JI, Nothing About Us 
Without Us: Disability Oppression and Empowerment (University of California Press 2000). 
For summary see Goodley (2010) 2-10 
32
 A medical model sees disability as a problem sited in the individual to be cured and 
normalised; a moral model sees disability as punishment for moral lapse or sin 
33
 see Liachowitz C, Disability as a Social Construct: legislative roots (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1988) 
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‘with impairments’ who function differently. 34   They identify the ‘negative 
social reaction to biological, cognitive, sensory or psychological difference’35 
as ‘a form of social oppression involving the social imposition of restrictions 
of activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered 
undermining of their psycho-emotional well-being.’36  This forceful challenge 
has given rise, inter alia, to a new academic discipline of disability studies.  
This discipline is international and trans-disciplinary in nature and breaks 
boundaries between cultures and disciplines. 37   Embracing a variety of 
perspectives, emerging from differing national contexts and histories, 38  it 
tries to analyse and re-align understandings of ‘disability’ to support the 
ambitions of disabled people and to contest their oppression.   
 
One important aspect of this new discipline concerns ownership.  Mainstream 
research into disability has overwhelmingly been carried out by people who 
define those with impairments as ‘other’.  As Linton observes, ‘[t]his 
contributes to the objectification of disabled people and contributes to their 
experience of alienation’. 39   Disability studies researchers have therefore 
                                                 
34
 Whilst this thesis refers broadly throughout to the ‘social model of disability’, neither the 
concept nor the content of such a model are undisputed among disability activists: see for 
instance Oliver M, ‘The Individual and Social Models of Disability’ (1990) Paper presented at 
Joint Workshop of the Living Options Group and the Research Unit of the Royal College of 
Physicians, 23 July 1990; Paul Abberley ‘The Concept of Oppression and the Development 
of a Social Theory of Disability’ 1997, Leeds Disability Archive; Corker M, ‘Disability 
Discourse in a Postmodern World’ in Shakespeare T (ed) The Disability Reader (Cassell 
1998); Oliver M and Barnes C, ‘Disability Politics and the Disability Movement in Britain: 
where did it all go wrong?’ (2006) Leeds Disability Archive; Finkelstein V, ‘The ‘Social Model 
of Disability’ and the Disability Movement’ (2007) Leeds Disability Archive; Light R, ‘Social 
Model or Unsociable Muddle?’ (Disability Awareness in Action, undated). For further 
perspectives see discussion and references in Goodley (2010) supra.   
35
 Sherry M, (Post)Colonising  disability  4 (Summer) Wagadu, Journal of Transnational 
Women’s and Gender Studies 10 cited in Goodley (2010) 8 
36
 Thomas C, Sociologies of Disability, ‘Impairment’ and Chronic Illness: Ideas in Disability 
Studies and Medical Sociology (Palgrave 2007) 73 
37
 Goodley (2010) 32, following Thomas C (2007) 
38
 For discussion, see Goodley (2010) 11-21; see also, for instance, Hvinden B ‘Nordic 
Disability Policies in a Changing Europe: Is There Still a Distinct Nordic Model?’ (2004) 38(2) 
Social Policy & Administration 170 
39
 Linton, S, ‘Disability studies/not disability studies’ (1998) 13(4) Disability & Society, 525. 
See also Hunt P, ‘Settling Accounts with the Parasite People: a Critique of ‘A Life Apart’ by 
E. J. Miller and G. V. Gwynne’ (1981); Oliver M, ‘re-Defining Disability: A Challenge to 
research’ (1987) 5 Research, Policy and Planning; Barnes C and Mercer G (eds) Doing 
Disability Research (The Disability Press 1997); Rioux MH ‘Disability: the place of judgement 
in a world of fact’ (1997) 41(2) Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 102; Gibbs D 
‘Disabled People and the Research Community’ Belfast 1999; Barnes C ‘Emancipatory’ 
Disability research: project or process?’ Glasgow 2001; Beresford P, ‘User Involvement in 
Research: connecting lives, experience and theory’ (University of Warwick 2003); Clark M, 
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been at pains to develop research methods that not only do not contribute to 
that experience of alienation, but which positively contribute to the inclusion 
and well-being of all participants.  The discipline thus subverts ‘the normative 
tendencies of academic disciplines, testing respected research encounters 
and challenging theoretical formations.’’40 
 
This thesis positions itself within both the discipline of law and the discipline 
of disability studies.  Whilst its focus is firmly on the law, its ethos is that of 
emancipation.  It explores the capacity of law to be emancipatory:41 to reflect 
disabled people’s challenge to the status quo and to bring about change.42  
To that end, the thesis is concerned both with the practical content and 
application of the law, and with the socio-legal and political concepts which 
underlie and surround it at international and national levels.  To discuss all of 
these aspects, it is necessary to find a language that enables discussion and 
analysis of relevant ideas, assumptions and conceptions as well as their 
practical legal manifestations.43   
 
The conceptual model underlying the theory and practice of a subject is often 
described as a ‘paradigm’.44  This language allows us to talk about different 
paradigms, conflicting paradigms, or a ‘paradigm shift’, meaning ‘a 
                                                                                                                                          
Glasby J and Lester H, ‘Cases for Change: User Involvement in Mental Health Services and 
Research’ (2004) 22(2) Research Policy and Planning, 31; Glasby J and Beresford P ‘Who 
knows best? Evidence-based practice and the service user contribution’ (2006) 26 Critical 
Social Policy 268; Hodge N, ‘Evaluating Lifeworld as an emancipatory methodology’ (2008) 
23(1) Disability & Society 29; Smith B and Sparkes AC, ‘Narrative and its potential 
contribution to disability studies’ (2008) 23(1) Disability & Society 17; Priestley M, 
Waddington L and Bessozi C, ‘Towards an agenda for disability research in Europe: learning 
from disabled people’s organisations’ (2010) 25(6) Disability & Society 731. It remains the 
case that a search on ‘disability’ on any of the major academic search engines will result in 
an overwhelming mass of medical information, where disabled people feature only as the 
objects of medical scrutiny.   
40
 Goodley (2010) 32 
41
 Santos BS, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, 2
nd
 ed (Butterworths 2002) chapter 9 
42
 Stein MA and Lord JE, ‘Future Prospects for the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities’ in Arnandóttir OM and Quinn G (eds) The UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009) 
43
 ‘Analytical jurisprudence should broaden its focus not only geographically, but also in 
respect of the range of concepts, conceptual frameworks, and discourses that it considers…’ 
Twining W ‘Have concepts, will travel: analytical jurisprudence in a global context’ (2005) 
1(1) International Journal of Law in Context 5, abstract 
44
 Oxford Compact English Dictionary 2000:  paradigm: 1 a typical example, pattern or model 
of something; 2 a conceptual model underlying the theories and practice of a scientific 
subject… 
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fundamental change in approach or underlying assumptions’.45   Indeed, talk 
of ‘paradigm shift’ is common in discussion of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities which is the focus of this thesis. 46  
However, this language takes us no further: it does not provide us with a 
technical language for analysing the processes by which a particular 
paradigm has come about, why it is the way it is, how it might interact with 
others, how it might develop or ‘shift’, or what the consequences might be.  
Nor does it allow us to pinpoint how such paradigms become sedimented in 
the structures and norms through which the dominant orders at any one time 
attempt to regulate our societies, or how they are translated through legal 
and administrative practice into the realities of people’s lives.   By contrast, 
the language of political discourse theory provides a sophisticated tool for 
just such analysis. 
 
Political discourse theory47 
 
Laclau and Mouffe see the social sphere as an inescapable political space 
where everything has meaning.  It is not possible to stand outside that space, 
to take a ‘neutral’ position.  The social space is filled with discourses.  For 
                                                 
45
 Ibid 
46
 See for instance. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Address to the 
Human Rights Council, 6.March 2009: The Convention ‘requires us to move away from 
charity-based or medical-based approaches to disability to a new perspective stemming from 
and firmly grounded in human rights…The depth and implications of the paradigm shift of the 
Convention require nothing less than a thorough and dispassionate reflection on what is 
needed at the national level….’; see also Kayess, R & French, P, ‘Out of Darkness into 
Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, (2008) 8 HRLR 
1; Melish T, ‘The UN Disability Convention’ (2007) 34 Human Rights Brief 37.  Quinn G and 
Arnardóttir OM, ‘Introduction’ in Arnandóttir OM and Quinn G (eds) The UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009) xvii.  See also ftnote 3 above. 
47
  Key writings which have informed the political discourse content of this thesis 
include: Laclau E and Mouffe C, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Verso 1985); Laclau E, 
New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time  (Verso 1990); Mouffe C, The Return of the 
Political  (Verso 1993); Howarth D, Norval AJ and Stavrakakis Y(eds), Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: identities, hegemonies and social change  (Manchester University Press 
2000); Torfing J, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Źiźek (Blackwell 1999); 
Critchley S and Marchart O (eds), Laclau: a critical reader (Routledge 2004);  Howarth D, 
Discourse (Open University Press 2000).  See also Laclau E, ‘Philosophical Roots of 
Discourse Theory’ (undated) Essex University Centre for Theoretical Studies, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/TheoStud/onlinepapers.asp, accessed 23/4/08 
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Laclau and Mouffe (and for this thesis), discourses are not only about 
language: they are ‘ ‘worlds’ of related objects and practices that form the 
identities of social actors’. 48   Although language is important in their 
constitution and (re-)articulation, discourses are primarily dynamic systems of 
social relations,49 where meaning is constantly renegotiated.50    
 
Howarth and Stavrakakis offer the example of a forest standing in the path of 
a proposed motorway:51  
‘[The forest] may simply represent an inconvenient obstacle impeding 
the rapid implementation of a new road system, or might be viewed as a 
site of special scientific interest for scientists and naturalists, or a 
symbol of the nation’s threatened natural heritage.  Whatever the case, 
its meaning depends on the orders of discourse that constitute its 
identity and significance.  In discourses of economic modernisation, 
trees may be understood as the disposable means for (or obstacles to) 
continued economic growth and prosperity, whereas in environmentalist 
discourses they might represent essential components of a viable eco-
system or objects of intrinsic value and beauty.  Each of these 
discourses is a social and political construction that establishes a 
system of relations between different objects and practices, while 
providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify.  In 
our example these subject positions might be those of ‘developers’, 
‘naturalists’, ‘environmentalists’ or ‘eco-warriors’.  Moreover, a political 
project will attempt to weave together different strands of discourse in 
an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as to fix the 
identities of objects and practices in a particular way.’ 
 
Three dynamic and interwoven components of a discourse come into view 
here: understandings, structures and identities.  Understandings shape (and 
are shaped by) construction of the discourse. They compete to dominate the 
field of meaning, influencing relationships between objects and practices, and 
forming the identities of social actors.   Discourses thus continually interact 
and change, borrowing or excluding elements from each other in their search 
for hegemony.  Such articulations52 always involve the exercise of power.53  
                                                 
48
  Howarth D, Discourse (Open University Press 2000) 101 
49
  Ibid 102-3 
50
  Torfing (1999) 85 
51
 Howarth D and Stavrakakis Y, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’ in 
Howarth D, Norval AJ and Stavrakakis Y, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, 
Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester University Press 2000) 2 
52
 ‘Articulation’ is defined as a ‘practice establishing relations among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’: Laclau E and Mouffe C (1985) 
supra 105, cited in Torfing (1999) 101 
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A successful hegemonic discourse is one that manages to redefine the 
terms of the political debate and set a new agenda.54     
 
Final resolution of these discursive articulations is impossible.  Because there 
is no ultimate, non-negotiable centre to ground the process of renegotiation, 
the ‘play of meaning’ extends infinitely and is never exhausted.55  This can be 
viewed empirically as a result of the infinite richness of reality, or 
theoretically.56 Either way, the dynamic nature of this social space is infinite 
and inescapable.   
 
Discourse theory investigates such processes: how actual social practices 
articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality. 57   But 
discourse theorists do not ‘apply’ theory to that reality; rather they use its 
insights to help to unravel and illuminate the events or actions that are the 
focus of their research.  As Howarth explains, ‘instead of applying a pre-
existing theory on to a set of empirical objects, discourse theorists seek to 
articulate their concepts in each particular enactment of concrete research.’ 
58 (original emphasis).  
 
Laclau describes his work as ‘an attempt to construct a viewpoint from which 
to think politics’.59  He also recognises that his propositions are only useful as 
steps to be discarded once one has climbed them.60  It is in this spirit that 
                                                                                                                                          
53
 ‘Power’ is used in this context in the Foucauldian sense: ‘The exercise of power… is a 
total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it 
seduces, it makes life easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids 
absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting 
subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.’ Foucault M, ‘The Subject and 
Power’ appended to Dreyfus HL and Rabinov P, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (University of Chicago Press1982) 220,  cited in Tremain S (ed) Foucault and 
the Government of Disability (University of Michigan Press 2005) 8 
54
 Torfing (1999)102 
55
 Ibid 85-87 
56 According to Derrida, ‘instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical 
hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions.’ Derrida J, Writing and Difference (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 1987 [1967]) 289, cited in Torfing (1999) 86   
57
  Howarth D and Stavrakakis Y (2000) 3 
58
  Ibid 5 
59
  Laclau E (1990) Preface xvi 
60
  Following Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein L, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1981) 189 cited 
in Laclau (1990) 5 
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political discourse theory is used as an analytical tool in this thesis: to provide 
a language in which to think about, describe, discuss and analyse the 
complex and dynamic nature of the law in its context.  Here, Laclau’s 
‘viewpoint’ helps to explore how the law (as a social practice) reflects – or 
fails to reflect - changing discourses to influence ‘the nexus between law, 
norms, and societal mores’,61 particularly in the context of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and its realisation in England. 
 
For instance, consider ‘disability’.  This word, in itself, is a negative: dis-
ability.  Its primary use has been within the particular discourse of ‘normality’ 
which has come to dominate modern capitalist society from the late 18th 
century.62  Within that discourse, ‘disability’ signifies a lack of ability, a failure 
of the individual to achieve ‘normality’ and so to function in or contribute to 
‘normal’ society.    Consequently, the ‘dis-abled’ individual must be 
diagnosed, segregated, and treated in order to be ‘made better’ or 
‘normalised’.  Until they become ‘better’ (if they do), such individuals are seen 
as ‘other’, as outside the scope of ‘normal’ society, as ‘useless’, a drain on 
resources, as less than human, as objects of charity.63  ‘Normality’ discourse 
thus excludes disabled people not only physically through segregation but 
also in terms of identity.  As Campbell describes, ‘[d]isability and disabled 
bodies are effectively positioned in the nether regions of “unthought”… the 
ongoing stability of ableism64 …depends on the capacity of that network to 
“shut away”, to exteriorize, and unthink disability and its resemblance to the 
essential (ableist) human self’. 65    Such invisibility manifests itself in a 
multitude of ways, some of which will be touched on in this thesis. 
 
                                                 
61
  Stein M and Lord JE, (2009) 31-35 
62
  See for instance Borsay A, Disability and Social Policy in Britain since 1750: a History of 
Exclusion  (Palgrave Macmillan 2005); Tremain S, ‘Foucault, Governmentality and Critical 
Disability Theory’ in Tremain S (ed) Foucault and the Government of Disability (University of 
Michigan Press 2005);  Barnes C, ‘A Legacy of Oppression’ (1997) 3-24 
63
 See for instance Hughes B ‘Bauman’s Strangers: Impairment and the invalidation of 
disabled people in modern and post-modern cultures’ (2002) 17(5) Disability & Society 571 
64
 Campbell defines ‘ableism’ as ‘a network of beliefs, processes, and practices [read 
‘discourse’] that produce a particular kind of self and body… that is projected as the perfect, 
as the species-typical, and, therefore, as essential and fully human.’  Campbell FK, 
‘Legislating Disability’ in Tremain S (2005) 127 ftnote 2 
65
 Ibid 109 
 13 
 
Political discourse theory recognises this exclusion of identity as a typical and 
necessary function of a developing discourse. In the process of its drive for 
hegemony, a discourse will always attempt to accommodate the widest 
possible range of demands, views and attitudes.  At the same time, it will 
exclude those that are incapable of inclusion, that directly negate its own 
meanings.   
 
Such exclusion creates what Laclau and Mouffe call the constitutive 
outside of the discourse.  The constitutive outside serves to strengthen the 
dominant discourse by defining its limits.  For example, the discourse of 
‘normality’ that forms the identity of the ‘able’ liberal subject relies on the 
exclusion of ‘dis-abled’ people’s identity for the maintenance of its hegemony.  
As Campbell explains, ‘[i]n order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to 
transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a 
constitutive outside…  disability is always present (despite its seeming 
absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness.’66    
‘Disabled’ and ‘abled’ identities are inextricably linked in the act of exclusion 
which at once renders disabled people invisible and confirms the hegemony 
of the ‘able’ liberal subject. 
 
Thus, any discourse’s 
hegemonic articulation ultimately involves some element of force and 
repression.  It involves the negation of identity in the double sense of 
the negation of alternative meanings and options and the negation of 
those people who identify themselves with these meanings and 
options.67   
 
This negation of identities has a double effect.  Firstly, it shores up and 
strengthens the dominant discourse: ‘I’m normal, you’re not – I feel better 
about my normality now that I’ve excluded you’.  Often, that process involves 
playing on people’s fears:68   impairment is seen as a personal ‘tragedy’, to 
be pitied; those who ‘overcome’ impairment as ‘brave’.  
                                                 
66
 Ibid 
67
 Torfing J (1999) 120 
68
 ‘The hegemonic force, which is responsible for the negation of individual or collective 
identity, will tend to construct the excluded identity as one of a series of threatening 
obstacles to the full realization of chosen meanings or options.’ Torfing, ibid 
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Secondly, negation of identity may give rise to ‘social antagonism’.   Here, 
people whose identities have been excluded respond to that exclusion.  
Responses can take various forms, from open confrontation to self-blame or 
resignation.69  Many people internalise the dis-ability imposed on them by 
‘normality’ discourse.   Demos provides the following example: 
When Tara was two she was sent to a special school and feels very 
strongly that the segregated education has had a lasting negative 
impact on her relationship with her family, her educational 
opportunities and, for many years after she left school, on the way she 
viewed herself.  ‘We were told that we must be as ‘normal’ as 
possible. The big shock was leaving school and finding I was on my 
own and having to communicate with non-disabled people. I had no 
idea what to say to them. So I spent the next ten years in the disability 
closet. People didn’t ask about my impairment, and I worked so hard 
to pretend it didn’t exist. It was like the elephant in the room that no 
one wants to talk about…. 70 
 
A different response to negation of identity is open confrontation.  Here, the 
excluded identity is reclaimed by those who identify with it, and is used to 
challenge dominant assumptions.  One example is Gay Pride; another is the 
Disabled People’s Movement.71  Disabled people began to mobilise as a 
political force in Britain from the late 1960s.72 One of the first outcomes of 
that mobilisation was a re-casting of the understanding of ‘disability’.  By 
distinguishing between impairment (individual functional limitation) and 
disability (caused by physical and social barriers), their social model of 
disability directly challenged the assumptions of ‘normality’ discourse - ‘I’m 
disabled by society, not by my impairment.’  The ‘problem’ is no longer the 
individual, but society: it is society, not the individual that needs to change.  
Social antagonisms can thus threaten a dominant discourse, as well as 
defining and strengthening it.  As will be seen in the course of this thesis, the 
social model of disability has proved a very effective political tool. 
                                                 
69
 Torfing (1999); see also Table 6.1 in Goodley (2010) 86-7 
70
 Miller P, Parker S and Gillinson S,  ‘Disablism: How to tackle the Last Prejudice’ (Demos 
2004) 
71
 See ‘affirmation’ model of disability, Goodley (2010) 12 
72
 Hunt P (ed) Stigma: The Experience of Disability (Geoffrey Chapman 1966) Leeds 
Disability Archive; Campbell J and Oliver M, Disability Politics: Understanding Our Past, 
Changing Our Future (Routledge 1996); Campbell J, ‘‘Growing Pains’: Disability Politics The 
Journey Explained and Described’ in Barton L and Oliver M (eds) Disability Studies: Past, 
Present and Future (The Disability Press 1997)  
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The re-casting of ‘disability’ by the Disabled People’s Movement also serves 
to illustrate Laclau and Mouffe’s explanation of what happens within a 
discourse.   
[S]ocial practices systematically form the identities of subjects and 
objects by articulating together a series of contingent signifying 
elements available in a discursive field.73 
   
Identities emerge as the social practice articulates or re-articulates those 
elements.74  The Disabled People’s Movement has re-articulated ‘disability’ 
from negative to positive, from individual problem to social construct, thus 
creating a new ‘disabled’ identity which is opposite to the understanding of 
‘dis-ability’ in ‘normal’ discourse.  And it is a new identity which ‘disabled’ 
people can – and do - embrace:   
It was when Tara ‘woke up’ to the social model of disability that things 
changed…  ‘I had a sudden realisation that everything that’s happened 
was because of how people look at impairment – as different, less, 
unacceptable…. Suddenly you can be the person you always thought  
you were but never could be.’ Now Tara is a campaigner rallying other 
disabled people to realise that the problem isn’t with them but with the 
society that holds them back.75 
 
As Howarth describes, ‘social antagonisms occur because social agents are 
unable to attain fully their identity… when ‘the presence of  “Other” prevents 
me from being totally myself.’76 
 
‘Disability’, in its social model/social construct sense, has been one of the key 
concepts that bind the Disabled People’s Movement as it has grown in 
strength and power.  In discourse theory terms, it can be described as a 
‘nodal point’ – a point of reference that binds together a system of 
meanings. 77   From its early focus on physical impairment, the Disabled 
                                                 
73
 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 7 
74
 See for instance the quote from Joshua Malinga in Chapter 2.4 below: ‘I went to Winnipeg 
to attend the Rehabilitation International [RI] Conference… When I left I was very passive, 
but when I returned I was very radical…  At that time, we began to recognize that disability 
was about human rights, about social change, about organizing ourselves.  We did not want 
to emphasize welfare but organization.’ Charlton J (2000) 12 
75
 Miller et al (2004) 22 
76
 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 10, citing Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 125 
77
 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 8; ‘The practice of articulation… consists in the 
construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning’, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 113, 
quoted in Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 22 note 37  
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People’s Movement has grown to encompass people with illness, mental 
health issues, learning disabilities, and, more recently, older people and 
‘carers’.  It has spawned an international academic discipline of disability 
studies, and built political networks across the world.  Although disability 
activists and academics have continued to develop a variety of 
perspectives,78 the understanding of ‘disability’ as social construct has been 
fundamental to the identification of such diverse people and practices with 
the Disabled People’s Movement and its new ‘disability’ discourse.   
 
According to Laclau, nodal points, in order to enable the possibility of such 
hegemonic success, must be empty signifiers.79  We have seen ‘dis-ability’ 
as a negative, helping to strengthen ‘normality’ discourse by its exclusion; 
and we have seen the re-articulation of ‘disability’ through the social model 
as social antagonism, reclaimed as positive identity by the Disabled People’s 
Movement to challenge the ‘ablist’ discourse of normality.  Both meanings 
rely on a dichotomy between ‘disabled’ and ‘non-disabled’/ ‘normal’.  But that 
dichotomy is not always clear.  Tregaskis points out that we all have many 
different identities.  She identifies herself as researcher, consultant, member 
of staff, friend, woman, white person, body, disabled person, oppressor and 
activist.80  This view illustrates Laclau’s ‘subject positions’, whereby any 
one individual may have a number of different subject positions: identities 
acquired ‘by a whole series of unconscious practices, rituals, customs and 
beliefs, with which they come to identify.’81  Tremain, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, also contests the political effectiveness of the dichotomy.  She 
sees the social model of disability as a ‘paradigmic example of [Foucault’s 
concept of] juridical power’.82 In this view, impairment as a category emerged 
                                                 
78
 Goodley (2010) 10-21 
79
 Drawing on the linguistic theory of Saussure, discourse theory differentiates between the 
‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’.  ‘Signifier’: The sound-image (or expression) that signifies a 
certain signified. ‘Signified’: The concept (or content) that is expressed by a certain signifier.  
Torfing(1999) 87 and Glossary 305.  See also Laclau E, ‘Philosophical Roots of Discourse 
Theory’ (undated) Essex University Centre for Theoretical Studies, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/TheoStud/onlinepapers.asp, accessed 23/4/08 
80
 Tregaskis C, Constructions of Disability: researching the interface between disabled and 
non-disabled people (Routledge 2004) 
81
 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 13 
82
 Tremain S, ‘Foucault, Governmentality and  Critical Disability Theory’ in Tremain S (ed) 
Foucault and the Government of Disability (University of Michigan Press 2005); see also 
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(and still persists) in order to legitimise the governmental (or medical) 
practices that generated it in the first place.  If the identity of the subject of 
the social model – the ‘person with impairments’ - is actually formed by the 
very political arrangements that the social model is designed to contest, then 
the social model will in fact confirm and extend those arrangements, shoring 
up, rather than challenging, ‘normality’ discourse.    Campbell goes further 
still.  She holds that ‘as a signifier, disability may be understood in terms of 
catachresis. That is, there is no literal referent for this concept.  As soon as 
we discursively interrogate “disability”, its meaning loses fixity, generality, and 
ultimately collapses.’83 (original emphasis). This view may well be shared by 
those around the world who have ever tried to define disability for legal 
purposes,84 including the drafters of the CRPD.85   However, it is the very 
‘emptiness’ of this signifier as its nodal point that enables the Disabled 
People’s Movement discourse to embrace the elements of history and 
understanding that have come with its expansion: from survivors of 
psychiatry, from people with learning disabilities, from academia, from 
international politics and more.  It is the ability to take in and incorporate such 
new discursive elements that has enabled it to grow and to flourish. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe theorise this ability of discourses to take in or to exclude 
discursive elements as relations of equivalence and difference. 86   
Relations of equivalence come to the fore when people weaken their internal 
differences to come together to oppose a particular discursive system.  
Torfing offers the example of the British Conservative and Labour Parties 
working together to defeat Nazism during World War II.  This process of 
‘equivalence’ applies not only to those who (temporarily) come together to 
                                                                                                                                          
Tremain S, ‘On the Subject of Impairment’ in Corker M and Shakespeare T (eds) 
Disability/Postmodernity: embodying disability theory (Continuum 2002) 
83
 Campbell FK, ‘Legislating Disability’ in Tremain (2005)  supra, 127 note 1; ‘catachresis’  = 
the incorrect use of a word, Oxford Compact English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed, Oxford, 2000 
84
 See, for instance, discussion of this issue in the context of the CRPD in Chapter 3 below; 
and see Office for Disability Issues ‘Review of Disability Estimates and Definitions’ In-house 
Report 128 (ODI 2004); Disability Rights Commission, ‘Consultation on definition of disability 
in anti-discrimination law’ (DRC 2006); Disability Awareness in Action, ‘Definitions of 
Disability – a Briefing Paper’ (DAA 2005) 
85
 See Chapter 3 below 
86
 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 129-130;Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 11-12; Torfing (1999) 
125-126  
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oppose, but also to ‘the enemy’ – the collection of ‘evil forces’ they are 
opposing - thus producing ‘a political frontier between two opposed camps’.87  
Where relations of equivalence are uppermost, as they were at the beginning 
of the Disabled People’s Movement, the political space will tend to simplify: ‘if 
you’re not with us, you’re against us’.  Polarisation of the disabled/non-
disabled dichotomy is emphasised, and construction of the ‘other’ or 
constitutive outside is strengthened.   Conversely, where relations of 
difference are uppermost, there is room for proliferation of differences and for 
stable compromises.  The Disabled People’s Movement has grown in size 
and influence by incorporating a variety of different elements.  During 
negotiation of the CRPD, disabled people’s organisations from a wide range 
of cultures and histories came together in the International Disability Caucus 
to work jointly and collaboratively with governments and the UN.  Here, 
confrontation is weakened, to include that which has previously been 
excluded.  But, as explained above, there can be no final resolution.  Neither 
set of relations will dominate completely: which predominates at any one time 
depends on the political struggles for hegemony. 
 
So we have the picture of a social world consisting of ever-changing and 
dynamic discourses, forming and attempting to expand themselves by 
incorporating some discursive elements and excluding others.  We see the 
identities of individuals being formed by those discourses, and responding to 
their inclusion or exclusion.  And we see those excluded ‘others’ constantly 
challenging and seeking to undermine the discourse(s) from which they have 
been excluded.  There is no possible ‘final’ resolution of these dynamic 
tensions; but that does not prevent us from wishing, and working, for such 
resolution through promotion of the hegemony of those discourses with which 
we identify. 
 
Hegemony ‘involves the expansion of a particular discourse of norms, 
values, views and perceptions through persuasive re-descriptions of the 
                                                 
87
 Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) 11; one of the effects of this will be discussed in Chapter 2 
below 
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world’.88  Those re-descriptions are articulated not in a vacuum, but through 
hegemonic practice: by ‘political agents attempting to bring about a moral, 
intellectual and political leadership’.89   Where such agents come together in 
a hegemonic project, such as the drafting of an international Convention, 
the outcome may be a hegemonic formation, such as the CRPD, which 
captures and sediments the various elements of the discourse they are 
seeking to promote.  Here, the word ‘hegemonic’ means hegemonic in intent, 
rather than hegemonic in effect: whether the project succeeds in producing 
‘hegemony’ is another question.90    
 
Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis trace the re-articulation of disability and human 
rights discursive elements to form a new disability/human rights discourse; 
and the  encapsulation of that discourse into a new international legal order.  
To what extent, if any, this new legal order can succeed in promoting the 
hegemony of the new discourse in England is the question underlying the 
remainder of the thesis. 
 
However hard we try to consolidate and strengthen the discourses with which 
we identify, they are always subject not only to social antagonism, but also to 
chance: events beyond our control may bring about their structural 
dislocation.  For instance, the traumatic events of the Second World War 
can be seen as destabilising earlier discourses by going beyond their 
understandings.  Before 1939, international human rights agreements such 
as the earlier Geneva Conventions 91  had focused primarily on relations 
between States.  At that time, the possibility of mass extermination of its own 
citizens by a modern State was beyond belief.  The events of World War II 
shattered those assumptions, along with many structures, individual lives and 
identities.92  But such dislocation also provides the opportunity for a new 
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ideology 93  to emerge to fill the space; earlier discursive elements are 
rearticulated to construct a new ‘myth’.94   
 
Modern international human rights law and ideology, often portrayed as a 
collective response to the dislocation of the Second World War,95 can be 
seen as such a ‘myth’, drawing on and rearticulating elements of earlier rights 
discourses,96 whilst also blending them with new components, 97 to produce a 
renewed vision of a world of ‘freedom, justice and peace’ (empty 
signifiers/nodal points) to which the ‘common man’ aspires.98  As with any 
‘myth’, this vision is unattainable at present; it represents an ideal 
society99which is specifically contrasted with the dislocatory events which 
have preceded it, 100  and is further constituted by the threat of social 
breakdown101 should this discourse not prevail.  In direct response to the 
events of the time, the emphasis is on peace between nations and on 
protecting individuals from the abuse of State power. 
 
Similarly, in describing the later pluralisation of the human rights framework, 
Mégret102 suggests three possible explanations for the appearance of ‘group-
specific’ international human rights treaties such as the CRPD:  1) that they 
are a political and pragmatic response to the failure of ‘mainstream’ human 
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 ‘The construction of particular discursive forms within a totalising horizon with universalist 
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rights - a ‘wake-up call’;  2) that something is missing in the ‘mainstream’ 
framework that requires it to be adapted for the specific context; or 3) that 
‘[s]pecific instruments are needed not only to adapt the existing language of 
rights, but because there is a dimension of the experiences of specific groups 
that is inherent to them and which almost requires the creation of new 
rights’.103  In each explanation, there is a ‘lack’ which has been identified in 
the human rights framework, a space to be filled by a new ideology, or myth.  
In the case of disability, this ‘lack’ has been filled by the disability/human 
rights myth captured in the CRPD text. 
 
Howarth and Stavrakakis explain that  
[f]rom their emergence until their dissolution, myths can function as a 
surface of inscription for a variety of social demands and dislocations.  
However, when a myth has proved to be successful in neutralising 
social dislocations and incorporating a great number of social demands, 
then we can say that the myth has been transformed into imaginary.  A 
collective social imaginary is defined by Laclau as ‘a horizon’ or 
‘absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility’.  He gives 
examples such as the Christian Millenium, the Enlightenment and 
positivism’s conception of progress as evidence of these social 
phenomena.104   (emphasis added) 
 
Here the myth has been so successful in embracing different elements and 
events that it comes to represent a ‘default’ system of meanings that 
underlies and structures our society.  If the myth of disability rights succeeds 
in becoming imaginary, the CRPD will be redundant: the rights of disabled 
people will be so much taken for granted that we will no longer need to ask 
the questions. 
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Law 
Emancipatory law 
One method of articulating and regulating systems of social relations is law.  
The sedimentation of ideas and practices in legal text, the interpretation and 
implementation of those legal texts through legal and administrative systems, 
is one collection of social practices through which a political discourse may 
seek to dominate the field of meaning.  For Santos, law plays a key role in 
these dynamics.  He describes forms of law as ‘revolving doors through 
which different forms of power and knowledge circulate’.105   In general, law 
helps to reinforce the power of dominant discourse and to contain and 
regulate social order. 106    But dominant social orders are always under 
pressure from those whose identities have been denied in the process of 
their formation.  When influenced by those pressures, law can also play a 
part in bringing about and in consolidating change.  Stein and Lord speak of 
‘expressive’ law: ‘the process whereby law can influence behaviour by 
altering broader social perceptions and conventions.’  For them, ‘law carries 
with it a symbolic social meaning, and so influences the nexus between law, 
norms and societal mores’.107  Santos also highlights the law’s emancipatory 
function:  
[w]hile regulation guarantees order in society as it exists in a given 
moment and place, emancipation is the aspiration for a good order in a 
good society in the future… the success of emancipatory struggles 
resides in their capacity to transform themselves into a new form of 
regulation, whereby good order becomes order.108   
 
The CRPD can be seen as an example of ‘expressive’ or ‘emancipatory’ law, 
born of the hegemonic negotiation project which encapsulated  the new 
disability/human rights discourse into a new legal order.  According to Stein 
and Lord,  
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[a]n expressive law analysis of the CRPD indicates that the treaty has 
the potential to legislate a belief change regarding persons with 
disabilities…  These notions create the point of departure for 
understanding the Convention itself as a process through which actor 
identities and interests may be shaped and reconstituted.109   
 
The implication is that reshaping those identities and interests will lead 
towards the ‘good’ (or at least a ‘better’) society - a fundamentally 
emancipatory aim.  Both Santos and Stein and Lord describe what political 
discourse theory might call hegemonic practice: an attempt by political 
agents to bring about - in this case through law - ‘the expansion of a 
particular discourse of norms, values, views and perceptions’ 110  – or 
paradigm change.    
  
Although Santos does not identify himself as a political discourse theorist, his 
ideas have many parallels with those of Laclau and his followers.  Capitalist 
societies, Santos says, are made up of constellations of political power, law 
and knowledge (discourses) which are characterised by ideological 
suppression of all forms of political power, law and knowledge except 
domination, State law, and science (negation of alternative discourse/identity; 
creation of constitutive outside).  These dominant constellations (discourses) 
thus create their own forms of ‘common sense’ (myth), which, once they 
become embedded in the social, political and cultural habitus of people and 
of social scientists (hegemonic), guide social practice, create comforting 
order, and produce reassuring labels (empty signifiers/nodal points).111  Both 
viewpoints thus see societies as comprising dynamic and competing 
discourses or constellations, which include or exclude elements in their 
search for hegemony, which organise systems of social relations, and which 
form the identities, and guide the actions, of social actors. 
 
Similarly, Santos describes the tension between regulation – ‘the set of 
norms, institutions and practices that guarantee the stability of 
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expectations’ 112   (dominant discourse) – and emancipation – ‘the set of 
oppositional aspirations and practices that aim to increase the discrepancy 
between experiences and expectations by calling into question the status 
quo’ 113  (social antagonism).  For Santos as for Laclau and Mouffe, ‘the 
idioms of regulation [dominant discourse] and emancipation [social 
antagonism] are inextricably linked together’. 114   Neither regulation nor 
emancipation will ever be complete or everlasting.  There will always be 
social struggles between regulatory powers, laws and knowledges (dominant 
discourse) on the one hand, and emancipatory powers, laws and knowledges 
(social antagonism) on the other.  There can be no final resolution. 
 
Discussion of law in this thesis is aided by two of Santos’ analytical tools: his 
‘cartography of law’ and his concept of ‘interlegality’.  In the first, Santos 
holds that ‘the relations laws entertain with social reality are very similar to 
those between maps and spatial reality’, 115  prompting the metaphorical 
application of such cartographical mechanisms as scale and projection to the 
analysis of legal text.   
 
The cartography of law: scale and projection 
Scale ‘is the ratio of distance on the map to the corresponding distance on 
the ground’.116   Scale determines the reach of the map, and the amount of 
detail it contains.  This aspect of Santos’ cartographic metaphor identifies 
international law as small-scale law. Just as a map of the world shows no 
more than a broad overview of continents, oceans and mountain ranges, so 
international law is drafted in general terms to cover all eventualities and 
legal contexts.  It provides an overall framework rather than detailed 
instructions for implementation.  National law, on the other hand, like a 
national road-map, can be seen as larger-scale law containing a higher 
degree of detail, but still suitable for generalising within national boundaries.  
It may in turn require more detailed secondary legislation that, like a walker’s 
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2½ - inch to the mile map, sets out, for instance, the precise calculations of 
eligibility for social security entitlement.   
 
 
 
By this analysis, the CRPD is small-scale law.  Its purpose is universal and 
its reach global, the rights it sets out, and the obligations it imposes, intended 
to apply across all cultures and legal systems.  At the same time, its drafting 
raises interesting issues of scale which are discussed further in Chapter 3.  
The English ‘community care’ legislation discussed in Chapter 7, on the other 
hand, encompasses both law of national scale117 and larger scale regulations 
and guidance detailing the duties of local authorities towards each 
individual; 118   while each local authority, in turn, has its own local 
interpretations, policies and systems. 
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Projection is the technique used by map-makers to represent the curved 
surface of the earth on a flat plane. 119   
 The earth is roughly spherical in shape, and three dimensional.  Maps, 
 however, are flat and only two dimensional. There is a variety of 
 ways in which the 3-D earth can be translated onto the 2-D map, but 
 the process of doing so (map projection) needs to be consistent 
 and thorough if the map is to be credible and ‘accurate’. 120 
 
Cartographers have developed different types of projection.  Some preserve 
angles rather than areas; some preserve distances at the expense of angles; 
other, hybrid, projections distort angles, distances and areas, but preserve 
the familiarity of shapes.  Each time, increasing the accuracy of one feature 
will increase the distortion of another.   
 
 
‘Take a look at the following map of the world, made using the well known Mercator 
projection. 
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Compare it with the following map made with a Mollweide projection. Look at the 
relative sizes of Africa and Greenland in both maps. 
 
 
Africa is 14 times the size of Greenland. The Mollweide projection accurately 
represents areas, whereas the Mercator projection exaggerates the areas as you get 
closer to the pole. However, the Mollweide projection shears the shapes near to the 
poles.’121 
 
Transferring this concept to the creation of law, Santos defines projection as 
‘the procedure by which the legal order defines the limits of its operation, and 
organizes the legal space inside them.’ 122   How projection decisions are 
applied by the cartographer will be determined by technical factors. It will also 
vary according to the purpose of the map, its cultural context and the 
ideology of the cartographer. It will inevitably involve some distortion of 
reality.123  And because choices need to be made, that distortion will never 
be neutral.  Similarly, the drafters of a new legal order must choose how to 
transfer the political social reality that is the subject of their project into a legal 
instrument that is technically sound and practical.  How that is done will vary 
according to the purpose of the legal instrument, the discursive elements to 
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be included, and the hegemonic intent of the drafters.  It will inevitably involve 
some distortion of the social reality, and that distortion will never be neutral.  
 
The cartographers of the CRPD included a range of social actors: UN 
organisations, governments, national human rights organisations, and 
disabled people, each bringing with them their various histories and 
perspectives, but joined in a common hegemonic project.  There were many 
ways the text could potentially have been written, but none that would reflect 
the whole of social reality without distortion.  The drafters drew on earlier 
models of human rights convention,124 and on equality law.125  They made full 
use of the reintegration of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.  
And they attempted to ensure that their project would continue through 
innovative implementation and monitoring procedures.  It will be seen in 
Chapters 3 and 4 that, from their central ideological perspective, the 
particular projections that this group of actors chose for translating their 
rounded and multi-dimensional social reality into the flat and two-dimensional 
text of this legally binding international human rights treaty are unique, taking 
forward understandings of both disability and human rights.  
 
Interlegality 
Santos’ second contribution is his concept of ‘interlegality’.  Santos divides 
capitalist societies into six clusters of social relations (or discourses – see 
Table 1 below). They are: the household, the work-place, the market, the 
community, civil society (or the citizen-place) and the world as global.  Each 
of these clusters has a legal dimension.  For instance, the legal dimension of 
the household relates to all of the informal rules and dispute settlement 
mechanisms that constitute social relations within the household; the market-
place also has rules of its own, such as private contract law or informal 
bargaining; national State law belongs to the citizen-place, and international 
law to the global world arena.   
 
 
                                                 
124
 Such as CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child  
125
 For such concepts as equality of opportunity and reasonable accommodation 
 29 
 
Table 1 
  
Structural place 
 
Legal dimension 
 
Epistemological form 
 
Household 
 
 
Domestic law 
 
Familial culture 
 
Work-place 
 
 
Production law 
 
Technology, training, 
corporate culture 
 
 
Market-place 
 
 
Exchange law 
 
Consumerism, mass culture 
 
 
Community-place 
 
 
Community law 
 
Local knowledge, community 
culture, tradition 
 
 
Citizen-place 
 
 
Territorial (State) law 
 
Nationalism, civic culture 
 
World-place 
 
 
Systemic law 
 
Universal progress, global 
culture 
 
 
From Santos Toward a New Legal Common Sense126 
 
Whilst each of these legal dimensions is active within its own social context, 
they also interact with each other.  For instance, State family law may 
intervene in the household, so that informal household systems are required 
to adapt. Conversely, informal household law may in practice sometimes limit 
what State law is able to achieve.  State law may itself have been influenced 
                                                 
126
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by international law, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
and household law by legal dimensions of the community.  It is the ‘dynamic 
interplay’ within and between these legal dimensions – their ‘contingency and 
creativity’, the ebb and flow of their respective discursive power - that 
produces what Santos calls legal constellations, or ‘interlegality’.127   In this 
sense, interlegality can be seen as the legal dimension of political discourse, 
and law as a ‘revolving door through which different forms of power and 
knowledge circulate.’128 
 
It will be seen in Chapter 3 that the CRPD encompasses multiple legal 
dimensions, drawing on international, national and local legal precedents, 
and demanding new legal relations between state and society, between state 
and individual, between individual and community. 129   The creativity thus 
produced acts as an engine for change, complete with ‘transmission belt’130 
to drive domestic implementation. Conversely, Chapter 5 eavesdrops on the 
‘constructive dialogue’ between the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the UK.  Here, the interplay between international legal 
understandings and national ones is less creative, leading to impasse and 
mutual frustration. 
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The thesis 
 
Structure 
The theoretical ideas outlined above provide a viewpoint and language to 
discuss and analyse the complex and dynamic thesis material.  The core 
material, however, is practical international, national and local law.  The 
thesis falls into two parts.  Part 1 focusses on the CRPD, while Part 2 
examines the UK’s understandings of economic, social and cultural rights, 
and the impact of those (mis)understandings on implementation in England 
of Article 19.  
 
Part 1: The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 
Chapter 2 describes events leading to adoption of the CRPD.  It traces 
construction of a disability/human rights myth which sets a new agenda at the 
UN, leading to a hegemonic project to embed that myth in a new international 
human rights treaty.  Chapter 3 analyses the text of the Convention.131  The 
central understandings captured in the Convention’s title, purpose and 
principles project the rights themselves, melding together civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social rights, highlighting angles of the human rights 
framework in new ways and challenging basic human rights assumptions.  
The CRPD myth  embedded in the Convention presents a re-description of 
the world, demanding its ‘deep reconstruction’ to reposition disabled people 
from excluded recipients of welfare to full and equal rights-holders.  Chapter 
4 examines the Convention’s implementation and monitoring provisions 
designed to ensure that the hegemonic project continues to expand; and 
looks more closely at Article 19, the right to live independently and be 
included in the community.  This ‘hybrid’ right is identified as fundamental 
towards the Convention’s goal of paradigm change,132 and the economic, 
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social and cultural rights it incorporates as essential to Convention 
realisation.    
 
Part 2: Implementation in England 
 
Chapter 5 examines the constructive dialogue between the UK and the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  This reveals the failure 
of successive UK governments to acknowledge the durable nature of such 
rights, re-articulating them instead as welfare entitlements to be implemented 
through the ‘specific laws, policies, and practices’ of the welfare state.  The 
Chapter concludes from this evidence that the UK has not yet made the 
transformation in understanding from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ that the CRPD 
demands.  
 
The question then arises as to how the disability/human rights myth will fare 
in a domestic context where economic, social and cultural rights are rendered 
invisible.  This question is explored through examination of the ‘specific laws, 
policies and practices’ in England relating to Article 19, the right to live 
independently and be included in the community. 
 
Chapter 6 traces understandings of independent living in domestic policy. It 
finds a discourse in transition from paternalistic to ‘person-centred’ provision, 
relying on principles of autonomy and participation which fit well with the 
emancipatory message of the Convention.  However, that policy is couched 
not in the language of rights but of welfare.  The economic, social and 
cultural rights necessary for its realisation remain invisible, leaving 
understandings of independent living and the services essential for its 
realisation without protection from unfettered re-articulation to suit differing 
political agendas, or from dislocation by global economic instability.   
  
Systems are explored through legislation.  Chapter 7 compares two attempts 
at mapping the legal space: a ‘neutral’ review of existing adult social care 
legislation, and a rights-based Independent Living Bill.  Whilst Article 19 
rights to individual autonomy and choice are likely to be strongly supported in 
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the forthcoming Social Care Reform Bill, the economic, social and cultural 
rights required for their exercise appear set to remain invisible, leaving the 
domestic legal map essentially unchanged. 
 
Discourses form and are formed not only through understandings and 
systems of social relations, but also through the identities of individuals.  
Chapter 8 examines administrative decision-making relating to independent 
living services in England.  It explores the potential for administrative power 
relationships and systems in this setting to oppress or to emancipate.  It finds 
that despite some areas of progress, the decision-making process continues 
to negate and oppress many of those it purports to serve.   
 
Chapter 9 investigates the capacity of administrative redress systems to 
counter such mis- and partial understandings, and to influence policy, law 
and administration towards a more CRPD-compatible, emancipatory 
discourse. The power of internal complaints procedures to influence wider 
policy, law or administration in this way is found to be negligible.  In the 
courts, incipient development of rights to dignity and participation have been 
countered by a high bar to engagement, with the result that case law reflects 
rather than alters dominant exclusionary understandings.   The role of the 
Ombudsman provides more positive possibilities, but is not without its 
challenges.  Redress systems generally engage a complex and labyrinthine 
system of power relations which may intensify rather than countering 
oppression. 
 
Part 2 concludes that the UK’s failure to acknowledge economic, social and 
cultural rights results in mis- and partial understandings, and thus in mis- or 
partial application, of Article 19 in policy, law and practice.  This in turn 
results in failure to fully implement the Convention as a whole, leading to 
frustration of its drafters’ hegemonic project in the English domestic sphere. 
 
Chapter 10 draws the thesis to its conclusion.  It finds that the UK’s 
reluctance to acknowledge economic, social and cultural rights as rights goes 
to the heart of CRPD implementation, calling into question its Article 4(1) 
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undertaking to ‘ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all disabled people’.  The thesis recommends 
explicit incorporation of economic, social and cultural rights into domestic 
law, policy, culture and administration, alongside acknowledgement that 
independent living law, policy and practice are rooted in the indivisibility and 
interdependence of rights without which the terms of Article 19, and thus of 
the Convention as a whole, will not be realised. 
 
Method  
This thesis is grounded in the writer’s experience as a practitioner in 
independent legal advice, including work in and with organisations of 
disabled people at local and national levels.  That experience nurtured both a 
deep and long standing engagement in the field of disability rights and an 
interest in the capacity of administrative and human rights law to bring about 
emancipatory change.  In the world of political discourse theory, everything 
has meaning: it is not possible to take a ‘neutral’ position.  Although no 
ultimate resolution is possible, actors continue to work for the promotion of 
those discourses with which they identify.  In that sense, this thesis – like the 
law it explores - is not neutral: it seeks to apply sound academic research 
methods to encourage new, emancipatory understandings. 
 
The research is a case study engaging a variety of qualitative research 
methods, including elements of observation, ‘real-time’ documentary 
research and classical legal doctrinal analysis.  The thesis reflects on 
developments to April 2012.   Subsequent events, including publication in 
July 2012 of a White Paper and Draft Bill relating to adult social care, are 
noted in a Postscript. 
 
Chapters 2 to 4 
Research for this thesis was conducted part-time over a period of seven 
years.  When it began in early 2005, the first working draft of the CRPD had 
just been produced in New York.  The researcher therefore had the benefit of 
following, through online reports and commentaries, conferences and 
personal discussions, the negotiation, adoption and ratification of the CRPD.  
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This lends to the research the advantage of real-time observation of 
developments.  However, because those developments are so recent and 
ongoing, the body of academic work relating to the CRPD remains relatively 
small, though growing. 133   The writer has therefore had to rely 
disproportionately, particularly in the initial stages of the research, on ‘grey’ 
materials and non-academic resources. 
 
Chapter 5 
Research for Chapter 5 included detailed analysis of past constructive 
dialogue documents from 1992 as well as personal observation of the 2009 
meeting between the UK and the UN Committee.  Absence from the UN 
Treaty Body database of official Summary Records of the first session of that 
meeting has necessitated strong reliance on the writer’s notes taken on the 
day.  These notes have been checked against the record published by the 
International Service for Human Rights,134 who were also present; and are 
consistent with history of the constructive dialogue and with the UN 
Committee’s 2009 concluding observations.135 
 
Chapters 6 to 9 
The developments in domestic independent living policy, law, administration 
and redress described in Chapters 6 to 9 have also been unfolding during the 
period of the research.  The Life Chances Report was produced in 2005, 
leading to the ‘transformation’ of service provision launched by the New 
Labour government in 2008.  This ‘transformation’ was overtaken by events, 
                                                 
133
 See for example on-going work at the Centre for Disability Policy and Law, National 
University of Ireland, Galway; The Center on  Human Policy, Law and Disability Studies, 
Syracuse University, USA; the Nordic Network on Disability Research (NNDR); and the 
Graduate Program in Critical Disability Studies, York University, Canada. Recent landmark 
publications include Arnandóttir OM and Quinn G (eds) The UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 
and Rioux MH, Basser L and Jones M (eds) Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and 
Disability Law (Martinus Nijhof 2011) 
134
 International Service for Human Rights, Treaty Body Monitor http://www.ishr.ch/treaty-
body-monitor/cescr#42 accessed 16.9.11 
135
 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/index.htm. See also  Bates E, ‘The United 
Kingdom and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in 
McCorquodale R and Baderin M (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 
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including the global economic crisis and election of the Coalition government.  
Similarly, review of social care legislation took place in 2011, and the courts’ 
potential role in stemming the effects of public funding cuts is only now 
becoming apparent.  Again, the body of academic work addressing these 
issues is as yet relatively small: the writer has relied strongly on documentary 
and web-based research and observation. 
 
The original intention for Chapters 8 and 9 of the thesis was to initiate an 
empirical user-led research project to recount the impact of administrative 
justice on participants’ experiences of independent living.  An unsuccessful 
funding bid, however, necessitated reliance on existing literature.  Analysis of 
this ‘second-hand’ literature has been complemented, wherever possible, by 
resources produced by disabled people and decision-makers in relation to 
their first-hand experience. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL DISABILITY RIGHTS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Introduction 
Chapter 1 has discussed the meanings of some concepts central to this 
research, and has introduced the theoretical tools used in the thesis to assist 
in discussion and analysis of the law relating to those concepts.  In Chapters 
3 to 9 that law is examined, first at international level and then through its 
translation into domestic policy, law and administration in England.  First, 
however, we look at where the international law has come from.   
                      
Howarth and Stavrakakis explain that ‘a political project will attempt to weave 
together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a 
field of meaning so as to fix the identities of objects and practices in a 
particular way’.1  The myth captured in the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities came about through the partial convergence of 
various discursive strands, each with their attendant social practices, some 
relating to international human rights law, others to the experience of 
disability. 2    To understand that myth, and the ‘disability/human rights’ 
discourse which is central to it and to this thesis, it is necessary to 
understand some of the preceding and concurrent ‘worlds’ which have been 
contested or partially absorbed and re-articulated in the process of its 
construction. 
 
This chapter explores some of those ‘worlds’.  It examines the 
individualisation and pluralisation of the international human rights 
                                                 
1
 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 2; and see Chapter 1 above 
2
 A further contextual paradigm has been development of the Millennium Development 
Goals, from which the issue of disability has, until very recently, been conspicuous by its 
absence. (‘Realizing the Millennium Development Goals for Persons with Disabilities through 
the Implementation of the World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons 
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Report of the Secretary 
General to 64
th
 Session UN General Assembly, A/64/180, July 2009, para 4).   International 
development is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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framework; developing understandings of equality; and renewed recognition 
of the interdependence of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.  
The experience of dis-ability drives the growing influence of the disabled 
people’s movement, with its resistance to oppression, its reinterpretation of  
‘disability’, its insistence on inclusion and participation, on ‘rights’ rather than 
‘welfare’.  The partial convergence of all of these elements gives rise to a 
new discourse of ‘disability/human rights’, which in turn leads to a hegemonic 
project: the negotiation of ‘a comprehensive and integral international 
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities’.3  This project attempts to sediment a new myth – a re-description 
of the world and of the place of disabled people in it - into a new legal order: 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
 
International Human Rights 
 
The modern framework 
Modern international human rights discourse did not come out of the blue.  
As we have seen in Chapter 1, it can be identified in political discourse terms 
as attempting to fill a ‘lack’ brought about by the ‘dislocation’ of the Second 
World War.4  The United Nations’ primary purpose was ‘to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’5 by promoting the conditions of stability 
                                                 
3
 GA Res 56/168 of 19 December 2001 
4
  Rights discourses were already in existence well before the 20
th
 century – see Chapter 1 
ftnote 96 above. The incipient international structures that followed the First World War, such 
as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation had already introduced 
an international network of states which could be incorporated into the new, more powerful, 
structures of the United Nations, and into the concept of International treaties.  The post-war 
myth of international human rights re-articulated and built on these earlier discourses to 
produce a renewed vision of the world. 
5
 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (UN Charter) Preamble para 1.  Article 1 of the 1945 
Charter of the United Nations sets out its purposes: 
1. To maintain international peace and security… 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples… 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; and 
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and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.6  
The promotion of such stability and well-being required a holistic range of 
action: promoting higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions 
of economic and social development; finding solutions to international 
economic, social, and health problems; and universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.7  The Preamble to the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborates this vision further, 
conjuring a world of freedom, justice and peace, where human beings enjoy 
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want; where the 
inherent dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family are recognised; where nations collaborate to promote social and 
economic progress; and where a common understanding of rights and 
freedoms comes about through education and progressive implementation.8  
As with any myth, this new world is unattainable at present: this is expressive 
law, which seeks to influence behaviour to bring about a world to which the 
‘common man’ aspires. 
 
The human rights and fundamental freedoms which are to be respected, 
without discrimination, in this new world include civil rights to life, liberty and 
security,9  to a fair trial,10  to freedom of movement,11  of expression12  and 
assembly.13  They include protection from slavery,14 from torture,15 and from 
arbitrary arrest or detention,16 from interference with private and family life,17 
                                                                                                                                          
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.    
6
  UN Charter Article 55 
7
  ibid 
8
 As described in Chapter 1, this myth is further constituted by contrast with the dislocatory 
events which have preceded it,
 
and by the threat of social breakdown should the new myth 
not prevail.   
9
 UDHR Article 3 
10
 UDHR Articles 10, & 11 
11
 UDHR Articles 13, 14 & 15 
12
 UDHR Article 19 
13
 UDHR Article 20 
14
 UDHR Article 4 
15
 UDHR Article 5 
16
 UDHR Article 9 
17
 UDHR Article 12 
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and from deprivation of property.18  They include political rights to take part in 
government, to access public services, and to vote in elections.19  And they 
include the right to realisation ‘through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each 
State’, of economic and social rights to social security, 20  to work,21 to rest,22 
to education, 23  and to an adequate standard of living, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services. 24   
Everyone also has the right ‘freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community’,25 as well as ‘duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible’.26  In line with the UN Charter, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out a holistic range of rights 
– civil, cultural, economic, political and social - whose protection is required in 
order to help bring about the world envisioned by its drafters.  
 
To become, and remain, hegemonic, and to increase that hegemony to the 
point where it becomes imaginary,27 a myth must seek to incorporate new 
discursive elements, and to negotiate social antagonism and dislocation.   
Since its inception, antagonism to the modern human rights discourse has 
arisen from many quarters; 28  the myth continues to be understood in a 
multitude of ways.29  ‘Human rights’ can thus be seen as an empty signifier, 
acting as nodal point for a variety of interpretations.   Since the 1940s, 
                                                 
18
 UDHR Article 17(2) 
19
 UDHR Article 21 
20
 UDHR Article 22 
21
 UDHR Article 23 
22
 UDHR Article 24 
23
 UDHR Article 26 
24
 UDHR Article 25 
25
 UDHR Article 27 
26
 UDHR Article 29 
27
 See Chapter 1 above 
28
 See for instance Campbell T, Ewing KD and Tomkins A (eds) Sceptical Essays on Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2001); ; Santos BS, ‘Toward a Multicultural Conception of 
Human Rights’ in Hernandez-Truyol B (ed) Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology, (York 
University Press 2002); Kennedy D, The Dark Sides of Virtue: reassessing international 
humanitarianism (Princeton University Press 2004); Dembour M-B, ‘Critiques’ in Moeckli D, 
Shah S and Sivakumaran S, International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 
2010); An-Naim AA, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1995)  
29
 Pillay N, ‘Human rights in United Nations action: norms, institutions and leadership’ (2009) 
1 EHRLR 1 
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international human rights discourse has succeeded in broadening from its 
post-war mission to protect people against the abuse of State power, to 
reflect increasing dominance of the discourse of liberal individualism and the 
unsatisfied demands of a variety of social groups.  It has seen the 
interpretation and re-interpretation of its core value of equality30 and the near-
fracturing and subsequent reclaiming of its holistic character through the 
tensions and resolutions of the Cold War. These re-articulations are 
considered next. 
 
Individualisation  
In the context of the post-war growth of Western liberal capitalism and its 
attendant individualism, the focus of the international human rights agenda 
has moved on.  Whilst the prohibition of State interference with individual 
rights remains, a growing emphasis has developed on restoring power and 
value to the individual.31  Human rights jurisprudence has imposed on States 
not only a ‘negative’ duty not to interfere with an individual’s rights, but also 
‘positive’ duties to protect and fulfil those rights.32  These must not only be 
respected by the State, but also protected from interference by others and 
fulfilled through positive action, to allow for ‘the development, without outside 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other 
human beings’.33  As Conor Gearty puts it,  ‘our dignity… demands that we 
each of us be given the chance to do the best we can, to thrive, to flourish, to 
do something with ourselves’.34      
 
In thus focusing on the individual, human rights jurisprudence has 
constructed an abstract view of what it is – at least in the context of human 
rights discourse - to be human.35  This view is underpinned by values of 
dignity, autonomy, equality and solidarity, and broadly coincides with the 
                                                 
30
 See for instance the ‘five generations’ of equality law outlined in Hepple B, ‘The new 
Single Equality Act in Britain’ (2010) 5 Equal Rights Review 11  
31
 Fredman S, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford University Press 2008)  
32
 Mowbray AR, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart 2004) 
33
 Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 
34
 Gearty C, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge University Press 2006) 50 
35
 Mégret F, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of Rights’ (2008) 
12(261) International Journal of Human Rights 3 
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liberal ‘subject’ as described by writers such as John Stuart Mill. 36  This 
autonomous human ‘subject’ has freedom to live his life how he chooses, 
and to exercise his rights, limited only exceptionally by the State (or his own 
conscience) for the common good or to protect the rights of others.  In theory, 
this ‘subject’ functions autonomously within a society designed to enable his 
wellbeing, not least through its protection and promotion of his human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.37     
 
Once this abstract view of the subject is established, it becomes clear that 
the actual experience of some people within real societies makes it harder – 
if not impossible - for them to achieve such an 'ideal' existence.   For the 
international human rights myth to flourish, those ‘unsatisfied demands’ must 
be incorporated into its discourse.  In response to social and political 
pressures, 38   the human rights framework has come to recognise, and 
attempt to mitigate, the disadvantage of successive groups of people; to 
articulate these additional ‘unfixed’ elements into the human rights discourse, 
and to sediment them in international human rights treaties such as CERD, 
CEDAW or the UNCRC.  In doing so, the human rights discourse itself has 
been modified,39 giving rise to what has been described as the ‘pluralisation’ 
of human rights.40 
 
Pluralisation 
Frédéric Mégret defines pluralisation as the ‘phenomenon whereby human 
rights, as law and ideology, has increasingly recognised the needs of specific 
groups or categories of humanity as worthy of specific human rights 
                                                 
36
 Mill JS, On Liberty (1859): ‘Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign’ 
37
 For alternative perspectives see for instance Donnelly J, Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice (Cornell paperbacks) 2
nd
 ed, (Cornell University Press 2002) chapter 5; 
An-Naim AA, Human Rights in Cross-cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1995); Baderin M, International Human Rights and Islamic 
Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 
38
 Such as the civil rights movement of the 1960s or feminism from the 1970s 
39
 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 105, cited in Torfing (1999) 101 
40
 Mégret F, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or 
Disability Rights?’ (2008) 30(2) Human Rights Quarterly 493 
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protection’.41  As noted in Chapter 1, he suggests three possible explanations 
for this phenomenon,42 each of which exhibits a ‘lack’ in the human rights 
framework.  Mégret argues that human rights discourse (not least by failing to 
raise the question) has been ‘intensely ambiguous’ about how pluralisation 
‘at least potentially and implicitly challenges the idea that human rights are 
about promoting equal rights for all’.   Pluralisation suggests that ‘human 
rights may also be about delving deeply into issues of identity, survival and 
dignity of particular groups’ (original emphasis).43    
 
This analysis taps into two important and inter-related concepts, elements of 
which have been re-articulated and re-formulated in disability/human rights 
discourse to become essential elements of the CRPD myth.  Firstly, it 
questions the formal approach to equality that underlies international human 
rights law.  Secondly, it suggests a need to delve deeper into identity, 
survival and dignity, to seek to understand and put in place the conditions 
required to transform the experience of oppression into inclusion and the 
equal, and actual, exercise of autonomy. 
 
Equality 
The idea that human rights are equally inherent in all human beings, and 
should therefore be realised equally, has played a fundamental role in 
modern international human rights discourse from the start;44 it is reflected, 
inter alia, in the ubiquitous requirement for rights to be realised without 
discrimination.45  However, as Mégret identifies, there is a tension between 
                                                 
41
  Ibid 494 
42
 1) A political and pragmatic response to the failure of ‘mainstream’ human rights - a ‘wake-
up call’;  2) that something is missing in the ‘mainstream’ framework that requires it to be 
adapted for the specific context; or 3) that ‘[s]pecific instruments are needed not only to 
adapt the existing language of rights, but because there is a dimension of the experiences of 
specific groups that is inherent to them and which almost requires the creation of new rights’. 
Mégret F, ‘The Disabilities Convention’ (2008) 495 
43
 Mégret (2008) supra 496; see also Otto D ‘Everything is Dangerous: Some Post-structural 
Tools for Rethinking the Universal Knowledge Claims of Human Rights Law’ (1999) 1 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 22 
44
 For instance, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 1: All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights.  See also standard human rights treaty phrasing: 
Everyone has the right to…/ No one shall be subjected to…. 
45
 See for example International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 2(1); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Article 2(2); European 
Convention on Human Rights Article 14. Also International Convention on the Elimination of 
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the traditional formal understanding of equality which underlies the 
universality of the modern human rights framework and the experiences of 
those groups who express their ‘unsatisfied demands’.   Equality law has 
attempted to address that tension. 
 
Traditional liberal discourse features freedom from discrimination as a basic 
civil liberty,46 designed to enable the autonomous subject to make choices 
and to act freely in society without encountering irrational, discriminatory 
barriers.  Despite some disagreement about the philosophical justifications 
for interfering with individual freedom,47 most liberal capitalist societies have, 
since the 1960s, accepted the need for some degree of domestic legal 
regulation in this field.48   Early non-discrimination law was based on the 
traditional formal view, requiring identical treatment of men and women, or of 
people with different racial backgrounds.  Disability discrimination law 
introduced an element of asymmetry for the first time, applying only to 
disabled people; 49   and imported the concept of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’50  requiring a limited degree of positive action to remove 
individual disadvantage.   
 
These innovations allow disabled people to be treated differently from others, 
to the extent that it is ‘reasonable’ to do so.51  They move discrimination law 
from a ‘formal’ to a more ‘substantive’ concept of equality, to taking a fuller 
                                                                                                                                          
All forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (CERD) and Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 (CEDAW) 
46
 See Bamforth N, Malik M and O’Cinneide C, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context, 1
st
 
ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2008); Fenwick H, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge-
Cavendish 2010)  
47
 According to Bamforth et al, ‘[w]ithin the liberal justification of discrimination [law] there are 
differences between those approaches that use a procedural form of liberalism and equality 
as a formal treatment of “like with like”; and those that base liberalism on deeper values such 
as autonomy, dignity or respect…  For procedural liberals… discrimination law and policy 
can be justified because of their contribution to the goal of state neutrality.  For perfectionist 
liberals [those calling on ‘deeper values’] …they are justified because they allow the state to 
secure valuable goods such as autonomy for individuals.’  Even this level of ‘interference’ 
with the freedoms of others goes too far for some.   
48
 Beginning with the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990; and see Lindqvist B, ‘UN 
Standard Rules on Disability Pave the Way for Human Rights’ (2004) 14(3) INTERIGHTS 
Bulletin 95  
49
 For instance, the provisions of the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995 might only be 
called upon by individuals who met the definition of disability set out in section 1. 
50
 Or ‘adjustment’ 
51
 See for example Archibald v Fife Council [2004] IRLR 651; [2004] ICR 954 (HL) para 68 
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and more flexible approach which allows for human difference.  Some argue, 
however, that it may also reinforce stereotypes, and so entrench 
disadvantage. 52   Furthermore, enforcement remains in the hands of 
individuals, after the (allegedly) discriminatory event, and there are many 
reasons why individuals may not take such action,53 rendering the law less 
effective.    
 
A further development, described by Hepple as ‘transformative equality’, 
attempts to bypass these issues by addressing structural disadvantage.  This 
imposes duties on public sector organisations to proactively assess the 
impact of their actions on particular disadvantaged groups.  Under this 
model, positive action to remove discriminatory barriers and to promote 
equality of outcome is seen as necessary, legitimate and desirable. 54  
Although the language is different,55 a growing congruence can be identified 
between this systemic understanding of equality and the human rights 
agenda’s focus on positive action to protect the dignity and autonomy of each 
individual.56   
 
Some take these arguments further again.  Stein57 argues that ‘[a]s human 
beings, each of us has strengths and weaknesses, abilities and limitations.’  
                                                 
52
 Amardóttir OM, ‘A Future of Substantive and Multidimensional Equality?’, presentation to 
The Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities – from Social Policy to Equal Rights 
Conference, Reykjavik, 27 September 2007; also Stein MA, ‘Disability Human Rights’ (2007) 
95(1) California Law Review 75, Part 2C.  See also Quinn (2002) chapter 13; Horejes T and 
Lauderdale P ‘Disablism Reflected in Law and Policy: The Social Construction and 
Perpetuation of Prejudice’ (2007) 3(3) The Review of Disability Studies: an International 
Journal 13 www.rds.hawaii.edu accessed 20/9/07 
53
 Genn, H, Paths to Justice: What People Do About Going to Law (Hart 1999); Pleasance et 
al, Causes of Action: Civil Law and Social Justice, 2
nd
 ed, (Legal Services Commission 
2006); Hurstfield et al, ‘Monitoring the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA): phase 3’ 
(Disability Rights Commission 2004); and Chapter 8 below 
54
 See for example Disability Discrimination Act 1995 Part 5A, and associated Regulations.  
For further discussion see O’Cinneide C, ‘Disability Discrimination’ n Bamforth N, Malik M 
and O’Cinneide C, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context, 1
st
 ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 
55
 Before the CRPD, there is no mention in human rights jurisprudence of reasonable 
accommodation/adjustment.  Instead, the emphasis is on human dignity and personal 
fulfilment. 
56
 This congruence can be traced in the domestic case law discussed in Chapter 9 below.  
See also Disability Rights Commission Legal Bulletin issue 11/April 2007, 61 and issue 12 
Legacy Edition 2007; also Fletcher A and O’Brien N, ‘Disability Rights Commission: From 
Civil Rights to Social Rights’ (2008) 35(4) Journal of Law and Society 520 
57
 Building on the human right to development and the ‘capabilities approach’ advanced by 
Amartya Sen and  Martha Nussbaum: see Stein MA, ‘Disability Human Rights’ (2007) 95(1) 
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He espouses a human rights framework that ‘esteems potential over extant 
function’, recognising the value of every individual for his or her own end, and 
assessing the efficacy of human rights protection in light of external factors 
that impact on individual development.  This view, sometimes described as 
‘multidimensional disadvantage equality’, 58  or equality of worth, again 
focuses on the inherent dignity and rights of each individual but now judges 
human rights protection in terms of its success in relieving the external 
factors which impinge on that individual’s fulfilment.59  This is a far cry from 
the traditional liberal understanding of formal equality, requiring action to be 
taken in relation to those external factors.  Stein suggests that ‘ensuring 
equality in any really meaningful sense requires not only the assertion of 
negative rights, but also a deep reconstruction of our world if we are to value 
and include every individual’s participation’.60 
 
The ‘exogenous factors’, or ‘multidimensional disadvantages’, that impinge 
on an individual’s development bring us back to the holistic vision of the 
drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  For them, economic, 
social and cultural rights are as important as civil and political rights in 
bringing about realisation of ‘the inherent dignity and… equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family’.61  However, the interdependence 
of rights has not always had a smooth trajectory.   
 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
With the onset of the Cold War, the holistic human rights formation was 
fractured, with East and West falling broadly into two camps.  In the West, 
immediate implementation and enforcement of civil and political rights took 
priority, whilst socio-economic rights were seen as inconsistent with the free 
                                                                                                                                          
California Law Review 75; also Burchardt T, ‘Capabilities and Disability: the capabilities 
framework and the social model of disability’ (2004) 19(7) Disability & Society 735 
58
 Arnandóttir (2009) Chapter 3 
59
 See also O’Cinneide C, ‘The Right to Equality: A Substantive Legal Norm or Vacuous 
Rhetoric?’ (2008) 1 HRR 81, 99: ‘Philosophical debates about the meaning of equality may 
illuminate discussion but it is ultimately the interplay of legal, social and political factors 
against the historical background context that will drive forward change in how equality rights 
are interpreted and understood.’  
60
 Stein M, ‘Disability Human Rights’ draft version 2006/07, 48 
61
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Preamble para 1 
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market ideology underlying capitalist/Western progress.62  Eastern European 
states, by contrast, tended to focus on economic, social and cultural rights, 
and ‘expressed reluctance and often outright animosity’ towards proposals 
for international human rights monitoring devices.63  This conflict resulted in 
an International Bill of Rights consisting of two separate treaties: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).64  
The holistic human rights discourse was thus partially dislocated by Cold War 
antagonisms that were more powerful than itself.   
 
The dichotomy reflected in the texts of the two Covenants also affected their 
ensuing development:  the two ‘sets’ of rights were treated unequally in terms 
of institutions, procedures or the development of norms.65   Although the 
Preambles to both Covenants recognise that  
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want 
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may 
enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and 
political rights,66  
 
in practice the obligations of States Parties under each Covenant are very 
different.  Notably, whereas each State Party to the ICCPR undertakes ‘to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’ the civil and political rights set out in that Covenant,67  a State 
ratifying the ICESCR undertakes merely to ‘take steps… to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights… ’.68   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                 
62 See for instance Hayek FA, Law, Legislation and Liberty: a new statement of the liberal 
principles of justice and political economy, vol 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 1976) 
63
 Rosas A and Helgesen J, ‘Introduction’ in Rosas A and Helgesen J (eds) Human Rights in 
a Changing East-West Perspective (1990), cited in Hunt P (1996) 
64
 Alston P, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Henkin L and Hargrove JL (eds) 
Human Rights: an Agenda for the Next century (1994) cited in Hunt P(1996).  Both treaties 
were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and came into force in 1976. 
65
 Hunt P(1996) 1 
66
 ICESCR Preamble para 3, mirrored in ICCPR Preamble para 3 
67
 ICCPR Art 2(2) 
68
 Article 2(1).  
 50 
 
Monitoring systems also developed unequally.  States Parties to the ICCPR 
have been reporting to the Human Rights Committee since 1976 ‘on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights’. 69   That 
Committee also has power to consider inter-State complaints, 70  and 
complaints from individuals claiming violation of their rights by a State Party 
to the Covenant’s Optional Protocol. 71   By contrast, no such monitoring 
committee was established by the ICESCR.  It was 1987 before the present 
Committee came into being, with a brief to ‘emulate, as far as practicable, the 
approach followed by the Human Rights Committee’. 72   This Covenant 
requires States to report ‘in stages’ on their progress in implementing the 
rights,73 indicating, if appropriate, ‘factors and difficulties affecting the degree 
of fulfilment of obligations’. 74   There is no provision for State-to-State 
complaints equivalent to Article 41 ICCPR, and (until recently) 75 no Optional 
Protocol allowing for individual complaints.  It will be seen in Chapter 5, 
however, that since 1987, the ESCR Committee has worked to clarify the 
norms contained in the Covenant,76 to expand the information base relevant 
to its work, 77  and to design an effective system for monitoring States’ 
performance.78   
 
Despite these tensions and inconsistencies between the two International 
Covenants, the overwhelming majority of UN Member States has ratified both 
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70
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treaties. 79   Since the end of the Cold War, re-evaluation of the inter-
relationship between the two sets of rights has resulted in a renewed 
recognition of their indivisibility,80 which by the beginning of the new century 
had again become an article of faith at the UN.  Human rights discourse has 
seized the opportunity to restore some of the stability of the post-war myth by 
reclaiming its holistic nature. 
 
We have seen how modern international human rights law and ideology have 
come about, in response to the dislocations of the Second World War, by re-
articulating elements from earlier human rights discourses; and how, despite 
antagonisms and dislocations,  they have since extended their reach, taking 
on board or reclaiming, as circumstances allow or demand, the individualism 
of Western liberal capitalism, the ‘unsatisfied demands’ of disadvantaged 
groups, substantive understandings of equality and the indivisibility and 
interdependence of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.  This 
behaviour is typical of a discourse seeking to maintain and increase its 
hegemony.81  Given these developments, one might suppose that disabled 
people’s human rights would be sufficiently protected.  However, here as 
elsewhere, disabled people were invisible.82   
 
Despite its ostensible embrace of ‘all members of the human family’, the only 
mention of disability in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is found in 
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Article 25,83 where disability is identified with ‘lack of livelihood’ and disabled 
people as deserving to be supported by the State or other providers of 
‘security’.  The Declaration thus reflects the dominant discourse of the time, 
which identified disabled people, if at all, as recipients of welfare rather than 
as holders of rights.  Elsewhere, the Declaration fails to include disability in 
its list of prohibited grounds for discrimination, 84   a pattern followed by 
subsequent treaties until 1989.85  It was not until disabled people themselves 
began to mobilise at international level that this exclusion was challenged. 
 
Disability 
 
International mobilisation 
Building on pockets of earlier protest,86  the political mobilisation of disabled 
people began in earnest in the 1960s.87   One important catalyst for their 
mobilisation at international level was a conference organised by 
Rehabilitation International, which took place in Winnipeg, Canada in 1981.  
Rachel Hurst takes up the story: 
There was an international organisation called Rehabilitation 
International which was mostly made up of rehabilitation professionals 
of one sort or another.  There were one or two leading disabled people 
who were involved with RI, notably Ben Lindquist… and those few… 
were trying to get RI to listen to the voice of disabled people. He was 
being singularly unsuccessful, which is not surprising.  And in 1980 RI 
had one of their world congresses in Winnipeg in Canada… [B]ecause 
of things that people like Ben had been saying, they invited some 
                                                 
83
 This despite the fact that President Roosevelt was a wheelchair user.  UDHR Article 25: 
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disabled people from all over the world…  2[00] to 300 disabled people 
were invited.  The rest of the conference was 3000 non disabled 
people, heavily professional…  [Disabled activists from England and 
US] were invited but there was also and this was much more important 
really, for the international movement, there were disabled people who 
came from the developing countries…  And when they met the disabled 
movement in Winnipeg, which was very small but it was strong, very 
strong, arranged a barbecue for the first evening of the RI 
conference…. Everybody met, drank a lot and discovered for the first 
time this shared commonality of oppression and it was a very, very 
emotional time but it was one of those times when history was really 
made and as a result of that barbecue they decided to go to the council 
of RI and demand that they had the substantial voice in the decisions 
that were being made.  And so the next day they did.  They marched 
into RI and the big plenary session they went up and said we demand 
that we are the people you are talking about, we must have a 
substantial voice in what you’re saying and the council said to them 
sorry we’ve got structures, we are going to stick to our structures, we 
know best, go away.  So they did, they actually, all two hundred of 
them… walked out of the conference and they never went back and 
they held their own conference in the hotel and they had workshops and 
they… had a tremendous time really analysing where they were all 
coming from, what barriers for their inclusion really were and how they 
could overcome them.  And by the end of the week they had made a 
major decision.  One that they had to set up an international body of 
disabled people, which was going to only look at the establishment of 
rights and equalisation of opportunities for disabled people. This is very 
important.  It was not about getting services… It was purely and simply 
as an organisation which reflected the voice of disabled people and 
supported rights and equalisation of opportunities.  Each of the disabled 
people were [sic] told to go home and set up their own national 
organisations.  Vic and Stephen came back and set up the British 
Council of Organisations for Disabled People.  Joshua went back and 
set up the National Council of Disabled People of Zimbabwe.  Others 
went back to their countries and there were forty.  And then in 1981 in 
Singapore they met again and Disabled Peoples’ International was 
founded….   It does not provide services, it is cross impairment, it has 
national assemblies now in 120 countries…88   
 
That experience radicalised many of those involved.  As Joshua Malinga 
from Zimbabwe reports,  
I went to Winnipeg to attend the Rehabilitation International [RI] 
Conference… When I left I was very passive, but when I returned I was 
very radical…  At that time, we began to recognize that disability was 
                                                 
88
 Hurst R, ‘The International Disability Rights Movement’, seminar to Centre for Disability 
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about human rights, about social change, about organizing ourselves.  
We did not want to emphasize welfare but organization.89 
 
Hurst describes the RI conference as the first discovery of ‘this shared 
commonality of oppression’.  The concept of oppression brings a new 
element to the conflict, challenging the individualism of liberal discourse.  As 
Young describes, ‘[f]or contemporary emancipatory social movements… 
oppression is a central category of political discourse.  Entering the political 
discourse in which oppression is a central category involves adopting a 
general mode of analyzing and evaluating social structures and practices 
which is incommensurate with the language of liberal individualism…’.90  For 
Young,  
a theory of justice should attend to factors other than individual rights 
and the distribution of resources: for example, the social structure and 
institutional context; issues of decision-making power and procedures; 
division of labour and culture.91   
 
All of these aspects feature strongly in disabled activists’ discourse.   
 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the social model of disability on which the 
Disabled People’s Movement is predicated demands transformation not of 
the individual but of social structures and institutions to accommodate the 
differences of impairment.  Joshua Malinga talks of ‘social change’.  As Hurst 
reports elsewhere, disabled people realised ‘that what they needed wasn’t 
special privileges, wasn’t special services but was actually to change society 
itself’.92   
 
Similarly, the demand not only to be heard, but to be actively involved in 
decision-making, to share power, comes strongly from Hurst’s account: ‘we 
are the people you are talking about, we must have a substantial voice in 
what you’re saying’. This message has been captured in the Movement’s 
mantra of ‘Nothing about us without us’, which shaped and permeated the 
                                                 
89
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CRPD negotiations, and, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, the text of the 
Convention.   
 
But individual rights and the distribution of resources matter too.  A third 
essential ingredient of this contestation of liberal understandings of 
‘normality’ is the demand for ‘rights’ in place of ‘welfare’.  Welfare is seen as 
compensation for exclusion; rights as the inherent, inalienable and equal birth 
right of all human beings.  Where people have been treated as outside 
humanity, assumed not to have a role to play in society, not ‘subjects’ as 
understood in liberal philosophy, not capable of exercising their autonomy or 
participating on an equal basis with others, then recognition of and respect 
for their rights takes on a particular and fundamental significance.  As Bengt 
Lindqvist was still insisting in 2000: 
 Disability is a human rights issue! I repeat: disability is a human rights 
 issue.  Those of us who happen to have a disability are fed up of being 
 treated by society and our fellow citizens as if we did not exist or as if 
 we were aliens from outer space. We are human beings with equal 
 value, claiming equal rights…93 
 
Disability at the UN 
Such deeply rooted exclusion not only from society, but also from human 
rights protection, began to change in response to the growth and activities of 
the disabled peoples’ movement.  The earliest disability-related UN 
provisions date from the 1970s,94 and reflect the individual/medical model of 
disability discourse prevalent at the time.  1981 was designated UN 
International Year of Disabled People, followed by a ten-year World 
Programme of Action concerning Disabled People,95 aiming at ‘equality’ and 
‘full participation’ in social life and development. 96    Disabled Peoples’ 
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International applied for observer status to the UN and had ‘a quite 
substantial impact’ on the writing of the World Programme of Action. 97  
Special Rapporteur Leandro Despouy confirms that  
it was at the urging of the non-governmental organizations concerned 
that the admissibility of this question [of disability as human rights issue] 
was recognized and the problem of disability could be considered by 
bodies responsible for the protection of human rights from the 
standpoint of and in connection with violations.98   
 
Disabled Peoples’ International argued for a convention on the rights of 
disabled people, but its time had not come, and they became involved in 
writing of the UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for 
Persons with Disabilities (the Standard Rules).99  Nevertheless, Quinn et al 
note that it is at this period that ‘an irreversible shift from the “caring” to the 
“rights” model’ can be identified.100    
 
Disability was beginning to be understood as a function of the relationship 
between disabled people and their environment, produced by their encounter 
with cultural, physical or social barriers;101 and disabled people’s expertise 
was beginning to be recognised.102    Moreover, the World Programme of 
Action served also to broaden the concept of human rights to recognise 
explicitly the right of every human being to equal opportunity. 103   The 
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disability/human rights discourse was gathering momentum, beginning to 
influence human rights discourse and to spawn activity around the world.104   
 
The 1993 Vienna Declaration sedimented this progress:  
all human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal and thus 
unreservedly include persons with disabilities…    The place of disabled 
persons is everywhere.  Persons with disabilities should be guaranteed 
equal opportunity through the elimination of all socially determined 
barriers, be they physical, financial, social or psychological, which 
exclude or restrict full participation in society.105   
 
The Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities (the Standard Rules) were adopted by the General Assembly in 
1993. 106   Although not mandatory, the Rules ‘imply a strong moral and 
political commitment on behalf of States to take action’.107  They set out 
preconditions for equal participation, such as medical care and support 
services;  target areas for equal participation, such as accessibility, 
education, employment, income maintenance, family life, culture and 
recreation; and implementation measures such as legislation, economic 
policies, training and research. They require a national focal point of 
coordination and input from organisations of disabled people.  The Rules are 
promoted and monitored by a United Nations Special Rapporteur, working 
alongside a panel of experts appointed by the major international 
organisations of disabled people.108  In addition to its consultative role, this 
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panel actively participates in monitoring activities and provides access to a 
world-wide network of national and local disabled people’s organisations.109  
 
The Standard Rules are thus an important precursor to the CRPD.  They 
accept the social model differentiation between individual impairment and 
social discrimination,110 recognising the need to address ‘both the individual 
needs… and the shortcomings of society’. 111    They acknowledge the 
influence of disabled people’s organisations in bringing about ‘a deepening 
knowledge and extension of understanding concerning disability issues and 
the terminology used’. 112   They recognise disabled people’s expertise in 
relation to their identity, survival and dignity, and make use of that expertise 
in development, promotion and monitoring.  Although they focus primarily on 
access and discrimination, the Rules help to cement what may be seen as a 
‘half-way’ point reached by the 1990s in the journey towards a full 
‘disability/human rights’ discourse.   
 
Looking back in 2004 on his nine-year stint as Special Rapporteur, Bengt 
Lindqvist observed that  
the Standard Rules have been widely used by disability NGOs [non-
governmental organisations] and by governments…  The panel of 
experts is an effective link between the UN monitoring activities and the 
NGOs in the field… This unique cooperation between the NGOs and 
the UN has proved to be very useful for both the UN and the 
organisations concerned.113   
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However, ‘[p]erhaps the most important effect of the introduction of the 
Standard Rules ten years ago has been to pave the way for the new 
paradigm of disability as a human rights issue’.114 
 
We can trace in these developments the growing influence of disabled 
people themselves.  So far, they have succeeded in initiating admissibility of 
the question of disability as a human rights issue; they have taken part in 
shaping the World Programme of Action, and in drafting, promoting and 
monitoring the Standard Rules.  In the process, they are gaining experience 
of international human rights systems and themselves earning 
acknowledgement of, and respect for, their expertise.  Mégret suggests a 
need for the human rights framework to delve deeper into issues of identity, 
survival and dignity of those whose rights it seeks to protect.    Disabled 
people are beginning to supply that expertise.  
 
Disability/human rights discourse 
 
Understandings  
We saw in Chapter 1 that discourses are ‘worlds’ of related objects and 
practices that form the identities of social actors; that they continually interact 
and change, borrowing or excluding elements from each other in their search 
for hegemony.  This chapter has so far explored some of the elements of 
international human rights and disability worlds which have contributed to a 
new discourse of ‘disability/human rights.’  New discourses come about 
through hegemonic practices of articulation: 115  in this case through the 
struggles of disabled people to contest their oppression and their invisibility in 
the world of international human rights.  In the process, some basic 
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assumptions of human rights discourse relating to autonomy and equality are 
challenged.   
 
Hill has set out seven conditions for the exercise of autonomy: 
(1) [individuals] have the psychological capacities for rational decision-
making which are associated with autonomy; 
(2) they actually use these capacities when they face important choice 
situations; 
(3) they have the rights of autonomy… i.e., a right to make morally and 
legally permissible decisions about matters deeply affecting their own 
lives free from threats and manipulation from others; 
(4) other people actually respect this right as well as their other rights; 
(5) they are able and disposed to have distinctly human values;  
(6) others respect this capacity by not presuming that they value only 
good experiences for themselves and by not counting their comfort as 
more important than their declared values; and, finally, 
(7) they have ample opportunities to make use of these conditions in 
living a life over which they have a high degree of control116 
 
This liberal definition of autonomy makes a number of assumptions.  It 
assumes rationality, and that rationality is desirable; it assumes ‘ample 
opportunities’ to exercise capacity, without manipulation; it assumes respect 
for that capacity from others; and it assumes a high degree of control.   
 
We have seen in Chapter 1 how the modern capitalist discourse of ‘normality’ 
has excluded disabled people as less than human, both physically through 
segregation and institutionalisation, and in terms of identity.  As a result, for 
many people living with impairments, the exercise of self-determination 
without manipulation, with respect for their decision-making and the 
consequent degree of control over their life is beyond the realms of 
possibility.   As disability advocate Marca Bristo describes,  
[f]undamentally, most of the problems experienced by people with 
disabilities stem from the perception that they are not fully human.  All 
too often people with disabilities have been excluded from the human 
franchise.  Frequently, they are simply left out in the planning and 
implementation of programs in the areas of housing, healthcare, 
employment and education. Many are subjected to horrific and 
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degrading treatment, warehoused and forgotten in institutions designed 
to remove them from society.117    
 
This reality equates to Young’s definition of oppression; and it identifies the 
autonomous liberal subject at the heart of the modern human rights 
framework as a fundamentally ‘ableist’ ideal.118   Even where human rights 
discourse allows for some positive obligations on the part of the State, as 
O’Cinneide points out, these are ‘treated as useful but limited tools, only 
applicable where necessary to remove obstacles which prevent self-sufficient 
individuals from freely exercising their personal autonomy’.119    
 
For people treated in the ways described by Marca Bristo to exercise their 
autonomy on an equal basis as full members of humanity requires more than 
the limited positive obligations of human rights law.  It requires reversal of the 
exclusionary understandings and practices of modern ‘normality’ discourse; it 
requires emancipation from oppression and active inclusion in, and 
transformation of, the planning and implementation of social programmes 
and structures; it requires respect for the exercise of individual decision-
making and autonomy; and it requires the opportunity to participate and to 
live a life over which one has a high degree of control.  As Charlton identifies, 
‘[t]he principles, demands and goals of the DRM [Disability Rights Movement] 
cannot be accommodated by the present world system’. 120   They seek 
fundamental transformation – a re-description of the world.121   
 
Human rights understandings of equality are similarly challenged.  The 
traditional formal understanding which underlies the universality of human 
rights discourse is found to be inadequate to encompass those ‘whose direct 
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claims to human rights are based on irreducible experiences that require a 
tailoring of the general rights regime’, and to which the principal human rights 
instruments have so far been ‘insufficiently sensitive’. 122       As Mégret 
identifies, ‘a concept of human rights that presupposes that all individuals are 
equal because they are all fundamentally alike can become oblivious to the 
fact that persons with disabilities, for example, are not autonomous in the 
same way as persons without disabilities.’123  (emphasis added).  Instead, 
Stein’s re-articulation of the concept of equality ‘repositions disability as a 
universal and inclusive concept … [It] embraces disability as a universal 
human variation, rather than as an aberration’.124  Against the liberal concept 
of formal equality, which separates, categorises and compares, Stein’s 
approach allows for all human beings, regardless of ‘abilities and limitations’ 
to be included in the human family.  It repositions disabled people in the 
world as equal rights-holders. Again, this view of equality requires ‘a deep 
reconstruction of our world’.125  Such fundamental challenge to core human 
rights understandings of autonomy and equality reveals a basic ‘lack’ in the 
international human rights framework which the new disability/human rights 
discourse seeks to fill.   Human rights discourse functions as a ‘surface of 
inscription’ for a re-description of the world and of the place of disabled 
people in it, for a shift in understanding from exclusion to inclusion, and from 
welfare to rights.   
 
Two further components assist with this process. Firstly, the openness of 
human rights discourse to pluralisation through incorporation of the 
unsatisfied demands of successive groups of people.  Precedents have been 
set by CERD, CEDAW and the CRC, and the way has been paved by the 
Standard Rules.  Secondly, economic, social and cultural rights have been 
reclaimed from their Cold War wilderness.  The timing of this renewal of the 
principle of interdependence and indivisibility of the two ‘sets’ of rights has 
significant consequences for disabled people.  As Leandro Despouy pointed 
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out in 1993, ‘[d]isability is perhaps the area in which the importance of 
recognizing the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights…is most 
evident and sharp’.126   More recently, Quinn and Bruce argue that  
[s]et against the backdrop of using rights to restore power to people, 
economic, social and cultural rights have an enabling function – they 
provide a bridge whereby persons with disabilities can take their place 
as valued and often highly productive citizens…. they enable people to 
take charge of their own lives.  It is in this sense that economic, social 
and cultural rights enhance freedom.127    
 
Socio-economic rights can be seen as a kind of ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
by society to enable the exercise of all human rights by individuals:128  they 
address the ‘multi-dimensional disadvantage’, or ‘exogenous factors’ that 
impinge on an individual’s development.  It will be seen in Chapter 3 that the 
integration of economic, social and cultural rights in the Convention text 
drives realisation of all of the Convention rights. 
 
Disabled people also bring key elements to the new discourse. They bring 
their experience and their expertise: their understanding of oppression, their 
history of mobilisation and resistance, their reclaimed identity, with its 
concomitant social model of disability; and their demand for inclusion, 
participation, and rights.  It is their leading contribution that allows human 
rights discourse to ‘delve deeply into issues of identity, survival and 
dignity’,129 enabling re-articulation of liberal understandings of autonomy and 
equality; and their expertise which enables international human rights 
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discourse to act as a surface of inscription for the unsatisfied demands of this 
new antagonism, and thus to preserve and expand its own hegemony. 
 
A successful hegemonic discourse is one that manages to redefine the terms 
of the political debate and set a new agenda.  By this definition, the 
disability/human rights discourse has arrived.  Disabled people are no longer 
invisible on the human rights stage, no longer excluded from the international 
human rights agenda.  They are acknowledged as rights-holders, and their 
experiences and contributions are recognised and valued.   
  
But at this stage, this new agenda is not yet fully embedded in international 
human rights law. As noted above, calls for a legally binding treaty were 
unsuccessful in the 1980s and 90s. The international activities of disabled 
people, however, continued to gather pace.  A millennium World Summit on 
Disability in Beijing attended by leading international disabled people’s NGOs 
produced the Beijing Declaration on the Rights of People with Disabilities in 
the New Century, committing these organisations to ‘strive for a legally 
binding international convention’.  The impetus of this drive was further 
accelerated by high profile adoption elsewhere at the UN of the Millennium 
Development Goals, which aim to halve world poverty by 2015.  Despite 
disabled people being significantly over-represented amongst the world’s so-
called ‘poorest of the poor’,130 they receive no mention in the Millennium 
Development Goals.131  This persistent invisibility proved an additional spur 
to the arguments of those working for a Convention.132 
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At the same time, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights 
commissioned a study on the human rights dimensions of disability ‘to 
examine what might be done to strengthen both the protection and the 
monitoring of the human rights of persons with disability’. 133  Following its in-
depth analysis of the moral authority for a human rights approach to 
disability, the Quinn Report134 concluded that ‘[t]he unreserved endorsement 
of a human rights perspective on disability has naturally put pressure on the 
human rights system to respond positively and appropriately’;135 it supported 
the development of a thematic convention.136  In December 2001, the UN 
General Assembly accepted that efforts so far by national and international 
bodies ‘ha[d] not been sufficient to promote full and effective participation and 
opportunities for persons with disabilities in economic, social, cultural and 
political life.’  It adopted a resolution establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to 
consider proposals for a ‘comprehensive and integral international 
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities based on the holistic approach in the work done in the fields of 
social development, human rights and non-discrimination…’.137 The UN had 
finally recognised the need to incorporate disabled people’s ‘unsatisfied 
demands’ fully into the human rights framework, and into binding 
international human rights law.   
 
The hegemonic project 
The scene is thus set in 2001 for a new hegemonic project: the coming 
together at international level of a variety of agents - States delegations, UN 
officials, national human rights institutions and disabled people’s 
organisations - in a joint attempt to capture the various elements of the new 
disability/human rights discourse they are seeking to promote. 138     By  
embedding their new ‘vision of how state, economy and civil society should 
be organised’139 in a new international treaty, they will attempt to create a 
                                                 
133
 Quinn and Degener (2002) Foreword 
134
 Quinn and Degener (2002) 
135
 Ibid  46, para 2.9 
136
 Ibid Chapter 13 
137
 General Assembly Resolution 56/168 of 19 December 2001 
138
 Torfing (1999) 302 
139
  Ibid 
 66 
 
new legal order aimed at transforming their vision into ‘a new form of 
regulation, whereby good order becomes order’. 140   This hegemonic 
formation 141  will seek to ‘influence behaviour by altering broader social 
perceptions and conventions’, carrying with it ‘a symbolic social meaning’ 
which ‘influences the nexus between law, norms and societal mores’.142  It 
will sediment a myth, which, it hopes, will in due course become imaginary.143  
This project, like the discourse it seeks to sediment, demands a new 
approach: a comprehensive, holistic, multi-faceted approach combining 
social development, human rights and non-discrimination, and involving 
disabled people and their organisations in consultation and drafting.144  It 
produces a new hegemonic practice of participatory law-making.   
 
We have traced above the role of disabled people in raising the question of 
disability as a human rights issue, in shaping the World Programme of Action 
and in drafting, promoting and monitoring the Standard Rules.  Their resulting 
experience of international human rights systems, and others’ 
acknowledgement of, and respect for, their expertise, is carried forward into 
the drafting of the Convention. 145  We have also seen that a key demand of 
the disabled people’s movement has been not only to be heard, but to be 
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actively involved in decision-making, to share power – a demand summed up 
in the motto ‘Nothing about us without us’.  This, too, is carried forward into 
the Convention drafting. 
 
Throughout the drafting process, disabled people played an unprecedented 
part in proceedings.  The first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee146 made 
three crucial decisions which shaped the remainder of the negotiations and 
their outcome.  Firstly, it agreed to allow accredited representatives of NGOs 
without consultative status to attend and to participate in public meetings.147  
This was later extended to informal consultations and closed meetings, and 
included substantive representation in the Working Group which produced 
the first draft text of the Convention.148  In order to promote equal NGO 
representation from the poorest and richest countries, a UN Voluntary Fund 
on Disability was set up to support travel and accommodation for disabled 
people and their assistants.  Large numbers of disabled people’s 
organisations from around the world took advantage of this opportunity, with 
estimates of up to 800 by the Final Session.149  They organised themselves 
into an International Disability Caucus to develop a position on controversial 
points and to adopt spokespersons on different issues.150 
 
In a further move, States were formally encouraged to incorporate disabled 
people into their official delegations to the negotiations, and to consult with 
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disabled people at home in preparing their negotiating positions. 151  Almost 
all States obliged, bringing disabled people either as heads of delegation or 
as official advisers.  As Melish describes, ‘these experts contributed an 
unusual degree of substantive expertise, sensitivity, receptiveness, creativity 
and commitment to the drafting committee’.152   The Chair described the 
negotiation process as ‘genuine dialogue, genuine interaction, and 
willingness to hear, comment upon, and accommodate other opinions’ by ‘a 
very unique group of delegates indeed’.153 
 
UN staff had to work hard to overcome access issues to accommodate the 
delegates. 154   The sheer number of disabled people taking part in the 
proceedings, combined with inaccessibility of the UN building and its 
information systems, significantly affected practical aspects of the drafting 
process.  Instead of the standard method of drafting articles of the treaty in 
small groups of State representatives, full article-by-article debate took place 
in the only accessible large conference room, with the full participation of all 
Member State delegations, national human rights institutions and hundreds 
of civil society and disabled people’s organisations representatives. At each 
session, formal considerations were followed by input from NGOs and State 
governments, followed by general informal discussions.  As Melish describes, 
‘[t]his process required a level of transparency, cooperation, self-restraint and 
consensus unmatched in human rights treaty drafting, and allowed civil 
society to monitor, participate in, and influence all decision-making 
discussions’.155   
 
It also served to educate.  One UN Secretariat representative acknowledged 
later in the negotiations that  
[disabled people’s] involvement was especially crucial in the early 
stages of the process, as there was limited disability expertise among 
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government representatives.  Now, many government delegations 
include persons with disabilities, including representatives of Disabled 
Peoples’ Organizations, and the expertise has spread among the 
Committee members.156 
   
As one State delegate remarked, ‘if in your country disabled children do not 
attend school at all, how can your government reach a view on the relative 
merits of mainstream or specialist education?’157   The negotiating process 
introduced people from many countries in the world to emancipatory models 
of disability – and of decision-making - for the first time.158  
 
The Convention thus represents  
an historic break from a state-centric model of treaty negotiation, in 
which instruments are negotiated behind closed doors, away from the 
very people they are intended to benefit.  It moves instead toward a 
participatory approach that takes the views and lived experience of the 
affected as the principle point of departure159  
 
reflecting the relations of difference uppermost in this discursive setting.  This 
participatory ethos is reflected not only in the text of the CRPD, but also in 
the emphasis placed there on the ongoing participation of disabled people 
and their organisations in policy and programme development, and in 
implementation and monitoring at domestic and international levels.160  It is 
an approach built into the text and requirements of the Convention itself.161 
 
Where relations of difference are uppermost, there is room for proliferation of 
differences and for stable compromises. 162   Just as development of the 
disability/human rights discourse has entailed the partial congruence and re-
articulation of a variety of elements of disability and international human 
rights understandings, modifying both, so this hegemonic social practice of 
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drafting a treaty brings together the different players into a new and unique 
process which reflects those elements and further modifies and develops the 
identities of those individuals.   The experience that disabled people and their 
organisations bring to the table educates and enriches States’ 
understandings. In turn, ‘the shift to the human rights perspective is being 
mirrored in the self-understandings of the disability NGOs’ 163  as they 
strengthen their cooperation and co-ordination and their familiarity with the 
international human rights system, resulting in increased capacity and 
confidence to help take implementation forward.164   Relations of difference 
enable stable compromise and discursive expansion. 
 
The Chair of the drafting Committee comments that the result of this unique 
drafting process was  
an extraordinarily far-reaching convention… When I first became 
involved in the process I would not have seen States being able to 
reach out as far as they have on the issues in the Convention.  The 
credit for that undoubtedly goes to colleagues from civil society who 
have been so actively engaged in the process in such large numbers.  
They have constantly cajoled, urged, entreated, pressured, argued and 
very very effectively persuaded governments to keep shifting the 
boundaries of the envelope in so far as the Convention is concerned.165    
 
Indeed, according to Lawson,  
given the importance of the role played by disability NGOs in its 
development, it would not be inaccurate to regard the CRPD as having 
been largely written by disabled people.166   
 
Relations of difference enable stable compromise: the CRPD was also the 
fastest drafted UN convention, taking a mere four years to complete. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has traced the articulation and re-articulation of a number of 
discursive elements relating to international human rights and disability as 
they have come together to form a new disability/human rights discourse.  
The individualisation and pluralisation of the human rights agenda, 
developing understandings of equality and the fracturing and subsequent 
reintegration of the holistic human rights framework have converged with 
international mobilisation of the disabled people’s movement with its 
resistance to oppression, and its challenge to exclusion from human rights 
protection.  At international level, the new discourse has succeeded in 
redefining the terms of the political debate and in setting a new agenda.  That 
agenda re-articulates liberal ‘ableist’ understandings of ‘normality’, autonomy 
and equality through the experience of dis-ability to produce a re-description 
of the world and of the place of disabled people in it.  Disabled people are re-
positioned from exclusion to inclusion, from welfare to rights. 
 
The new discourse is the subject of a hegemonic project aimed at laying 
down its vision of a new accessible and inclusive world into international 
human rights law.  The practice thus engendered reflects the nature of the 
new discourse in its holistic and participatory approach that takes the views 
and lived experience of disabled people as its principle point of departure.  
The relations of difference come to the fore as disabled activists work 
alongside UN human rights organisations, governments, national human 
rights institutions and human rights NGOs to bring about a new hegemonic 
formation, or legal order: a ‘comprehensive and integral international 
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities based on the holistic approach in the work done in the fields of 
social development, human rights and non-discrimination.’167 
 
Chapter 3 examines the outcome of that hegemonic practice - the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  Concepts of scale and 
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projection drawn from Santos’ ‘cartography of law’168  provide analytical tools 
for examination of the core principles and the rights as set out in the 
Convention text.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
 
Introduction 
We have seen law as a social practice, as a method of articulating and 
regulating systems of social relations, and as Santos’  ‘revolving doors 
through which different forms of power and knowledge circulate.’1  Chapter 2 
has described the growing disability/human discourse that has succeeded in 
setting a new agenda at the UN.   Encapsulation of that discourse’s re-
description of the world into a new legal order entails the creation of a 
‘revolving door’ through which its power and knowledge can circulate, to 
establish new understandings, systems of social relations and identities 
around the world that reflect and promote its particular  norms, values, views 
and perceptions.  Ultimate success would result in expansion of the 
disability/human rights discourse from myth to imaginary: its re-description of 
the world and of the place of disabled people in it would become a ‘default’ 
system of meanings that underlie and structure our societies. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the realisation of this new vision would require fundamental 
revision of dominant assumptions, structures and practices: ‘a deep 
reconstruction of our world’.2 
 
Sedimentation of rounded and multi-dimensional social reality into the flat 
and two-dimensional text of a legally binding international human rights 
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treaty, however, will inevitably distort that reality.3  The drafters must choose 
the scale and operational limits of their legal order, and must organise the 
legal space within.  Their choices will reflect not only the technical challenges 
of their project, but also the purposes, identities and ideologies of the actors.   
 
With the help of Santos’ ‘cartography of law’, this Chapter explores the text of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: how it 
captures, lays down and projects the various elements of the 
disability/human rights myth into a coherent international treaty.  In line with 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4  the Convention text is 
interpreted in its context, including its preamble, and in the light of its object 
and purpose, its travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of its 
conclusion. 
 
A skilled cartographer will choose projection techniques that serve the 
purpose of the map.  Those techniques will help to clarify the terrain, to orient 
the map-user, and to guide them to their destination.  Similarly, in drafting the 
Convention, negotiators must find a way to set out the rights in ways which 
express the central ‘myth’ and serve this expressive legal order’s hegemonic 
aims.  Their drafting techniques must clarify the disability/human rights 
terrain, and must orient and guide its various users to reach that ultimate 
destination where the new vision becomes imaginary.  Which techniques 
might be chosen, and how might they be applied? 
 
First and foremost, the CRPD is a human rights convention.  The raw 
material from which it must be fashioned is the existing international human 
rights framework: the Convention’s remit excludes the creation of new rights.5 
Unusually, though, it is also a social development convention.  Economic, 
social and cultural rights are as available to the drafters as civil and political 
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rights.  One projection, then, concerns the interpretation and reformulation of 
all of those rights together into an integral and comprehensive Convention 
text.  A third element of this holistic endeavour is equality.  The drafters must 
decide whether and how they will make use of the various understandings 
and legal interpretations of equality outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
A further projection concerns realisation of the rights.  Despite their 
established implementation and monitoring systems, existing treaties have 
failed to protect the rights of disabled people. 6   The onus is on this 
Convention to bring about real change in societies and in the lives of 
individuals.  The projection techniques chosen here will help to determine the 
success or otherwise of this new legal order and of the discourse it reflects 
and promotes.   
 
Last but not least, for disabled people’s ‘unsatisfied demands’ to be 
incorporated into ‘ablist’ human rights discourse, this Convention must delve 
deeper into issues of identity, survival and dignity of those whose rights it 
seeks to protect.  The map must be shaped throughout by disabled people’s 
experience and expertise.   
 
Maps have centres: ‘a fixed point, a physical or symbolic space in a 
privileged position, around which the diversity, the direction and the meaning 
of other spaces are organized.’7   The ideological ‘centre’, or ‘myth’, of the 
Convention is the disability/human rights discourse described in chapter 2.  
Its vision shapes and colours every aspect of the Convention text.   Its most 
direct expression can be found in the Convention’s title and in its purpose 
and principles as set out in Articles 1 to 9.   These are considered first.  Maps 
also have boundaries: the ambit of the Convention is discussed next.  
Thirdly, the Chapter turns to the rights themselves, as set out in Articles 10 to 
30.   
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Realisation of the Convention’s purpose, however, requires more: that this 
‘revolving door’ enable the power and knowledge of disability/human rights 
discourse to circulate around the world.  The Convention’s implementation 
and monitoring provisions as set out in Articles 31 to 50 seek to ensure 
continuation of the hegemonic project.  These are considered in Chapter 4. 
 
Exploration of the CRPD text 8  reveals a treaty which not only speaks 
forcefully to the re-positioning of people with impairments, but also, as 
Mégret remarks, ‘provides a unique opportunity to rethink how we conceive 
of the human rights of all’.9    
 
The Centre 
Title and purpose 
In 2001,10  the UN General Assembly instructed the Ad Hoc Committee to 
consider proposals for ‘a comprehensive and integral international 
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities’. 11    Inclusion of ‘integral’ in the instruction signals that this 
convention will have equal status with other core human rights treaties.12  
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protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities’ were Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Morroco, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uruguay.  From French (2007) 18 note 
11
 Ibid. This remained the working title throughout most of the negotiations, although shorter 
titles were being put forward from the start: ‘Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ was supported by several members of the Working Group in January 2004.  
Daily Summary related to Draft Articles 1 and 2, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgsuma2.htm 
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The word ‘comprehensive’ encapsulates the Assembly’s further instruction to 
the negotiating committee to base the convention on ‘the holistic approach in 
the work done in the fields of social development, human rights and non-
discrimination’.13    
 
Initial consultations produced objectives ranging from the eradication of 
poverty, through multiple discrimination, access, de-institutionalisation, 
protection from abuse and the guarantee of personal dignity.14  The Working 
Group set up to draft an initial working text discussed the right to be different, 
accessible environments, survival, realisation of potential, and the 
importance of international cooperation and development. 15   The ‘holistic 
approach’ characteristic of disability/human rights discourse was clear from 
the start.  
 
Later discussion about shortening the working title was linked to 
consideration of a purpose clause.  The CRPD’s original working text 
includes as its Article 1:16    
 PURPOSE  
The purpose of this Convention shall be to ensure the full, effective 
and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by 
persons with disabilities. 
                                                                                                                                          
12
 Kayess R and French P, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1, 20; though placing 
the negotiations in New York rather than Geneva, with secretariat support from ECOSOC 
rather than the OHCHR somewhat negates that message. 
13
 GA Res A/RES/56/168  
14
 Compilation of Proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral Convention to Promote and 
Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Ad Hoc Committee 3
rd
 session, 
New York, 16-27 June 2003  (A/AC.265/2003/CRP.13 and Add.1) 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/a_ac265_2003_crp13.htm ; Ad Hoc Committee 
on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Views submitted by Governments, 
intergovernmental organizations and United Nations bodies concerning a comprehensive 
and integral international convention on the protection and promotion of the rights and dignity 
of persons with disabilities’, note by the Secretary-General, 
A/AC.265/2003/4+A/AC.265/2003/4/Corr.1 (2003) 
15
 Daily Summary related to Draft Articles 1 & 2, January 5, 2004 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgsuma2.htm  
16
 As presented to the Ad Hoc Committee at its third session: Report of the Working Group to 
the Ad Hoc Committee, 3
rd
 session, A/AC.265/2004/WG/1 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwgreport.htm  The working group consisted 
of 27 States and 12 disability NGOs, with the South African Human Rights Commission 
representing national human rights institutions. 
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An alternative version ‘that the Ad Hoc Committee may wish to consider’ ran: 
 The purpose of this Convention shall be to protect and promote the 
 rights of persons with disabilities. 
In line with its individualisation agenda, 17  international human rights 
jurisprudence has developed three levels of obligation in the realisation of 
human rights: a duty to respect, a duty to protect, and a duty to fulfil.18   The 
duty to respect prohibits a State from interfering with an individual’s right.  
This relatively straightforward duty is generally associated with classic civil 
and political rights, though it may also apply in a socio-economic context.19  
The duty to protect requires a State to prevent an individual’s right being 
infringed by others.  Here the duty becomes more complex: it involves the 
State taking action against one individual to protect the rights of another.  
However, as Fredman concludes, ‘it is possible to formulate and apply a 
positive duty to protect without incurring insurmountable problems of 
indeterminacy’.20   
 
The duty to fulfil, on the other hand, is more contentious.  Firstly, it requires 
the State to take positive action which may (or may not) involve the 
expenditure of significant resources. 21    In liberal democracies, the 
expenditure of such resources is particularly controversial in relation to socio-
economic rights, where it becomes entangled in debates between neo-liberal 
‘free-marketeers’22 and those who support varying levels of redistribution of 
society’s ‘goods’.23  Secondly, it may be difficult to determine how and when 
                                                 
17
 See Chapter 2 above 
18
 Apparently originating in Shue H, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign 
Policy (Princeton University Press 1980) 52; see also Hunt (1998) 31-34; Fredman (2008) 
69.  Sometimes a fourth ‘duty to promote’ is added in between protection and fulfilment. 
19
 Such as enforced eviction by the State: Hunt (1998) 32 
20
 Fredman (2008) 76 
21
 Contrary to some assumptions, this applies to rights across the board – civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social. For instance, to guarantee the right to a fair trial it is 
necessary to invest in a civil and criminal justice system, including courts, representation and 
more;  to guarantee the right to life involves provision of police and security services, a host 
of health and safety measures;  and so on. See for example Statement by Louise Arbour, 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee, 7
th
 
session, New York 27 January 2006, 4 para 2; Hunt (1998) 34.    
22
 Such as Hayek 
23
 Such as Rawls or Dworkin 
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a right has actually been fulfilled. 24   However, as Hunt points out, ‘when 
legislators wish to impose the tertiary obligation to fulfil, they can reduce the 
indeterminacy by precise, detailed drafting’.25  The negotiators of the CRPD 
exercised this option to the full.   
 
The consolidated ‘Chairman’s text’26 retains the long title, and includes a 
revised purpose clause as Article 1: 
 The purpose of this Convention is to promote, protect and fulfil the full 
 and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
 persons with disabilities.’27 (emphasis added) 
 
At the same time, the Chair questioned  
 ‘whether we need this Article at all…  it is not  the practice in other 
 treaties to have a “purpose” provision…’. (original emphasis)28 
 
The International Disability Caucus and others, however, argued for the 
clause, in the interests of the clarity and accessibility of the Convention.29  
The inclusion of a purpose clause serves to re-emphasise both the overall 
objective of the Convention, and the binding nature of its obligations. 
 
At the same time, the International Disability Caucus  
proposed replacing “fulfil” with “ensure.”  It noted that governments 
must themselves refrain from interfering with the rights of persons with 
disabilities, prevent third parties from doing so, and take proactive 
measures to protect those rights, and that the language of the article 
                                                 
24
 Fredman goes back to basic principles in her discussion of this question.   ‘Positive 
duties’, she says, ‘aim to secure to all the ability to exercise their rights.  This requires the 
removal of constraints, as well as provision of resources or the facilitation of activities which 
ensure that all are substantively equal in the ability to participate fully as citizens in society.’  
Fredman (2008) 77 ff.  Other work on this question includes the development of indicators 
and benchmarks: see for example Hunt, P, Novak, M, Osmani, S, ‘Human Rights and 
Poverty Reduction Strategies: a discussion paper’ 
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/kc/downloads/vl/docs/AH177.doc, accessed 4.9.09.  For an 
overview, see Malhotra R and Fasel N, Qualitative Human Rights Indicators – A Survey of 
Initiatives (2005) Background Paper developed for a seminar conducted by the Institute for 
Human Rights Abo Akademi University, which may be accessed at www.abo.fi/instut/imr. 
(from French (2007)) 
25
 Hunt (1998) 34 
26
 Produced prior to the 7
th
 negotiating session; see Covering Letter from the Chair, October 
7
th
, 2005 
27
 Article 1, para 1. Chairman’s Text, October 7
th
 2005 
28
 Ibid  3 
29
 Chairman’s Text as amended by the International Disability Caucus, January 2006, 7 
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must reflect this.  It argued that “ensure” and perhaps “respect” might 
be useful to reflect this intention.30    
 
Santos describes how, during the Cold War, Western media showed the 
Soviet Union on a world map designed, through projection techniques, to 
exaggerate the size of the Soviet Union, and thereby to dramatize the Soviet 
threat.  In the CRPD, the use of the word ‘fulfil’ in the purpose clause would 
enlarge the obligations of States, taking the Convention beyond the 
instructions of the General Assembly, and beyond the desires of those 
governments concerned to avoid potential resource implications. 31   The 
replacement of ‘fulfil’ by ‘ensure’ subtly changes the projection of the 
Convention to reduce the size of that threat.  The final version reads: 
 The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and 
 ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and 
 fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote 
 respect for their inherent dignity. 
 
Principles32 
Dignity 
The concept of human dignity is a powerful one.  It features in the preamble 
to the United Nations Charter,33 and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 34  and has played an important role in the individualisation and 
pluralisation of the human rights agenda.  The concept of dignity is also a 
complex one, operating at different levels35 and entailing both subjective and 
objective elements;36 its legal protection includes both negative and positive 
                                                 
30
 Summary record, 7th session 30th Jan 2006 
31
 Costa Rica, for instance, ‘favored the Chair’s text but without “fulfil,” as it believed the 
guarantee of “fulfilment” was beyond the scope of a legal text.’ Summary record, 7
th
 session, 
30 January 2006 
32
 For further discussion of the principles of dignity, equality and participation in disability and 
human rights law, see Rioux M, Basser L and Jones M (eds) Critical Perspectives on Human 
Rights and Disability Law (Martinus Nijhof 2011); see also Batmanghelidjh C, ‘The gateless 
wall: a discourse on participation’ in Griffiths S (ed) The Politics of Aspiration (Social Market 
Foundation 2007) 
33
 Para 2 
34
 Preamble para 5, Article 1: ‘All human beings are born equal in dignity and rights…’ 
35
 ‘Human dignity can operate on three levels: the dignity attaching to the whole human 
species; the dignity of groups within the human species; and the dignity of human 
individuals.  The legal implications of each kind of dignity are slightly different.’  Feldman D, 
‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value’ Part I [1999] Public Law 682, 684 
36
 ‘In relation to the subjective aspect of dignity, the law of human rights will typically be 
concerned to prevent treatment which damages a person’s self-respect and physical or 
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duties. 37   In negotiation, after ‘much discussion’ within its ranks, the 
International Disability Caucus recommended to the committee that dignity 
be included in the general principles under Article 3 (general principles) 
rather than in the purpose.  The Caucus stressed ‘the inherent nature of 
dignity in every person and the need to avoid implying that the dignity of 
persons with disabilities requires promotion.  For this reason it suggested 
referring to “respect for dignity.” ’38   Indeed, as the Chair summarised, ‘many 
delegations pointed out the need to approach the topic of dignity with 
caution…’  The balance of views supported removing ‘dignity’ from the title 
and including it in the purpose clause. 39  
 
At the 7th (pen-ultimate) session, the title of the CRPD was shortened to 
‘International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’.  Respect 
for the inherent dignity of disabled people is reiterated in the final text as a 
fundamental requirement not only in the Convention’s purpose, but also in its 
Preamble,40  in individual articles,41  and as the first of its general principles, 
as set out in Article 3.42  
 
Three further principles in particular spring from the page in Article 3: 
autonomy, inclusion and participation.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
moral integrity.  With regard to the objective aspect, the law will usually have to go further, 
imposing positive duties on people to act in ways which optimise the conditions for social 
respect and dignity.’  Feldman [1999] 686-7 
37
 See for instance  Feldman D, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value ’Part II [2000] Public Law 
61; Basser LA, ‘Human Dignity’ in Rioux M, Basser L and Jones M (eds) Critical 
Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law (Martinus Nijhof 2011); McCrudden C 
‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal 
of International Law 655 
38
 Summary record, 7
th
 session, 30 January 2006; there was also discussion about whether 
or not to include the word ‘inherent’ 
39
 Summary record, 7
th
 session, 30 January 2006 
40
 Preamble (a)Recalling the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations which 
recognize the inherent dignity and worth …; (h) Recognizing also that discrimination against 
any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the 
human person;…  
41
 For instance Article 8: awareness raising, para 1(a): ‘… to foster respect for the rights and 
dignity of persons with disabilities;’  Article 24: education, para 1(a) ‘The full development of 
human potential and sense of dignity and self-worth…’ 
42
 Article 3(a) ‘Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to 
make one’s own choices, and independence of persons’ 
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Autonomy  
The first reads: 
 (a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the 
 freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons. 
 
This restatement of such standard human rights principles might be seen as 
routine, but for disabled people’s history of exclusion by the ‘ablist’ discourse 
of normality, and their previous invisibility in human rights and development 
discourse.  As seen in Chapter 2, for people with impairments to exercise 
their autonomy requires reversal of that exclusion, respect for individual 
decision-making and the opportunity to live a life over which one has a high 
degree of control.  In that context, the demand for respect for the attributes 
set out in Article 3(a) contests the outright denial of such attributes to 
disabled people by the understandings, structures and practices of 
‘normality’.43     
 
Inclusion and participation 
Emancipation from oppression also requires active inclusion in social 
programmes and structures, and the opportunity to participate in the wider 
world.44  Article 3(c) sets out the principle of ‘full and effective participation 
and inclusion in society’.  A key component of such inclusion is 
 3(d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities 
 as part of human diversity and humanity.   
 
This principle directly challenges the exclusionary force of ‘normality’ 
discourse, and repositions disabled people in the world.  As such it is central 
to the ‘expressive’ purpose of the Convention as it seeks to transform cultural 
understandings of disability and associated ideas of ‘normalcy’ and 
‘impairment’.45  People with impairments are no longer to be ‘othered’ on 
account of their differences, understood as less than human or (mis)treated 
accordingly.  Instead, they are to be respected and accepted as full members 
of a diverse humanity.   
                                                 
43
 See chapter 2 above 
44
 See for example Jones M, ‘Inclusion, Social Inclusion and Participation’ in Rioux et al 
(2011) 
45
 See also Jackie Leach Scully, ‘Reframing Disability in the UN Convention’, presentation at 
NNDR Conference, Reykjavik, May 2011 
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Participation must be ‘full and effective’.  This principle is reiterated 
throughout the Convention,46 not least through the requirement that disabled 
people must be closely consulted and actively involved in the development of 
all legislation, policies and other decision-making processes that concern 
them, and in monitoring and implementation.47  ‘Nothing about us without us’ 
is sedimented here and, as seen in Chapter 4 below, in the Convention’s 
implementation provisions. 
 
Equality 
Article 3 also includes a range of principles relating to equality, including non-
discrimination,48 equality of opportunity,49 and gender equality.50  Along with 
human rights and social development, non-discrimination forms one of the 
three ‘cross-cutting themes’51 of the Convention, as directed by the General 
Assembly.  In designing the Convention map, the drafters had choices as to 
whether and how they made use of the various understandings of equality 
outlined in Chapter 2.   
 
Quinn describes the negotiation process: 
The first option was to draft a bald non-discrimination text.  Such a 
text… could have been short… with a general prohibition against 
discrimination… [and] could have been adopted fairly rapidly as most 
States respond favourably to the non-discrimination ideal….  However, 
such a text would have lacked the specificity needed in complex areas 
like education to be a real driver of change.  The second option was to 
follow the model of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
which takes great care to tailor the general human rights (both sets) to 
the particular situation of children….  However, virtually no State had an 
appetite for this approach…  The end result is a curious hybrid between 
a simple non-discrimination approach and an approach that applies an 
informed understanding of non-discrimination to tailor a wide variety of 
substantive rights to the realities of persons with disabilities (again, 
including both sets of rights).52 
 
                                                 
46
 Including for example Article 8 awareness-raising, Article 9 accessibility, and Article 19 
living independently and being included in the community 
47
 Article 4(3) 
48
 Article 3(b) 
49
 Article 3(e) 
50
 Article 3(g); see also Rioux MH and Riddle CA, ‘Values in Disability Policy and Law: 
Equality’ in Rioux et al (2011) 
51
 Quinn G and Arnardóttir OM, ‘Introduction’ in Quinn and Arnadóttir (2009) xviii 
52
 Ibid xix 
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Many different but interlinked and fundamental changes to the ways in which 
people and societies function are required to bring about a world where all 
disabled people are fully recognised as being part of humanity, as having 
equal worth, with equal rights to live, to make choices, to participate in and to 
contribute to the world around them. Like any physical terrain, this social 
terrain is complex and multi-dimensional; the drafters must find ways to 
express in the map all the various aspects of equality required to bring about 
such changes.  On a map, gradients and dimensions are shown by contours 
and by colouring.  In the Convention, too, different ‘levels’ of equality can be 
traced, and they colour the text in different ways.   
 
Disability discrimination as defined in Article 2 comprises  
…any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability   
which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.  It includes all forms of 
discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation. 53 
 
As Lawson notes, this is an extremely broad definition.54  It aims to reflect all 
elements of the disability/human rights discourse and to encompass all 
elements of the disability experience.  
 
Non-discrimination provisions imposing primary duties to respect and 
protect disabled people’s rights permeate the text.55  General principles of 
non-discrimination56 and equality of opportunity57 are shored up by Article 5, 
where ‘all persons are equal before and under the law’.58  Obligations to 
ensure the ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the rights59 ‘on an equal basis with 
                                                 
53
 This definition follows the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in CERD Art 1 
54
 Lawson A, Disability and Equality Law in Britain (Hart 2008) 30 
55
 As the preamble recognises: (h) … discrimination against any person on the basis of 
disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person 
56
 Article 3(b) 
57
 Article 3(e) – not ‘equality of outcome’ 
58
 Article 5(1) 
59
 See for example Article 1:purpose, Article 4: General obligations, Article 6: Women with 
disabilities, etc 
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others’60 pepper the text.  There must be equality, too, between disabled 
people.  The text is expressly inclusive of all disabled people, 61  on 
recognising their diversity,62 specifically ‘including those who require more 
intensive support’, 63 echoing Article 3(d).    
 
A further contour is added by the concept of multiple discrimination.64  
States must ‘guarantee to disabled people legal protection against 
discrimination on all grounds.’ 65  (emphasis added).  There is particular 
recognition of the greater risks faced by disabled women and girls,66 and 
added protection for disabled children. 67  However, there are limits to this 
multiple discrimination contour.  During early discussions, the rights of a 
number of vulnerable groups were raised, including ethnic minorities and 
older persons.68  There are some passing references to age or older people 
                                                 
60
 This phrase recurs 18 times in the main body of the text - though, as Richard Light points 
out, this can be read in more than one way: ‘If Member States are quite so anxious about 
ensuring that disabled people do not enjoy greater human rights protection than non-
disabled people, I would ask that a generic paragraph be included as a ‘General Principle’ 
within Article 3 rather than indiscriminately scatter this mantra throughout the Convention.’ 
Light R, ‘Review of the Chair’s Draft Text Prepared Subsequent to the Sixth Session of the 
UN Ad Hoc Committee’ 17 
61
 See for instance Article 1 Purpose; Article 4 General obligations; Article 17 Protecting the 
integrity of the person; Article 19 Living independently and being included in the community, 
etc.;  see also International Disability Alliance, ‘Position Paper on the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and Other Instruments’ (IDA 2008)  
62
  Preamble (i); Article 3 General principles;  
63
  Preamble (j) As Thailand said in the Working Group discussions, disabled people ‘ “who 
cannot express their own self-determination” are still entitled to live in dignity’, Working 
Group Discussions, Volume 3/1, January 5, 2004, 2 
64
 The Preamble expresses concern ‘about the difficult conditions faced by persons with 
disabilities who are subject to multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination on the basis of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous or 
social origin, property, birth, age or other status.’  Preamble (p).  This was foreshadowed by 
the 1975 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, whose rights ‘shall be granted to all 
disabled persons without any exception whatsoever and without distinction or discrimination 
on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or 
social origin, state of wealth, birth or any other situation applying either to the disabled 
person himself or herself or to his or her family’ - an impressive early recognition of both 
multiple discrimination and discrimination by association. 
65
 Article 5(2); In line with the earliest discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee: Compilation of 
proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and 
Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Specific Proposals, 2003 
66
 Equality between men and women is a general principle (Article 3(g)); women with 
disabilities have an Article of their own (Article 6), and gender equality is mainstreamed 
throughout the Convention text including Article 8, awareness-raising; Article 16, freedom 
from exploitation, violence and abuse; Article 17, Protecting the integrity of the person; 
Article 28: Adequate standard of living and social protection.  See also Preamble (q) 
67
  Article 53(h), Article 7 etc.   
68
 See, for instance, Seminar of Quito, June 2003 
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in the final text69 but no specific reference to race or ethnicity outside the 
preamble. 
 
For the central purpose of the Convention to be realised, the ‘various 
barriers’ which hinder disabled people’s full participation in society must be 
addressed.  As noted in chapter 2, national disability discrimination law has 
developed the concept of ‘reasonable accommodation’ for this purpose. 70     
In the CRPD, this concept makes its first appearance at international treaty 
level, thus extending its reach to all States Parties to the Convention.  Failure 
to take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is 
provided 71   constitutes discrimination under the Convention. 72    This 
provision, however,    raises the equality contour only so far, focusing as it 
does on each individual case and allowing for a defence of ‘undue burden’. 73  
Nevertheless, it helps to add a more substantive equality contour, which 
requires some positive action to remove barriers and change environments.  
                                                 
69
 Article 8(1)(b), Article 28(2)(b) and (e); see also Townsend P, ‘Policies for the aged in the 
21
st
 century: more “structured dependency” or the realisation of human rights?’ (2006) 26 
Ageing & Society, 161 
70
 In countries with such law in place, those with anti-discrimination duties are required to 
adjust their arrangements so as to remove disadvantage to the individual.  45 out of 193 UN 
Member States currently have some form of disability discrimination law.  See Lindqvist 
(2004); Lawson (2008) 
71
 Article 5(3) 
72
 Article 2, para 3 The duty to make reasonable accommodation is also specified in relation 
to particular rights: in relation to access to justice (Article 13(1)); liberty and security of the 
person (Article 14(2)); education (Article 24(2)(c) & (5); and employment (Article 27(1)(i).  For 
Kayess and French, ‘[t]he incorporation of a State obligation to ensure that reasonable 
accommodations are made… is perhaps the most fundamental instrumental element of the 
convention.’ Kayess and French (2008) 1, 12. It certainly adds a new concept to international 
human rights law, and seeks to ensure its practical exercise in a far wider geographical and 
cultural context than heretofore.  However, on its own, it seems unlikely to bring about the 
fundamental emancipatory shift required for full realisation of the Convention rights.  
73
 ‘… Necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a 
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons 
with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’ Article 2, para 4.  As Lawson identifies, ‘[t]he emphasis is on the 
barriers which operate in a particular case and thus on the need to respond to the specific 
circumstances of the individual disabled person in question’: it is unlikely to encompass the 
more generalised type of public equality duty required under the UK Disability Discrimination 
Act.  The duty is further narrowed by the defence of ‘disproportionate or undue burden’, the 
interpretation of which may vary according to the resources of the duty-bearer.  Lawson 
(2008) 31.  As Kayess and French anticipate, this formulation of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ ‘is more likely to produce results for persons who require marginal changes 
to the prevailing social environment.’ Furthermore, as they observe, ‘the terminology ‘undue 
burden’ is most unfortunate in that it activates precisely the construction of persons with 
disability as ‘burdens’ on the community that the CRPD otherwise attempts to overcome.’ 
Kayess and French (2008)12   
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Other Convention provisions take this process further. Despite the 
replacement of ‘fulfil’ with the less threatening ‘ensure’ in the purpose clause, 
the drafters of the Convention show no compunction in imposing positive 
duties on ratifying States.   Article 5(4) provides express permission to take 
‘[s]pecific measures…necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of 
persons with disabilities’: such measures ‘shall not be considered 
discrimination under the terms of the present Convention’. 74   
 
Full realisation of substantive equality for those who exercise their 
autonomy in different ways, however, requires more than measures generally 
designed to remove obstacles from self-sufficient individuals.75   Reversal of 
their oppression requires social and structural change.  States must therefore 
take a broad sweep of proactive measures to bring about that change.  Some 
are practical measures that directly impact on the ability of individuals to 
function, such as technological research76 and training of those who provide 
personal assistance and services. 77   Others aim at wider social change.  
Article 8 seeks to remove attitudinal barriers, requiring States to raise 
awareness and foster respect for the rights and dignity of disabled people;78 
to ‘combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices… in all areas of 
life’;79 and to ‘promote awareness of the capabilities and contributions’ of 
disabled people. 80    The obligation to ensure access to the physical 
environment, to transportation, to information and communications, and to 
other public facilities and services is set out in Article 9, and throughout the 
text. 81   Less tangible structural barriers must be removed through the 
                                                 
74
 This presumably refers to relatively short-term positive measures to compensate for 
historic inequality.  Unlike the parallel provision in CEDAW, this is not confirmed in the Article 
text, leaving interpretation open.  Article 4(1) of CEDAW says: ‘Adoption by States Parties of 
temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and 
women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall 
in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these 
measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment 
have been achieved.’ 
75
 O’Cinneide (2009)  
76
 Article 4(f) & (g) 
77
 Article 4(i) 
78
 Article 8(1(a) 
79
 Article 8(1)(b) 
80
 Article 8(1)(c) 
81
 General principle under Article 3(f); e.g. Article 4(h), Article 13(1), Article 20, Article 21 
etc… 
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abolition of discriminatory laws, regulations, customs and practices;82 acts or 
practices that are inconsistent with the Convention must be avoided.83  The 
protection and promotion of Convention rights must be taken into account in 
all policies and programmes.84 
 
The central purpose and principles of the Convention thus encapsulate the 
different elements of disability/human rights discourse so as to reverse 
oppression and to bring about transformation of the world.  This is 
expressive, emancipatory law, with hegemonic intent.  Human rights values 
of dignity, autonomy and participation are shaped to contest the denial of 
identity brought about by ‘normality’ discourse, and to demand respect and 
inclusion.  Inclusion requires not only non-discrimination and its contours, but 
also ‘a deep reconstruction’ 85  of the technical, attitudinal, physical and 
structural environment.   The direction and meaning of the rest of the 
Convention radiate from this central vision. The drafters make thorough and 
imaginative use of ‘precise, detailed drafting’ to that end,86 not only in relation 
to these central provisions but also, as will be seen below, in the way that the 
rights themselves are formulated, and in the steps States must take to 
implement them. 
 
Boundaries 
 
Legal regulation (like a map) requires boundaries and definitions.  To make 
sense of the map, we need to know the extent and depth of its reach.  How 
far does the Convention’s power to regulate seep into society?  What is the 
scope of that power, and who are the duty-holders?  As importantly, given 
the fundamentally inclusive nature of the Convention’s core principles, whose 
rights are being reaffirmed by this Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
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83
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84
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 Stein (2007) draft 48 
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Disabilities?  Whose rights (if any) are being excluded from protection?  What 
are the limits of the operation of this legal order? 
 
As with any international human rights treaty, the primary duty-holder under 
the CRPD is the State.87  But the obligations that States shoulder when they 
ratify this Convention extend beyond the public into the private sphere.  This 
aspect springs from the earliest discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee,88 and 
can be traced in different ways within the Convention text.  States must take 
measures to ensure that private entities as well as public take accessibility 
into account.89   They must promote the employment of disabled people in 
the private sector.90  They must eliminate disability discrimination by ‘any 
person, organisation or private enterprise’. 91  Their awareness-raising 
measures must range ‘throughout society’.92 The reach of the Convention 
thus permeates not just public functions, but all of civil society.93 
 
Moreover, Convention duties do not stop at the individual’s front door.  
Disabled people are to be protected from ‘all forms of exploitation, violence 
and abuse, both within and outside the home’; 94  many services will be 
provided in a domiciliary setting.95  And such responsibilities are not only laid 
at the door of the State.  Individuals too have moral duties, albeit not legally 
binding under the Convention, to other individuals and to the community to 
which they belong, ‘to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights 
recognized in the International Bill of Human Rights’.96  The Convention’s 
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 See for example seminar of Quito: option 1 (b) eliminate all forms of discrimination against 
persons with disabilities in public and private spheres…; Compilation of proposals for a 
Comprehensive and Integral Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities, A/AC.265/CRP.13, Add.1 & Add. 2 (2003) 
89
 Article 9(2)(b) 
90
 Article 27(1)(h) 
91
 Article 4(e) 
92
 Article 8(1)(a) 
93
 An interesting development here is the recent establishment of a regional monitoring body 
under the aegis of the League of Arab States, entirely funded by the private sector, 
‘indicating the growing awareness of and interest and involvement in the rights of persons 
with disabilities on the part of sectors that were never involved previously.’  Hissa Al-Thani 
(2009) infra 
94
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power to regulate leaves no stone unturned; it links all of Santos’ structural 
places. 
 
And whose rights does this all-pervading legal order seek to protect? 
The drafters of previous international human rights conventions have not 
been faced with such complex considerations surrounding the definition of 
the human beings whose rights they protect.97  As discussed in chapter 1, 
agreeing a definition of an empty signifier such as ‘disability’ is notoriously 
difficult, if not impossible.  Furthermore, the negotiators of the Convention 
were drawn from a wide range of cultural backgrounds and understandings of 
disability, making consensus even harder to achieve.98  Negotiation on this 
issue was left to the end of the drafting, with many people, including the 
Chair,99 suggesting that there should be no definition in the Convention, as 
defining might unintentionally exclude people.  Others, perhaps recalling 
some courts’ exclusive application of national definitions,100 argued that the 
only qualifying hurdle should be that one is ‘human’.101  The International 
Disability Caucus agreed that there should be no definition of ‘disability’, but 
argued that it was necessary to define who is protected: ‘[i]f we do not have 
such a definition, States may define what they find best and may exclude 
                                                 
97
 CERD Art 1 defines ‘racial discrimination’; CEDAW Art 1 defines ‘discrimination against 
women’; CRC Art 1 defines ‘child’ quite simply as ‘every human being below the age of 
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 One member of the UK delegation, for instance, describes how ‘different UN member 
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disability groups which should be covered and protected by this 
Convention.’102    
 
A definition of ‘persons with disabilities’ was eventually agreed at the final 
session. 103   It is found in Article 1, alongside the purpose, making it 
impossible for States to derogate from the definition without also derogating 
from the overall purpose of the Convention.104 The definition reads:  
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with 
various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society 
on an equal basis with others. 
 
The definition reflects a social model of disability: it is the interaction with 
barriers that hinders equal participation.105  It is designed to be open and 
inclusive, to minimise the risk of exclusion.  As Grainne de Burca explains, 
‘[t]he aim was to satisfy those who wanted to retain flexibility and the 
possibility of dynamic evolution, as well as those who sought above all to 
prevent governments or courts resiling from commitments by adopting 
excessively narrow or exclusionary interpretation’.106   The openness of the 
definition is further supported by recognition in the preamble that ‘disability is 
an evolving concept…’.107  
 
In line with the holistic and inclusive nature of the purpose and principles at 
the Convention’s core, these negotiations betray an unwillingness to define 
the limits of this legal order at all, albeit tempered by recognition that not to 
do so may lead to undesired consequences.   
 
                                                 
102
 Chairman’s text as amended, supra, 8 
103
 In the working text, February 2006: annex II to Ad hoc committee report of 7
th
 session, 
there is no definition in Article 1, or mention of ‘evolving concept’ in the preamble.  These 
decisions were made at the final session in August 2006.  The EU agreed with the Chair: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7eu.htm  
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 Quinn and Arnandóttir (2009)  
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instance Art 25, right to health (b) requires provision of healthcare needed ‘because of their 
disabilities’ rather than ‘because of their impairments’; Art 23, respect for home and family 
(4) states that ‘no child shall be separated from parents on the basis of disability…’ rather 
than ‘on the basis of impairment’. 
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The boundaries of this legal order are thus pervasive, open and flexible.  The 
Convention’s power to regulate seeps far into society, through public and 
private sectors, and into the home.  Duty-holders range from States through 
organisations to individuals.   These boundaries – or lack of them – answer to 
Mégret’s identified ‘lack’ in the international human rights framework:  the 
failure to understand that exclusion, oppression, discrimination or violence 
may stem not only from the State, but also from social structures, prejudices, 
the community or the family. 108   Furthermore, the ‘disabled/non-disabled’ 
dichotomy almost becomes blurred at the edges.  The rights being protected 
here are potentially those of all of us.109 
 
From this transformative centre, and within these open and flexible 
boundaries, how is the legal space organised to project the rights which are 
the treaty’s raw material?  How do the drafters choose to distort and fashion 
that material, emphasising some aspects above others, drawing continents 
larger or smaller, reshaping their picture of the world to expose and inscribe 
the disability/human rights terrain?  Specific rights are projected through 
Articles 10 to 30. 
 
Projecting the rights 
 
The Convention was never intended to create ‘new’ rights, or to give disabled 
people rights that others do not have.110  Rather, it reaffirms and reformulates 
existing rights, moulding them to reflect the experience of disability.111  The 
negotiators of the Convention had at their disposal the full range of civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights, as set out in the International 
Bill of Rights, as well as their various international, regional and national 
interpretations.  Choices had to be made as to how this raw material should 
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110
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111
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be fashioned into an international human rights treaty capable of delivering 
its particular purpose.  The resulting projections, as Mégret concludes, have 
‘a significant impact on the formulation of human rights… because disability 
forces human rights to re-examine some core assumptions about what the 
needs of human beings are, and how they relate to society and the state’.112   
 
Reshaping the rights 
Some existing rights needed little elaboration from the drafters.  The right to 
life,113 for instance, is plainly stated, with the simple addition that disabled 
people’s right to life must be protected on an equal basis with others –  not so 
simple when one remembers that that protection has not always been, 114 
and is often still not,115 forthcoming.116  The right to life is supplemented by a 
duty to protect disabled people in situations of risk, such as armed conflict, 
humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters 117  - a duty drawn from 
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 Mégret (2008b) 3 
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 See Nazi Aktion T4 programme: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/714411/T4-
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international humanitarian law, and an extra reminder that disabled people 
may suffer disproportionately in such circumstances.118    
 
Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment119 is simply drafted, with the addition that ‘[i]n particular, no one 
shall be subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation’, recalling, inter alia, the experience of people with learning 
disabilities in that context.120   That right is then supplemented by a duty to 
protect disabled people from all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse,  
both inside and outside the home,121 depredations frequently visited on those 
living with impairment. 122     Furthermore, the ‘existence of a disability 
[impairment] shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty’123 – recalling the 
widespread involuntary institutionalisation of disabled and older people and 
those with mental health issues.124   
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Of key importance is the right of disabled people to recognition everywhere 
as persons before the law.125  Again, this seems simple enough, but for the 
different ways that the law treats those who are deemed not to have legal 
capacity.  Here too, this is – sometimes literally - a vital issue for disabled 
people, and another area in which others make fundamental decisions on 
their behalf.126   Having required States to recognise that disabled people  
‘enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’,127  
Article 12 proceeds to specify the measures to be taken, where necessary, to 
support disabled people in exercising that capacity.128   Once such support is 
in place, if required, the person should have equal property rights, control of 
their own financial affairs, 129  and equal access to justice. 130   Disabled 
people’s physical and mental integrity must be respected;131 they must be 
free to choose their nationality and residence, 132  and to vote.133    
 
Respect for home and family life134 focuses strongly on the right to marry and 
have a family, to retain fertility and to ‘freely and responsibly’ make decisions 
about child-bearing – rights taken for granted by non-disabled people, but 
frequently, even routinely, denied to many disabled people.135  No child136  
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shall ‘be separated from its parents on the basis of a disability [impairment] of 
either the child or one or both of the parents’.137  In sum, disabled people 
must be free to exercise the standard freedoms of the ‘able’ liberal subject in 
a democratic, capitalist society. 
 
These basic civil and political rights take on a new dimension when subjected 
to the disability experience.  The framing of the rights emphasises that, for 
disabled people more than most, life-threatening violence and abuse may 
occur on a daily basis; being in a family138 or managing one’s own affairs 
may seem beyond the realms of possibility.  In reshaping existing rights to 
contest that experience, the drafters draw out particular angles under new 
headings.  For instance, respect for personal integrity and protection from 
exploitation, violence and abuse feature as separate Articles, emphasising 
their importance in the disability context.  In the process, the text comes 
close to creating ‘new’ rights. 139 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights undergo similar distortions.  The right to 
health is supplemented by rights to habilitation and rehabilitation, 140  to 
privacy of health records,141 and to personal mobility.142  The right to work 
requires reasonable accommodation in the workplace and affirmative action 
programmes to promote employment in the private sector.   As befits the 
Convention’s social development remit, and the impoverished circumstances 
of millions of disabled people around the world,143 States must take a range 
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of steps to safeguard and promote the equal right to an adequate standard of 
living, including access to appropriate and affordable services to meet 
disabled people’s impairment-related needs, and their inclusion in poverty 
reduction programmes.144  Disabled people must ‘have the opportunity to 
develop and utilize their creative, artistic and intellectual potential, not only for 
their own benefit, but also for the enrichment of society’,145 with support for 
‘their specific cultural and linguistic identity, including sign languages and 
deaf culture’.146 
 
The right to education strongly reflects the disability projection.  Many 
disabled people’s negative experience of their own treatment in childhood, 
including segregation from family and community, institutionalisation, 
medicalisation and denial of education, continues to inform their identities, 
capacities and actions as adults, producing a strong driving force for 
change. 147    Moreover, education is a crucial element in achieving the 
overarching principle of respect for disabled children’s evolving capacities 
and their right to preserve their identities’.148  Education merits one of the 
                                                                                                                                          
to be regarded in their own communities as the most disadvantaged (World Bank, quoted in 
United Nations, ‘From Exclusion to Equality’, UN Handbook for Parliamentarians, no 14 
(2007) 3; and see Chapter 1 above  
144
 Article 28. See ‘Realizing the Millennium Goals…’, report of the Secretary General to 64
th
 
Session UN General Assembly, A/64/180, July 2009, para 4; Pleasence P and Balmer N, 
‘Mental health and the experience of housing problems involving rights’ (2007) 2(1) People, 
Place and Policy Online, 4 
145
 Article 30(2) 
146
 Article 30(4) 
147
 See, for instance, Tara’s story in Chapter 1 above;  Reiser R, ‘Internalized Oppression: 
How it seems to me’ in Rieser R and Mason M (eds) Disability Equality in Education (ILEA 
1990)   
148
Article 3(h).  How best to achieve this outcome remains a contentious issue: alongside 
those who fight for inclusion in mainstream provision, there are also those who strongly 
favour separate education. The World Blind Union, for instance, considers that ‘UNESCO’s 
promotion of inclusive education has harmed blind children enormously.  Blind children find 
themselves mainstreamed in a class without support, with teachers who can’t read Braille 
and lack the ability to communicate effectively with blind children.’  The World Federation of 
the Deaf is concerned that [i]n developing countries… some deaf schools are being closed in 
the name of inclusive education, resulting in high illiteracy among deaf children.’  Others 
recognise that  ‘[w]hat is more complicated is striking the balance between special versus 
inclusive education… The fundamental principle at the core of this article is the issue of 
choice.  The article should not allow for reliance on special schools as excuse for States to 
not make general schools accessible.’  European Disability Forum, Daily Summary, 3 August 
2005
       
 98 
 
longest articles in the Convention text, providing detailed instructions on how 
it is to be realised.149 
 
The interdependence of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights is 
now widely accepted – at least in theory - within international human rights 
discourse; the way that they are mapped out in this Convention, in the 
context of disabled people’s profound experiences of exclusion, reaffirms that 
interdependence. 150    The ‘universality, invisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and the need 
for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed their full enjoyment without 
discrimination’ is reaffirmed in the Preamble.151    Economic and social rights 
not only appear as rights in themselves: they are incorporated into articles 
dealing with civil and political rights, and vice versa, leading to inseparable 
fusing of the traditional dichotomy.  Such ‘hybrid’ rights include, for instance, 
the right to health which prohibits discriminatory denial of healthcare, 152 
echoing the right to life; the right to work includes protection from slavery, 
forced or compulsory labour.153  Conversely, appropriate support services 
must be provided to victims of exploitation, violence or abuse;154  accessible 
family planning education and services must be available to allow informed 
reproduction choices.155   As Mégret identifies, the drafters ‘ride roughshod’ 
over the traditional international human rights dichotomy between the two 
‘sets’ of rights.156  It will be seen in Chapter 4 below that Article 19, the right 
to live independently and be included in the community which stands at the 
centre of Convention realisation, exemplifies this fusion.  Here again, as 
Stein and Lord note, ‘several articles appear at first blush to reflect newly 
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created rights, but in fact were included for the purpose of clarifying the 
means through which other CRPD rights are realized’.157    
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, economic, social and cultural rights have 
an enabling function, allowing people to take charge of their own lives, to 
exercise their autonomy and to participate in and contribute to society.  
Disability is a context in which that function is particularly ‘sharp’.158   These 
rights are thus inextricably bound up with the exercise and realisation of all 
Convention rights; they are a key element in the repositioning of disabled 
people from welfare to rights in the new world of the disability/human rights 
discourse, and on the Convention map.   
 
However, the two ‘sets’ of rights remain unequal in their application: whilst 
civil and political rights are to be implemented immediately, economic, social 
and cultural rights may be subjected to ‘progressive realisation’.159  How to 
address this dichotomy engendered much discussion during negotiation.  
Whilst a requirement for immediate implementation of all economic, social 
and cultural rights was generally accepted as unrealistic, delegates were 
concerned that such flexibility should not apply to non-discrimination in their 
application.  Others argued that the aspects of economic, social and cultural 
rights accepted in international law as requiring immediate application go well 
beyond non-discrimination:160 these aspects should also be given immediate 
effect. The problem was finally resolved in Article 4(2).161   The Chairman’s 
2005 draft of this section allows for progressive realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights except where this ‘would result in discrimination on 
the basis of disability.’ 162   Following negotiation, this exception was 
rephrased, allowing for broader interpretation: 
With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party 
undertakes to take measures to the maximum of its available 
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resources and, where needed, within the framework of international 
cooperation,  with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation 
of these rights, without prejudice to those obligations contained in the 
present Convention that are immediately applicable according to 
international  law.163 
 
The Convention’s central re-description of the world thus projects the rights 
themselves in ways that fundamentally alter the traditional rights perspective.  
It melds the rights together, it highlights angles of the human rights 
framework in new ways, and it challenges basic human rights assumptions.  
The drafting techniques have another dimension that stretches the 
international human rights framework, not only focusing the rights 
themselves, but also driving their practical realisation.   The CRPD has been 
described above as small-scale, ‘systemic’ 164  law: its function as an 
international treaty is to provide a broad, universal framework.  These 
cartographers, however, have engaged in larger-scale drafting.  ‘The tertiary 
obligation to fulfil’ is not far from their minds:165    they map in not just the 
continents, but also some particular roads to be followed.    
 
Enlarging the scale  
The detail and nature of those roads vary from one right or duty to another.  
The objective of Article 8, for instance, is to bring about the sea-change in 
attitudes necessary to achieve the Convention’s purpose.  Earlier 
international human rights treaties have addressed parallel aims, but none 
has provided such specific direction to States as to how they should bring 
about the desired outcome.  CEDAW and CERD maintain their small-scale, 
overarching style.166 The CRPD, on the other hand, not only sets out in broad 
                                                 
163
 See 2009 discussion between UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and UK delegation in Chapter 5 below 
164
 Santos (2002), see Chapter 1 above 
165
 Hunt (1999) 34: ‘when legislators wish to impose the tertiary obligation to fulfil, they can 
reduce the indeterminacy by precise, detailed drafting.’ 
166
 CERD addresses such culture change in its Article 7: ‘States Parties undertake to adopt 
immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture 
and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and 
to promoting understanding tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical 
groups…’.    CEDAW Article 5 requires States ‘to modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
supremacy of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women’, and to ensure 
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terms what States should do, but also goes into detailed directions about the 
means to be used:   including running public awareness campaigns, 167  
fostering respect in the education system 168  and in the media, 169  and 
promoting disability awareness training.170  The Article thus strays from its 
small-scale remit into larger-scale territory in an effort to promote the actual 
realisation in practice – the fulfilment - of its objective.   
 
Other duties are equally specific.  To achieve accessibility, States must 
identify and eliminate obstacles in, inter alia: 
(a) Buildings, roads, transportation and other indoor and outdoor facilities, 
including schools, housing, medical facilities and workplaces; 
(b) Information, communications and other services, including electronic 
services and emergency services.171 
 
They must provide minimum access standards and guidelines; training for 
stakeholders; and easy-read and Braille signage, guides and interpreters. 
They must promote support to ensure disabled people’s access to 
information and technology.172  This list includes items which are commonly 
viewed as ‘reasonable accommodations’ in the individual context; here they 
are demanded of the State. 
 
The road to freedom of expression 173  requires information to be made 
available in accessible formats, alternative communication methods to be 
used in official interactions, and private service providers and the mass 
media to be encouraged to do the same.  Even this traditional ‘negative’ civil 
right – a freedom from State interference - entails very specific (and socio-
economic) positive actions on the part of the State.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
that family education includes a proper understanding of the roles of men and women in the 
upbringing of children.’ 
167
 Article 8(2)(a)(i),(ii)&(iii) 
168
 Article 8(2)(b) 
169
 Article 8(2)(c) 
170
 Article 8(2)(d) 
171
 Article 9(1)(a) & (b) 
172
 Article 9(2) 
173
 Article 21 
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The right to education makes full use of this technique.  As well as a long list 
of measures to ensure a fully inclusive education system at all levels,174  
‘appropriate measures’ to be taken by States include:  
(a)Facilitating the learning of Braille, alternative script, augmentative and 
alternative modes, means and formats of communication and 
orientation and mobility skills, and facilitating peer support and 
mentoring; 
(b)Facilitating the learning of sign language and the promotion of the 
linguistic identity of the deaf community; 
(c)Ensuring that the education of persons, and in particular children, who 
are blind, deaf or deafblind, is delivered in the most appropriate 
languages and modes and means of communication for the individual, 
and in environments which maximise academic and social 
development.175 
 
The disability/human rights projection of the rights themselves and these 
forays into larger-scale drafting combine to give a clearer picture than usual 
of the nature and contours of this terrain, and the routes through it to the 
intended destination.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Sedimentation of a discourse into a new international legal order entails the 
creation of a ‘revolving door’ through which its particular forms of knowledge 
and power can circulate, to establish new understandings, systems of social 
relations and actor identities around the world.  Like cartographers, the 
Convention drafters must convert their rounded and multi-dimensional social 
reality into the flat and two-dimensional text of a legally binding international 
human rights treaty.  They must define their central ideological perspective 
and the limits of their legal order.  They must apply projection techniques that 
are technically sound, whilst serving the purpose of their hegemonic project.  
They must set out the terrain so as to guide the Convention’s travellers 
towards the ultimate destination where the disability/human rights myth 
becomes imaginary. 
                                                 
174
 Article 24(2)(a) – (e) 
175
 Article 24(3) 
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This Chapter has examined the Convention text as it lays down its central 
purpose and principles, its boundaries and its projection of the rights 
themselves.  It has found a purpose clause designed to re-emphasise the 
overall objective of the Convention and the binding nature of its obligations; 
principles of respect for dignity, autonomy, inclusion, participation and 
equality which aim to re-position disabled people from ‘other’ to integral part 
of human diversity and humanity; and broad, inclusive and flexible 
boundaries which blur the dichotomy between ‘disabled’ and ‘non-disabled’ to 
apply the Convention’s terms potentially to all of us.  Civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights are melded together to reshape all rights in the light 
of disabled people’s experience, and to provide clear roads to the intended 
destination.  Traditional dichotomies are brushed aside, 176  relations of 
difference prevail, and dynamics of interlegality abound. 
 
Like any myth, the vision of the CRPD drafters is unattainable at present: it 
represents an ideal society.  As Lawson comments,  
[a] reading of the terms of the CRPD might well lead one to the view 
that it heralds a “new era”.  If implemented fully it would impact on all 
aspects of the lives of millions of disabled people and, indeed, on their 
very existence.  Further, its impact would not be confined to disabled 
people, but would extend to all.  It may, of course, directly benefit any 
member of the human race because those who are currently not 
disabled may become so at any moment.  In addition, its provisions 
require the reshaping of societies in a way required by no other human 
rights treaty.  The realization of human rights for disabled people 
requires fundamental changes to be made to building and product 
design, to modes of transport, of communication and of information and 
service provision, as well as to the attitudes and expectations of the 
general population and of political leaders.177    
 
This re-description of the world has been mapped, but it is not yet reality; it 
awaits a fundamental transformation which has yet to take place.  Existing 
treaties, with their implementation provisions, have failed to bring about that 
transformation.178   The onus is on the drafters of this Convention to succeed 
where earlier treaties have failed – to ensure that their new legal order does 
                                                 
176
 Mégret (2008b) 
177
 Lawson (2006-2007) 618-9 
178
 Quinn and Degener (2002), Louise Arbour (2006), IDRM Reports etc 
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enable disability/human rights discourse to circulate, and to establish new 
understandings, systems of social relations and actor identities around the 
world.  Again, the drafters apply a number of innovative techniques to put in 
place the necessary conditions for expansion of their project’s hegemony.  
These include the Convention’s implementation and monitoring provisions, 
which are examined next.  To make concrete the enquiry into the 
Convention’s goal of paradigm change, Chapter 4 also examines further the 
Article 19 right to live independently and be included in the community. 
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Chapter 4  
Implementation 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 has highlighted the Convention map’s central purpose and 
principles, and its flexible boundaries.  It has explored the techniques used to 
project civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights through the 
experience of disability, and to give a clearer picture than usual of the nature 
and contours of the terrain and the routes through it to the intended 
destination.  But roads are of no use unless they are travelled; maps just 
decorative until they are used; and international treaties of symbolic value 
only unless and until they are effectively implemented.   The Convention’s 
realisation provisions are designed to ensure that the hegemonic project from 
which this map has emerged does not end with adoption of the Convention, 
but continues to build its power and influence to transform understandings, 
practices and identities around the world – to transform the myth into 
imaginary.     
 
This Chapter examines the implementation and monitoring provisions 
designed to take the hegemonic project forward.  It also examines in more 
depth a right which is fundamental to realisation of the Convention project: 
the right to live independently and be included in the community set out in 
Article 19.  Although some Convention drafters were concerned that Article 
19 should not be seen as endorsing disabled people’s independent living 
movement, it is argued here that the concept of independent living as 
understood by that movement is so deeply ingrained that it is impossible to 
extract it from the Convention myth.  Section 2 below provides a brief 
overview of the history, philosophy and practice of independent living before 
examining the text of Article 19.  As a ‘hybrid’ right included to clarify the 
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means through which other Convention rights are realised, implementation of 
Article 19 is chosen as ‘barometer’ for success or otherwise of the 
Convention drafters’ hegemonic project in Part 2 of the thesis. 
 
Implementation and monitoring 
 
The ‘projection techniques’ used to try to ensure realisation of the CRPD’s 
vision are at once practical and imaginative.  They include the standard UN 
systems, but, as one might expect of these ‘cartographers’, systems are 
shaped, augmented and coloured to emphasise their focus and their 
direction; and they are deepened to engage players across the board and at 
all levels, not least disabled people themselves.  They thus encourage the 
continued development of relations of difference and of constellations of 
interlegality, 1  and set in train a series of implementation mechanisms 
designed to ensure that the hegemonic project that has succeeded in  
embedding the disability/human rights myth into international law continues 
to flourish.  These mechanisms are set out in Articles 30 to 50. 
 
Like other international human rights treaties, the CRPD establishes a 
monitoring committee.2  When nominating their candidates, States Parties 
‘are invited to give due consideration’ to Article 4(3).3  This is the ‘nothing 
about us without us’ provision which requires States to ‘closely consult with 
and actively involve’ disabled people and their organisations when 
implementing the Convention.  As well as reflecting ‘equitable distribution’ 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 1 above 
2
 Article 34. Consisting initially of twelve members elected by the States Parties, increasing 
to eighteen once eighty States have ratified: Article 34(2)  Once elected, members serve a 
term of four years, and are eligible for re-election once: Article 34(7). The Committee reports 
every two years to the General Assembly and to the Economic and Social Council.  The 
initial Committee was elected in November 2008 and held its first session in February 2009.  
One of its first actions was to ensure that disabled people had access to its meetings, 
including provision of information in accessible formats, interpreters and personal and 
technological assistance.   As at August 2012, the Committee has held seven reporting 
sessions, published rules of procedure and guidance on monitoring, and held ‘days of 
discussion’ on equal recognition before the law (2009) and accessibility (2010): for updates 
see http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/crpd/pages/crpdindex.aspx last accessed 1.9.12 
3
 Article 34(3) 
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along geographical, cultural, gender and legal system lines, ‘consideration 
shall be given’ to participation on this Committee of ‘experts with disabilities’.4  
The CRPD is thus the first international human rights treaty to specifically call 
on States Parties to nominate experts coming from the target group.5  The 
Committee, once established, has the standard job of monitoring States 
Parties’ implementation progress through a ‘constructive dialogue’ based on 
their periodic reports.6   Here too, States are ‘invited to consider’ preparing 
their reports with ‘due consideration’ to consultation with and involvement of 
disabled people as required under Article 4(3).  Where a State has ratified 
the Convention’s Optional Protocol, the Committee has competence to 
consider complaints from individuals or groups in that State who claim to be 
victims of violations of their Convention rights.7  
 
This part of the monitoring procedure ties the Convention securely into the 
established UN human rights monitoring framework.  The reporting system 
produces a national/international ‘dialogue’ with potential to influence 
discursive dynamics, and to strengthen the disability rights ‘myth’.  But under 
this Convention, States will also talk to each other on a regular basis, and to 
civil society, in a Conference of States Parties, a forum with no equivalent 
in other international human rights treaties.8  Under Article 40, a Conference 
                                                 
4
 Article 34(4) 
5
 ‘CRPD: An Overview of the Conference of Sates Parties and Committee of Experts’, 
adapted from an article co-authored by Shatha Rau Barriga, RI; and Kirsten Young (formerly 
of the Landmine Survivors Network) in Rehabilitation International Review, December 2007.  
Although other UN Monitoring Committees may, in practice, appoint, for instance, women to 
the CEDAW Committee, there is no provision within the text of CEDAW which requires them 
to consider doing so. 
6
 Article 35(1) and (2).  An initial ‘comprehensive’ report must be submitted by each State 
within two years of ratification, and subsequent reports at least every four years. 
7
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 1 
8
 Burca reports that ‘Article 40 was strongly advocated by the Latin American and Caribbean 
grouping of States, as well as by NGOs.  The model which the NGOs had for a strong 
biennial conference was apparently inspired by a similar provision in the Ottawa Landmines 
Convention, in which the annual conference plays a particularly substantive role because 
there is no independent monitoring provision provided for in that Treaty.  The CRPD, on the 
other hand, has… an international monitoring mechanism with an optional individual 
complaints procedure, as well as significant provisions on national monitoring.  The provision 
in Art. 40 providing for a biennial meeting of the parties is therefore additional to these, and 
therefore serves a slightly different function from that under the Ottawa Convention.’ Burca 
(2010) 187-188. See also Liebowitz T, Minkowitz T, Trommel S and Barriga SH, ‘How the 
Conference of States Parties Can Serve as an Essential Forum for CRPD Implementation’ 
(2008) 57(1) Rehabilitation International Review 8; Barriga SR and Young K, ‘CRPD: An 
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of States Parties must be convened by the UN Secretary-General every two 
years 9  to consider ‘any matter with regard to the implementation’ of the 
Convention.10  Delegates to the Conference attend formal sessions and take 
part in interactive discussions.  Less formal sessions are organised jointly 
with NGOs; and side events address specific issues.11  As the final press 
release from the first conference in 2009 proclaimed: Delegates, Civil Society 
Representatives Take Part in Interactive Dialogue.   This ‘interactive 
dialogue’ has now become an annual rather than a biennial event. 12 
 
A further dynamic is created by the engagement of Regional Integration 
Organisations.   Both the Convention and its Optional Protocol are open not 
only for ratification by States, but also to ‘formal confirmation’ by ‘regional 
integration organisations’.13    The EU was an active participant in the drafting 
negotiations,14  and acceded to the CRPD in 2010.15   It may vote in the 
meeting of States Parties, with a number of votes equal to the number of its 
member States that are party to the Convention, except where an individual 
                                                                                                                                          
Overview of the Conference of States Parties and Committee of Experts’ (2007) 56(4) 
Rehabilitation International Review 
9
 Or on the decision of the Conference of States Parties: Article 40(2) 
10
 Article 40(1). Burca describes this element of the realisation framework as one of the 
‘experimentalist features’ of the Convention: ‘[t]he idea of revisability, of a built-in opportunity 
for regular review and reconsideration of all aspects of the substance and functioning of a 
regulatory system, is central to the model of experimentalist governance.’ Burca (2010) 187; 
see also Liebowitz et al (2007) 
11
 For instance, at the second Conference in September 2009, an informal session was held 
on disability and poverty, ‘with special reference to the current economic crisis’.  
(http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1479  accessed 13/1/10). The Conference of 
States Parties thus provides a forum for the early consideration of such potential dislocatory 
events as the economic downturn.    
12
 CRPD Article 42(2) requires the Secretary-General of the UN to convene a Conference of 
States Parties ‘biennially or upon the decision of the Conference of States Parties’.  The first 
Conference decided to make the event an annual one.   
13
 Optional Protocol Article 11; CRPD Article 42. These are organisations ‘constituted by 
sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence 
in respect of matters governed by [the] Convention.’
13
  Optional Protocol Article 12; CRPD 
Article 44 
14
 The EU’s initial approach to the drafting of the Convention was ‘somewhat ambivalent’: it 
was concerned that a treaty might ‘end up reinforcing a segregationist tendency in law and 
policy for people with disabilities’. However, ‘once it became clear that there was to be a 
Disability Convention, the Commission perceived an opportunity for the European Union to 
become party for the first time, as a recognised international organisation, to an international 
human rights Treaty.  At this point, the Commission switched tactics to make a strong 
argument for a binding instrument’, albeit advocating for an ‘anti-discrimination’ rather than a 
‘substantive rights’ approach, seeking to promote its own internal model of disability 
discrimination at the international level. Burca (2010) 179-80.   
15
 The EU acceded to the CRPD on 23 December 2010.  
http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=12&pid=166  accessed 7.1.11 
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member State votes in its own right.  The presence of regional organisations 
as Parties to the Convention brings new perspectives to the discussion, 
including their history and experience as a regional body, their institutional, 
legal and political relationships with their Member States, and, in the case of 
the EU, its established role in the international development field.16   
 
More practical international cooperation is also required.  This Convention 
came about in part because of the absence of disability from the Millennium 
Development Goals.17   One of the CRPD’s aims is to ensure that such 
invisibility is not repeated.  Ratifying States undertake to recognise the 
importance of international cooperation for realising the purpose and 
objectives of the Convention.18  The measures to be taken19 include ensuring 
the accessibility of international development programmes; 20   capacity-
building;21 cooperation in research and its accessible dissemination;22 and 
providing technical and economic assistance.23   In 2007, Special Rapporteur 
Hissa Al-Thani reported24 that, despite strong political will, lack of resources 
and expertise was ‘commonly cited’ as an obstacle to achieving the 
Convention’s objectives.  She concluded that international and interregional 
cooperation in policy and practice is one of the most effective ways to hasten 
implementation.   
 
                                                 
16
 See Ferri D, ‘The Implication of the UNCRPD for EU Law’ (2011) presentation to ERA 
(Academy of European Law) Seminar on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Madrid, 15-16 December 2011 
17
 See Chapter 2 above.  ‘Realizing the Millennium Development Goals for Persons with 
Disabilities through the Implementation of the World Programme of Action concerning 
Disabled Persons and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Report of 
the Secretary General to 64
th
 Session UN General Assembly, A/64/180, July 2009, para 4; 
Kayess and French (2008) 17 
18
 Article 32(1) 
19
 ‘As appropriate, in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations and 
civil society, in particular organizations of persons with disabilities’, Article 32(1) 
20
 Article 32(1)(a) 
21
 Article 32(1)(b) 
22
 Article 32(1)(c) 
23
 Article 32(1)(d) 
24
 Economic and Social Council, ‘Monitoring of the implementation of the Standard Rules on 
the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities’, 16 November 2006, 
E/CN.5/2007/4, Hissa Al-Thani, Special Rapporteur, para 45 
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It should not be forgotten that the Standard Rules on the Equalisation of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities,25 with their Special Rapporteur 
and panel of experts, have not gone away.  In her capacity as Special 
Rapporteur, Hissa Al-Thani attended the Ad Hoc Committee sessions and 
contributed to the Convention’s drafting.26  Al-Thani speaks of ‘the symbiotic 
relationship’ between the Standard Rules and the Convention: 27  CRPD 
articles mirror the Rules in content and substance, and the Rules ‘serve as a 
detailed checklist on what needs to be done and how it should be 
approached’.28  The role of Special Rapporteur has since been extended to 
cover not only promotion and monitoring of the Standard Rules, but also 
promotion and advocacy of the Convention.29 
 
The Disabled People’s Movement’s mantra of ‘nothing about us without 
us’ not only served as a rallying call during the drafting negotiations,30 but 
was also applied there in very practical and effective ways.31   That mantra 
also colours the Convention’s realisation provisions.32  It insists on disabled 
people’s continuing involvement:  
 in Monitoring Committee nominations and on the Committee itself;  
 in participation at Committee meetings, and in preparation of States’ 
reports; 
                                                 
25
 see chapter 2 above 
26
 Economic and Social Council, ‘Monitoring of the implementation of the Standard Rules on 
the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities’, 16 November 2006, 
E/CN.5/2007/4, Hissa Al-Thani, Special Rapporteur, para 3 
27
 Ibid, para 11 
28
 Ibid, para 13. One such contribution is the Global Survey on Government Actions, which 
has resulted in the ‘most comprehensive body of research into disability’, yielding information 
on progress in 114 countries. Economic and Social Council, ‘Monitoring the implementation 
of the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities’, 17 
November 2008, E/CN.5/2009/6, para 31(c) 
29
 Ibid para 29 
30
 See chapter 2 above 
31
 See chapter 2 above 
32
 See for instance Office of the High Commission for Human Rights ‘Monitoring the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Guidance for Human Rights Monitors’ 
Professional training series no 17 (United Nations, 2010); Disability Rights Promotion 
International, ‘Opportunities, Methodologies and training resources for Disability Rights 
Monitoring’ (DRPI 2003); International Disability Rights Monitor, IDRM International Disability 
Rights Compendium, (Centre for International Rehabilitation 2003) 
International Disability Rights Monitor, IDRM: Regional Report of the Americas, (International 
Disability Network and the Centre for International Rehabilitation 2004)  
International Disability Rights Monitor, IDRM: Regional Report of Asia, (IDRM 2005) 
International Disability Rights Monitor, ‘The United Kingdom’ in IDRM: Regional Report for 
Europe (IDRM 2007) 
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 through potential complaint under the Optional Protocol; 
 in the activities and discussions of the Conference of States Parties;  
 through regional integration organisations; and  
 in international development measures to realise the purpose of the 
Convention.   
The right to form disabled people’s organisations at international, national, 
regional and local levels can be found in Article 29(b)(i).  Disabled people’s 
organisations have not been slow to take up the challenge.33   
 
However, as Philip Alston remarks, international activities ‘might be a useful 
catalyst, but what ultimately matters is what is done, perhaps in conjunction 
with those measures, at the national level.’ 34    Here, too, the CRPD’s 
realisation provisions point the way. 
 
Perhaps the innovation with the most potential for driving real implementation 
is the Convention’s provision for national implementation and 
monitoring.35  Ratifying States ‘shall designate one or more focal points 
within government for matters relating to implementation’ of the Convention, 
with ‘due consideration’ to establishing ‘a coordination mechanism within 
government to facilitate related action in different sectors and at different 
levels’.36  Independent bodies, too, must be established to ‘promote, protect 
and monitor’ implementation of the Convention, ‘in line with the principles 
relating to the status and functioning’ of such institutions.37  And relevant 
research data must be collected, disaggregated and accessibly 
                                                 
33
 As well as the Conference activities described above, they have published guidance and 
developed training, organised national, regional and international seminars, run advocacy 
campaigns and implementation projects, and more: ‘Status of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and the Optional protocol thereto’, General Assembly, 7 July 
2009, A/64/128.  Monitoring projects established prior to the Convention also continue: see  
Disability Rights Promotion International, http://www.yorku.ca/drpi;  International Disability 
Rights Monitor http://www.idrmnet.org.:  and Pinto PC, ‘Monitoring Human Rights: a Holistic 
Approach’ in Rioux MH, Basser L and Jones M (eds) Critical Perspectives on Human Rights 
and Disability Law (Martinus Nijhof 2011)   
34
 Alston P, ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Eide A, Krause C 
and Rosas A, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Brill 2001) 
35
 Article 33 
36
 Article 33(1) 
37
 Article 33(2). The Paris Principles: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm.   
 112 
 
disseminated 38  to support this implementation assessment process.  At 
national level, the requirement is for implementation focused and integrated 
into and throughout government, complemented by strong independent 
statutory promotion and monitoring mechanisms.   
 
Here too, ‘[c]ivil society, in particular persons with disabilities and their 
representative organizations, shall be involved and participate fully’ in that 
monitoring process. 39   As seen in Chapter 3 above, they must also be 
consulted and actively involved when governments develop and implement 
relevant legislation and policy, and in other decision-making processes that 
concern them.40   
 
As Quinn explains, this Convention is  
interesting and unique and distinctive.  Most international Conventions 
say: we have the obligations, in the pure ether, now go do it.  The gap 
has always been – where is the transmission belt between international 
law and the domestic matrix for change?  This Convention actually goes 
the extra step and requires that matrix to be in place.41   
 
Just as the cartographers have shaped the rights to map out the 
disability/rights terrain more clearly than usual, and to orient the duty-bearer 
more specifically on the routes to be taken, so also projection of the 
Convention’s implementation provisions strengthens and deepens the 
implementation process.  All of the players involved in the drafting process 
will continue to meet at the Conference of States Parties, through their 
regional integration organisations and through international cooperation and 
development networks.  The promotion and monitoring systems established 
through the Standard Rules continue and are strengthened, as are domestic 
networks within and outside government.  Governments are engaged in 
dialogue with the UN Monitoring Committee, and with each other and their 
regional organisations at the Conference of States Parties.  Disabled people 
                                                 
38
 Article 31 
39
 Article 33(3) 
40
 Article 4(3) 
41
 Quinn G, ‘Added value of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(2008) presentation to Seminar of the European Coalition for Community Living, Drammen, 
Norway; printed in Newsletter of the European Coalition for Community Living, December 
2008/January 2009, 2 
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and their organisations are active and involved at every level around the 
world.   The ‘transmission belt’ is not only between international and national 
spheres: all of Santos’ structural places, with their legal dimensions, are 
engaged, offering countless opportunities for the continuation of dynamic 
interlegal interplay.  Legal and political relations of difference leave room for 
a proliferation of differences and for stable compromises, allowing 
disability/human rights discourse to serve as surface of inscription for a 
variety of social demands and dislocations.  The scene is set for continuation 
of the hegemonic project that has produced the Convention to translate its 
‘particular discourse of norms, values, views and perceptions’ 42  into 
‘imaginary’43 and into the reality of the lives and identities of all concerned. 
 
In addition to these implementation and monitoring provisions, there are 
several Articles particularly central to the Convention’s goal of paradigm 
change.  For example, the Article 12 requirement for States to recognise 
disabled people as persons before the law, enjoying legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life is a pre-requisite for the exercise 
of other Convention rights;44 and implementation of Articles 8 (awareness-
raising) and 9 (accessibility) are essential to bring about the structural and 
attitudinal change necessary for substantive realisation of equality, autonomy 
and participation. 45    Also pre-requisite is Article 19, the right to live 
independently and be included in the community.  As we have seen in 
Chapter 3, while Article 19 appears to create a ‘new’ right, in fact it was 
included for the purpose of clarifying the means through which other CRPD 
rights are realised.46   For this reason, it is chosen in Part 2 as ‘barometer’ of 
hegemonic expansion of the disability/human rights discourse in England.  In 
preparation, this section looks more closely at disabled people’s independent 
living discourse, and at the terms of Article 19.  
                                                 
42
 Torfing (1999) 302 
43
 The ‘default’ system of meanings that underlie and structure our society: see Chapter 1 
above 
44
 See Chapter 3 above, and  for example United Nations, ‘From Exclusion to Equality’, UN 
Handbook for Parliamentarians, no 14, (2007) 89.  At the time of writing, the UNCRPD 
Committee is working on the legal, theoretical and practical aspects of Article 12: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx  2/4/12 
45
 See Chapter 3 above 
46
 Stein and Lord (2009) 30 
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Independent living 
 
Although the Convention drafters’ remit prohibited the creation of ‘new’ rights, 
several articles appear ‘at first blush’47 to do so.  Article 19, the right to live 
independently and be included in the community, is one such article.  
Included to clarify the means through which other Convention rights are 
realised, it stands at the centre of Convention implementation.  It both 
encapsulates core elements of disabled people’s social-antagonistic 
discourse, directly challenging traditional assumptions of dependency and 
exclusion, and embodies the Convention’s fusion of civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights.  Progress in realisation of Article 19 will therefore 
serve as an important barometer of progress in implementing the Convention 
as a whole.  Understandings of independent living, with their related systems 
and subject positions, will help to provide evidence of the progress – or 
otherwise – of disability/human rights discourse as it enters the national 
arena. 
 
There is a substantial body of literature on independent living written by 
disabled people, which flows directly from their experience and which 
constitutes the authoritative perspective, or combinations of perspectives, on 
its meaning.  The following section aims only to give sufficient flavour of that 
meaning for a reader unfamiliar with the concept of independent living to 
understand its importance to realisation of the Convention’s purpose, and to 
follow the arguments made in Part 2 of the thesis.48  
 
Following a brief outline of the history, philosophy and practice of 
independent living, this section focuses on its sedimentation in Article 19 of 
the Convention.  The negotiation and text of the Article are examined before 
we turn to the UK in Part 2 of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
47 Ibid 
48
 It is hoped that the reader will then feel moved to explore the literature for themselves to 
gain a deeper understanding. The Leeds Disability Archive at 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/index.html  offers a useful starting point. 
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History  
The international mobilisation of disabled people,49 which has had such a 
formative influence on international human rights law,50 sprang from earlier 
politicisation at national and local levels.51    In England, in 1966, Paul Hunt 
recognised that disability challenges accepted social values in fundamental 
ways:  
disabilities like ours, which often prohibit any attempt at normal living in 
society, almost force one to consider the basic issues, not only of 
coping with a special handicap [sic], but of life itself… the most acute 
questions arise and the most radical ‘answers’ are called for.52    
 
As disabled people came together across impairment boundaries to discuss 
those acute questions, some radical answers began to unfold.53  The ‘social 
model’ of disability 54  ‘was, and remains, the British disabled people’s 
movement’s “big idea”.’55   
 
In the United States, one of the early manifestations of disability activism was 
the spread of Centres for Independent Living (CILs).  The first CIL was set up 
in 1968 by a small group of disabled students from the University of Berkeley, 
California, known as the ‘rolling quads’.  As students, despite being 
accommodated in hospital quarters, they had got used to being part of the 
mainstream community.   When they graduated, rather than accepting the 
prospect of future dependency, ‘they got together and decided to think up 
ways of actually changing the society that they lived in.’56  One result was an 
organisation that operated on three basic premises: it was led by disabled 
people, covered all impairments, and had as its objective social change.  As 
Rachel Hurst comments, ‘[t]hose were quite, well very radical ideas…’’.57  By 
                                                 
49
 Hurst (2000) and see Chapter 2 above 
50
 See Chapters 2 and 3 above 
51
 See Charlton (2000) Chapter 8; Campbell (1997); Barnes and Mercer (2006) Chapter 3 
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 Hunt P, ‘A Critical Condition’ in Hunt P (ed) Stigma: The Experience of Disability (Geoffrey 
Chapman 1966), Leeds Disability Archive 
53
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 See Chapter 1 above 
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1971, just three years later, there were 144 such Centres across the USA, 
and their model has since spread around the world.   
CILs signalled a clear break from the dominant understanding of disabled 
people as passive individual recipients of charitable services. The CIL was an 
organisation of disabled people with a radical political agenda: far from being 
passive, these disabled people were active, in control and demanding 
change.  The philosophy of independent living, which developed from these 
beginnings, became a cornerstone of the US Disability Rights Movement 
(DRM);58  its principles, together with the social model of disability, continue 
to underpin disability politics, and disabled people’s organisations (DPOs), 
worldwide.  Alongside the social construct understanding of disability, 
‘independent living’ acts as a nodal point in disabled people’s discourse.59  Its 
emptiness as a signifier enables it to embrace a wide range of histories, 
viewpoints and aspirations.60  
Philosophy 
Independent living has been described as ‘the emancipatory philosophy and 
practice which empowers disabled people and enables them to exert 
influence, choice and control in every aspect of their life’.61  It stands in direct 
contrast to the ‘welfare’ model, which sees people as passive recipients of 
compensation for their exclusion from society.62  As Ed Roberts, one of the 
Berkeley group, explains, ‘[w]hen people with disabilities come to the 
conclusion that they have the right to be in the community, to have a say in 
how that community treats them, they are beginning to develop a 
consciousness about taking control of their lives and resisting all attempts to 
give others that control’. 63   There is a strong element of antagonistic 
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 See for instance John Evans’ oral evidence to the JCHR inquiry into the implementation of 
the right of disabled people to independent living,  28 June 2011: disabled people have three 
main ideas: the social model of disability, independent living, and human rights. 
60
 Though see Part 2 of the thesis for its openness to re-articulation and dislocation 
61
 Hasler F ‘Philosophy of Independent Living’ (Independent Living Institute 2003) 
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resistance to the experience of exclusion and enforced dependency:64 this 
political discourse is not only about autonomy, it is about anti-dependence.   
A second, related, key element is control.  Charlton writes that ‘[t]he DRM’s 
demand for control is the essential theme that runs through all its work, 
regardless of political-economic or cultural differences.  Control has universal 
appeal for DRM activists because the needs of people with disabilities and 
the potential for meeting these needs are everywhere conditioned by a 
dependency born of powerlessness, poverty, degradation, and 
institutionalisation.  This dependency, saturated with paternalism, begins with 
the onset of disability and continues until death.’65    Individual empowerment 
and self-determination are not only seen as essential in themselves, they are 
central to a wider resistance to these conditions. 
As Hasler explains, ‘independent living is more than an individual aim. It 
encompasses a change in social relations.’66  Independent living brings 
disabled people together to work collectively, and with their allies,67 for a 
future where they will all enjoy the day-to-day choices and freedoms that 
others take for granted.  As we have seen, achieving these goals involves a 
‘deep reconstruction’68 of the world, which in turn requires ways of thinking 
that are incommensurate with the ‘ableist’, exclusionary language of liberal 
individualism.69  It requires inclusive, collective action to bring about ‘respect 
for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human 
diversity and humanity’.70   
Moreover, that action must be holistic.  Independent living means different 
things for different people.  The barriers that they face will vary according to 
their individual and social circumstances and the choices they make.  
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Independent living is an issue that spans all age groups and stretches right 
across all areas of social and economic life – through employment, housing, 
transport, education, health and social care, financial provision and more.   
As Young recognises, it is necessary to address all aspects of exclusion71 to 
overturn the structures and practices of oppression, or to address the 
‘multidimensional disadvantages’ of inequality.72 
It will be apparent from this brief description that these discursive elements of 
the philosophy of independent living – anti-dependence, control, change in 
social relations and holistic structural transformation – are not only central to 
the understandings of the Disabled People’s Movement, but, through them, 
also central to the CRPD myth73 and to its interpretation.  As John Evans 
commented to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the whole Convention 
is about independent living.74 
We may also see that this political philosophy aims to work through all of the 
dynamic and interwoven components of hegemonic discourse construction 
described in Chapter 1:  through understandings, systems and identities.  
The growing social antagonistic construction of new understandings of 
disabled people’s place in the world forms the basis of the organisational 
design and ethos of the CIL, of identities of individual disabled people 
through their consciousness and empowerment.75   It seeks to establish new 
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systems of social relations through wider attitudinal and structural change.76  
The agenda is pursued through hegemonic practice. 
Practice 
As well as founding this empowering, inclusive and holistic philosophy of 
resistance and emancipation - including a new form of organisation through 
which to live and deliver that philosophy - the independent living movement 
has developed practical approaches to try to bring about the kinds of social 
change it seeks. 
One of the first CILs in England77 drew up a list of seven ‘basic needs’ of 
independent living.  They are: 
Information – to know what your options are  
Peer Support – encouragement and guidance from other disabled people 
Housing – a suitable place to live 
Equipment – technical aids, to reduce unnecessary dependence on others  
Personal Assistance – human help with everyday tasks  
Transport – to get where you need to be 
Access to the Environment – to go where everyone else does.78  
This list is not exhaustive – as noted above, ‘basic needs’ will vary from one 
person and circumstance to the next – but they constitute a minimum as 
identified, and generally agreed, by disabled people’s organisations.79   They 
are also reflected in Article 19 (and other Articles) of the CRPD. 
The organisations of disabled people that deliver independent living support 
generally focus on these areas, campaigning on and providing information 
and help with housing, equipment, transport and access. 80   Many focus 
strongly on personal assistance: lack of such assistance is closely linked to 
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80
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being forced to live in institutional care.81  Financial provision is also seen as 
essential to combat poverty and secure independence. 82   Beyond these 
holistic services, however, the defining quality of a CIL is peer support: 
encouragement and guidance from other disabled people.  There are many 
reasons for this.  One is the high level of specialist expertise and local 
knowledge that these organisations have developed.  Others are the 
personal expertise of those who work in the organisation, drawn from their 
own experiences of disability; and the overall accessibility of the organisation 
and its services.  But it goes further even than this.   
Realisation of independent living requires a change in power relations at both 
individual and collective levels.  We have seen that individual responses to 
negation of identity, such as that experienced by many disabled people, 
range from open confrontation to self-blame or resignation; and that people 
frequently internalise the dis-ability imposed on them by ‘normality’ discourse.  
Escape from that response – to become ‘the person you always thought you 
were but never could be’83 – is both pre-requisite for and consequence of 
independent living.  The power relationship between individual and CIL is one 
that recognises and shares that experience: it is one of respect, equality and 
empowerment as against disrespect, discipline and oppression.84    
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This organisational model also captures and puts into practice the holistic, 
inclusive and collective nature of independent living philosophy, working 
together ‘from below’ to bring about change not only in the lives of individuals 
but also in the wider community.85   The importance of organisations of 
disabled people in bringing about change has been clear from the history 
related so far in this thesis.  That history demonstrates that not only individual 
identities but also systems and practices, including law, may be influenced as 
this hegemonic practice articulates and re-articulates its discourse.   
Elements of disabled people’s independent living discourse are reflected in 
many settings, including the UK government policy discussed in Chapter 6 
below.   And they are reflected throughout the Convention.  Accessibility is a 
general principle under Article 3.  Article 9 requires the elimination of 
obstacles to access to the environment, including transport, schools, 
housing, workplaces and communications - a requirement echoed throughout 
the Convention.  Mobility aids and other assistive devices and technologies 
must be researched, promoted and made available.86  Professionals and staff 
working with disabled people are to be trained so as to better provide the 
personal assistance and services guaranteed by the Convention. 87   The 
freedom of disabled people to form and join their own organisations is to be 
actively promoted and encouraged; 88  and those organisations are to be 
involved at all levels of the implementation process.89  
The Article that most clearly encapsulates the concept of independent living 
itself is Article 19: the right to live independently and participate in the 
community, which is considered next. 
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Article 19 
 
Under Article 19 Living independently and being included in the community: 
 
States Parties to this Convention recognize the equal right of all 
persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal 
to others, and shall take effective and appropriate measures to 
facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and 
their full inclusion and participation in the community, including by 
ensuring that: 
 
(a) Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their 
place of residence and where and with whom they live on an equal 
basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particular living 
arrangement; 
 
(b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home, 
residential and other community support services, including 
personal assistance, necessary to support living in the community, 
and to prevent isolation or segregation from the community; 
 
(c) Community services and facilities for the general population 
are available on an equal basis to persons with disabilities and are 
responsive to their needs. 
 
Quinn reports that the insertion of Article 19 was ‘rightly challenged by 
Governmental representatives, who said that there was no precedent for it 
elsewhere’. 90   This is indeed one of several CRPD Articles that initially 
appear to create ‘new’ rights, a power explicitly beyond the remit of the 
drafters.91   ‘But, of course,’ Quinn continues, 
the argument that won at the end of the day was that this is because 
one assumes a capacity for freedom and choice.  Whereas, in the 
disability context, we must go the extra mile to ensure people have the 
highest level of attainment to functioning, in order to enjoy the blessings 
of freedom.92   
 
The Chair of the negotiating committee identified 
three views expressed on this matter of rights: (1) there is no right 
created in this Article, (2) the elements of the chapeau as a whole are a 
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right, and thus the word “right” should be in the chapeau, and (3) that 
the right is only in relation to 19(a).93   
 
The fact that this debate took place at all exemplifies the failure of others to 
see or address the human consequences of the exclusion, segregation and 
objectification of disabled people.  As we have seen, independent living, 
when understood in the sense developed by disabled people, directly 
challenges those deep-seated attitudes and practices.  It demands visibility, 
the right to have rights and to exercise them on an equal basis, and in 
community, with others. In so doing it pushes traditional liberal human rights 
understandings of autonomy and equality to encompass the experience of 
disability, and of those who may not exercise their autonomy in the same way 
as others.  As such, Article 19 is arguably one of the most important rights 
set out in the Convention, a key feature of the terrain: without the actual 
choice, control and freedom it requires, the exercise of all other rights is 
compromised. 
 
During drafting, some negotiators were keen to stress that Article 19 should 
not be seen as endorsing the independent living movement, the term ‘to live 
independently’ being preferable to ‘independent living’ for that reason. 94    
Early in the negotiations, some expressed concern that the words ‘living 
independently’ did not reflect the cultural norm in many countries, and that 
the words might be misconstrued as meaning that disabled people should be 
separated from their families,95 or as applying only to those capable of living 
in the community without support,  thus negating the purpose of the Article.96   
However, retaining the concept was important to many delegations,97 and by 
the 7th (pen-ultimate) session the Chair felt that consensus had been reached 
for using the term ‘living independently’ with the understanding that it was 
intended to reinforce the concept of ‘community living’.98    
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‘Independent living’ has been identified above as a nodal point in disabled 
people’s discourse, where it serves as surface of inscription for anti-
dependence, control, change in social relations and holistic structural 
transformation.  All of these discursive elements figured strongly in 
negotiation of Article 19 and are integrated throughout the Convention.   
Given the influence of disabled people through the participatory drafting 
process, this is not surprising.  However keen the drafters to distance 
themselves from the independent living movement itself,99 the concept of 
independent living as understood by that movement is so deeply ingrained 
that it is impossible to extract it from the Convention myth.   
 
In the process of these discussions, there was wide agreement that 
autonomy and personal choice were at the heart of the article.100  In Chapter 
2, we touched on some of the assumptions made in liberal understandings of 
autonomy, and how disability/human rights discourse challenges those 
assumptions with its re-description of the world, and its re-positioning of 
those who are not autonomous in the same way as the ‘able liberal subject’.  
In Article 19, we find encapsulation of that central challenge.   The Article is 
also about inclusion.  Anti-dependence and non-institutionalisation featured 
strongly throughout the negotiations.  For instance, the World Network of 
Users and Survivors of Psychiatry explain that ‘the issue here is the 
perception by others that PWD [persons with disabilities] need to be 
segregated from society, where a person without a disability makes the 
decision for/about the PWD, and the need for a shift away from this 
paradigm.  Here the institution becomes a prison.  So autonomy is the central 
issue in institutionalization.’ 101   Changing those perceptions, and the 
knowledge, power systems and identities they have established, is central to 
the hegemonic project.  As the Chair of the negotiating committee confirmed, 
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‘Article 19 is fundamental towards the [Convention’s] goal of a paradigm 
shift’.102   
 
In its final form, the head of the Article reaffirms disabled people’s rights to 
inclusion, autonomy and participation, echoing the core CRPD principles set 
out in Article 3103 and supported in preamble paragraphs (n): 
(n) Recognizing the importance for persons with disabilities of their 
individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make 
their own choices, 
 
and (m): 
(m) Recognizing the valued existing and potential contributions made 
by persons with disabilities to the overall well-being and diversity of their 
communities, and that the promotion of the full enjoyment by persons 
with disabilities of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and of 
full participation by persons with disabilities will result in their enhanced 
sense of belonging and in significant advances in the human, social and 
economic development of society and the eradication of poverty. 
 
Typically for this Convention,104 Article 19 then goes on to enlarge the scale 
by mapping in some of the measures States should take to facilitate 
enjoyment by disabled people of this right.  Article 19(a) goes straight to the 
heart of the matter, overturning enforced dependency and institutionalisation 
to grant choice of their living arrangements to disabled people themselves.  
This provision builds on ICCPR Article 12(1), CERD Article 5(d)(i) and 
CEDAW Article 15(4), all of which set out a right to freedom to choose one’s 
residence.105 
 
Implementation of Article 19(b) offers the person the social support they need 
to function autonomously in their chosen home and to have access to their 
community, particularly to prevent isolation and segregation.  During 
negotiation, some expressed concern that this text did not recognise the right 
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of the person to control these supports and services.106  By contrast, the UK, 
on behalf of the EU, argued in favour of deleting this provision altogether,107 
despite its foundation in the Standard Rules.108 
 
Article 19(c) seeks to ensure that, once in that community, general facilities 
and services are available without discrimination, so as to enable the person 
to benefit and to contribute on an equal basis with others.   
 
If we compare these provisions with the ‘seven needs’ of independent living, 
above, we find just two out of the seven here: housing, and personal 
assistance.  The original Working Group text included an additional 
requirement that ‘(d) persons with disabilities have access to information 
about available support services’.109  This provision was later subsumed into 
States’ general obligations under Article 4.110  As noted above, the remaining 
‘needs’ for equipment, transport, access to the environment and peer support 
are similarly found elsewhere in the Convention. 
 
Whilst Article 19 rights to inclusion, autonomy and participation, including the 
right to choose one’s residence, fall squarely into the civil and political 
category, access to the housing options, support services and community 
facilities essential for their realisation belong in the economic, social and 
cultural domain.   Article 19 thus demonstrates the CRPD’s inseparable 
fusion of the two ‘sets’ of rights discussed in Chapter 3 above.  Here, the 
interdependence and indivisibility of rights becomes particularly ‘sharp’.   As 
Serbia and Montenegro recognised early in negotiations, ‘one of the 
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preconditions to exercise the freedom of choice of where to live would be the 
necessary support.’111   Far from fulfilling a ‘welfare’ role in compensating 
disabled people for their exclusion, economic, social and cultural rights here 
take on the ‘enabling’ function vital to their inclusion.112   They are thus key to 
repositioning disabled people as full, equal and active subjects in the new, 
accessible and welcoming world: once all of the provisions of this Article are 
realised, ‘the place of disabled people is everywhere’,113 and the hegemonic 
project is on its way.    
 
However, as we have seen, whereas civil and political rights are to be 
implemented immediately, economic, social and cultural rights may be 
subject to ‘progressive realisation’.  Whilst there was general acceptance 
among the Convention drafters that this was the case,114 how to address this 
dichotomy in the context of Article 19 engendered much discussion.  One 
proposal 115  that was accepted was to soften the head of the article by 
replacing ‘take… measures to enable’ disabled people to live independently 
with ‘take… measures to facilitate’ them to do so (emphases added).  As with 
the replacement of ‘fulfil’ with ‘ensure’ in the Convention’s purpose clause,116 
this change subtly alters the projection of the Article, reducing the imperative 
of socio-economic duties set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) to allow for 
progressive realisation.  The EU suggested taking this alteration further by 
amending the end of the Chapeau to read ‘including measures aimed at 
ensuring that…’ rather than directly imposing a duty on States to ‘ensure 
that…’.117  This proposal was not agreed.  Further discussion ranged around 
whether or not to include the words ‘to the maximum of available resources’ 
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in Article 19.  Although various alternatives were suggested, 118  it was 
eventually decided to reflect this issue generically in Article 4(2).119     
 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that key elements of Article 19 are 
economic, social and cultural rights, and therefore subject to progressive 
realisation.  As Serbia and Montenegro commented during negotiations, 
‘[t]his is complicated by the centrality of freedom of choice in the article, 
which has more immediate implementation implications.’120  As we have seen 
above, those implications relate not only to realisation of Article 19, but also 
to the other Convention rights that depend on realisation of Article 19 for their 
implementation.  How the economic, social and cultural rights set out in 
Article 19 are implemented will therefore have a determinative effect not only 
on disabled people’s experience – or otherwise – of living independently and 
being included in the community but also on their opportunity – or otherwise 
– to exercise all Convention rights.  From a political discourse perspective, 
how these economic, social and cultural rights are understood, how systems 
of social relations are established to reflect that understanding, and how, in 
practice, they impact on the lives and identities of disabled people will 
determine whether – or not – the hegemonic project succeeds in 
repositioning disabled people in the world and thus in translating the 
Convention myth into imaginary.  For these reasons, Article 19 is chosen in 
Part 2 of the thesis as ‘barometer’ for progress – or otherwise – of the 
hegemonic project in England.   
 
Article 19 is emancipatory law par excellence.  It is designed to contest 
oppression by bringing about ‘a new political relationship’121  between the 
experiences and expectations of both disabled and ‘non-disabled’ people.  It 
seeks to stabilise those expectations on a new and more demanding and 
inclusive level through a new form of regulation ‘whereby its good order 
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becomes order.’122   Similarly, it is expressive law: ‘a process through which 
actor identities and interests may be shaped and reconstituted.’123  But at this 
stage, the Article’s emancipatory, expressive potential has yet to be fulfilled.   
 
Once the right to live independently and be included in the community, with 
its accompanying histories and understandings, is embedded in international 
law, its realisation becomes a requirement in widely differing political and 
cultural settings around the world.124  Such realisation will depend on the 
manner of its reception into those national settings: acceptance of the myth 
and its transformation into imaginary will succeed or fail accordingly.125   All 
manner of social antagonisms, dislocations and re-articulations await it along 
the way.  Furthermore, we have identified ‘independent living’ as a nodal 
point in disabled people’s discourse.  Such nodal points are effective 
precisely because of their emptiness as a signifier, which allows the 
discourse to take in and incorporate new discursive elements with which a 
range of actors can identify.126  Whilst this may assist in absorbing social 
antagonism and neutralising dislocations, it may equally lead to partial or 
mis- interpretations; to re- or mis-appropriation by other, more powerful, 
discourses; and to application in contexts far removed from the principles and 
practices from which it grew.127  It may even become a new expression of old 
and unchanged oppression.128     Whether or not Article 19 achieves its 
emancipatory potential will depend on many factors, not least the ability of 
disabled people and their supporters to retain ownership of its meaning, its 
interpretation and its application.129            
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Conclusion  
 
This thesis began by introducing the ‘viewpoint’ of political discourse theory.  
From that viewpoint, the social world is seen as consisting of ever-changing 
and dynamic discourses.  As they compete for hegemony, such discourses 
incorporate or exclude discursive elements, establish systems of social 
relations and form the identities of social actors.  Chapter 2 described the 
formation of one such discourse: a new international disability/human rights 
discourse which succeeded in setting a new agenda at the UN.  This 
discourse presents a re-description of the world and of the place of disabled 
people in it.   Here, the world is accessible and welcoming; impairment is no 
longer seen as an aberration to be ‘othered’, but as universal human 
variation to be accepted, respected and accommodated; and disabled people 
are no longer excluded recipients of welfare, but are included as active, 
valued and equal rights-holders.  The new discourse succeeds in initiating a 
participatory hegemonic project aimed at sedimenting this vision into 
international human rights law.   
 
Law is understood here as one method of articulating and regulating systems 
of social relations.  The CRPD drafting project can thus be seen as one 
method by which the international disability/human rights discourse may seek 
to dominate the field of meaning, by creating a new legal order through which 
its particular combination of norms, values, views and perceptions can 
circulate within national societies around the world.  Chapter 3 has examined 
that ‘revolving door’: the new hegemonic formation which is the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  It has examined the 
Convention text, in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in 
its context, including its Preamble, and in the light of its object and purpose, 
its travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of its conclusion.  Metaphors 
of scale and projection drawn from Santos’ ‘cartography of law’ have served 
to highlight the Convention’s central purpose and principles, its flexible 
boundaries, its projection of all human rights through the experience of 
disability.   
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This Chapter has examined the dynamic implementation systems the 
Convention puts in place to try to ensure that the hegemonic project 
continues to expand.  If that project succeeds, the disability/human rights 
myth encapsulated in the Convention will come to represent a ‘default’ 
system of meanings that underlies and structures our societies.  The myth of 
disability rights will become imaginary, and ‘good order’ will become order. 
 
This Chapter has also looked in more depth at one right which is fundamental 
to that transformation.  Article 19, the right to live independently and be 
included in the community, has been identified as encapsulating core 
elements of disability/human rights discourse, and as clarifying the means 
through which other Conventions rights are realised.  As a ‘hybrid’ right, 
Article 19 exemplifies the Convention’s fusion between the two ‘sets’ of 
rights: realisation of its socio-economic provisions is a pre-requisite for 
exercise of its civil and political rights to autonomy and participation.  How 
these socio-economic provisions are implemented will therefore have a 
determinative effect not only on realisation of Article 19, but also on exercise 
of all Convention rights and on success or otherwise of the hegemonic 
project.  For that reason, implementation of the economic, social and cultural 
rights set out in Article 19 has been chosen as a ‘barometer’ of that success 
in Part 2 of the thesis. 
 
By 2007, the myth has arrived and has been mapped.  The new 
disability/human rights agenda is now entrenched in international human 
rights law.  As Quinn comments, ‘[w]hatever happens now, there is no going 
back.  Disability has moved to the core of the UN human rights agenda in 
theory’.130  The ‘startling instrument’131 that is the CRPD was the fastest-
drafted international human rights convention; 132  it achieved the greatest 
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number of signatories on its opening day,133  and came into force just over 
one year later.134  Despite this enthusiastic international reception, there is no 
guarantee that it will succeed, where its predecessors failed, in bringing 
about the ‘deep reconstruction’ of meanings, systems and identities it aims to 
achieve.  All myths are constantly at risk of being undermined in their turn by 
social antagonisms or by dislocatory events beyond their control.  As 
Charlton identifies, 
[t]here are… two sides to the ‘permanence’ of disability oppression.  On 
one side is the capacity of oppressive structures and institutions to 
reproduce themselves through the myriad power relationships in 
everyday life.  On the other side is the inevitability that oppression will 
generate its opposites – resistance, empowerment, and, from these, 
potentially, liberation and freedom.135   
 
Whether or not this myth survives, and whether it achieves its ultimate 
emancipatory goal to become ‘imaginary’ will depend on the power of the 
disability/human rights discourse in all its forms to continue to incorporate 
and accommodate those antagonisms into its own project, to produce a ‘new 
practice of disability politics’136 and thus to build its hegemony. 
 
Supporters of this transformation argue for ‘persuasion’, ‘socialisation’ and 
education as means to achieve the Convention’s objectives.  Quinn argues 
that  
we should view the Convention less as a means for coercing States and 
more as a powerful tool for enabling its revolutionary insights to 
percolate into the political process (by ‘persuasion’ and ‘socialisation’) 
and hence transform the political process to the point that justice and 
rights for persons with disabilities is seen as the primary departure point 
and not as an annoying distraction.137   
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By ‘persuasion’, Quinn refers to the potential for internalisation and 
‘ownership’ of the Convention’s values by States. ‘Socialisation’ entails actors 
within States adopting those beliefs and behavioural patterns, thereby 
becoming socialised to align policy with Convention values and bring about 
meaningful change.138    In political discourse terms, this may be seen as the 
establishment of national systems of social relations and the provision of 
subject positions with which social actors identify.  As will be demonstrated in 
Part 2 below, ownership, internalisation and socialisation of the Convention 
beliefs and values are vital not only to political change, but also to legal and 
administrative change.   
 
Stein and Lord argue that  
the CRPD should be regarded as an educative tool insofar as it can 
serve to teach mainstream society about the life circumstances of 
persons with disabilities by providing information regarding their relative 
position.  Its potential may be fully realized provided the provisions in 
the Convention supporting its use as an educational tool are fully 
implemented by both State and non-State actors.  In this respect, the 
CRPD’s narrative regarding the unnecessary and amenable nature of 
the historical exclusion of persons with disabilities across societies can 
serve a vital function beyond the particular implementation of its 
substantive obligations in law and policy.139   
 
But law and policy are vital too.  Law is one method of articulating and 
regulating systems of social relations.  The disability/human rights myth has 
been set down in a new international legal order.  States Parties are the 
primary duty-holders under that legal order.  They deliver their international 
law obligations through domestic policy, law and administration.   How they 
do so will be shaped by the constellations of power and knowledge that 
already circulate in their national arenas.  Those domestic discourses, too, 
will influence the shaping of social practices and the identities of social 
actors.  The extent to which domestic policy, law and administration reflect 
the intentions of the Convention’s drafters will depend not only on the power 
of the emancipatory disability/human rights myth, but also on its reception in 
domestic settings.  As Philip Alston remarks, ‘what ultimately matters is what 
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is done, perhaps in conjunction with [international] measures, at the national 
level’.140 
 
Part 2 of the thesis turns to the UK.  Chapter 5 stays in the international 
arena to explore broader domestic understandings of human rights as 
evidenced in successive UK governments’ dialogue with the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.   Chapters 6 to 9 delve into the 
intricacies of independent living in England, examining understandings 
through policy, systems through legislation, and identities through decision-
making and redress.  Chapter 10 draws the thesis to a close with 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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Implementation in 
England 
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Chapter 5  
The United Kingdom and 
economic, social and cultural 
rights  
 
Introduction 
 
Part 1 of this thesis described the disability/human rights myth, the 
sedimentation of that myth in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, and its implementation provisions designed to ensure that 
the hegemonic project continues to expand to translate the myth into 
imaginary.  Whether, or to what extent, that project succeeds will depend not 
only on the power of the myth itself and of its legal order, but also on the 
antagonisms and dislocations it meets in the domestic sphere.  Part 2 of the 
thesis turns to the UK.  This Chapter examines UK understandings of 
economic, social and cultural rights as evidenced in the international arena.  
The following chapters focus on the implementation of those rights in 
England, taking Article 19, the right to live independently and be included in 
the community, as case study. 
 
The UK is often seen as one of the most neo-liberal States in Western 
Europe. 1   According to McFarlane, its society has for centuries 2  existed 
                                                 
1
 O’Cinneide C, ‘Socio-economic Entitlements and the UK Rights Framework’ (2005) Irish 
Human Rights Commission Conference on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Model of 
Enforcement, Dublin, 9/10 December 2005, 1 
2
 ‘England was as ‘capitalist’ in 1250 as it was in 1550 or 1750’: McFarlane A, The Origins of 
English Individualism (Blackwell 1978) 195-96 
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within a capitalist discourse 3  springing from a long-ingrained and 
idiosyncratic kind of individualism peculiar to England. 4   This kind of 
individualism, with its particular understandings of liberty and equality, 5 
helped to form the philosophies of the Enlightenment6 and the classical free-
market economics of Adam Smith.7  Although it has a long history of civil 
liberties,8 has played an active role in developing the modern international 
human rights framework,9 and is party to all of the main international human 
rights treaties,10 it was not until 2000 that the UK introduced human rights 
protection into its domestic law.11   The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) ‘brought home’ through the Human Rights Act 1998 focuses 
overwhelmingly on civil and political rights.12  
 
Even this limited introduction of human rights into domestic law met with 
some fierce political resistance. 13   Despite campaigns 14  to counter such 
                                                 
3
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resistance, the ‘human rights culture’ it was designed to encourage15 has 
been slow to materialise;16  antagonistic discourse persists;17  and, at the 
time of writing, the fate of the Human Rights Act itself still hangs in the 
balance.18  As Shami Chakrabarti comments, ‘[n]o modern Bill of Rights can 
have had such a testing infancy.’19  Meanwhile, economic, social and cultural 
rights enjoy no constitutional protection in UK law, and remain invisible in 
domestic human rights discourse.20 
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The UK also has a long history of excluding disabled people.21  In response 
to political pressure, however, disabled people’s rights have recently 
acquired some legal protection.  The Disability Discrimination Act was 
passed in 199522  and developed incrementally to include not only duties not 
to discriminate and to make reasonable adjustments in employment, 
education and housing, but also a positive public sector duty to promote 
disability equality. 23   Its provisions have now been incorporated into the 
Equality Act 2010.24 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010, with their related 
case law, 25  make up the key legal dimensions of disability equality and 
human rights discourse in the UK. 26   For government, they constitute 
evidence that the UK ‘has become a world leader in disability rights’, with 
‘robust anti-discrimination and human rights legislation’ already in place.27   
 
However, one important ingredient is missing.  As Quinn et al reiterate, ‘in the 
context of disability… the removal of barriers through civil rights and non-
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 See discussion in Chapter 6 below. Also Borsay A, Disability and Social Policy in Britain 
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discrimination law is clearly not enough.’28   Chapters 2 to 4 above have 
described the important role played by economic, social and cultural rights in 
disability/human rights discourse, in the CRPD text and in Article 19: that role 
is not one of welfare provision as compensation for exclusion, but is one of 
enabling inclusion, the exercise of autonomy and full subject hood without 
which all Convention rights are compromised.  One reflection of this 
understanding is the formulation of Article 4(2) which, whilst allowing for 
some ‘progressive realisation’ of socio-economic rights, requires immediate 
application not only of non-discrimination in their application but also of more 
substantive obligations established in international law.29   These rights are 
thus central to the hegemonic expansion of the disability/human rights myth 
which seeks to re-position disabled people in the world as rights-holders: 
they provide a ‘bridge’ whereby disabled people can take their place as 
valued and productive citizens.30   
 
This Chapter explores successive UK governments’ understandings of 
economic, social and cultural rights through their dialogue with the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  It traces some of the 
dynamics as national understandings meet international discourse, and the 
legal dimensions of Santos’ citizen-place and world-place set up 
constellations of interlegality which will influence the understandings, 
systems and identities of those tasked with implementing Article 19 in 
England. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Quinn and Degener (2002) 19; see also Stein MA and Stein PJS, ‘Beyond Disability Civil 
Rights’ (2006-2007) 58 Hastings Law Journal 1203 
29
 ‘Those obligations contained in the… Convention that are immediately applicable 
according to international law.’  Article 4(2), and see discussions in Chapter 3 above and the 
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 Quinn and Bruce (undated) 
http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/Common%20Files/Disability%20Research%20Unit/GQ/Quinn%
20and%20Bruce%20Disability%20Paper.pdf  accessed 4.3.08 
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The constructive dialogue 1992 – 2009 
 
Support for the principle of interdependence and indivisibility of rights 
features strongly in the UK’s international self-presentation.  The UK has 
been a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR/the Covenant) since it came into force in 1976. In the 
international arena ‘[t]he UK Government believes that social and economic 
rights are as important as civil and political rights’.31   However, evidence 
closer to home suggests otherwise.  There have been no moves to ratify, let 
alone incorporate, the European Convention on Human Rights’ companion, 
the revised European Social Charter.32  Furthermore, the UK’s acceptance of 
the European Union Lisbon Treaty in 2007 was conditional on agreement of 
a Protocol relating to application of the appended EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights.  This Protocol specifically emphasises ‘for the 
avoidance of doubt’ that nothing in Title IV of the Charter - which sets out, 
inter alia, socio-economic rights to work, social security, and health - ‘creates 
justiciable rights applicable to … the United Kingdom’. 33   Although, in 
practice, the Charter does apply to UK law insofar as it gives effect to EU 
law, 34  there  remains an element of ambiguity – not to say downright 
contradiction - in the UK’s overall position. 
 
We saw in Chapter 2 above that the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the Committee) has established a system to consider 
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revised Charter of 1996, and has not chosen to accept the Charter’s Optional Protocol which 
grants rights of collective petition.   
33
 Protocol ‘On the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
to Poland and to the United Kingdom’, C306/156, 17.12.2007, Article 1: 1. The Charter does 
not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal 
of … the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, 
practices or action of … the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.  2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, 
nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to … the United 
Kingdom, except in so far as … the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its 
national law.’ 
34
 See NS and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-411-10) ECJ 
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periodic reports by States Parties to monitor their progress in implementing 
the Covenant.  In that process, a ‘conversation’ develops between State and 
Committee, known as a ‘constructive dialogue’, where the State Party is 
required to justify its actions or omissions.  During their dialogue, 
disagreements have developed between the Committee and the UK on a 
number of key issues, necessitating successive UK governments to articulate 
their positions clearly and succinctly in response to the Committee’s 
questioning.  Examination of that dialogue may thus provide some 
clarification of the UK’s apparently ambiguous understandings of its 
international obligation to implement economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
Consistent reporting to the Committee did not begin until 1992, when the UK 
submitted its Core Document.  This explains that:  
the United Kingdom does not have a Bill of Rights or written 
constitution…  Under the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements 
the possession of rights and freedoms is an inherent part of being a 
member of our society.  Rights, therefore, are not conferred by the 
Government; they already exist unless Parliament decides that the 
needs of society are such that they should be restricted in some specific 
way…  [Accordingly,] [t]reaties and conventions are not incorporated 
directly into domestic law.... and Courts in the UK interpret only those 
laws made by Parliament.35   
 
The Covenant itself does not require States Parties to formally incorporate its 
terms into their domestic law, or to accord it any specific kind of status there.  
It is, after all, small-scale law designed to apply across all cultures and legal 
systems.  Article 2 adopts a broad and flexible approach, requiring 
implementation ‘by all appropriate means’, allowing for differences in national 
legal systems,36 including the ‘dualist’ system adopted by the UK.37  It does, 
                                                 
35
 United Kingdom Core Document, HRI/CORE/1/Add.5 (1992), para 133 
36
 Article 2(1); see also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General 
Comment 3, ’The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par.1)’ 14/12/90, para 3 and 
General Comment  9, ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ 03/12/98, para 1 
37
 Some States have incorporated economic, social and cultural rights into their constitution: 
examples include India, South Africa and Canada.  Here, national judicial systems will be 
called upon to determine relevant cases under the Constitution.  Others, such as Norway, 
have incorporated the Covenant directly into domestic law.
 
 Yet other States, including the 
UK and New Zealand, whilst being party to the ICESCR, remain unconvinced of the 
justiciability of economic and social rights, and make no provision for determination of those 
rights as such within their domestic legal system.  
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however, suggest that ‘appropriate means’ will include ‘particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.’38  In the words of the Committee,  
the Covenant norms must be recognized in appropriate ways within the 
domestic legal order, appropriate means of redress, or remedies, must 
be available to any aggrieved individual or group, and appropriate 
means of ensuring governmental accountability must be put in place.39 
 
In 1994, the Committee asked the UK to ‘cite specific laws that had been 
changed to enable the UK to comply with its Covenant obligations’.  It was 
given a ‘sample list’ of recent legislation described as ‘generally in line’ with 
the principles and objectives of the Covenant.  Though guided by the 
Covenant, the government was unable to cite any specific measures that had 
been taken as a result. 
 
The UK’s 1996 report is the first to cover Article 2 of the Covenant.  Here the 
government sets out its stall in relation to implementation: 
[r]ights corresponding to those enumerated in human rights conventions 
[sic] are provided for within the United Kingdom by the common law and 
supplemented by legislation.40 
 
Furthermore, it continues, the ‘greater part’ of the provisions of the Covenant 
do not purport to establish norms which lend themselves to translation 
into legislation or justiciable issues, but are statements of principle and 
objectives.41    
 
Here we begin to see the UK government’s failure to comprehend the idea of 
economic, social and cultural rights as ‘rights’.  We saw in Chapter 2 above 
how the holistic human rights formation was fractured in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, with socio-economic rights being understood in the 
capitalist West as being inconsistent with free market ideology.  In the UK in 
1996, after 17 years of Conservative government influenced by Hayek’s 
principles of justice and economy, 42  this discourse remains powerful. 43  
                                                 
38
 Article 2(1) 
39
 General Comment 9 
40
 United Kingdom Third Report to UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,  
E/1994/104/Add.11, 17 June 1996, para 8 
41
 Ibid para 9 
42
 Hayek (1982) and see discussion below 
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However, by the time this UK report comes up for discussion before the 
Committee in December 1997, major political changes have taken place in 
the UK with the landslide election of a New Labour government.  Might these 
domestic changes be reflected in the ‘constructive dialogue’?   
 
It seems not.  At their 1997 meeting, New Labour plans to incorporate the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law are lauded by 
the UN Committee.  Why not give the Covenant similar treatment?  
Committee members44 suggest ‘that the UK [does] not regard the Covenant 
has having the effect of law, but only a guideline’: the UK is reminded of its 
full obligation as a Party to the Covenant to translate its international norms 
into binding legal obligations.  But, as the UK delegates explain, ‘the British 
preference is for hard law on specific issues’; Covenant ‘principles’ are given 
effect by a large body of existing law dealing with many social, economic, 
and, less frequently, cultural, issues.   
 
Far from domestic political change bringing about a rapprochement in the 
understandings of the Committee and the UK government, this dialogue 
reveals a growing distance between their respective positions.  The 
Committee is becoming more confident in its monitoring role.  It has worked 
to clarify the nature of States Parties’ obligations,45 and the norms it expects 
to be translated into binding domestic law.46  The UK, on the other hand, 
rejects interpretation of the small-scale Covenant rights as justiciable norms, 
interpreting them instead as ‘principles’ to be given effect through large-
scale, ‘specific’ domestic legislation.  This polarisation is reinforced by the UK 
delegation’s statement that ‘the general term “human rights” as applied by 
the Committee, is not one frequently in use in the UK…’47  Not only does the 
                                                                                                                                          
43
 But see JUSTICE and 13 other NGOs, ‘Poverty Undermines Rights in the UK’ Joint 
submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
October 1997 
44
 Mr Sadi 
45
 General Comment 3 
46
 By  the time of this dialogue (17
th
 session,1997), the Committee had produced 7 General 
Comments: Reporting by States Parties (1), international technical assistance (2), the nature 
of States Parties’ obligations (3), the right to adequate housing (4), persons with disabilities 
(5), the economic, social and cultural rights of older persons (6) and forced evictions (7).   
47
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Seventeenth Session, Summary 
record of the 36
th
 meeting, E/C.12/1997/SR.36, 27 November 1997, para 47 
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UK not accept the Committee’s interpretation of Covenant rights as 
justiciable norms, it rejects the whole discourse of economic, social and 
cultural rights as ‘human rights’. 
 
The UK’s Fourth Periodic Report contains just one paragraph on 
implementation:  
2.01 The United Kingdom gives effect to its obligations under the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by means of specific 
laws, policies and practices which implement the various rights set out 
in the Covenant.   
 
This prompts a request from the Committee to ‘explain further the meaning of 
paragraph 2.01… in particular with regard to the “effects” the UK intends to 
give to its “obligations” under the Covenant…’,48  to which the UK replies: 
A.1   The Convention [sic] is not directly applied as law within the 
territories to which these reports apply.  The United Kingdom gives 
effect to the various articles of the Convention by specific laws, policies 
and practices of the appropriate authorities in those territories.  These 
are described in the paragraphs of the reports relating to those 
articles.49   
 
At their meeting in 2002, the Committee launches straight into the issue of 
incorporation.  The UK delegation, however, stands its ground: the Covenant 
rights are not justiciable, and it is not appropriate for British judges to 
interpret them. Furthermore, ‘[s]ome aspects of the Covenant…  [are] not 
entirely unequivocal.’  This last comment brings a swift rejoinder.  By now the 
Committee has produced a total of 15 General Comments designed to clarify 
interpretation of the Covenant,50 including one on its domestic application.51     
From the Committee’s view, some Covenant rights are ‘completely 
unambiguous’ and any further ambiguities are covered by those General 
Comments.  Maybe the UK will review its position in the light of the General 
                                                 
48
 List of Issues 2002 
49
 Reply to List of Issues, 2002. See also JUSTICE and other NGOs, ‘Joint NGO Report to 
the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights: response to the UK 
Government’s Fourth Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ April 2002, section 1: Background: Socio-economic rights in the UK legal 
system. 
50
 Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, E/C.12/1/Add.79, 17 May 2002, para 
24  
51
 General Comment 9 
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Comments?  But ‘no’ says the UK delegate: Covenant rights are justiciable 
under specific domestic legislation rather than under the Covenant as a 
whole.  The UK has fulfilled its obligations and ‘will not accept any charge of 
having evaded them’.52   The Committee, for its part, ‘strongly recommends’ 
that the UK ‘re-examine the matter’.53  
 
Far from re-examining the matter, the UK in its Fifth Report of 2007 confirms 
categorically that:  
The ICESCR has not been and is not expected to be incorporated into 
domestic law.  This means that the rights contained in the Covenant are 
not directly enforceable by domestic courts.54   
 
Furthermore,  
the Government is not convinced that it can incorporate the rights 
contained in the ICESCR in a meaningful way within the British legal 
system.55 
 
Reasons given are that 
 some of the rights are not clearly defined;  
 budgets are limited: a court decision requiring ‘greater progress’ in one 
area, e.g. health, would imply a reduction in another, e.g. education;  
 differing political views56 mean that it would be inappropriate for the 
courts to determine government economic policy;  
 individuals in the UK already have ways to challenge government 
policy through their MP or complaints procedures;57 and  
 not all human rights require identical approaches: UK policy has been 
to take legislative action within the scope of each right, e.g. Education 
Act etc.58   
 
                                                 
52
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-eighth session, Summary 
Record of the 12
th
 Meeting, 6 May 2002 para 36 
53
 Concluding Observations 2002 
54 United Kingdom Fifth Report to UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
E/C.12/GBR/5, July 2007, para 51 
55
 Fifth Report, para 74 
56
 Examples given are ‘targeted interventionist policies’ contrasted with deregulation and  
‘individual economic initiative’ 
57
 There is no mention here of judicial review or administrative redress -  see Chapter 9 
below 
58
 Fifth Report, paras 74-5 
 148 
 
In other words, the terms of the Covenant are too vague; politicians, not 
courts, should determine the allocation of limited resources; and individuals 
have political and administrative, rather than legal, routes to redress.  It 
seems that this dialogue has reached deadlock.59 
 
Up to this point, the ‘constructive dialogue’ between the UK and the 
Committee has been conducted outside the realm of domestic human rights 
discourse.60   Within that highly politicised domestic discourse, economic, 
social and cultural rights have remained invisible.  Between 2007 and 2009, 
however, there appear to be some cracks in that invisibility. 
 
Alongside the increased influence of the European Convention on UK legal 
discourse following introduction of the Human Rights Act, the UK’s 
membership of the European Union61 has required it to accept a superior 
European legal order which takes precedence, in areas of EU competence, 
over the domestic legal order.62   Such precedence has been a contributory 
factor 63  underlying increased use of international law in UK domestic 
courts. 64   This broader outlook on the part of the judges has also 
                                                 
59
 See also British Institute of Human Rights ‘BIHR Response to the UK Government’s draft 
5th periodic report under the ICESCR to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (BIHR 2007) 
60
 Apart from the few UK lawyers specialising in this area of international human rights law.  
Human rights NGOs focused overwhelmingly on civil and political rights.  Documents were 
not available on government websites.  When the writer requested a copy of the UK Fourth 
Report from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 2002, she received a phone 
call asking for her credentials and why the Report was required.  The Fifth Report was the 
first to be made readily accessible online, after responsibility was transferred from the FCO 
to the Department of Constitutional Affairs (now Ministry of Justice) 
61
 European Communities Act 1972 
62
 Particularly since the UK signed up to the EU Social Chapter in 1997, many of those areas 
of competence relate to socio-economic matters.  See below for discussion of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 and UK Protocol 
63
 Together with the Human Rights Act requirement for courts to ‘take into account’ ECHR 
jurisprudence: HRA s2 
64
 As Higgins remarked in 2000, ‘[c]ulture is not static, and the last decade has been marked 
by an extraordinary opening up of the English courts to the appropriate application of 
international law.’ (Higgins R, ‘Dualism in the Face of a Changing  Legal Culture’ in Andenas 
M and Fairgrieve D (eds) Judicial Review in International Perspective, Liber Amicorum in 
Honour of Lord Slynne of Hadley, vol II (Kluwer Law International 2000).  Questions about 
the status of international organisations (Tin Council, Greenpeace) or about the limits of 
national and EU competence (International Transport Workers' Federation and Another v 
Viking Line ABP and Another; Case C-438/05 (2007) Times, 14 December 2007) have 
demanded judges’ attention to non-domestic law. NGOs have also played a legitimate role in 
influencing that process: Carter P, ‘Polemics & Persuasion – the Use of International Law by 
NGOs’ (2006) presentation to British Institute of International and Comparative Law lecture 
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encompassed increasing attention to – even application of - international 
human rights law.65 
 
Devolution, too, has produced tensions that challenge the status quo. 66  
Since 1999, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have each taken forward 
their own understandings of human rights issues, particularly in the realms of 
the economic, social and cultural rights that make up the majority of their 
devolved competence.67   
 
At Westminster, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR) was set up in 2000 to coincide with the introduction of the Human 
Rights Act.  It has consistently interpreted its brief68 as being wider than just 
the Human Rights Act.   In 2007, three existing Equality Commissions69 were 
subsumed into a new Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)70, the 
first independent statutory body to be tasked with the promotion and 
monitoring of human rights across England, Scotland and Wales.  Together 
with its Northern Ireland and Scottish equivalents, the EHRC is accredited71 
to monitor not only domestic human rights implementation but also the UK’s 
international human rights commitments.  As a result of these developments, 
and despite some strong antagonisms, elements of European and 
                                                                                                                                          
Series International Law in the Domestic Courts, 8 May 2006: ‘NGOs play a legitimate role in 
enhancing the effect of international law and in doing so change its nature by increasing its 
reception in municipal courts.’ 
65
 For further discussion of  this phenomenon, see also Lord Bingham’s maiden speech in 
the House of Lords HL Deb 3 July 1996 col 1465; McCrudden C, ‘A Common Law of Human 
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 499; Bingham T, Widening Horizons: the influence of comparative 
law and international law on domestic law, The Hamlyn Lectures 61
st
 series (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 
66
 See, for instance, the dialogue surrounding a proposed Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 
2008, below 
67
 Such as tuition fees, residential care funding (Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act 
2002), proposed Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, etc. 
68
 To consider ‘matters relating to human rights in the United Kingdom’  
69
 Equal Opportunities Commission, Race Equality Commission and Disability Rights 
Commission 
70
 See for instance  British Institute for Human Rights ‘Something for Everyone: the impact of 
the Human Rights Act and the need for a Human Rights Commission’ (BIHR 2002);  Klug F, 
‘Establishment of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights: implications for the public 
sector’ (2004) Westminster Explained 36: An assessment of the impact of the HRA, 7 
December 2004; O’Cinneide C, ‘The Commission for Equality and Human Rights: A New 
Institution for New and Uncertain Times’ (2007) 36(2) Industrial Law Journal 141 
71
 in line with the international Paris principles; see Equality and Human Rights Commission 
‘EHRC’s role in relation to UN Human Rights Treaties’ (EHRC 2010) 
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international human rights discourses have begun to infiltrate the domestic 
sphere; traditional understandings of sovereignty and duality have been 
increasingly challenged. 
 
These developments served to ensure that the UN Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Committee’s 2002 recommendation to ‘re-examine the matter’ 
of incorporation received more than usual attention.  A JCHR inquiry into 
those conclusions72 found that: ‘the case for incorporating guarantees of the 
Covenant rights in UK law… merits further attention’.73  Economic, social and 
cultural rights ‘should not be regarded as the poor cousins of the civil and 
political rights incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act.’74  Later, 
discussion of a potential British Bill of Rights75 prompted a further JCHR 
report. 76   Here we find analysis by the JCHR of the New Labour 
government’s ‘evolving position’77 on incorporation of socio-economic rights: 
from outright opposition, through apparent acceptance that ‘a constitution or 
Bill of Rights can “accord importance” to economic and social rights’,78 to 
contemplation of ‘the possibility of including provisions about social and 
economic rights in the form of “deliberative and interpretive principles”’.79  
The JCHR itself suggests an approach which imposes a duty on government 
to achieve progressive realisation of the relevant rights, within available 
resources, and to report to Parliament on the progress made; whilst ensuring 
                                                 
72
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’, Twenty-first Report of Session 2003-04, HL Paper 183, HC 1188, para 1 
73
 Ibid para 73; either by incorporating the terms of the Covenant itself, or by developing 
domestic formulations of the Covenant rights as part of a UK Bill of Rights 
74
 Ibid para 163; see also submissions to the JCHR inquiry from Democratic Audit ‘Economic 
and Social Rights for the UK’ (2003) and JUSTICE ‘Inquiry into the Concluding Observations 
of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ (2003) 
75
 Ibid paras 158 - 164 
76
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘A Bill of Rights for the UK?’, Twenty-Ninth Report, 10 
August 2008,  HL 165-I/HC 150-I; and Evidence of Jack Straw to Joint Committee on Human 
Rights inquiry into a Bill of Rights for the UK?, 21 May 2008; see also Foster S, ‘Finally: a Bill 
of Rights for the UK?’ (2008) 13(2) Coventry Law Review 8; Klug F, ‘A Bill of Rights: Do We 
Need One or Do We Already Have One?’ [2007] Public Law 701 
77
 Between July 2007, when the Green Paper on ‘[t]he Governance of Britain’ was published, 
coincidentally with the UK’s Fifth Periodic Report to the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights discussed above, and May 2008, when the Justice Secretary, Jack 
Straw, gave evidence to the JCHR inquiry. 
78
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘A Bill of Rights for the UK?’ Twenty-Ninth Report of 
session 2007-08, HL 165-I/HC 150-I. 10 August 2008, para 160 
79
 Ibid para 163 
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that the rights are not enforceable by individuals, but rather that the courts 
have a very circumscribed role in reviewing the measures taken by the 
government. 80   The Committee examines three potential models for 
incorporation, before recommending inclusion of rights to health, education, 
housing and an adequate standard of living.81  It helpfully provides some 
draft Articles at Annex 1.82   
 
In May 2009, three weeks before the UK ratified the CRPD,83 a large UK 
delegation84 travelled to Geneva to be examined by the Committee in the 
latest stage in their increasingly fractious ‘constructive dialogue’.   Although 
the delegation’s brief must be to defend the UK’s ‘inability’ to incorporate 
ICESCR rights into the British legal system, as set out in the Fifth Report, it 
would seem that discourse at home has shifted, albeit incrementally, from the 
position in 1997, when ‘the general term ‘human rights’ as applied by the 
Committee, [was] not one frequently in use in the UK…’.85   Could it be that 
this shift offers the prospect of compromise to resolve the apparent 
confrontation between government and Committee?  The following section 
describes discussion at the 2009 meeting of incorporation, progressive 
realisation, and justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights; of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, and of Bills of Rights; and of the invisibility 
of Covenant rights in UK domestic discourse.  
 
                                                 
80
 Ibid para 192 
81
 Ibid para 196 
82
 For further discussion of the constructive dialogue to this point see Bates E, ‘The United 
Kingdom and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in 
McCorquodale R and Baderin M (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 
83
 On 9 June 2009, with three reservations relating to service in the armed forces, education, 
and social security appointeeship, and one declaration relating to education 
84
 23 members from Ministry of Justice, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Scotland 
Government, Welsh Assembly Government, Northern Ireland Office of the First Minister, 
Home Office, Government Equalities Office, Department for Innovation, Universities and 
Skills, Department for Children, Schools and Families, Department for Work and Pensions, 
Department of Health, Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 
Department for Communities & Local Government, headed by Ministry of Justice. 
85
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Seventeenth Session, Summary 
record of the 36
th
 meeting, E/C.12/1997/SR.36, 27 November 1997, para 47; and see above 
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The 2009 meeting86 
Incorporation 
The leader of the UK delegation,87 opening proceedings, emphasises the 
‘high value’ the UK places on the work of the Committee, and the respect it 
has for the Committee’s ‘advice’.88  He emphasises the UK’s commitment to 
‘vigorous development’ of relevant policy, pursuing a ‘progressive agenda’ 
through the Welfare State.  He reiterates that ‘[i]t is the Government’s clear 
view that, for the UK, democratically elected representatives are better 
placed than are the judiciary to make politically sensitive decisions on 
resource allocation’; and that ‘Parliamentary sovereignty remains the 
cornerstone of the UK constitution’. 89   Already, this Statement is plainly 
couched in the language of traditional domestic legal discourse, where 
Parliament is sovereign, and non-justiciable economic, social and cultural 
‘policy’ is delivered through the welfare state.  Covenant rights are referred to 
throughout as ‘principles and objectives’,90  their implementation as ‘policy’,91 
and the rights themselves as welfare ‘entitlements’. 92    Whilst the 
government’s on-going Bill of Rights and Responsibilities consultation93 is 
highlighted, there is no hint of the incremental shifts in the government’s 
thinking described above.  
 
                                                 
86
 At the time of writing, there are only partial Summary Reports of this meeting available on 
the UN Treaty Body database.  They relate to the 15
th
 and 16
th
 sessions on Wednesday 13
th
 
May 2009.  The proceedings of the earlier opening session on Tuesday 12
th
 May 2009 are 
therefore reported here from a draft copy of the Opening Statement by the leader of the UK 
delegation, available on the day, and the writer’s notes taken at the meeting.  It has not been 
possible to cross-check these notes against an official record. They have, however, been 
checked against the record published by the International Service for Human Rights, who 
were also present.  See Method in Chapter 1 above 
87
 Dr Vijay Rangarajan, Constitution Director, Ministry of Justice; his draft statement was 
made available to the public in hard copy on the day.  See Appendix 1 below 
88
 UK Examination, 12/13 May 2009, Opening Statement, para 4.  It least one Committee 
member finds this introduction ‘provocative’: the recommendations of the Committee are 
NOT just ‘advice’: ‘you need a stronger word’.   Dr Rangarajan responds that maybe ‘advice’ 
does not carry the right connotations, but the UK takes the Committee’s contributions 
‘extremely seriously’. 
89
 Para 11 
90
 Paras 10, 13,  
91
 Paras 2, 4, 5, 9, 10,   
92
 Para 19 
93
 Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice Rights and Responsibilities: developing 
our constitutional framework (Cm 7577, 2009) 
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The Committee expresses disappointment at the UK’s position.94   It seems 
to them that the UK is ‘still holding on to its inflexible approach’95 whereby 
Covenant rights are not justiciable or understood as rights: ‘it hasn’t changed 
at all’.96  The UK has ratified the Covenant, but is saying it is bound only at 
international level, not domestic level; that obligations are progressive only; 
that Parliament is best.  Covenant obligations are not being implemented or 
taken seriously.97  Moreover, lack of direct applicability of international law to 
domestic law should not affect incorporation:98  most countries apply and 
implement ESCR all over the world. 99   The UK’s reasons for non-
incorporation in its Fifth Report do not make sense.  It seems to the 
Committee that the government does not wish domestic courts to enforce 
Covenant rights.  That raises questions about ratification, and needs to 
change.100   
 
Delegates explain again that the UK does not incorporate international 
treaties, that the ECHR was an exception, and that EU law has direct effect 
regarding some ESC rights.  They accept that some of the UK’s arguments, 
such as vagueness of the Covenant’s language, ‘may have lost their 
force’.101  However, the Committee should look at the UK’s achievements 
and future plans, even though they may not be expressed in terms of the 
Covenant.102    The UK is not hostile to economic, social and cultural rights, 
but keen to see their realisation.  The problem is not direct applicability of the 
text of the Covenant, but the need for Parliament to legislate, which causes 
legal and practical difficulties.  They cannot see change in the near future, 
although the government has an open mind, as evidenced in their current Bill 
of Rights consultation.103  
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Acting Chair Ms Bras Gomes notes that the government ‘disagrees with the 
Committee on a number of issues.’  On the one hand, it agrees that 
‘economic, social and cultural rights are as important as and indivisible from 
civil and political rights’,104 yet on the other it treats them as part of the 
welfare state, not as rights.  Why are they not indivisible at practical level?  
How does the government see these obligations?  It makes no reference to 
‘fulfilment’.105 
 
Progressive realisation 
The UK’s Opening Statement repeatedly emphasises the ‘progressive’ nature 
of implementation under Article 2,106 reflecting the UK’s understanding that 
‘although some rights require immediate realisation, the obligation under the 
Covenant is one of progressive realisation’.107  
 
As noted in Chapter 2 above, unlike its equivalent in the ICCPR, Article 2 
ICESCR allows for the ‘progressive realisation’ of the Covenant rights, ‘to the 
maximum of available resources’.  However, according to the Committee’s 
General Comments, 108  this is not to be interpreted as indefinite 
procrastination.  Ratifying States undertake to ‘take steps…with a view to 
achieving’ realisation of the rights; that undertaking is ‘unqualified’.109  Steps 
taken ‘must be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible 
towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.’110  Moreover, a 
‘minimum core obligation’ must be met ‘to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights…’.111  Failure to do 
so constitutes breach of a State’s obligations.112  Beyond this minimum, the 
Covenant imposes on States the three levels of obligation described in 
Chapter 3 above: to respect, protect and fulfil the rights concerned.  Failure 
to perform any one of these three obligations, albeit progressively, also 
                                                 
104
 Fifth Report, para 75 
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106
 Opening Statement paras 9, 10, 11, 13, 16  
107
 Ibid para 11 
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 155 
 
constitutes a violation of the rights.113   States are to act in a way reasonably 
calculated to realise the enjoyment of each right;114  and to achieve specific 
targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard. 115     Any deliberately 
retrogressive measures must be fully justified.116  These are some of the 
substantive obligations established in international law to which CRPD Article 
4(2) on socio-economic rights refers. 
 
The Committee notes the UK’s statement that some rights require immediate 
realisation whilst others may be implemented progressively.  They ask which, 
in the UK’s view, are which?117  but receive no specific answer.118   
 
The Committee also wants to know why the UK thinks that ESC rights are not 
justiciable.  In their view, justiciable ESC rights contribute to good 
government, but they are only applicable in administration or courts if spelled 
out in domestic legislation:119   a right which cannot come to court is not a 
right.120   ‘Do you see the State as Messiah? How can you do that?’  asks 
one Committee member in frustration.121   
 
Justiciability 
The question of justiciability again serves to illustrate the polarised 
understandings of the two parties to this discussion.  On the one hand, the 
Committee has travelled a long way from the idea of economic, social and 
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cultural rights as non-justiciable ‘principles and objectives’.  In its General 
Comment 9,122 it points out that, in addition to States’ general duty to provide 
an effective remedy where human rights are breached, 123  ‘there are a 
number of other provisions in the [Covenant], including articles 3, 7(a)(i), 8, 
10(3), 13(2)(a), (3) and (4) and 15(3) 124 which would seem to be capable of 
immediate application by judicial and other organs in many national legal 
systems.’125   The incorporation of ESC rights by many countries around the 
world, and the development there and at the UN126 of a growing body of 
ESCR jurisprudence,127 has contributed to a renewed understanding of ESC 
rights as full, justiciable rights on a par with, and inseparable from, their civil 
and political counterparts.   
 
This understanding of justiciability goes further than the provision of specific 
national legislation.  As Langford explains,  
[w]hat is novel is not the adjudication of social interests.  Domestic 
legislation in many countries provides a measure of judicially 
enforceable labour and social rights.  What is significant is that the more 
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durable human rights dimensions of these social values…, whether 
captured in constitutions or international law, are being adjudicated.  128 
 
This international legal discourse that recognises and adjudicates the 
‘durable human rights dimensions of social values’ is one with which the 
members of the Committee strongly identify: it is the reason for and the 
objective of their existence as a Committee, and shapes all of their work.  As 
we have seen, it also strongly shapes, inter alia, the CRPD.   As Langford 
continues,  
[t]his is not to downplay the role of legislation from either a principled or 
pragmatic perspective.  It is often more precise and contextualised and 
has the direct authoritative and democratic imprimatur of the legislature.  
But legislative rights are not always sufficient to protect human rights, 
and they are subject to amendment by a simple majority of the 
population.129 
 
The UK, on the other hand, has failed to travel down that road.  From their  
neo-liberal national perspective, successive UK governments have persisted 
in viewing socio-economic rights not as ‘rights’, but as non-justiciable guiding 
‘principles’ – a position strongly reflected once again in the delegation’s 2009 
Opening Statement.  The UK argues that it has ‘specific laws, policies and 
practices’ in place to progress that realisation, and thus to meet its 
obligations under the Covenant.  Moreover, ‘a wealth of advice and 
guidance’130 ensures that people know about their welfare entitlements, and 
those entitlements can be enforced through political and administrative 
systems: through judicial review in the courts, through ‘various specialised 
independent tribunals, and by reference to the independent Parliamentary 
Commissioners (sic) for Administration (Ombudsmen).’131  So, from the UK’s 
perspective, what is the Committee’s problem? 
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The Committee tries to explain.    It reassures the delegation that the role of 
the Committee is not to take the place of Parliament: 132   However, it 
questions the adequacy of judicial review as a remedy for vulnerable 
groups.133 People in difficult situations have a double bind: difficulty of the 
situation and difficulty of getting redress.  They need access to legal 
remedies.134  The UK should not be afraid of involving the judges: allocation 
of resources is a matter of reasonableness and proportionality,135 concepts 
that judges are used to applying. 
 
However, the delegation persists in its view that resources are a matter for 
elected Parliaments not judges.  Internationally, judges such as those in India 
or South Africa have gone further than the UK would feel acceptable.136 
This dialogue calls up previous discussion between the UK and the 
Committee when they were negotiating the text of the ICESCR’s new 
Optional Protocol.   
 
Optional Protocol 
An Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, allowing for individual and group 
petition to the Committee by those claiming to be victims of violation of 
Covenant rights, was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 
2008.137  During negotiation of the Protocol, the UK expressed its view that 
‘[s]ignificant questions remained in relation to the [ESCR] Committee’s 
competence to consider national decisions on resource allocation’;138  and its 
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concern ‘about granting the Committee powers to assess a State party’s 
obligations to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights’.139  It argued140 that  
a comprehensive approach might not be viable in situations where all of 
the rights contained in the Covenant were not enshrined at national 
level and suggested that one option could be to limit communications 
[under the Protocol] to claims of discrimination. 141   
In line with its dualist system, the UK generally has a tentative approach to 
the right of petition to UN Committees.  Historically, the only outside bodies to 
which a British citizen might resort have been the European Court of Human 
Rights142 or, indirectly, the European Court of Justice.143   In 2005, in an 
exploratory gesture,144 the UK acceded to the new Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),  allowing individuals or groups claiming to be victims of CEDAW 
rights violation to ‘submit communications’ to that Convention‘s monitoring 
committee.145   An independent evaluation of the ‘CEDAW experiment’ to 
identify any practical benefits, to assess costs, and to consider wider 
implications146 had just reported at the time of the Geneva meeting.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In Geneva, the Committee asks whether the UK will sign the [new ICESCR] 
Optional Protocol.147  The delegate responds that the UK is not against the 
Protocol on principle, but is not convinced of its practical use.  After all, UN 
Committees are not courts, and individuals in the UK can use domestic 
courts and tribunals.  The UK has been testing out the process by ratifying 
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the CEDAW Protocol, but there is not yet enough empirical evidence on 
which to judge its usefulness.  In the meantime, the government will consider 
ratifying other Optional Protocols, including that of the CRPD, to gather a 
database of evidence. 
 
Bills of Rights 
The UK’s Opening Statement draws the Committee’s attention to the recent 
[New Labour] government consultation on a British Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities.148  This document149 explains that 
[a]lthough economic, social and cultural rights are not currently 
incorporated directly into UK law… [t]he Government remains 
committed to meeting social and economic needs equitably through its 
policy decisions and legislative programme.  It continues to do this on 
the basis of democratically elected representatives making decisions in 
Parliament on the allocation of scarce resources.150   
 
Following emphasis on the importance of responsibilities in the welfare state, 
the Paper explains that 
[i]n drawing up a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, the Government 
would not seek to create new and individually enforceable legal rights in 
addition to the array of legal protections already available.  However, it 
welcomes discussion on whether there could be advantages in 
articulating constitutional principles which can be drawn from existing 
welfare provisions.  It might be possible to distil the values which frame 
our welfare system in order to reflect, in one coherent document, certain 
social and economic guarantees and the responsibilities and conduct 
expected of individuals.151 
 
We have noted above the contribution of the JCHR to that debate, where it 
recommends inclusion of rights to health, education, housing and an 
adequate standard of living.  The UN Committee asks whether these 
recommendations have been implemented.152   Committee members have 
also looked at the Government’s consultation document:  they conclude that 
the consultation relates to civil and political rights, not economic, social and 
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cultural rights.  The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is also in the 
process of preparing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.  The Committee 
notes that that Commission has a mandate in favour of economic, social and 
cultural rights being justiciable and enforceable.  Will the UK government 
enact the resulting Northern Ireland Bill of Rights? And include Covenant 
rights in a UK Bill of Rights? 
 
The UK delegation replies that, following the consultation, a Bill might include 
some economic, social and cultural rights.  The Government does not see 
directly enforceable rights as appropriate, because ‘people in the UK have so 
many already.’153  Questions about the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights cannot 
be answered yet, as discussions are still in progress.154 
The ensuing fate of the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights serves to illustrate the 
tensions created by devolution mentioned above.  The Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission ( NIHRC) presented its advice to the Government 
on the possible content of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland in December 
2008. 155   This advice was thus available to the Government and to the 
Committee prior to their 2009 meeting.  It included, inter alia, constitutional 
rights to education, identity and culture, language, health, adequate standard 
of living, accommodation, work, environmental rights, and social security.  
Almost a year later, and six months after the Geneva meeting, the 
Westminster Government’s response156 simply referred consideration of the 
Commission’s advice to the ongoing national consultation on a potential Bill 
of Rights and Responsibilities for the UK as a whole, discussed above. The 
NIHRC’s reply was barely polite: the Commission  
finds itself in the position of analysing a paper that: 1. demonstrates a 
lack of understanding of the purpose and functions of a Bill of Rights; 2. 
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fails to take appropriate account of international human rights 
standards; 3. appears to be suggesting the lowering of existing human 
rights standards in Northern Ireland; 4. fails to satisfy the minimum 
common law consultation requirements; and 5. misrepresents the 
advice given by the Commission.157   
The 2009 national debate on a Bill of Rights, too, has now been overtaken by 
events.158   
Nevertheless, according to the 2009 delegation in Geneva, one consequence 
of that national debate will be enhanced ‘awareness of, and civic participation 
and engagement with, economic, social and cultural rights in the UK’.159  This 
links into another issue raised by the Committee prior to the meeting. 
 
Visibility 
It has been argued above that economic, social and cultural rights have been 
invisible in UK human rights discourse; and that only recently might that 
invisibility have begun, incrementally, to change.  The first question in the 
Committee’s list of issues arising from the UK’s Fifth Report runs as follows: 
1. Please provide further detailed information on the measures taken by 
the State party to increase awareness of the provisions of the 
Covenant and their application among judges, public officials, police 
and law enforcement officers, medical practitioners, nurses and other 
health-care professionals, teachers, social workers and the public at 
large. 
 
The UK replies: 
1. The UK Government is fully committed to a vigorous development of 
economic, social and cultural policy within the UK.   Nevertheless …[i]t 
believes that domestic law and specific official guidance provide 
officials with the best framework for delivery of services to the public. ..  
the Government considers it more appropriate for training and 
guidance for public officials and service providers to focus on their 
duties under the specific laws and policies which they are required to 
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implement, rather than on the provisions of the Covenant as such.  
The Government does not believe that further awareness raising of 
the general provisions of the Covenant would be of practical benefit to 
officials delivering specific services, or to improved standards of 
service.160 
 
Moreover, ‘[t]he Government does not believe that further raising of 
awareness of the provisions of the Covenant would be of practical 
benefit to the general public’, as ‘[t]here is a wealth of advice and 
guidance from NGOs, charities and other independent organisations 
about the rights under the Covenant…’.161 
 
The Government is confident that, in general, people in the United 
Kingdom are aware of their economic, social and cultural rights… the 
benefits and services provided by the Welfare State… have become 
so deeply engrained in the culture of the UK that they are universally 
regarded as “rights”.162 
 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), in its submission to 
the Committee, disagrees.  Despite their strong support from the British 
public, economic, social and cultural rights 
do not have the same level of understanding as civil and political rights 
in Britain, since the primary focus of the government’s guidance has 
been on the Human Rights Act 1998…  Indeed the language of the 
government primarily refers to the rights as part of the “Welfare State”, 
not as universal human rights standards which are often interdependent 
to the enjoyment of civil and political rights…163  
 
The EHRC calls for the government to take a human rights based approach 
to Covenant rights and obligations to ensure that the rights are taken into 
consideration in the development of relevant legislation and policy.164 
 
Again, the Committee finds itself ‘very disappointed’, by the Government’s 
response on this issue.165 
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Following the meeting in 2009, the Committee’s concluding observations 
were forthright: 
The Committee urges the State party to ensure that the Covenant is 
given full legal effect in its domestic law, that the Covenant rights are 
made justiciable, and that effective remedies are available for victims of 
all violations of economic, social and cultural rights.  The Committee 
reiterates its recommendation that, irrespective of the system through 
which international law is incorporated in the domestic legal order 
(monism or dualism), following ratification of an international instrument, 
the State party is under a legal obligation to comply with such an 
instrument and to give it full effect in its domestic legal order.  In this 
respect, the Committee again draws the attention of the State party to 
its General Comment No. 9 (1998) on the domestic application of the 
Covenant.166 
 
Despite the apparent incremental shift in government thinking noted by the 
JCHR, no compromise has been found to resolve the confrontation between 
government and Committee.  What implications for the hegemonic project 
working to transform the CRPD myth into imaginary might be deduced from 
this ‘not-so-constructive’ dialogue? 
 
Discursive re-articulation and the perils of 
interlegality 
 
Examination of the UK’s dialogue with the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights reveals, as Ms Bras Gomes comments, that the 
UK ‘disagrees with the Committee on a number of issues’.  They range 
through incorporation, progressive realisation, justiciability, the Optional 
Protocol, the content of Bills of Rights and awareness-raising/visibility – that 
is, through all of the key aspects of Covenant implementation.  Most 
important for this thesis is evidence in the dialogue of strong resistance on 
the part of successive UK governments to any recognition of these rights as 
rights, or to any enforcement of their more durable human rights dimensions, 
whether by their own citizens or by the Committee itself.  Instead, the UK 
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persists in re-articulating socio-economic rights as ‘principles and objectives’ 
to guide politicians in formulating ‘welfare’ policy.  As Ms Bras Gomes 
continues: on the one hand, the UK agrees that economic, social and cultural 
rights are as important as civil and political rights, yet on the other it treats 
them as part of the welfare state, not as rights.  ‘Why’, she asks, ‘are they not 
indivisible at practical level?’167 
 
Transformation in thinking from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ is fundamental to the 
CRPD’s emancipatory purpose.   In the Convention text, the traditional 
dichotomy is no longer relevant: both ‘sets’ of rights are equally and 
indivisibly important to the repositioning of disabled people in the world, and 
to the realisation of all Convention rights.  Yet, despite the UK’s participation 
in CRPD negotiations, this fundamental shift in understanding has not taken 
place at national level.  As can be seen from the ‘constructive’ dialogue, it 
continues to be persistently and forcefully resisted by successive UK 
governments in the face of strong international pressure.  We may indeed 
ask, with Ms Bras Gomes: why? 
 
The constructive dialogue is a dialogue between two different legal 
dimensions: international and national – in Santos’ terms, world-place and 
citizen-place.  The dynamic interplay within and between such legal 
dimensions produces what Santos calls legal constellations, or ‘interlegality’.  
The interplay during this dialogue is - albeit diplomatically - antagonistic, 
leading to impasse and mutual frustration.  Part of this non-communication 
may be explained by the differing scales of law involved in the discussion.  
For the UK, the Covenant is too small-scale to be interpreted as other than 
principles or guidance: it prefers its specific, larger-scale domestic law to give 
effect to those principles.  On the other hand, the Committee is not satisfied 
that such specific large-scale law is capable of encompassing the durable 
nature of the Covenant’s terms.  Their differences, however, go further.  
Santos describes forms of law as ‘revolving doors through which different 
forms of power and knowledge circulate’.168  Further understanding of this 
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impasse may thus be gleaned from examination of some of the ‘forms of 
power and knowledge’, or discourses, at play in this constructive dialogue.   
The Committee is made up of 18 ‘experts’ in the field of ESC rights from a 
variety of nations, cultures and legal settings.  By their nature, experience 
and position, these individuals identify strongly with the international 
discourse of economic, social and cultural rights as rights.  It is this discourse 
that provides them with their ‘subject positions’169 as social agents in our 
dialogue.  They are engaged in a hegemonic project to bring about their 
vision of how states, economies and civil societies should be organised.170  
Since the Committee’s inception, it has worked to clarify the norms contained 
in the Covenant, to expand its information base, and to implement an 
effective system for monitoring States’ performance.171  To further increase 
the discourse’s hegemony, the Committee has produced 21 General 
Comments, 172  which are supported by the Limburg Principles, 173  the 
Maastricht Guidelines174 and other declarations.175   The Covenant rights are 
increasingly adjudicated by other UN bodies, by regional human rights bodies 
and by national courts around the world.176  As the Committee points out to 
the UK delegation, most countries now apply and implement economic, 
social and cultural rights, through a variety of legal systems.  From its near-
dislocation by the Cold War, through the work of the Committee and 
others, 177   this discourse is growing in hegemony: it is succeeding in 
redefining the terms of the political debate and in setting a new agenda, 
where its norms and the durable human rights dimensions of its values are 
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recognised, accepted and applied.178  The place of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the CRPD is one manifestation of that success.  In Geneva, 
the Committee alternately cajoles and presses the UK delegation to offer 
some olive branch or compromise, to show some willingness to take 
elements of this discourse on board.  But to no avail. 
 
The UK not only fails to recognise this new agenda, it actively rejects it, 
resisting all attempts to shift it from its position.  Economic, social and cultural 
rights as rights remain invisible in domestic human rights discourse, re-
articulated as ‘principles and objectives’ and as welfare entitlements.  As we 
saw in Chapter 1, such exclusion is a typical response where a hegemonic 
discourse meets an element that is incapable of being accommodated 
because it directly negates its own meanings.  If the discourse of economic, 
social and cultural rights as rights is diametrically opposed to dominant UK 
domestic legal/political discourse, it will be incapable of being accommodated 
into the UK legal system.  The UK’s Fifth Report proclaims as much.179   
 
We have recognised above that the UK is often seen as one of the most neo-
liberal States in Western Europe, and we have noted the influence of liberal 
free-market thinkers such as Hayek on domestic political discourse.  A brief 
excursion into Hayek’s position on economic, social and cultural rights may 
help to illustrate some reasons why the UK shows such strong resistance to 
the Committee’s efforts. 
 
In Law, Legislation and Liberty,180 Hayek sets out ‘a new statement of the 
liberal principles of justice and political economy’.  Volume 2 is concerned 
with ‘the mirage of social justice’.   Here, Hayek differentiates between ‘plain 
justice’ – ‘the moral precepts men have evolved for the guidance of their 
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individual actions’181 - and the demand for ‘social justice’, which is ‘addressed 
not to the individual, but to society’.  A liberal, free market-based ‘society’,182  
he argues, is incapable of acting for a specific purpose.  To achieve ‘social 
justice’, therefore, the members of society would need to organise 
themselves so as to make it possible to assign particular shares of the 
product of society to the different individuals or groups.183    Hayek admits 
that  
the manner in which the benefits and burdens are [currently] 
apportioned by the market mechanism would in many instances have to 
be regarded as very unjust if it were the result of a deliberate allocation 
of particular people [original emphasis]. But this is not the case.  Those 
shares are the outcome of a process the effect of which on particular 
people was neither intended nor foreseen by anyone when the 
institutions first appeared – institutions which were then permitted to 
continue because it was found that they improve for all or most the 
prospects of having their needs satisfied.  To demand justice from such 
a process is clearly absurd, and to single out some people in such a 
society as entitled to a particular share evidently unjust.184     
 
From this view of ‘social justice’, Hayek proceeds to consider justice and 
individual rights.185  Here, he holds that 
[t]he time-honoured political and civil rights…constitute essentially a 
demand that so far as the power of government extends it ought to be 
used justly….186   
 
These neutral negative rights ‘are merely a complement of the rules 
protecting individual domains’.187     Socio-economic rights, by contrast, are 
positive rights  
for which an equal or even higher dignity is claimed.  These are claims 
to particular benefits to which every human being as such is presumed 
to be entitled without any indication as to who is to be under the 
obligation to provide those benefits or by what process they are to be 
provided.188  
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They cannot be claimed against ‘society’, because ‘society’ ‘cannot think, act, 
value or “treat” anybody in a particular way’.189  For such claims to be met, 
therefore,  
the spontaneous order which we call society must be replaced by a 
deliberately directed organization… whose members would have to do 
what they are instructed to do.   They would not be allowed to use their 
knowledge for their own purposes but would have to carry out the plan 
which their rulers have designed to meet the needs to be satisfied.  
From this it follows that the old civil rights and the new social and 
economic rights cannot be achieved at the same time but are in fact 
incompatible: the new rights could not be enforced by law without at the 
same time destroying that liberal order at which the old civil rights 
aim…190   (emphasis added)   
 
Hayek’s views illustrate the more extreme neo-liberal arguments against 
socio-economic rights.191  However, they help to show how, for supporters of 
such views, the discourse of economic, social and cultural rights as rights 
with which the Committee so strongly identifies might be understood as 
incompatible with, and thus incapable of accommodation into, national neo-
liberal capitalist discourse. There would then remain no alternative but to 
exclude the concept of economic, social and cultural rights as rights, to 
render it invisible in national discourse, and to seek to re-articulate its 
elements, where necessary, as compensatory welfare entitlements resting in 
the gift of the State.  Such exclusion and re-articulation confirms and 
strengthens the constitutive outside of the national discourse.  The process 
accentuates the relations of equivalence at play in the dialogue, as 
evidenced in the defensive stance of the UK in 2002 as it insists that ‘it will 
not accept any charge of having evaded’ its international obligations.192   In 
2009, the UK’s invitation to the Committee to accept this partial re-
articulation, asking them to look at the UK’s achievements and future plans, 
even though they may not be expressed in terms of the Covenant, is not 
taken up.   Nevertheless, as the leader of the UK delegation comments, the 
UK’s position is unlikely to change in the near future.   
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Conclusion 
 
Examination of the UK’s constructive dialogue with the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reveals disagreement on incorporation, 
progressive realisation, justiciability, the Optional Protocol, the content of Bills 
of Rights and awareness raising/visibility – that is, on all key aspects of 
Covenant implementation.  The UK’s strong resistance to any recognition of 
these rights as rights, or to any enforcement of their more durable human 
rights dimensions, raises questions about its implementation of the ICESCR.  
It also raises questions about the UK’s capacity to make the transformation in 
thinking from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’, which is fundamental to implementation of 
the CRPD.    
 
Discourses seek to dominate or organise a field of meaning in a particular 
way, by weaving together different discursive strands. 193   In international 
disability/human rights discourse, the ‘strand’ of economic, social and cultural 
rights as rights plays a key role, not only in practice, by enabling the exercise 
of all CRPD rights, but also in understanding the re-positioning of disabled 
people from welfare recipients to rights-holders vital to its hegemonic 
success. The UK’s position as evidenced in the constructive dialogue 
demonstrates that it has not yet made – indeed, that it resists - that vital 
transition in understanding.  The question then arises as to how the 
international disability/human rights myth will fare in a domestic context that 
so strongly resists acknowledgement of one of its central elements.  As 
Flóvenz suggests,  
one might come to the conclusion that in those States in which 
economic and social rights have not been sufficiently implemented until 
now, there may arise some problems in implementing the Convention 
as a whole.194   
 
The UK consistently maintains that it ‘will not ratify a treaty unless the 
Government is satisfied that domestic law and practice enable it to 
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comply’.195  Three weeks after the Geneva meeting, on 9 June 2009, the UK 
ratified the CRPD,196 undertaking to ‘ensure and promote the full realisation 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all disabled people in its 
jurisdiction’.197  The Explanatory Memorandum required by the ratification 
process198  makes it clear that 
[t]he Convention does not aim to establish new human rights for 
disabled people but sets out with greater clarity the obligation on States 
to promote, respect, and ensure the human rights that disabled people 
already have, so that they are treated on an equal basis with other 
people.199  
 
It explains that the Convention  
encompasses civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights.  These rights cover all areas of life including: the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person; access to justice; personal mobility; 
health; education; work; recreation; and provision for equal recognition 
before the law. 200 (emphasis added)  
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This apparent recognition of economic, social and cultural rights as rights, 
however, is fleeting.  Further down the Memorandum, when setting out the 
Government’s actions to ensure that disabled people in the UK have 
‘comprehensive and enforceable’ rights, the language changes.  Here, the 
rights are referred to as ‘civil and human rights’, identified as those already 
available under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Human Rights 
Act 1998. 201   Economic, social and cultural rights as rights have again 
become invisible. 
 
To expand its hegemony, a discourse must attempt to dominate the field of 
meaning, establish new systems of social relations and provide new subject 
positions in line with its particular norms, values and perceptions.  However, 
we have seen that the UK’s ownership 202  of one key element of CRPD 
discourse is missing.  The remainder of this thesis assesses the impact of the 
UK’s mis-understanding of economic, social and cultural rights on the ability 
of international disability/human rights discourse to expand its hegemony in 
England through the ‘revolving door’ of the Convention.  
 
Taking CRPD Article 19, the right to live independently and be included in the 
community, as a case study, the following Chapters examine in turn the 
‘specific laws, policies and practices’ 203  relating to independent living in 
England.   Chapter 6 examines the understandings reflected in independent 
living policy for signs of re-organisation of the field of meaning in line with the 
CRPD myth.   Chapter 7 investigates legislation for potential progress 
towards new CRPD-compatible systems of social relations.  Social relations 
are at their most dynamic where policy and law are delivered to the individual 
through the administrative justice system.  Chapter 8 explores administrative 
decision-making for evidence of CRPD-compatible emancipatory practice. 
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Chapter 9 explores the capacity of available redress systems to influence 
policy, law and practice in line with the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project.    
Chapter 10 brings the thesis to its conclusion.
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Chapter 6 
Independent Living in England: 
Policy  
 
Introduction 
 
A political project, such as that driving realisation of the Convention myth, will 
attempt to weave together different strands of discourse in an effort to 
dominate or organise a field of meaning.  It will seek to establish systems of 
social relations between different objects and practices, and to provide 
subject positions with which social agents identify, in line with its re-
description of the world.  If it succeeds, it will redefine the terms of the 
political debate and set a new agenda.   
 
The disability/human rights project has succeeded at international level: 
‘[d]isability has moved to the core of the UN human rights agenda in theory’.1 
It is encapsulated in a unique international legal order which projects all of 
the rights through the experience of disability and puts in place systems for 
further expansion of its hegemony.  We have seen that Convention as 
hegemonic in intent, as expressive or emancipatory law, as a ‘revolving door 
through which different forms of power and knowledge circulate.’2   Whether 
it succeeds in its hegemonic intent is another question, which depends, at 
least in part, on the constellations of power and knowledge already 
circulating in the domestic sphere.  The remainder of this thesis examines 
some of those constellations in the context of Article 19 in England, and 
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attempts to assess potential for the Convention to influence understandings, 
systems and identities to set a new, CRPD-compatible agenda here. 
 
When the UK ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, it undertook to ‘ensure and promote the full realisation of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities…’3   
Among the measures States are required to take to that end are: 
(a) To adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures 
for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention; 
(b) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that 
constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities; and 
(c) To take into account the protection and promotion of the human rights 
of persons with disabilities in all policies and programmes.4 
 
In addition, under Article 4(3), States are required to ‘closely consult with and 
actively involve’ disabled people, through their representative organisations, 
in the development and implementation of legislation and policies, and in 
other decision-making processes that relate to them. 
 
Among the rights the UK has undertaken to realise is Article 19.  This 
requires ratifying States to recognise and to take effective and appropriate 
measures to facilitate the equal right of all disabled people to live in the 
community with choices equal to others, and their full inclusion and 
participation in the community.  Article 19 has been identified in Chapter 4 as 
encapsulating core elements of disability/human rights discourse and as 
clarifying the means through which other Convention rights are realised.  As 
a ‘hybrid’ right, it exemplifies the Convention’s fusion between the two ‘sets’ 
of rights: realisation of its socio-economic provisions is pre-requisite for 
exercise of its civil and political rights to autonomy and participation, which in 
turn are pre-requisite for the exercise of other Convention rights.  How these 
socio-economic provisions are implemented will therefore have a 
determinative effect on success or otherwise of the Convention’s hegemonic 
project.  
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Yet we have seen that the UK persists in re-articulating economic, social and 
cultural rights as non-justiciable ‘guiding principles’ to be implemented 
through the specific policies, laws and practices of its welfare state, 
demonstrating that it has not yet made – indeed that it resists – the vital 
transformation in thinking from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ demanded by both the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the CRPD.   
 
The impact of this fundamental re-articulation on the Convention’s 
hegemonic prospects will be analysed through the ‘specific policies, laws and 
practices’5 of the welfare state as they relate to the economic, social and 
cultural rights engaged in implementation of Article 19: 
 
(a) Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their place 
of residence and where and with whom they live on an equal basis 
with others and are not obliged to live in a particular living 
arrangement; 
 
(b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home, 
residential and other community support services, including personal 
assistance, necessary to support living in the community, and to 
prevent isolation or segregation from the community; 
 
(c) Community services and facilities for the general population are 
available on an equal basis to persons with disabilities and are 
responsive to their needs. 
 
For a discourse to succeed in redefining the debate and setting a new 
agenda, it must influence understandings in the field of meaning, establish 
new systems of social relations between objects and practices, and provide 
subject positions with which social agents can identify. 6   Chapter 7 will 
examine the systems of social relations sedimented in independent living 
legislation in England; Chapter 8 the systems, relationships and identities 
circulating in current independent living practice; and Chapter 9 the capacity 
of redress systems to influence independent living policy, law and practice in 
line with the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project.  First, this Chapter analyses 
the field of meaning within which independent living policy in England is 
shaped. 
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The domestic social space 
 
Overview 
In the international sphere, disability/human rights discourse has succeeded 
in redefining the terms of the political debate and in setting a new agenda.  
That agenda re-articulates liberal ‘ableist’ understandings of ‘normality’, 
autonomy and equality through the experience of dis-ability to produce a re-
description of the world and of the place of disabled people in it.  The practice 
it engenders reflects the nature of the new discourse in its holistic and 
participatory approach that takes the views and lived experience of disabled 
people as its principal point of departure.  In the English domestic sphere, we 
find a very different social space from that at international level. The 
foundations of capitalist discourse in England, with its idiosyncratic form of 
individualism, run deep.7  Understandings of economic, social and cultural 
rights are not the only element of disability/human rights discourse to be 
articulated differently at national level: equality and disability, too, are 
understood in different ways.   
 
One curious idiosyncrasy of British liberal discourse has been that equality 
and human rights have been ‘kept separate’.8   Despite early enactment of 
non-discrimination law, equality is only beginning to be acknowledged as a 
fundamental human rights value.9   Equality law is considered by many to be 
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unduly ‘politically correct’ 10  or to burden business with unnecessary ‘red 
tape’11 – both characteristics seen as interfering negatively with individual 
and market freedom.  
  
Moreover, liberal discourse assumes an ‘able’ autonomous human ‘subject’, 
free to live his life how he chooses, fettered only occasionally by the State.12  
The related discourse of ‘normality’ relies for its own constitution on the 
exclusion of dis-abled people not only physically through segregation but also 
in terms of identity.13  All of these discursive elements can be found in the 
history of disability policy in England.   
 
Poor Laws14 relegated the ‘impotent’ poor to the workhouse15 and ensured 
that their situation was ‘less eligible’ than that of the ‘independent labourer of 
the lowest class’. 16  People with physical impairments were segregated into 
‘special schools’ or hospitals,17 where ‘crippled’ children were ‘straightened 
out’ physically and behaviourally, 18  and war veterans and paraplegics 
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‘rehabilitated’19 to ‘rescue’ them from the ‘human scrap-heap’.20  Those too 
old to be ‘normalised’ might be sent to the poor law infirmaries, ‘put to bed 
and kept there’, stigmatised as ‘parasites’ on the national economy.21  ‘Idiots’, 
‘lunatics’ and ‘persons of unsound mind’ were incarcerated in asylums, along 
with people with ‘mental deficiencies’ such as impaired coordination, sight or 
hearing, and ‘moral deficiencies’, such as pregnancy outside marriage. 22  
Many were subjected to psychiatric experimentation with electro-convulsive 
therapy or psychosurgery.23   
 
These institutional developments, with their physical segregation, social, 
medical and psychiatric objectification and control, negation of identity and 
concomitant experiences of abuse and oppression, feature strongly in the 
shared history of disabled people.24  Alongside such institutional experience, 
however, many disabled people lived, with or without ‘poor relief’, in the 
community.  Here, as Borsay describes,  
[f]aced with poor wages, joblessness and the extra costs of impairment, 
disabled people cobbled together a makeshift domestic economy of 
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support from family and community as well as from mutual aid, 
charitable assistance and state relief.25   
 
Some made a living exhibiting themselves to the public in ‘freak shows’,26 
trading on negative fascination with difference.27 
 
Conditions for disabled people in England have improved immeasurably 
since the days of the Poor Laws.  As the 20th century progressed, and social 
attitudes changed, the workhouse was replaced by the public assistance 
institution, and draconian psychiatric treatments were largely overtaken by a 
‘pharmacological revolution’. 28    With foundation of the 1940s 
Beveridge/Marshall welfare state, 29  poor law infirmaries became NHS 
geriatric wards, psychiatry a branch of medicine within the NHS, and public 
assistance institutions became residential homes run by local authorities or 
the charity sector.  As limited rights of appeal against mental health detention 
were introduced,30 numbers resident in mental and ‘sub normality’ hospitals 
began to fall.  From the 1960s, as disabled people mobilised to counter their 
oppression, a programme of hospital closure31 gave rise to a new discourse 
of ‘care in the community’.  
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However, despite the social model of disability being the British disabled 
people’s movement’s ‘big idea’, the medical model with its ‘normalisation’ 
discourse 32  still predominates in many powerful quarters; 33  paternalistic 
service provision which assumes dependency persists; the principle of ‘less 
eligibility’ still lingers in the social security system;34 and disabled people’s 
organisations often struggle to survive and to have their voices heard.35  In 
this domestic sphere, respect for their experience and expertise regarding 
identity, survival and dignity cannot be assumed. 
 
With economic, social and cultural rights rendered invisible, equality seen by 
many as interfering negatively with freedom, and liberal ‘normality’ discourse 
still powerful, domestic understandings in England constitute, at first glance, 
a challenging context for expansion of the international disability/human 
rights project.  We will find some of those challenges below.  Nevertheless, 
disabled people’s independent living discourse has achieved a substantial 
degree of success.  Following a brief historical background, this chapter 
traces its fortunes from 2005. 
 
Disabled people’s influence 
In England, as elsewhere, disabled people have responded to oppression 
and negation of their identity in many ways.36  From the 1960s,37 a strong 
                                                 
32
 As Finklestein describes his experience, ‘The aim of returning the individual to normality is 
the central foundation stone upon which the whole rehabilitation machine is constructed.  If, 
as happened to me following my spinal injury, the disability cannot be cured, normative 
assumptions are not abandoned.  On the contrary, they are reformulated so that they not 
only dominate the treatment phase searching for a cure but also totally colour the helper’s 
perception of the rest of that person’s life.  The rehabilitation aim becomes to assist the 
individual to be ‘as normal as possible.’  Oliver (1996) 105; see also Tara’s experience of 
‘special school’ in Chapter 1 above 
33
 See Chapters 7 – 9 below 
34
 Beresford P, Fleming J, Glynn M, Bewley C, Croft S, Branfield F and Postle K, Supporting 
People: towards a person-centred approach (Policy Press 2011) 40-41 
35
 Disability LIB ‘Less Courses, more conversations’: Disabled People’s Organisations 
(DPOs) and Mainstream Capacity Building, (Disability LIB 2010); Maynard Campbell S, 
Maynard A and Winchcombe M, ‘Mapping the Capacity and Potential for User-Led 
Organisations in England: a summary of the main findings from a national research study 
commissioned by the Department of Health’ (Equal Ability CIC 2007); Disability LIB ‘Thriving 
or Surviving’ (Scope 2008); Woodin S, ‘Mapping User-Led Organisations: User-Led Services 
and centres for Independent/Integrated/inclusive Living: A Literature Review Prepared for the 
Department of Health’ (University of Leeds 2006) 
36
 Their social antagonistic discourse can be traced back to the late 19
th
 century: Campbell 
(1997) 79 
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catalyst was resistance to the institutionalisation promoted and serviced by 
the large impairment charities.38  In the 1970s, the Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS)39 became ‘founders of this philosophy 
that relocated the burden of disability from the individual’s problem to the way 
society was structured,’40 the future social model of disability.  Here, as in the 
USA, we find emphasis on political organisation, on self-determination, non-
segregation, on choice, control and inclusion, captured in the ‘Nothing about 
us without us’ mantra.41  In England, however, as Barnes explains,  
[i]t is evident that unlike the work of their American counterparts, 
[British] accounts suggest that the basis of disabled people’s 
oppression is founded upon the material and ideological changes which 
occurred as a result of the emergence of capitalist society.42   
 
For instance, Finkelstein argued that ‘disability is the direct result of the 
development of western industrial society.’ 43   More recently, the British 
Disabled People’s Movement, like its international counterpart, has expanded 
to encompass a wide range of approaches and perspectives.44 
 
                                                                                                                                          
37
 Hunt P (ed) Stigma: The Experience of Disability (Geoffrey Chapman 1966); UPIAS 
(1974/5); Barnes (1991); Campbell (1997)  
38
 Jane Campbell tells us that in England, ‘[i]n the late 1960s disabled people began to 
question as a collective, the modus operandi of a plethora of predominantly impairment 
charities.  The charities, along with the quasi medical and social service professions who 
also dictated the direction and pattern of our lives began to come in for more overt criticism.’  
Campbell (1997) 78-90 
39
 Formed following a letter to the Guardian dated 20
th
 September 1972 from a Leonard 
Cheshire Home resident, Paul Hunt (Leeds Disability Archive) 
40
 Campbell (1997) 
41
 Disability LIB (2008) 6. Whilst this thesis refers broadly to the ‘social model of disability’, 
neither the concept nor the content of such a model is undisputed among disability activists: 
see for example Light R, ‘Social Model or Unsociable Muddle?’ (DAA undated); Oliver M and 
Barnes C, ‘Disability Politics and the Disability Movement in Britain: where did it all go 
wrong?’ (2006) Leeds Disability Archive; Shakespeare T, Disability Rights and Wrongs 
(Routledge 2006); Abberley P ‘The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social 
Theory of Disability’ (1997), Leeds Disability Archive; Finkelstein V, ‘The ‘Social Model of 
Disability’ and the Disability Movement’ (2007) Leeds Disability Archive 
42  Barnes C, ‘A Legacy of Oppression’ in Barton L, Oliver M, Disability Studies: Past Present 
and Future (The Disability Press 1997) 9; see also Oliver M, The Politics of Disablement 
(Palgrave Macmillan 1990); Evans J, ‘The Independent Living Movement in the UK’ in 
Alonso JVC (ed) El Movimiento de Vida Independiente, Experiencias Internacionales (Luis 
Vives 2003) www.independentliving.org/docs6/evans2003.html  
43
 Finkelstein V, Attitudes and Disabled People (World Health Organisation 1980) 
44
 Goodley (2010); Leeds Disability Archive 
 183 
 
The British Disabled People’s Movement also gave birth to a range of 
organisations of disabled people (DPOs).45   In response to their roots, British 
DPOs strongly differentiate themselves from organisations for disabled 
people, such as the large high-profile disability charities challenged by 
UPIAS.46   DPOs range from small unfunded self-help groups; through local 
access or self-advocacy groups; to medium-sized charitable organisations, 
including Centres for Independent Living, providing front-line services, 
supporting smaller DPOs, and campaigning for disability rights. 47   Their 
national voice is provided by a small number of national DPOs48 offering 
structural support and campaigning on the wider political stage.49    
 
One outcome of the campaigning activities of British disabled people and 
their organisations was enactment in 1995 of the first Disability Discrimination 
Act in Europe.  From its limited beginnings, this Act developed incrementally 
to include not only a duty not to discriminate in specific fields such as 
employment, education and housing, but also a positive public sector duty to 
promote disability equality.50  This last provision came into force in 2006, 
imposing a general duty on all public authorities, when carrying out their 
                                                 
45
 See Barnes C and Mercer G, Independent Futures: creating user-led disability services in 
a disabling society (Policy Press 2006); Maynard Campbell et al (2007); Disability Lib (2008)   
46
 ‘Whereas DPOs work to the social model of disability, with a commitment to self-
determination, rights and equality, organisations ‘for’ disabled people often work to a medical 
model, looking to ‘normalise’ the individual rather than to change society, providing 
segregated services, and raising money through charitable activities which portray disabled 
people as ‘tragic’ victims.   The success of such fundraising contributes to wide disparity in 
income – and thus in capacity and power - between DPOs and the disability charities, 
creating further resentment and hostility’ (Disability LIB 2008, 13).  In 2004, an attempt was 
made to overcome these hostilities when Scope (a large disability charity) and Disability 
Awareness in Action (an organisation of disabled people) published a Statement of 
Collaboration on the Human and Civil Rights of Disabled People (Miller et al 2004,17).  
‘However, distrust remains, not least because some disability charities now argue that they 
fit the definition of a DPO, adopting the language of rights without necessarily adapting their 
ideology or activities accordingly’ (Disability LIB 2008, 13). 
47 Maynard Campbell et al (2007); Disability LIB (2008) 
48
 For national pan-disability infrastructure and campaigning organisations, see UK Disabled 
People’s Council (UKDPC) http://www.ukdpc.net/ukdpc/index.php last accessed 5.9.12; 
Disability Rights UK http://www.disabilityrightsuk.org/ last accessed 5.9.12.   Other national 
DPOs spring from a particular experience of disability.  Prominent among these are People 
First, run by and for people with learning disabilities, and Shaping Our Lives, ‘an 
independent user-controlled organisation, think tank and network’ with a diverse membership 
and focus on ‘user involvement’ in research and training  
49
 Disability LIB (2008) 18 
50
 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as amended by Disability Discrimination Act 2005, Part 
5 (ss49A – 49F); see also Disability Rights Commission, ‘Ten years of the DDA’ Bulletin 
(Disability Rights Commission 2005) 
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functions, to ‘have due regard’ to the elimination of disability discrimination 
and the promotion of equality.51  A further ‘specific’ duty required key public 
authorities to publish a Disability Equality Scheme, setting out how it would 
assess the impact of its activities on disabled people.  This ‘specific’ disability 
duty differed from those under race and gender legislation in two ways: firstly, 
by requiring that disabled people be involved in producing and reviewing the 
Scheme, with their involvement recorded in the Scheme; and secondly, by 
requiring key Secretaries of State52 to report every three years on progress 
made towards disability equality across their policy sectors, and on co-
ordinated actions proposed to make further improvements.53   The Disability 
Equality Duty (DED) thus moved UK disability equality law from the formal 
individualistic understanding of non-discrimination as civil liberty to a more 
‘transformative’ 54  understanding of equality requiring systemic proactive 
action.55  It also began to build a holistic framework within government to 
address and take forward disability equality policy.  Regulators prepared to 
audit all public bodies on their equality and human rights compliance.56 
 
                                                 
51
 DDA95 s49A 
52
 The 11 secretaries of State subject to this duty in 2008 were: Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform; Children, Schools and Families; Communities and Local Government; 
Culture, media and Sport; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; health; Home Office; 
Innovation, Universities and Skills; Justice; Transport and Work and Pensions.  All published 
their first reports in December 2008 
53
 Office of Disability Issues, ‘Secretary of State Reports on Disability Equality: overview’, 
December 2008, Foreword.  They reported for the first  (and only) time in 2008 
54
 Fredman S, ‘Disability Equality: a Challenge to the Existing Anti-discrimination Paradigm?’ 
in Lawson A and Gooding C, Disability Rights in Europe (Hart 2005); O’Cinneide C, 
‘Disability Discrimination’ in Bamforth N, Malik M and O’Cinneide C, Discrimination Law: 
Theory and Context, 1
st
 ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2008); Lawson A, Disability and Equality Law 
in Britain: the role of reasonable adjustment (Hart 2008); Hepple B, ‘The new Single Equality 
Act in Britain’ (2010) 5 Equal Rights Review 11 
55
 See Chapter 2 above.  Also Disability Rights Commission ‘The Duty to Promote Disability 
Equality: Statutory Code of Practice, England and Wales’ (DRC 2005); Disability Rights 
Commission ‘The Disability Equality Duty and Involvement: Guidance for public authorities 
on how to effectively involve disabled people’ (DRC 2006); Disability Rights Commission 
‘Doing the Duty: an overview of the Disability Equality Duty for the public sector’ (DRC 2006). 
For one example of practical application, see Dyer L, ‘Involving Service Users and Carers – 
the Mersey Care Way’ (Mersey Care NHS Trust 2008); 
56Audit Commission, Human Rights: Improving Public Service Delivery, London, Audit 
Commission 2003; Noronha N de, ‘Assessing Equality and Human Rights in local public 
services’ (2009) presentation to ‘Equality, Human Rights and Good Relations: evidence 
based interventions and policy making’ seminar, University of Liverpool, 21 May 2009 
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Although the DED did not spring from the CRPD,57  it was in many ways 
consistent with its ethos and its requirements, requiring proactive structural 
and attitudinal change in line with CRPD Articles 8 and 9, co-ordinated action 
within government in line with Article 33(1), and the involvement at all levels 
of disabled people in line with Articles 4(3) and 33(3).  It also contributed to 
their access to services under Article 19.58 
 
Disabled people’s independent living campaigns also succeeded in 
introducing some elements of ‘entitlement’ 59  and choice 60  into the 
paternalistic ‘care’ system instituted by the post-war welfare state.  One early 
breakthrough was enactment in 1970 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled 
Persons Act, section 2 of which placed a duty on local authorities to provide 
assistance in the home.61   Soon after, members of two disabled people’s 
projects62 convinced their local authorities that their residential care funding 
should be used instead to pay for self-managed housing and support in the 
community.  A national network of disabled people’s organisations providing 
advice and information was set up in 1978,63  and the first UN International 
Year of Disabled People in 1981 prompted the formation of a number of 
DPOs64 in response to local demand for peer support for independent living.   
 
                                                 
57
 Public sector equality duties had been introduced in Northern Ireland, (Northern Ireland 
Act 1998, s75), Wales (Government of Wales Act 1998, s120) and the Greater London 
Authority (Greater London Authority Act 1999, s33) as part of the process of devolution in 
1998, and had been shown to produce results.  Provisions for NI specifically include 
disability; for Wales and London the provisions cover ‘all people’, thus much wider than the 
current discrimination ‘strands’, though relating to ‘opportunity, rather than ‘outcome’. They 
had also been recommended by the influential Hepple Report of 2000 (Hepple B, Coussey M 
and Choudhury T, Equality, A New Framework: Report of the independent review of the 
enforcement of UK anti-discrimination law (Hart 2000)) and by the Disability Rights Task 
Force which preceded the Disability Rights Commission. An incipient race equality duty 
introduced in 1976 was considerably strengthened following the Stephen Lawrence inquiry 
and a gender equality duty followed hard on the heels of DDA Part 5A, in 2007. 
58
 See Chapter 9 below 
59
 See discussion of Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 s2 and National Health 
Service and Community Care Act 1990 in Chapter 7 below 
60
 Community Care (Direct Payments) Regulations 1997 SI 1997/734, now Health and Social 
Care Act 2001 s57(1) and (2)  
61
 Discussed further in Chapters 7 and 8 below 
62
 Derbyshire Coalition of Disabled People and ‘Project 81’, set up by three residents of a 
Leonard Cheshire Home, later the Hampshire Coalition of Disabled People  
63
 Disablement Information and Advice Line, or DIAL UK, formed by the Derbyshire Coalition 
of Disabled People in 1978 
64
  Such as DIAL Chester; Project 81 developed into the Hampshire Coalition of Disabled 
People in 1982  
 186 
 
It was also in 1981 that the first Green Paper on ‘Care in the Community’ set 
the seeds for the policies discussed below.  A national Independent Living 
Fund (ILF) was subsequently set up ‘to enable disabled people to live 
independent lives in their community rather than in residential care.’ 65   In 
2010, the Fund had over 21,000 beneficiaries.66  
   
Another notable success for disabled people was enactment of the 
Community Care (Direct Payments) Act in 1996.  This introduced direct 
payments as an alternative to local authority-provided services for individuals 
who choose to employ their own personal assistants. 67   As we saw in 
Chapter 4 above, control plays a strong part in disabled people’s 
independent living discourse in relation to both anti-dependence and 
individual empowerment.  Direct Payments were hailed as increasing that 
control, enabling choice in how, and by whom, services were provided.68  As 
Stevens et al recognise,  
[i]n this light, choice is constructed as a means to overcome oppression 
and is related to concepts of autonomy, inclusion, rights and citizenship.  
Critically, choice is therefore conceived in terms of a wider conception 
of autonomy, and related to choice of lifestyle, activities and living 
arrangements… Addressing cultural and philosophical attitudes to 
disability and older people was given equal importance.69    
 
                                                 
65
 In 1988 to run for 5 years.  When the initial fund closed in 1993, a new Fund was 
established to supplement support provided by the local authority. To qualify (2010 figures), 
the claimant must be receiving support from their local authority amounting to at least £340 a 
week, or £17,680 a year; have less than £23,000 in capital; and be receiving the highest rate 
care component of Disability Living Allowance. 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/DisabledPeople/FinancialSupport/OtherBenefitsAndSupport/DG_
4019444  accessed 7.8.11 
66
 21,792 users, receiving average quarterly payment of £1300.47, totalling £84,985,456.70 
per quarter.  Independent Living Fund, User Profile Analysis, Results up to quarter ending 
June  2010.   http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/user-profiles-0610.pdf  accessed 7.8.11 
67
 Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996; see further Pridmore A ‘Disability Activism, 
Independent Living and Direct Payments’ Paper for ‘Independent Living and Direct 
Payments: the National Picture’ Conference, Leeds 22 March 2006, Leeds Disability Archive 
68
 As pioneered by disabled people’s organisations, Direct Payments are characterised by: 
self-assessment and self-definition of support needs; choice of who works with the disabled 
person, with the right to hire and fire; the disabled person defining what the personal 
assistant does and how; and recognition of the value and importance of support from 
disabled people’s organisations – offering advocacy, independent information, training, 
advice and administrative back-up – to enable disabled people to set up and run their own 
schemes.  Morris (1993); see also Blyth C and Gardner A ‘ ‘We’re not asking for anything 
special’: direct payments and the carers of disabled children’ (2007) 22(3) Disability & 
Society 235 
69Stevens et al ‘Assessing the Role of Increased Choice in English Social Care Services’ 
(2011) 40(2) Journal of Social Policy 257, 259 
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Despite slow uptake, Direct Payments have now developed into wider 
concepts of ‘personal budgets’ and ‘personalisation’ discussed further below.   
 
By 2005, disabled people had developed in the social model of disability a 
powerful political tool.  A range of local and national DPOs had grown to 
provide voice and support for independent living.  Their campaigning had 
contributed to the enactment of discrimination law and its development from 
formal to substantive, from individual to systemic; and to an, albeit limited, 
shift in service provision from institution to community, 70  and from local 
authority control to individual control.   As Jenny Morris comments,  
[t]he recasting of the welfare agenda… has not only been played out 
within the politics of Old Labour, New Labour and the New Right, but 
has also been profoundly influenced by the grassroots movements 
amongst those groups who are particularly reliant on the welfare state 
for their life chances.71   
 
In 2005, disabled people’s lobbying for independent living achieved a further 
breakthrough: the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit produced a report,72 which 
identified independent living as one of four key elements in its strategy for 
‘Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People’ (The Life Chances 
Report).73 
 
 
                                                 
70
 But see for instance Scourfield P ‘ ‘What matters is what works’? How discourses of 
modernization have both silenced and limited debate on domiciliary care for older people’ 
(2006) 26(1) Critical Social Policy 5 
71
 Morris J, ‘Independent Living: the role of evidence and ideology in the development of 
government policy’ (2005) Paper delivered at Cash and Care Conference, Social Policy 
Research Unit, University of York, 12-13
th
 April 2005.  Gearty C ‘Putting Lawyers in their 
Place: the Role of Human Rights in the Struggle against Poverty’ (undated) 15 
72
 Drawn up jointly with four other government departments: Department of Work and 
Pensions, Department of Health, Department of Education and Skills and Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, and with strong input from disabled people: see Morris (2005) 
73
 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, ‘Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People’, January 
2005 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/disability.aspx  last accessed 
13.6.12 (Life Chances Report) 
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Improving Life Chances 
The Life Chances Report sets out to ‘bring disabled people fully within the 
scope of the “opportunity society” ’.74   Its ‘ambitious vision’ is that  
by 2025, disabled people should have the same opportunities and 
choices as non-disabled people and be respected and included as 
equal members of society.75   
 
Four areas are identified as central to future strategy to bring this vision 
about, one of which is helping disabled people to achieve independent 
living.76  This is to be achieved  
by moving progressively to individual budgets for disabled people, 
drawing together the services to which they are entitled and giving them 
greater choice over the mix of support they receive in the form of cash 
and/or direct provision of services… measures should also be taken to 
improve the advice services available to disabled people and to address 
existing problems with suitable housing and transport...   This package 
of measures…should deliver improved outcomes for disabled people, 
their families and wider society in the short, medium and long-term.77   
 
The Report identifies two main barriers to achieving its aims, which 
are evident across all aspects of disabled people’s lives – in where they 
live, their personal relationships, their opportunities for education, 
training and employment; access to healthcare; access to leisure 
activities; and participation in the life of their local community and in 
wider society.78   
 
Firstly,  
[t]he support which society makes available to people with a range of 
different impairments is generally not fitted to the person.  Instead, 
disabled people are expected to fit into services.79   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74
 Ibid 4 
75
 Ibid; see also Morris J, ‘Citizenship and disabled people’ (2005) Paper for DRC Seminar 
‘Equal Rights… equal responsibilities?’ February 2005 
76
 the other three are improving support for families with young disabled children, facilitating 
a smooth transition into adulthood, and improving support and incentives for getting and 
staying in employment 
77 Life Chances Report, Executive Summary, 4 
78 Ibid para 4.2,  60 
79
 Ibid 
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Secondly,  
[p]olicies and practice do not pay enough attention to enabling disabled 
people to be active citizens, or to supporting disabled people to help 
themselves.80    
 
Within these broad categories, specific problems are identified.  One is ‘a 
welfare system which assumes dependency’ - an assumption reflected in the 
culture of health and social care structures, with ‘a failure to see expenditure 
on independent living as a form of social and economic investment.’ 81  
Another is the ‘silo-based’ approach of government bodies, which results in a 
fragmented and inflexible82 rather than a comprehensive and cost-effective 
approach to meeting disabled people’s needs. 83   The resulting, often 
inadequate, responses to need lead to poor quality of life and unequal 
opportunities, and may even exacerbate disability. 84   Assessment often 
focuses on eligibility for services rather than on the individual’s needs, 
thereby denying choice and control and leading to additional demands on 
services. 85  Inflexible service provision combined with unsuitable housing 
has led some people to move into residential care against their wishes.  At 
the time of the Report, increasing numbers of people with learning 
disabilities, mental health needs and physical or sensory impairments were 
being placed in residential care,86 where they ‘often have little or no further 
                                                 
80
 Ibid 
81
 Ibid 
82
 Morris J, “One town for my body, another for my mind”: Services for people with physical 
impairments and mental health support needs (Joseph Rowntree Foundation/York 
Publishing Services 2004).  For instance, ‘[t]he failure of services to meet the needs of 
people with learning disabilities and people who are deaf or hearing impaired, who also have 
mental health support needs, has been… well documented’: Life Chances Report, 63, 
referencing  Foundation for People with Learning Disabilities, Count Us In: The report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into meeting the mental health needs of young people with learning 
disabilities (Mental Health Foundation 2002); Department of Health, A Sign of the Times: 
Modernising mental health services for people who are deaf (DoH 2002) 
83
 Life Chances Report, 61 
84
 ‘It is often inadequate responses to need that lead to a poor quality of life and unequal 
opportunities, rather than impairment itself: poor quality of life may be created by a failure to 
meet needs relating to impairment; by disabling barriers that make worse or create 
impairment or illness; or by services which are disabling in themselves, such as unreliable 
assistance to get up in the morning in time to get to work, which leads to loss of job, 
unemployment and negative effect on mental and physical health.’  Ibid, 61 
85
 Ibid 65 
86
 Ibid 66; placements in residential care of those with learning disabilities or mental health 
support needs increased by 20% and 40% respectively between 1997 and 2002, and the 
numbers of people with physical and/or sensory impairments in residential care was also 
increasing. 
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contact with the funding authority… [m]any people have a very low quality of 
life and some experience serious abuse.’ 87   Further barriers to independent 
living identified in the Report include low income, the negative attitudes of 
transport providers, and the failure of general policies and services, such as 
planning initiatives, libraries and leisure centres to take disabled people into 
account. 
 
We will return to these issues below and in following Chapters.  However, it 
becomes evident already that the concerns identified in the Life Chances 
Report coincide closely with the requirements set out in Article 19 of the 
Convention.  We find disabled people deprived of choice of living 
arrangement, placed in residential care for lack of housing options or support, 
contrary to Article 19(a).  We find paternalistic, fragmented and disabling 
provision of individual support services, contrary to Article 19(b).  And we find 
failure on the part of services and facilities for the general population to 
respond to disabled people’s needs, contrary to Article 19(c).  Underlying all 
of these issues is a welfare system that assumes dependency, whose 
discourse permeates the cultures of health and social care systems and 
institutions, and results in dis-abling services which negate the rights to 
choice, inclusion and participation at the core of Article 19 and of the 
Convention.  The existing field of meaning, with its systems and identities, is 
in need of reorganisation if it is to reflect CRPD discourse. 
 
The Life Chances Report proceeds to identify ‘what works’ in addressing 
these issues.  Firstly, it highlights the importance of involving disabled people 
and their organisations in the development and implementation of policy and 
the delivery of services, echoing disabled people’s mantra of ‘Nothing about 
us without us’, and the participatory ethos of the Convention.  The Report 
argues that ‘disabled people are best placed to take the lead in identifying 
their own needs and in identifying the most appropriate ways of meeting such 
needs’: the most effective responses are those ‘personalised’ to individual 
                                                 
87
 Ibid 67, referencing Pring J, ‘The frequency and potential consequences of the failure to 
visit learning-disabled adults in out of area placements’ (2004) 9(2) Learning Disability 
Review 35; see also Chapter 3 ftnote 121 
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need, 88   enabling control, sharing power and acknowledging disabled 
people’s expertise.  Furthermore, says the Report, ‘effective support 
addresses all aspects of someone’s life, instead of fragmenting their lives 
across different services and/or funding mechanisms’:  this is a holistic 
exercise, addressing all aspects of exclusion.  To enable this transformation, 
‘[d]isabled people need access to high-quality information and advice 
services, as well as to supported, independent advocacy’: the Report 
recommends that ‘by 2010, each locality… should have a user-led 
organisation modelled on existing CILs’.89  It points out that ‘effective use of 
resources supports family and friendship networks and enables access to 
mainstream society’, anticipating the Article 19 right to be included in the 
community.  The Report thus strongly reflects the core elements of disabled 
people’s independent living discourse as described in Chapter 4: it suggests 
anti-dependence and inclusion, self-determination with collective peer 
support, change in social relations and holistic action.90 
 
The aims and understandings of the Life Chances Report fit closely with 
those of the drafters of the CRPD, and with the terms of Article 19.  However, 
at the time, the Convention was still in negotiation, and, despite the UK’s 
involvement in those negotiations, there is no reference to them in the Life 
Chances Report.  Instead, the understandings of independent living which 
shape the Report came directly from the multi-disciplinary project team set up 
to prepare it.91    The team’s Expert Group on independent living included 
                                                 
88
 Life Chances Report, 72 
89
 Ibid, recommendation 4.3 
90
 See also Massie B, ‘Finding the Wormhole: Achieving equal citizenship for disabled 
people’ (2006) 4
th
 Annual Disability Lecture, St John’s College, Cambridge University, 9 May 
2006: ‘we will only secure a future of equal human and civil rights through a strategy which 
positively transforms society’s expectation of disabled people’. For a response to the Life 
Chances Report from one disabled people’s organisation, see  Gibbs D, ‘Public Policy and 
Organisations of Disabled People’ (2005) Seminar presentation to University of Leeds 
Centre for Disability Studies, 22 April 2005; for a discussion led by disabled people’s 
organisation on what needs to happen to fulfil the commitments set out in the Life Chances 
Report, see Morris J, ‘Centres for Independent Living/Local user-led organisations: a 
discussion paper’ (Valuing People Support Team 2006)  
91
 This included a Strategy Unit team comprising civil servants and others with expertise in 
economics, policy-making and disability issues, an Advisory Group and three Expert Groups. 
The team conducted bilateral discussions, shadowed disabled people in variety of settings, 
conducted focus group consultations with disabled people and others and received written 
submissions: Life Chances Report, Annex C, D and E 
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long-term disability activists and service users, as well as others involved in 
service provision.92  As Jenny Morris93 explains,  
[t]he adoption of the Improving Life Chances report is … a reflection of 
the success of the disability movement in challenging the notion that, if 
you need assistance to go about your daily life, then you are a 
‘dependent person’.94   
A government Office for Disability Issues (ODI), guided by an advisory group 
of disabled people, 95  was set up to coordinate work across government 
departments to help deliver its ‘Improving Life Chances’ commitments.  Over 
the next 3 years, the ODI undertook research on the costs and benefits of 
independent living96 and housing adaptations,97 conducted an Independent 
Living Review and published an Independent Living Strategy.98  It supported 
the introduction of individual budgets which bring together a variety of funding 
streams, with a view to reducing bureaucracy and increasing choice and 
control.    
                                                 
92
 For list, see Life Chances Report, Annex B 
93
 Consultant and member of the Strategy Unit team closely involved in drafting the Report 
94
 Morris (2005) 8.  Morris also highlights the role of research in the development of 
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see also Office for Disability Issues Roadmap 2025: achieving disability equality by 2025 
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Expectations of Disabled People’ (Office for Disability Issues 2008) 
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A 2006 Green Paper 99 set out a vision for transforming the lives of people 
using social care by giving them more control and choice over their care, to 
be achieved by wider use of direct payments in the form of ‘individual 
budgets’, with a greater role for ‘self-assessment’.  A further initiative by the 
Department of Health100 was followed in 2007 by a ‘Concordat’101 between 
six government departments102 promising to  
put people first through a radical reform of public services, enabling 
people to live their own lives as they wish, confident that services are of 
high quality, are safe and promote their own individual needs for 
independence, well-being and dignity.103   
 
The agreement proposed setting up a new ‘personalised’ adult social care 
system,104 supported by ring-fenced funding105 ‘to help councils to redesign 
and reshape their systems over the next 3 years’.106  
 
In 2008, the Department of Work and Pensions conducted ‘a wide ranging 
consultation on the future of welfare, 107   whose objective was ‘a social 
revolution’: an 80 per cent employment rate to reduce social exclusion - ‘the 
next step in the onward march of equal rights’. 108    The ensuing White 
Paper109 heralded an ‘empowering welfare state’, in which ‘everyone has 
personalised support and conditions to help them get back to work, 
underpinned by a simpler benefits system and genuine choice and control for 
                                                 
99
 Department of Health, Independence, Well-being and Choice, Cm 6499, 21 March 2005 
100
 Department of Health, ‘Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community 
services’,  Cm 6737, 31 January 2006 
101
 ‘Putting People First: a shared vision and commitment to the transformation of adult social 
care’  
www.dh.gov.uk/en/PUBLICATIONSANDSTATISTICS/PUBLICATIONS/PUBLICATIONSPOL
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 See Department of Health Local Authority Circular LAC(DH)(2008)1 
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 LAC(DH)(2008)1;and LAC(DH)(2009)1 
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 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, No one written off: reforming welfare to reward 
responsibility (Cm 7363, 2008) www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/noonewrittenoff  accessed 
27.8.08 
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 Ibid Executive Summary, para 6 
109
 Department of Work and Pensions, ‘Raising expectations and increasing support: 
reforming welfare for the future’ (Cm 7506,2008) 
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disabled people’.110   These proposals were welcomed by disabled people as 
including both a strong commitment to disability equality in the workplace and 
increased financial support for those unable to work.111  
 
‘Individual budgets’ 112  had been piloted in 13 English local authorities 
between 2005 and 2007.113  Though welcomed by some service users as 
alternative to receiving conventional social care services, there were 
difficulties in including funding streams other than local authority social care 
funds due to poor engagement between different agencies, and restrictions 
on how resources could be used.114   However, proposals for pooled budgets 
re-emerged in the Department of Work and Pensions’ Right to Control 
scheme115 under the Welfare Reform Act of 2009.  Further policy papers from 
the New Labour government in 2009 and 2010 reported on progress by local 
authorities in making Personal Budgets the norm,116 and endorsing them as 
part of a future ‘National Care Service’.117   
 
In all of these developments, we can trace the increasing adoption of key 
elements of disabled people’s discourse.  Together, they illustrate a 
developing policy couched in a language of ‘independence’, ‘choice’, ‘control’ 
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which echoes disability activists’ calls for change. 118    They evidence a 
growing recognition at national level of the need for a holistic approach, and 
a determination to bring about radical change in the way that disabled people 
are supported to live independently as active members of the community.   
Throughout these developments, disabled people worked closely with and 
within government, and government appeared to be listening: ‘co-production’ 
became a new buzz-word,119 and relations of difference prevailed.120  They 
augured well for implementation of Article 19 of the Convention.  Local 
authorities, too, were taking action: by April 2010, 42 out of 152 councils had 
made good progress towards personalisation,121 and a new comprehensive 
National Care Service was being planned.122  Alongside these government-
led developments, a private member’s Disabled Persons (Independent Living) 
Bill was presented to Parliament, where it received support from the House of 
Lords.123 
 
The independent living policy initiated by the 2005 Life Chances Report 
originated not from the concurrent CRPD negotiations, but from the multi-
disciplinary team124 set up to prepare it.  Although that policy relies strongly 
on principles of autonomy, dignity, freedom and inclusion, it is not couched in 
the language of human rights, 125  and they remain absent from the ODI’s 
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Independent Living Strategy three years later.126   It was not until 2008 that 
the work of the ODI began to be acknowledged on its website as ‘contributing 
towards the Government's work to ratify’ the CRPD127 in preparation for its 
designation as the ‘coordination mechanism within government’ tasked with 
facilitating implementation under Article 33(1) of the Convention.128   Even 
after ratification, the revised 2010 government guidance on eligibility for adult 
social care,129  though upholding values of dignity, equality and respect , 
contains just one section headed ‘Equality and Human Rights’. 130   This 
consists of three paragraphs on equality with no mention of human rights, let 
alone of economic, social and cultural rights, of the CRPD or of Article 19.   
Given the highly politicised nature of civil and political rights discourse in the 
UK while this policy was being developed, it is perhaps understandable that 
the policy-makers chose not to venture there.131  The exclusion of economic, 
social and cultural rights from this discourse, however, as we have seen, is 
more deeply ingrained.132   
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Nevertheless, when the policy developments described so far are placed 
alongside ‘transformative’ progress in implementation of the Disability 
Equality Duty, 133  it appears in early 2010 that, despite the invisibility of 
economic, social and cultural rights, discursive elements compatible with the 
aims of the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project , and of Article 19, are 
progressing well.  Policy has generally moved away from exclusion and 
segregation in line with Article 19(a); independent living, as understood by 
disabled people, is established at the centre of government disability policy, 
with increasing profile and control by disabled people of the services required 
under Article 19(b); and proactive equality duties are in place, with built-in 
involvement of disabled people in line with Article 4(3), to bring about 
structural change in line with Article 19(c).  
 
However, as Hodgkins comments, whilst independent living  
has become very much the new order in terms of disability support 
provision…. the associated ideologies remain potentially unchecked 
and of liability in terms of the oppressive relations concerning disabled 
people in the manner in which the rhetoric of new reform retains 
elements of the old oppression, albeit reframed.134   
 
We have identified ‘independent living’ as an important nodal point in 
disabled people’s discourse.135  Nodal points are effective because they are 
empty signifiers, 136  allowing the discourse to incorporate new discursive 
elements with which a range of actors can identify, thus absorbing social 
antagonisms and neutralising dislocations.   We have seen this process in 
action between 2005 and 2010, as independent living becomes ‘the new 
order in terms of disability support provision’.   
 
Empty signifiers, by their nature, are equally open to re- or mis-appropriation 
by other, more powerful discourses, and to application in contexts far 
removed from the principles and practices from which they grew.137  In the 
                                                 
133
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134
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absence of a stabilising legal framework which recognises the durable 
human rights dimensions of social values,138 the ideologies associated with 
independent living ‘remain potentially unchecked and of liability’. 139  
Oppressive structures have the capacity to reproduce themselves through 
‘the myriad power relationships in everyday life.’140    The international human 
rights framework seeks to counter that oppression through its emancipatory 
legal order in which economic, social and cultural rights play a pivotal role.  
Without that protection, understandings of independent living, and the 
services essential to its realisation, are wide open to re-articulation by other, 
more powerful, discourses, and to dislocation by unforeseen events.  We see 
examples in the events that followed. 
 
Re-articulation 
 
In May 2010, a General Election led to formation of a Conservative/ Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government.   Its Coalition Agreement confirmed that this  
Government believes that people needing care deserve to be treated 
with dignity and respect.  We understand the urgency of reforming the 
system of social care to provide much more control to individuals and 
their carers, and to ease the cost burden that they and their families 
face.141   
 
New Labour’s ‘Transforming Social Care’ agenda and the ‘trailblazer’ pilots of 
personal budgets under Right to Control, both of which were in mid-flow, 
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139
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have continued under the new government.142  However, deep public funding 
cuts introduced in response to the banking crisis, together with reformulation 
of independent living policy in line with the new government’s strongly free 
market-based ideology, have had a significant impact on the prospects of the 
hegemonic project and Article 19. 
 
Service provision 
In November 2010, the Coalition published its ‘Vision for Adult Social Care’, 
setting out ‘overarching principles’ and giving ‘context for future reform’.143  
The vision builds on and accelerates many aspects of New Labour’s 
‘transformation’.  Like New Labour, the new Government seeks to shift power 
‘from central to local, from state to citizen, from provider to people who use 
services’.144   
 
Prevention is seen as ‘the first step’: ‘it is always better to prevent or 
postpone dependency than deal with the consequences’.145  This is  
best achieved through community action, working alongside statutory 
services.  We need to inspire neighbourhoods to come together to look 
out for those who need support.146   
 
This ‘Big Society’ approach to social care  
means unlocking the potential of local support networks to reduce 
isolation and vulnerability… [and] must focus on what people can do for 
each other.147    
 
Councils should support carers, 148  make full use of new technology, 149 
provide re-ablement, 150  work closely with health service providers 151  and 
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bring employment and housing services together to improve well-being and 
meet emerging needs – all CRPD-compatible measures, promoted as  
improv[ing] outcomes for individuals and return[ing] savings to other 
areas, such as housing, health, social care and the criminal justice 
system.152 
 
Like its predecessor, this government sees securing the best outcomes for 
people as its objective,153 and agrees that people, not providers, should have 
choice and control over their care, as this will protect their dignity and 
freedom and enhance their quality of life.  The vision is ‘to make sure that 
everyone can get the personalised support they deserve’.154   With this in 
mind, the roll-out of personal budgets, ideally as a cash payment ‘to give 
maximum flexibility and choice’,155 is accelerated to become the norm for 
everyone who receives on-going care and support.156   We are reminded 157  
that ‘[e]ven those with the most complex needs can benefit from personalised 
services’.158  Personalisation also requires ‘wholesale change – a change of 
attitude by councils and staff, reform of financial and management and 
information systems, and reduction of inflexible block contracts’.159    It is the 
job of councils to ensure that everyone can get the information and advice 
they need to achieve ‘real autonomy and choice’,160 whether directly from the 
council, or through local support, advocacy and brokerage services provided 
by voluntary – including user-led - organisations.161  Again, these objectives 
are compatible with disabled people’s independent living discourse and with 
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the CRPD.  When we examine how these objectives are to be implemented, 
however, we find some changes in approach. 
 
Delivery is strongly consumer-orientated, aiming for a ‘broad market of high 
quality service providers’ to match the variety of people’s needs.  Here, 
councils, with their NHS partners, have a role in ‘stimulating, managing and 
shaping’ a ‘thriving social market in which innovation flourishes.’  Partnership 
working between individuals, communities, and statutory, private and third 
sector organisations will result in better outcomes for people, and achieve 
efficiencies and savings.162  Contracting systems must be  
fair and proportionate and enable micro and small social enterprises, 
user-led organisations and voluntary organisations to compete to 
deliver personalised services.163    
 
The choice and competition thus generated ‘can be a powerful tool to drive 
up quality and reduce and control costs.’164  There is strong emphasis on 
cost control: ‘[n]ow, quality and efficiency can no longer be seen as two 
separate objectives – we must deliver both’.165  Though local health and 
social care authorities retain a facilitating role, the market is expected to 
supply the required variety and quality of services to meet consumer demand 
at reduced cost.  The Audit Commission, which has led on regulation of 
public bodies’ equality and human rights compliance,166 is abolished.167 
 
The workforce delivering this vision will be employed not only in traditional 
health and social care structures, but also ‘mutuals, employee-owned co-
operatives, user-led organisations, existing independent sector employers 
and individual people who use care and support.’168   Individual disabled 
people making use of personal assistants will be reminded of their 
                                                 
162
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‘responsibility to be a good employer and to train, recruit and retain staff.’169  
The extension of independent Social Work Practices170  to adult social care 
‘should result in greater choice and control over the services that local people 
purchase.’171  Here, it is local people, not the local authority, who are the 
‘purchasers’. 
 
Under the Coalition, then, the shift ‘from state to citizen’, 172  which was 
welcomed as an exercise in ‘co-production’ by disabled people under New 
Labour, becomes even more radical.173  The ‘wholesale change’ in attitudes 
and systems results not in a National Care Service but in ‘Open Public 
Services’:174 free competition and the ‘rational economic man’175 will ensure 
that a broad range of high quality and cost-effective local services are 
available to all.  The State’s role is to facilitate this ‘thriving social market’, 
whilst power and control is devolved to ‘communities’ and it is the job of 
‘neighbourhoods’ to look out for those who need support.  Once more, ‘care 
in the community becomes care by the community’.176  Disabled people have 
been repositioned, not as rights-holders, or as ‘co-producers’, but as 
individual consumers and employers, stimulating market competition by 
making choices about how and where they spend their personal budgets, 
and responsible for their own ‘welfare’ outcomes.  Their organisations, too, 
have been de-politicised: whilst DPOs are recognised as potentially offering 
‘very individualised solutions’,177 and are supported to fulfil that function,178 
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they are just one category on a list of micro and small providers who deserve 
a ‘fair and proportionate’ chance to enter the competition for delivery of 
services.   Independent living policy has been re-articulated in line with the 
Coalition’s own style of individualistic economic liberalism: ‘nothing about us 
without us’ has become ‘nothing about me without me’.179   
 
The UK government, as duty-holder under the Convention, has undertaken to 
‘take effective and appropriate measures’ to facilitate the full enjoyment by all 
disabled people of their right to live independently and be included in the 
community.  The individualised and market driven solutions envisaged by the 
Coalition government may constitute one effective method for facilitating that 
enjoyment.  Indeed, for some disabled individuals, personalisation, with its 
focus on outcomes, choice and control, has proved an effective route to 
increased independence and quality of life. 180    However, as the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights warned in 1994, 
[g]iven the increasing commitment of Governments around the world to 
market-based policies, it is appropriate in that context to emphasize 
certain aspects of States parties’ obligations.  One is the need to ensure 
that not only the public sphere, but also the private sphere, are, within 
appropriate limits, subject to regulation to ensure the equitable 
treatment of persons with disabilities…. Where such protection does not 
extend beyond the public domain, the ability of persons with disabilities 
to participate in the mainstream of community activities and to realize 
their full potential as active members of society will be severely and 
often arbitrarily constrained… in such circumstances it is incumbent on 
Governments to step in and take appropriate measures to temper, 
complement, compensate for, or override the results produced by 
market forces.181 
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with Disabilities, 9/12/94, para 12; see also O’Connell P ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: 
Neo-Liberal Globalisation and Human Rights’ (2007) 7(3) Human Rights Law Review, 483 
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The radical shift of responsibility for individual outcomes from state to 
individual also threatens to steer English independent living discourse away 
from wider international human rights understandings.  Quinn and Degener 
identify solidarity as one of the four ‘core values of the human rights mission’:  
mutual ties and obligations exist between people by virtue of their 
shared membership of a political community.  Freedom does not exist in 
a vacuum – it must be made tangible and this often means buttressing 
the system of basic freedoms by substantive social and economic 
supports.182   
 
We have recognised the sedimentation of this value of solidarity in the 
durable nature of economic, social and cultural rights, their vital enabling role 
in the context of disability, and their integrated projection in the Convention 
map, including Article 19.  As we have seen, the UK translates these rights 
through its welfare state.  
 
There have been many changes to the welfare state in England since the 
original post-war settlement, particularly since the 1980s when local authority 
involvement in direct service provision was reduced to a residual role, and 
local services became increasingly subject to market disciplines, such as 
charging, competition and contracting.183  For Taylor-Gooby,  
welfare state citizenship rests on values of reciprocity, inclusion, and 
institutional trust, [but] the shift towards an individualisation of 
responsibility for welfare outcomes constrains reciprocity, contradicts 
inclusion and undermines important aspects of trust.184   
 
He finds that the reform programmes ‘based loosely on an individual rational 
actor theory of agency’ 185  undergone in all European welfare states, 
particularly since the 1980s, and particularly in the UK,186 have eroded the 
                                                 
182
 Quinn and Degener (2002) 19 
183
 Loughlin M, ‘Restructuring of Central-Local Government Relations’ in Oliver D and Jowell 
JL (eds) The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press 2000) 145-6; see also 
Beresford P and Turner M, ‘It’s Our Welfare’ (1997) Report of the Citizens’ Commission on 
the Future of the Welfare State (National Institute for Social Work 1997) 
184
 Taylor-Gooby P, Reframing Social Citizenship (Oxford University Press 2009) 3   
185
 Taylor-Gooby P (ed) Welfare States under Pressure (Sage 2001) 4 
186
 Taylor-Gooby, P ‘Welfare Reform in the UK: the Construction of a Liberal Consensus’, in 
Taylor-Gooby (2009) 147: ‘The UK has made the most rapid and far-reaching welfare state 
reforms in any of the countries considered in this book…’ 
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base of public support for inclusive state provision.187  In that situation, he 
concludes, 
[t]he public and government commitment to supporting those at the 
bottom which underlies social inclusion falters.  Collective defences 
against the impact of inequality… on social cohesion are weakened.188    
 
Several commentators identify a contradiction between the individualism of a 
Direct Payments approach and the need for collectivity in the responsibility 
for welfare.189  Stevens et al conclude190  that  
the focus on choice of service and resources is at best insufficient and 
potentially counter to the overall goals of independent living and 
increased autonomy and rights as expressed both by [New Labour] 
government and the Independent Living Movement….  This can be 
seen as a problem, not with the abstract concept of choice, but in the 
specific emphasis given in public policy to the market model of 
individual agents making free purchasing choices.191   
 
They offer three critiques.  Firstly, whilst Direct Payments and IBs may act as 
a market-driven alternative to properly funded and co-produced public 
services, the question remains 
whether individual purchasing choices will cumulatively create a sort of 
‘trickle-up’ effect on service development and quality, which will thereby 
impact on market supply.192   
 
Secondly, 
[g]iving people using services more of a role in assessing their own 
needs and in making choices about the kinds of services they want to 
‘purchase’ involves a challenge to existing power relationships with 
professionals, such as social workers, who have previously been key 
players in these decisions.193  
                                                 
187
 Taylor-Gooby (2009) 3 
188
 Ibid 190; we can see evidence of this, for instance, in the present discourse of welfare as 
‘privilege’, and withdrawal of social security benefits or housing as ‘punishment’ – see for 
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eviction?INTCMP=SRCH accessed 5.9.12 
189
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Work and Social Sciences Review; Ziv N, ‘The Social Rights of People with Disabilities’ in 
Barak-Erez D, Gross A M (eds) Exploring Social Rights (Hart 2011) 394 
190
 from data collected for evaluation of Individual Budgets (IB) pilots: the IBSEN study, 
Glendinning et al (2008) 
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 Stevens M, Glendinning, C, Jacobs, S, Moran, N, Challis, D, Manthorpe, J, Fernadez, J-L, 
Jones, K, Knapp, M, Netten, A, Wilberforce, M, ‘Assessing the Role of Increased Choice in 
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Stevens et al’s third critique relates to equity.  ‘Shopping around’ for a service 
requires information about availability, cost and quality, and the insight, 
energy and ability to identify better buys.   The necessary information must 
be made available and accessible in order to make choices real.  Even with 
that information, those with such competences, or access to willing relatives 
or brokerage services, are likely to gain most from the increased choice, 
while those without risk poorer outcomes.  As we have seen in Chapter 2 
above, policies based on individual rational actor theory of agency are 
insufficient to bring about equality for those who exercise their autonomy in 
different ways.194 
 
Disabled people’s philosophy of independent living encompasses all of these 
concerns.  Whilst individual empowerment and control are vital, they also 
contribute to a collective responsibility for social change.  That collective 
responsibility is founded in reciprocity, inclusion and trust, as practised in 
disabled people’s organisations.  Changing power relationships is seen as 
key to emancipation from oppression; and provision of information about 
one’s options a ‘basic need’ of independent living.  These core aspects of 
disabled people’s understanding of independent living are excluded from the 
Coalition government’s re-articulation of New Labour’s ‘transformation’ 
agenda.  Whilst civil and political rights to autonomy and participation set out 
in the head of Article 19 are enthusiastically embraced, their economic, social 
and cultural counterparts, without which they cannot be exercised, are 
stripped of collective responsibility for their equal realisation.195 
Whereas in April 2010, it seemed that, despite the absence of economic, 
social and cultural rights in domestic discourse, the understandings of the 
CRPD’s drafters, and of Article 19(a) and (b) were progressing well in the 
                                                 
194
 Mégret (2008a) and Chapter 2 above; see also Morris J ‘Rethinking Disability Policy’ 
Viewpoint (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2011) 
195
 See also Dean H, ‘From Poverty Reduction to Welfare Rights: A Social Policy Perspective 
on Human Rights’ (2006) Crossing the Boundaries: The Place of Human Rights in 
Contemporary Scholarship conference, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
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domestic field of meaning, in 2011 such progress seems less certain. 196   
Whilst elements of autonomy and choice are emphasised, their delivery is ‘at 
best insufficient and potentially counter to the overall goals of independent 
living’,197 deprived of its collective reciprocity, inclusion and trust.  Hayekian 
understandings of individual rights and social justice are again in the 
ascendant.198   
 
Systemic equality duties aimed at structural change in line with Article 19(c) 
are also under pressure.  
 
Equality 
Immediately before the General Election, the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 was subsumed into the Equality Act 2010.   The Disability Equality Duty 
(DED) was merged into a Single Equality Duty covering all nine of the new 
Act’s ‘protected characteristics’.199  The new Coalition government decided to 
implement the new general duty to ‘have due regard to’ the need to eliminate 
unlawful discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good 
relations;200  and to consult on whether or not to continue with the specific 
duty to produce Equality Schemes.201   
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
As seen above, the specific DED202 required disabled people to be actively 
involved in production of Disability Equality Schemes, in line with CRPD 
                                                 
196
 Morris J, ‘Independent Living and Government Policy: Triumph or Tragedy?’ (2011) 
Seminar for Leeds University Centre for Disability Studies, 23 March 2011 
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 Stevens et al (2011) 
198
 See for example Morris J, ‘Rethinking Disability Policy’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
2011): ‘Some aspects of the arguments made by disability organisations have been 
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199
 Equality Act 2010 s149.  For further discussion of the effects on disability equality law of 
this process, see Lawson A, ‘Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010: 
Opportunities Seized, Lost and Generated’ (2011) 40(4) Industrial Law Journal 359.  For 
discussion of compatibility of the Equality Act with the CRPD, see Lawson, ibid and Butlin 
SF, ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Does the Equality Act 
2010 Measure up to UK International Commitments?’ (2011) 40(4) Industrial Law Journal 
428 
200
 This duty came into force in April 2011 
201
 Coalition Government Public Sector Equality Duty consultation Aug-Nov 2010 
202
 Unlike other equality ‘strands’: race and gender discrimination law included specific 
equality duties, but without parallel provisions on involvement and Secretary of State reports 
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Article 4(3),203 and promoted holistic action across government through the 
requirement for regular Secretary of State reports, in line with Article 33(1).  
These provisions no longer stand.204  In their place, key public bodies205  
must publish, at least annually, information to demonstrate their compliance 
with the general Equality Duty; and to set equality objectives that the public 
body itself thinks it should achieve, at least every four years. 206   According 
to the Ministerial Statement accompanying the Regulations, 
[t]he publication of this information will ensure that public authorities are 
transparent about their performance on equality. This transparency will 
drive the better performance of the equality duty without burdening 
public authorities with unnecessary bureaucratic processes, or the 
production of superfluous documents. Public authorities will have 
flexibility in deciding what information to publish, and will be held to 
account by the people they serve.207   
 
There is no requirement for the involvement of disabled people in this 
process, or for Secretary of State Reports.   
 
At the same time, the Equality Act itself has appeared on the Cabinet Office 
‘Red Tape Challenge’ website, where all are offered  
the opportunity to look at all provisions in the Equality Act and tell us if 
they are too bureaucratic and burdensome for the benefit they bring, 
whether they could be simplified or better implemented, or if you think 
they should be kept exactly as they are.208 
 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission responsible for overseeing the 
Act faces a 60% cut in funding,209 and statutory Codes of Practice relating to 
the Public Sector Equality Duty are cancelled by the government.210  
                                                 
203
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204
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 See http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/themehome/equalities-act/  
accessed 10.8.11 
209 See  http://just-
fair.co.uk/hub/single/equality_and_human_rights_commission_facing_a_60_cut_in_funding 
11/8/11;; for background on the EHRC see for example Lester A and Beattie K, ‘The New 
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Equality, too, is thus re-articulated to conform to the neo-liberal agenda.   
Disabled people’s involvement in public sector equality duties is dismantled, 
along with incipient holistic cross-government frameworks as ‘unnecessary 
bureaucratic processes’.  Equality law itself is undermined as potentially 
‘burdensome’ and its monitoring weakened.   Here, too, central elements of 
the disability/human rights project are contested by powerful domestic 
discourse.  Contrary to international requirements,211 progress towards the 
systemic equality required for realisation of Article 19(c) is in retrogression. 
 
The Convention’s hegemonic project also faces another problem. 
 
Dislocation 
Dislocation is the destabilisation of a discourse resulting from the emergence 
of events beyond its control.  The global economic crisis which began in 2008 
is one such event.  Governments around the world continue to struggle to 
manage its consequences, adopting a range of tactics with varying success. 
The UK Coalition government’s approach has been to instigate deep public 
funding cuts in order to cut borrowing.212  Local authorities have taken the 
brunt of these cuts, shouldering in real terms reductions in funding of 28% 
over four years.213  At the same time, new funding for adult social care of 
£1.5bn over that period was announced, with a further £1bn to be transferred 
from the NHS to support joint working.  According to the Local Government 
Association, this additional funding will be insufficient to meet an estimated 
rise in the annual cost of adult social care by 2014-15 of around £6bn.214 
Moreover, these new funds are not ring-fenced, leaving local authorities free 
                                                                                                                                          
Commission for Equality and Human Rights’ [2006] Public Law 197; Klug F, ‘Establishment 
of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights: implications for the public sector’ (2004) 
Westminster Explained 36: An assessment of the impact of the HRA, 7 December 2004   
210
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proceed with non-statutory codes.    http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/legal-and-
policy/equality-act/equality-act-codes-of-practice/ accessed 8.3.12 
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 ICESCR Article 2 and Gen Comment 9 – principle of non-retrogression 
212
  Local Government Association Briefing, ‘The Spending Review 2010’, 20 October 2010 
http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/14462985  accessed 7.8.11 
213
 Tapering from £28.5bn in 2010-11 to £22.9bn in 2014-15; compared with cuts of 8.3% 
overall across all department budgets; ibid 
214
 Ibid; see also Department of Health, Dilnot report, ‘Fairer Care Funding’, 4 July 2011, 
http://www.dilnotcommission.dh.gov.uk/2011/07/04/commission-report/  accessed 12.8.11 
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to cut their social care budgets in real terms in the face of overall budgetary 
pressures; and some have done so.215    
 
Since 2003, local authorities have been required to follow statutory guidance 
when designing their eligibility criteria for care provision.  That guidance216 
sets out four bands of eligibility: critical, substantial, moderate and low.  They 
may be broadly summarised as follows: 
 ‘critical’ means that life is at risk, or there is great risk of serious illness 
or harm;  
 ‘substantial’ covers situations of abuse or neglect, and/or where the 
majority of personal care routines, work or education, social 
relationships and/or family responsibilities cannot be sustained; 
 the inability to sustain several of these personal, work and social 
routines and responsibilities constitute the ‘moderate’ band;  and 
 ‘low’ eligibility applies where one or two such roles or responsibilities 
cannot be undertaken.217 
Over recent years, councils have increasingly raised the threshold of 
eligibility for social services.  Immediately before the 2010 Spending 
Review,218  72% of councils provided services only to those falling into the 
substantial or critical bands, with 3% meeting critical needs only.  In a high 
proportion of local authorities, savings in adult social care spending will 
therefore involve restricting eligibility to those with critical needs only: where 
life is not at risk, and there is not great risk of serious illness or harm, no 
service will be provided.  As Jane Campbell points out, ‘[i]f  disabled people 
cannot access services unless they have the highest level of need, then all 
                                                 
215
 See R (on the application of W) v Birmingham City Council; R (on the application of M, G 
and H) v Birmingham City Council [2011] EWHC 1147 (Admin), discussed in Chapter 9 
below 
216
 Department of Health ‘Fair Access to Care Services’ LAC (2002) 13 issued under Local 
Authorities Social Services Act 1970 s7(1); Department of Health ‘Fair Access to Care 
Services: guidance for eligibility criteria for adult social care’ 2003 (FACS); revised as 
Department of Health ‘Prioritising Need in the Context of Putting People First: a whole 
system approach to eligibility for social care – guidance on eligibility criteria for adult social 
care, England 2010’ (2010) Gateway ref 13729 
217
 See FACS and Prioritising Need, supra 
218
 A survey based on Freedom of Information responses from 97 out of the 152 English 
councils conducted by Community Care Magazine in September 2010; 
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/Articles/2010/09/15/115321/councils-to-deny-social-care-
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the empowering, transforming delivery in the world will not change the 
inequality they experience’.219 
 
Public funding cuts also affect other areas of disabled people’s lives. 220  
Among them, the Independent Living Fund was closed to new applicants in 
2010, and is set to close altogether in 2015, facing many with loss of 
employment or return to institutional care; 221   the cost of an additional 
bedroom needed for disability reasons222 will no longer be met by housing 
benefit, causing living arrangements to be unaffordable; and the benefit on 
which many rely to meet the additional costs of impairment is further 
‘reformed’ to achieve a 20% budget reduction. 223    In 2011, the JCHR 
conducted an inquiry into implementation of the right of disabled people to 
independent living.  It concluded that  
the range of reforms proposed to housing benefit, Disability Living 
Allowance, the Independent Living Fund, and changes to eligibility 
criteria risk interacting in a particularly harmful way for disabled 
people… As a result, there seems to be a significant risk of 
retrogression of independent living and a breach of the UK’s Article 19 
obligations.224   
 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, any deliberately retrogressive measures must 
be fully justified in the international arena.225 
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220
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Some resistance to these negative discursive trends is just visible.  Disabled 
people lobby and demonstrate.226  A consortium of organisations from across 
the social care sector, including some DPOs, takes forward New Labour’s 
Putting People First project.227  The role of economic, social and cultural 
rights in a time of austerity moves up the agenda in legal and academic 
discussion.228   And, finally, the Joint Committee on Human Rights highlights 
Article 19, insisting that the CRPD is hard, not ‘soft’ law;229 and the Minister 
for Disabled People commits to basing the forthcoming Disability Strategy on 
the CRPD.230 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the understandings reflected in independent 
living policy in England for signs of re-organisation of the field of meaning in 
line with the CRPD myth.  From a long history of exclusion, policy relating to 
independent living in England has undergone a number of discursive 
transitions: from the Poor Laws to the post-war welfare state, to ‘care in the 
community’, non-discrimination and personalisation.  Since the 1960s in 
particular, disabled people themselves have profoundly influenced the policy 
agenda, developing the social model of disability, resisting discrimination and 
claiming control of services.  From 2005, under the New Labour government, 
it seems that, despite the invisibility of economic, social and cultural rights in 
domestic discourse, the concerns underlying Article 19 have been 
recognised, and work is in train to put in place systems to address them.  
Elements of disabled people’s independent living discourse are adopted by 
government; the need for holistic approach and radical change are 
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acknowledged; co-production becomes a new buzz-word; and relations of 
difference prevail, allowing potential for discursive expansion. 
 
However, the ‘nodal point’ of ‘independent living’ is an empty signifier, open 
to re- or mis-appropriation by other, more powerful, discourses.  Without 
protection of the international human rights framework, including recognition 
of the durable nature of economic, social and cultural rights, understandings 
of independent living remain wide open to re-articulation or dislocation.  From 
2010, re-articulation of New Labour’s ‘co-production’ model of personalisation 
through the individualistic and market-driven discourse of the Coalition 
government, combined with the dislocation of global economic crisis, has 
resulted in a range of policy developments which reverse earlier progress 
and set implementation of Article 19 into regression.231 
 
Despite international jurisprudence requiring that the durable nature of 
economic, social and cultural rights and their indivisibility from their civil and 
political counterparts are recognised and implemented at domestic level,232   
they remain invisible in the domestic field of meaning throughout the 
developments described above.  So too does the ‘revolving door’ through 
which international disability/human rights discourse seeks to circulate its re-
description of the world: the CRPD itself, including Article 19, is absent from 
policy discussion.233  Only in 2011 do some small elements of resistance to 
this invisibility begin to re-appear, bolstered in 2012 by a strong JCHR report 
on Article 19.  Meanwhile, a number of widely varied understandings of 
independent living circulate in the policy field: from established and still 
dominant assumptions of dependency, through New Labour’s (and disabled 
people’s) understandings of co-production, to the Coalition government’s 
individualistic and market-based interpretation and disabled people’s and 
human rights supporters’ rights-based perspectives.  
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In the domestic field of meaning, then, despite some initial progress, the 
CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project is encountering re-articulation, dislocation 
and regression.  Though it may take comfort from strong domestic emphasis 
on individual civil and political rights to autonomy and choice, without 
recognition of the economic, social and cultural rights required to enable their 
exercise, the hegemonic project is at serious risk.234 
 
As well as seeking to dominate the field of meaning, the project must also 
establish systems of social relations.  One method of articulating and 
regulating those systems is law.  In 2008, the ODI acknowledged that ‘there 
is a gap between national policy and people’s real experiences.’ 235   It 
nonetheless did not feel that new legislation was necessary, hoping instead 
that its Independent Living Strategy would ‘begin to fill the gap’.236  Others 
disagreed.  In 2006 and subsequent years, a private member’s Disabled 
Persons (Independent Living) Bill was introduced in Parliament.  In 2008, the 
Law Commission embarked on a review of existing legislation relating to 
adult social care.  Both are considered in Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234
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Chapter 7 
Independent Living in England: 
Legislation 
Introduction 
In the domestic policy field, the CRPD remains invisible and its drafters’ 
hegemonic project faces a combination of antagonism, re-articulation, 
dislocation and regression which puts it at considerable risk.  Within that field 
of meaning, if it is to achieve hegemony, disability/human rights discourse 
must establish new systems of social relations in line with its re-description of 
the world.  One method of doing so is through law.  Indeed, CRPD Article 
4(1) requires States Parties to adopt all appropriate legislative measures to 
implement Convention rights,237 and to modify or abolish existing laws and 
regulations that discriminate against disabled people.238 
 
We have seen in Part 1 that Article 19 is a hybrid right, exemplifying the 
Convention’s fusion between the two ‘sets’ of rights, so that realisation of its 
socio-economic provisions is a pre-requisite for exercise of its civil and 
political rights to autonomy and participation, and thus to implementation of 
the Convention as a whole.  One might assume, therefore, that ‘appropriate 
legislative measures’ for its implementation would address its civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social elements on an equal basis, as interdependent 
and indivisible rights.  In England, however, despite international rhetoric to 
the contrary, the two sets of rights are not indivisible at practical level:239 the 
transition from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ thinking in relation to the economic, social 
and cultural rights essential for implementation of Article 19 has not taken 
place. 
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Moreover, while radical re-interpretations of social care delivery circulate in 
the policy arena,240 the legislative framework has failed to keep up.  Current 
legislation governing Article 19 services has its roots in the 1940s welfare 
state.  It reflects seriously out-dated understandings, and has become 
‘exceptionally tortuous’. 241   Whilst the New Labour government was not 
prepared to legislate, a private member’s Disabled Persons (Independent 
Living) Bill was introduced unsuccessfully to Parliament between 2006 and 
2009,242 and in 2008 the Law Commission launched a review of adult social 
care legislation. 
 
Unlike its predecessor, the Coalition government does intend to introduce 
new legislation.  Its timeline for reform of adult social care incorporates the 
Law Commission’s review,243 as well a separate report from a Commission 
on the Funding of Care and Support.244  These two reports, along with the 
Coalition’s ‘Vision for Social Care’,245 will feed into a White Paper246 followed 
by a Social Care Reform Bill.247  The legal dimension of independent living 
discourse in England, like the field of meaning,248 is in flux. 
 
The drafters of the Social Care Reform Bill will undertake the task of mapping 
this fluctuating discursive terrain.  They will have available, as we have seen 
in Chapter 6, a number of widely varied understandings of independent living: 
from established and still dominant assumptions of dependency, through 
New Labour’s (and disabled people’s) understandings of co-production, to 
the Coalition government’s market-based interpretation and disabled 
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241
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people’s rights-based perspectives.   International economic, social and 
cultural rights jurisprudence, which might provide coherence and precedent, 
is not available.  In its absence, which central ideology will fix the direction 
and meaning of this legal order?  Which discursive elements – or their 
combinations – will be reflected in the new Social Care Reform Bill?  Which 
will drive the projection decisions of the drafters to increase the accuracy of 
one feature whilst distorting the accuracy of another?  How the legislators 
complete their task will not only reflect the central ideology and discursive 
elements they choose, but will also impact on the capacity of international 
disability/human rights discourse to influence domestic systems of social 
relations, and on the lives of disabled people through the social realities they 
create.249  
 
This Chapter investigates the dynamics of these various ‘constellations of 
power and knowledge’ as the players concerned in this challenging project 
work to produce ‘a simple, consistent, transparent and modern framework for 
adult social care law’250 without reference to economic, social and cultural 
rights.   Following a brief overview of the current legislative framework, the 
Chapter explores the Law Commission’s review, alongside the Independent 
Living Bill, and relates them to the requirements of Article 19 CRPD. 
 
Current legislative framework 
 
In contrast to policy-makers’ adoption of the language of ‘independent living’, 
‘choice’, and ‘control’, legislation continues to use the paternalistic language 
of ‘needs’ and ‘care’.251   The national statute that currently provides the 
gateway to independent living support services in England and Wales is the 
NHS & Community Care Act 1990 (NHSCCA).  This Act sets out a system for 
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assessment which is the first point of contact for access to all ‘community 
care’ services. 
 
Under NHSCCA s47(1)252 local authorities have a broad duty to assess any 
person in their area who may be in need of services.  Once an assessment 
has been conducted, the local authority has discretion under s47(1)(b) as to 
whether or not to make any provision, applying a system of eligibility 
criteria.253  Where it appears to the local authority that the person being 
assessed is a disabled person, s47(2) empowers the local authority to make 
a decision as to the services that person requires under section 4 of the 
Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act 1986 
(DP(SCR)A).254    
 
This last provision takes us on a journey.  Despite its mention only of the 
1986 Act, s47(2) in effect refers back to s2 of the Chronically Sick and 
Disabled Persons Act of 1970 (CSDPA), which in turn refers back to s29 of 
the National Assistance Act 1948 (NAA), one of the founding statutes of the 
post-war welfare state.  Section 29 of the NAA delegates power to local 
authorities to make ‘welfare arrangements for blind, deaf, dumb and crippled 
persons, etc’ 255   over eighteen, including those ‘who suffer from mental 
disorder of any description’, or who are ‘substantially and permanently 
handicapped by illness, injury, or congenital deformity…’256   The ‘welfare 
arrangements’ that might be made include ‘instruction in their own homes or 
elsewhere in methods of overcoming the effects of their disabilities’, 257 
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 s47(1) of the NHSCCA states: 
… where it appears to a local authority that any person for whom they may provide or 
arrange for the provision of community care services may be in need of any such services, 
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255
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256
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providing ‘workshops where such persons may be engaged… in suitable 
work,’258 and hostels for those engaged in such work or training.259  They 
may be helped to dispose of the produce of their work,260 and/or provided 
with ‘recreational facilities in their own homes or elsewhere’. 261   A local 
authority may keep a register of the people for whom such arrangements 
have been made. 262   From this paternalistic baseline, enactment of the 
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act in 1970 was seen by the disabled 
people’s movement as a landmark achievement,263 not least because its s2 
is worded in such a way as to suggest that it imposes a duty rather than a 
discretionary power on the local authority to provide specific domiciliary 
services - such as help in or adaptation to the home, transport to local 
authority services, meals, or a telephone - as part of the exercise of its 
functions under NAA s29.264    
 
Other ‘community care services’ that might be accessed via a NHSCCA s47 
assessment include residential care, maternity support, aftercare services for 
people detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, and welfare services for 
‘old people’. 265   Additionally, the Children Act 1989 empowers the local 
authority to provide a variety of services and/or accommodation to a child 
under 18.266  
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NHSCCA s47(3) requires the local authority conducting the assessment to 
invite relevant health and/or housing authorities to take part in the 
assessment. 267  Resistance to such joint working at local level has been 
such that further legislation268 and guidance269 on this issue have been found 
necessary over the past two decades, and the issue continues to challenge 
development of a holistic independent living discourse.270  However, whether 
through health, housing or community care channels, the law provides for a 
range of possible housing outcomes to such assessment, from nursing or 
residential care, 271  through public housing, 272  or supported housing, 273  to 
adaptations or equipment to enable a person to stay in their own home.274  
This framework offers, in theory, a range of housing options compatible with 
Article 19(a).275 
 
The manner in which assessment is carried out is left to each local 
authority.276  As we saw in Chapter 6, since the days of the Poor Laws, it has 
fallen to the local community – ‘the Parish’ - to administer ‘relief’.  Under the 
welfare state, the duty to provide welfare services falls to the elected local 
authority, and, since the 1970s,277 to its social services department.  Each 
such authority has discretion as to how it implements that duty within the 
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framework of national statute.   In practice, a number of Regulations and 
Directions from the Secretary of State,278  supplemented by a plethora of 
smaller-scale circulars, Executive Letters, and guidance have been issued 
over the years to assist local authorities in their duties.279   
 
The result is a three-stage assessment process: 1) the gathering of 
information about the person’s ‘community care needs’; 2) a decision on 
which ‘needs’ call for the provision of services, through the application of 
‘eligibility criteria’;280 and 3) the preparation of a ‘care plan’ explaining which 
‘care needs’ must be met and detailing the services to be provided to meet 
them.281  As noted above, the language in which this process is couched282 is 
far from that of ‘choice’ or ‘control’ found in the policy arena; and further still 
from any concept of ‘rights’.  Once a particular ‘need’ is recognised in an 
individual’s ‘care plan’,283 the local authority has a duty to provide services to 
meet it.284  The application of eligibility criteria varies widely between local 
authorities, leading to wide geographical discrepancies in service provision.  
S47(5) allows for the temporary provision of services prior to assessment in a 
situation of ‘urgency’.   
 
Enactment of the Community Care (Direct Payments) Act in 1996 allowed 
some service users for the first time to receive their allotted social service 
provision in cash rather than in kind.  Direct Payments have been gradually 
extended to a wider group of recipients,285 and have led to Individual Budgets 
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and personalisation as described in Chapter 6.  Local authorities were 
notoriously slow in developing and promoting their direct payments schemes, 
to the extent that regulations were introduced in 2003 286  imposing an 
obligation to make direct payments where the person meets certain 
conditions.287   
 
Unlike NHS health services, social services are not free at the point of 
delivery: eligibility is means-tested.  The Health and Social Services and 
Social Security Adjudications Act 1983 (HASSASSA) 288   allows local 
authorities to recover such charge (if any) for services as they consider 
‘practicably reasonable’ for the individual to pay. 289   This covers both 
residential290 and domiciliary services,291 provided in kind or through Direct 
Payments.292   Different local authorities reach different conclusions as to 
what charges they ‘consider reasonable’, leading to a ‘postcode lottery’ in 
relation to charging, with wide variations between local authority areas.293 
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While policy has embraced the discourse of ‘personalisation’ as promoting 
autonomy and choice, in line with the head of Article 19, the ‘social welfare’ 
legislation currently governing the range of services required to support 
independent living under Article 19(b) continues to reflect a dominant 
‘welfare’ discourse.  As the Social Care Institute for Excellence points out,  
both ‘needs’ and ‘eligibility’ are concepts rooted in the Poor Law, 
casting people who may need social care as supplicants, rather than 
individuals in control of their own lives who may require care and 
support to help them live their lives as they wish.294    
 
The Law Commission’s Scoping Report 295  underlines the quantity and 
complexity of the law, identifying 34 relevant Acts of Parliament;296 and notes 
its outdated concepts that favour institutional care for disabled and older 
people, its offensive, stigmatising language, and its potential incompatibility 
with European Convention rights. 297  It is maybe unsurprising, then, that this 
out-dated  298  body of law has given rise to many difficulties in its application.  
These include wide and unpredictable geographical variations in the 
availability and processes of assessment, eligibility, service provision and 
charging, resulting, inter alia, in uncertainty and risk for disabled people 
wishing to move from one local authority area to another – the ‘portability’ 
problem; duplication of bureaucracy;299 and the on-going failure of statutory 
bodies to work together;300 all of which result in significant avoidable costs for 
local authorities, the State and disabled people alike.301  For the latter, the 
cost is not just financial: it includes restriction or denial of the physical, social 
                                                 
294
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and psycho-emotional support required for the exercise of their right to 
independent living.302   
 
When the UK ratified the CRPD, it undertook, inter alia, to replace 
discriminatory laws and practices with Convention-compatible ones.303  It has 
yet to fulfil this undertaking. 304   Yet the tensions that might lead to its 
fulfilment are evident.  As Ed Mitchell comments,  
[t]he personalisation initiative is a radical re-engineering of the provision 
of care services.  The governing community care legislation, however, 
reflects an earlier, often more paternalistic era.  This means that 
personalisation strains at the boundaries of the legislation governing 
adult social services.305   
 
Conversely, as the Law Commission identifies,  
[d]ifficult law may also have the effect of stifling innovation and the 
multiple layers of law can make it difficult to promote flexibility and new 
policy approaches in practice.306    
 
Two contrasting attempts have recently been made to address these 
problems.  The Disabled Persons (Independent Living) Bill (the Independent 
Living Bill/ILB) first presented to Parliament in 2006, 307  and the Law 
Commission’s 2008 Review of Adult Social Care are considered next.  
Santos’ cartography of law again provides assistance. 
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Mapping adult social care 
 
Like the drafters of the CRPD map, those working to produce ‘a simple, 
consistent, transparent and modern framework for adult social care’ 308  in 
England must translate the complex social reality of independent living 
support here into a two-dimensional legal order.  To create this medium-scale 
map, they must define its central ideology and the limits of its operation, and 
they must organise the legal space within.  This will inevitably involve some 
distortion of reality, and because choices have to be made, that distortion will 
not be neutral.  Despite the widely varying understandings of independent 
living competing for hegemony in English political discourse, the process of 
projection ‘needs to be consistent and thorough if the map is to be credible 
and ‘accurate’. 309   One international framework of understandings which 
might provide some conceptual coherence, as well as legal precedents and 
guidance - that of economic, social and cultural rights - is unavailable, 
excluded from the domestic discursive field by successive UK governments’ 
reluctance to recognise or incorporate its understandings.310   
 
In order to explore potential for compatibility in current developments with the 
UK’s undertakings to replace discriminatory laws and practices with CRPD-
compatible ones,311 this section compares two recent attempts at redrawing 
the domestic legal map: the Law Commission’s 2008-2011 Review of Adult 
Social Care and the Health and Social Care (Independent Living) Bill 2006-
2009. 
 
The Law Commission launched its review with a Scoping Report.  The 
Commission’s role, it says, is to undertake law reform, not to make ‘political 
judgements about the setting of spending priorities or the making of value 
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judgements about rights and responsibilities’. 312   These are a matter for 
government.  It acknowledges that 
[d]rawing a clear distinction between law reform, on the one hand, and 
political policy on the other is not always easy… where the two meet it 
can be difficult to disentangle them. 313   [Nevertheless,] [t]he big 
decisions about how much of a welfare state we should have and how it 
should be funded are not decisions for us….  314   
 
Already we find an essentially ‘welfare’ approach, with deference to 
politicians on allocation of resources. 
 
A subsequent Consultation Paper 315  proposed a single adult social care 
statute for England and Wales,316 setting out the duties imposed and powers 
conferred on local authorities.  It would be backed by larger-scale statutory 
instruments, such as regulations, and, at a third level, by guidance, possibly 
in the form of a statutory Code of Practice.  Central to the statute would be 
the community care assessment, the eligibility decision and the formation of 
a care plan.317   The Law Commission’s consultation and final report are 
considered below, and compared with the terms of the Independent Living 
Bill.  
 
Maps have centres and boundaries, and project their multi-faceted realities in 
different ways, according to their purpose, cultural context and the ideologies 
of the cartographers.  So also the drafters of a legal order define the centre 
and limits of its operation and organise the legal space within.  Comparison 
between the Law Commission’s proposals and the Independent Living Bill 
begins with their central purpose and principles. 
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Centre: purpose and principles 
Law Commission  
The Law Commission’s objective is  
to review the law under which residential care services, domiciliary and 
community services, support for carers and adult protection is provided. 
The ultimate aim would be to provide a coherent legal structure, 
preferably in the form of a single statute, for these services.318   
 
The approach adopted is to create, as far as possible,  
a neutral legal framework that is not wedded to any particular policy and 
is capable of accommodating different policies and practices in the 
future, [whilst maintaining] the core entitlements and rights that are 
crucial to the existing community care legal framework.319     
 
The problem with this approach, as we have seen throughout this thesis, is 
that the legal framework resulting from this project – whatever it is - will never 
be, to any extent, neutral.  In this highly politicised context, every word that is 
used, every concept that is included or excluded, every procedural power 
relationship built into the system will have meaning.  Projections which distort 
reality are unavoidable.   The very attempt at neutrality can be seen as a 
political statement: it works to exclude or minimise the 
emancipatory/expressive function of the law which is fundamental to its 
contribution to the ‘deep reconstruction’ required for the overturning of 
oppression. Contrary to CRPD Article 4(3), there is no reference here to the 
involvement of disabled people in the review of the legislation, though many 
disabled people, carers, older people and their organisations took it upon 
themselves to respond.320 
 
The Consultation Paper lists a number of ‘general concepts with a view to 
considering whether they are capable of forming the basis of statutory 
principles.’321  They are: 
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1. that decision-makers must maximise the choice and control of service 
users 
2. person-centred planning 
3. that a person’s needs should be viewed broadly 
4. the need to remove or reduce future need 
5. the concept of independent living 
6. an assumption of home-based living 
7. dignity in care 
8. the need to safeguard adults at risk from abuse and neglect 
 
Despite CRPD ratification, there is no reference here to human rights, 
including economic, social and cultural rights, to the CRPD, or to Article 19.    
The Paper then asks whether any of these principles  
are capable of being the primary principle of the legislation;… the first 
and paramount consideration whenever social services makes a 
decision or takes action.’322 (original emphasis).   
 
Here, consultees are asked to consider the central or ‘fixed point’ of the 
map:323  which, if any, of these ‘general concepts’ should take precedence in 
shaping projection decisions? 
 
A large majority of consultees324 agreed that there should be a statement of 
principles included in the statute, that overarching principles could guide 
decision-making and clarify the aims of the statute as a whole.325  There was 
much less consensus regarding which principles should be included, with 
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maximising choice and control, dignity in care and safeguarding adults at risk 
seen by many326 as essential to the provision of adult social care. Person-
centred planning, viewing a person’s needs broadly, the need to remove or 
reduce future need and independent living were supported by a smaller 
majority.327   Given that personalisation, holistic assessment and prevention 
have featured as integral to national policy founded on independent living 
since 2005, it may seem odd that these principles achieve relatively less 
support from Law Commission consultees.328  When we look in more detail at 
consultees’ arguments for and against the principle of ‘independent living’, 
however, we find a dichotomy.  On one hand, those familiar with disabled 
people’s understandings of the concept 329  are strongly supportive of its 
inclusion and primacy, believing that it should become ‘the first and 
paramount consideration whenever social services make a decision or take 
action.’330  Others, by contrast, are less clear about its meaning, and thus 
about its relevance.  They raise concerns about a lack of legal clarity,331 the 
danger of raising unrealistic expectations,332  the principle’s application in the 
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 Maximising choice and control: 61 out of 83 that expressed a view; dignity in care: 62 out 
of 78; safeguarding: 53 out of 68.  ASCCR (2011): Statutory Principles 
327
 Person-centred planning: 47 out of 73; viewing needs broadly: 48 out of 71; removing 
future need: 49 out of 71; independent living: 44 out of 82. 
328
 Out of a total of 231 submissions, 82 expressed a view on the principle of independent 
living.  Of those, 44 felt it should be included, 25 felt it should not, and 13 held an equivocal 
position.  ASCCR (2011) para 3.130 
329
 Such as the ODI: ‘The adult social care statute should be based on the concept of 
independent living, with emphasis on: choice and control – disabled people having choice 
and control over the support they need to go about their daily lives; and co-production – 
involving those who are affected by the policy at every stage of policy development, 
implementation and delivery’;  or National Centre for Independent Living:  ‘We agree that the 
future adult social care statute should include a statement or principles, or a purpose clause.  
This statement or clause should make it unequivocally clear that the purpose is to enable 
disabled people to live independently – i.e. take full part in society, and achieving potential in 
all areas of life (family, school, community, employment)….’,  National Centre for 
Independent Living and RADAR Joint Response to the Law Commission Adult Social Care 
Consultation (2010) 5 
330
 Disability Wales, ASCCR (2011) para 3.129 
331
 Such as Cartrefi Cymru: ‘Given that the concept of “independent living” is so difficult to 
pin down and encompasses such a wide range of aims and principles we 
agree that it would not lend itself to a legally enforceable statement of principle.’ ASCCR 
(2011) para 3.135 
332
 Such as Gateshead Advocacy Information Network and North Tyneside Council, ASCCR 
(2011) para 3.146 
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context of differing housing options,333 and even potential conflict with the 
principle of choice and control.334   
 
In its Final Report, the Law Commission chooses ‘well-being’ as its central 
principle.  It offers no definition of ‘well-being’, but provides a checklist of 
seven factors that must be considered when a decision is made.  These are 
hedged around with exceptions and provisos which offer opportunity for the 
individual to be side-lined.  For instance, the decision-maker should assume 
that the person is the best judge of their own well-being, except in cases 
where they lack capacity to make the relevant decision;335 the individual’s 
views, wishes and feelings should be followed wherever practicable and 
appropriate; individuals should be given the opportunity to be involved in 
assessment, planning, development and review of their care and support as 
far as is practicable in the circumstances; and, where it is necessary to 
interfere with the individual’s rights and freedoms,  the least restrictive 
solution should be used wherever that is practicable. 
 
During consultation, in conformity with the Law Commission’s list of ‘general 
concepts’, human rights are barely mentioned.  However, on the final two 
pages of the Law Commission’s analysis of responses we find ‘Further 
suggestions for principles’, including non-discrimination336 and human rights.  
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation considers that a statement of principles 
should  
begin with, and be framed by, explicit reference to the role of adult 
social care in promoting and protecting human and civil rights and 
entitlements.337   
 
Older people in Wales argue that statutory principles should  
                                                 
333
 Such as Carers UK, ASCCR (2011) para 3.141 
334
 Such as Disability Law Service, ASCCR (2011) para 3.142; Royal College of Physicians 
of Edinburgh, ibid para 3.144 
335
 See CRPD Article 12 and discussion in Chapter 3 above 
336
 RNIB and Guide Dogs: ‘Whilst the principle of non-discrimination is clearly stated 
elsewhere in legislation we consider that it has never been clearly stated in relation to the 
provision of social care – for example, where older people are refused assistance or 
provided with more limited services.’ ASCCR (2011) para 3.236 
337
 ASCCR (2011) para 3.237 
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reflect “human rights principles and be based on rights, choice, dignity 
and independence”.  Any proposed statutory principles should be 
measured against the United Nations Principles for Older Persons and 
other similar UN Conventions.338   
 
And, finally, we find reference to the CRPD.  The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission suggests using either the UN Principles for Older Persons or the 
preamble to the CRPD339  as ‘platform’ for further development.  No-one 
mentions Article 19(b).   
 
Tessa Harding reminds the Law Commission that ‘the principles themselves 
“do not need to be reinvented for the purpose of this statute”: 
They should be based on the existing principles embodied in the Human 
Rights Act and in the United Nations Convention on Human Rights.  
People who need the support of social care services are no different 
from anyone else: they just need some help to secure the same rights 
as others. It is about respect for the individual and his or her dignity and 
autonomy and the absolute duty of the state to promote these.340 
 
Indeed, such principles have been drafted before, not only in the Human 
Rights Act, the UN Principles for Older Persons and the CRPD but also in the 
private member’s Health and Social Care (Independent Living) Bill debated 
and passed on three occasions by the House of Lords between 2006 and 
2009, which, along with its international counterparts, also finds itself invisible 
in the Law Commission’s consultation. 
 
Independent Living Bill  
The original Health and Social Care (Independent Living) Bill (ILB)341 was 
drafted for Lord (Jack) Ashley of Stoke by the Disability Rights 
Commission,342 informed, in line with CRPD Article 4(3), by wide consultation 
                                                 
338
 ASCCR (2011) para 3.240 – reflecting different progress in discursive transformation in 
Wales amongst older people 
339
 Not the CRPD itself 
340
 ASCCR (2011) para 3.243 
341
 Then called the Disabled Persons (Independent Living) Bill; discussion of the Bill, unless 
otherwise stated, refers to the 2009 text. 
342
 Disability Rights Commission ‘A Briefing on Lord Ashley’s Disabled Persons (Independent 
Living) Bill’ (DRC 2006); Disability Rights Commission, Equal Opportunities Commission and 
Carers UK, ‘The Future: Who Cares’ (2006) 
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with organisations of disabled people, older people and carers, some of 
whom came together to campaign for its adoption.343  The Bill  
seeks to enable people with disabilities to make decisions about what 
care and assistance they receive, and about their living arrangements, 
by providing rights and entitlements to independent living. 344. 
 
Its purpose is to  
ensure that disabled persons enjoy the same choice, freedom, dignity, 
control and substantive opportunities as persons who are not disabled 
at home, at work, and as members of the community…345   
 
The Bill is clear about its principles: 
1(3) Disabled persons should be able to exercise choice, freedom and 
control and enjoy personal dignity and substantive opportunities to 
participate fully in work, family life, education, public, community and 
cultural life. 
 
1(4) Disabled persons are the best judge of their own requirements and 
therefore any practical assistance and associated support allocated to 
disabled persons following assessment should be based on their own 
choices, lifestyle preferences and aspirations. 
 
1(5) Any action taken or decision made under this Act in relation to a 
disabled person’s living arrangements and accommodation should 
ensure that each disabled person is empowered to determine his own 
living arrangements in relation to – 
 
(a) the type of accommodation or setting in which he wishes to live; 
and 
(b) with whom he shares that accommodation or living space. 
 
Discrimination against disabled people is prohibited on a list of 11 grounds, 
including ‘impairment or any aspect of their appearance or behaviour which 
might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about them’; 346  and 
                                                 
343
 ‘Our Lives, Our Choices’ campaign, RADAR Briefing on the Health and Social Care 
(Independent Living) Bill, December 2009; National Centre for Independent Living 
‘Independent Living Bill and Adult Care Reform: Making the Connections’ (NCIL 2008) 
344
 Official summary of the Bill, 2009  http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2009-
10/healthandsocialcareindependentlivinghl.html, accessed 6.5.11 
345
 s1(1); ‘and consequently to ensure that families and carers of disabled persons enjoy 
greater health, wellbeing, equality and opportunities to participate in social and economic life’ 
was added to original version by later amendment 
346
 Independent Living Bill 2009, s1(10)(c) 
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positive steps should be taken to correct any disadvantage or social 
exclusion arising from such discrimination.347  
 
Under sections 1(6), 1(7) and 1(8), disabled children’s views and aspirations 
should be given due weight; and they should be supported to express those 
views and to participate actively in decision-making on their behalf.  Disabled 
adults, too, should be enabled and empowered to make their own decisions, 
with support where necessary.  Two further principles relate to the avoidance 
of reliance on care and support provided by a child or young person which 
may impair their health, well-being, education or leisure opportunities; and to 
the protection of the health, well-being and substantive opportunities of all 
carers, including parents of disabled children. 
 
Under s1(11): 
Any action taken or decision made under this Act, for or on behalf of a 
disabled person, should be done or made with due regard to the need 
to respect and promote his human rights and the principles set out in 
this Act. 
 
All those with duties under this Act shall carry out those duties to the 
maximum extent of their available resources.348 
 
Here we find a purpose and list of principles in line with those of the CRPD 
and with Article 19.  The respect and promotion of disabled people’s human 
rights is clearly stated as a primary principle governing all actions and 
decision-making,349 in line with CRPD Article 1.  General principles include 
choice, freedom and control, dignity and participation, in line with CRPD 
Article 3 and the head of Article 19; and self-determination in the 
arrangement of personal assistance and support in line with Article 19(b).  
Article 19(a) is reflected in the power to determine one’s living arrangements 
under s1(5); CRPD Article 3(h)350 in respect for the rights of children, both 
disabled and as ‘carers’; and CRPD Article 12351 in support for adult decision-
                                                 
347
 Ibid s1(10) 
348
 Independent Living Bill 2009 s1(14)   
349
 Ibid s1(11)   
350
 CRPD Article 3(h): Respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and 
respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve their identities 
351
 CRPD Article 12: Equal recognition before the law 
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making.  The Bill’s s1(10) prohibition of discrimination against disabled 
people comes close to the CRPD Article 5(2) prohibition ‘on all grounds’, 
echoing the CRPD Article 3(d) principle of respect for difference and the 
CRPD Article 5(4) permission to take positive action to address the 
consequences of discrimination.    Whilst there is no overt acknowledgement 
that the services in question are economic, social and cultural rights, there is 
recognition that they should be provided ‘to the maximum of available 
resources’ in line with ICESCR Article 2(1) and CRPD Article 4(2). 
 
On the one hand, then, we have a Law Commission review whose ‘neutral’ 
purpose and proposed principles make no reference to human rights, and 
whose final report proposes that individual ‘well-being’ rather than 
independent living  should be the basis for all decisions made and actions 
carried out under the statute.352  On the other hand, we have an Independent 
Living Bill which takes respect for and promotion of disabled people’s human 
rights as its primary objective.  How do these two very different central 
positions define the limits and project the content of their respective legal 
orders to ‘facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities’353 of the right to 
independent living, as required by CRPD Article 19? 
 
Boundaries: defining the limits 
With an eye on the exclusionary definitions in current legislation, the Law 
Commission does not propose to include a central definition of a disabled 
person or service user, arguing that such definitions can be stigmatising, and 
too broad to serve any useful legal purpose.  Instead a person should be 
eligible for services if they have an ‘assessed eligible need’354 determined 
through the assessment process.  
 
The Independent Living Bill, by contrast, does provide a definition, which 
echoes that of the CRPD:355 
                                                 
352
 Law Commission, ‘Adult Social Care’ (LawCom 326, 2011) HC 941, Part 4 
353
 CRPD Article 19 
354
 Law Commission Consultation Paper (2010) para 38, provisional proposal 9-3 
355
 See Chapter 3 above 
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“disabled person” means a person of any age… who – 
(a) has a physical, neurological or sensory impairment, a learning 
disability, a mental health problem, an illness or health condition, or 
(b) has had an illness or health condition, and who faces barriers to 
independent living…356 
 
We may recall here the arguments for and against a definition of ‘persons 
with disabilities’ during the CRPD negotiations, and the role of the definition 
there in both retaining flexibility and the possibility of dynamic evolution, and 
preventing governments or courts resiling from commitments by adopting 
excessively narrow or exclusionary interpretations.357  
 
For the Law Commission, ‘services’ are defined negatively through 
maintaining and clarifying the existing divides between health and social care 
provision,358 and positively through a short but inexhaustive list of ‘community 
care services’ 359   which closely reflects the services covered by existing 
legislation: 
 residential accommodation [NAA48 s21] 
 community and home-base services [NAA48 s29; CSDPA70 s2] 
 advice, social work, counselling and advocacy services, [NAA48 s29, 
LASSA70 s6, Children Act 89 ss 17 & 21,etc, Mental Health Act 1983 
s117] or  
 financial or any other assistance [e.g. Children Act 89 s17(6); Disabled 
Facilities Grants, etc] 
 
The corresponding Independent Living Bill list includes practical assistance, 
such as equipment and technology, personal care and help around the home, 
shopping, and assistance to participate in education, family life, employment, 
or social life; and ‘associated support services’ such as mobility or low vision 
training, various therapies, prosthetics or continuing or palliative health care;   
‘or any other matter which would enable the disabled person to enjoy 
                                                 
356
 Independent Living Bill s3 
357
 G Burca G de, ‘The European Union in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ 
(2010) 35(2) European Law Review 174, 190; and see Chapter 3 above 
358
 Law Commission Final Report (2011) Recommendation 51 
359
 Ibid, Recommendation 28.  The Government, in its consultation response, considers the 
‘term and concept of “community care services” rather outdated. With the move to personal 
budgets and self-directed support, we have an opportunity to modernise the language we 
use…’ Government Response, para 39; and see Postscript below 
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independent living…’.360  The provision of adaptations to the home remains 
mandatory. 
 
Law Commission services must be provided in accordance with the well-
being principle, which must also be directed to a list of outcomes:  
 health and emotional well-being;  
 protection from harm;  
 education, training and recreation;  
 the contribution made to society; and  
 securing rights and entitlements. 
 
Again, these outcomes are little different in essence from those underlying 
the paternalistic ‘welfare arrangements’ of the 1948 Act.361 
 
The Independent Living Bill also defines ‘independent living’ in terms of 
outcomes.  Here ‘independent living’ means  
disabled persons enjoying the same choice, freedom, dignity, control 
and substantive opportunities as persons who are not disabled at home, 
at work, and as members of the community in order to improve 
outcomes for disabled persons in relation to: - 
 
(a) their individual autonomy; 
(b) their confidence and security; 
(c) respect for and full enjoyment of their rights to privacy and 
family life; 
(d) their participation in education, life-long learning, training and 
recreation; 
(e) the contribution made by them to society, including their 
participation in voluntary work and employment; 
(f) their social and economic well-being; 
(g) their participation in community and public life; and 
(h) their physical and mental health and emotional well-being.362 
Another non-exhaustive list determines minimum outcomes to be secured:   
(a) ensuring freedom from physical risk, inhuman or degrading treatment 
(b) ensuring dignity within, and control over, a person’s personal living 
environment 
(c) the full enjoyment of the right to personal development and to 
establish and maintain family and other social relationships 
(d) support for participation in the life of the community 
(e) support to participate in essential social and economic activities 
                                                 
360
 Independent Living Bill s15(3) 
361
 See extracts from NAA s29 above 
362
 Independent Living Bill s3 
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(f) support to access an appropriate range of recreational and cultural 
activities363 
 
Whilst the boundaries of the Law Commission’s map reflect the status quo, 
the Independent Living Bill’s boundaries are more emancipatory and 
inclusive. Within these contrasting boundaries, how do the drafters organise 
the legal space? 
 
Projection: organising the legal space364 
Law Commission 
Law Commission proposals envisage two levels at which adult social care 
should be provided.  At the universal level, the local authority provides 
information, advice and assistance to those who have not had, or do not want, 
an assessment, or are not eligible for services.  This duty ties in with the 
policy focus on prevention and the authority’s role as facilitator and stimulator 
of a local services market.  At the second level, ‘targeted’ social services are 
provided following a community care assessment. 
 
The duty-holders here are local authorities.  They retain their duty to 
undertake a ‘community care’ assessment where it appears to them that a 
person may have ‘community care needs’.    The low qualifying threshold for 
an assessment is thus retained, 365  as is a general duty to promote co-
operation between themselves and other ‘relevant organisations’, such as 
housing, education and health authorities.  The problem of ‘portability’ of 
support services between authorities is addressed through an enhanced duty 
on both local authorities to co-operate.366  The receiving authority must carry 
out an assessment, explain in writing if they decide to offer a significantly 
                                                 
363
 Ibid s15(6) 
364
 Santos defines projection as ‘the procedure by which the legal order defines the limits of 
its operation, and organizes the legal space inside them.’  Santos (2002) 430, and see 
Chapters 1 and 3 above 
365
 The duty to assess is triggered where it appears to a local authority that a person may 
have needs that could be  met by community care services.  Law Commission, ‘Adult Social 
Care’ (LawCom 326, 2011) HC 941, Summary, para 12 
366
 ‘This would allow a local authority to request assistance from another local authority or 
other body and the requested body would have to give due consideration to the request.’  
Ibid, Summary, para 40 
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different support package, and must continue to provide the original package 
until the new assessment is completed. 
 
The assessment should focus on the person’s needs and the outcomes they 
wish to achieve,367 rather than ‘the person’s suitability for a particular existing 
service.’368  Local authorities are required to ‘consult with’ the individual and 
their carer, ‘except if consultation is not realistically possible in the 
circumstances’. 369   In place of the present plethora of guidance on 
assessment procedure, the Secretary of State would make regulations which 
require at a minimum that assessors  
adopt a proportionate approach to assessment, having regard to the 
needs of the individual; carry out a specialist assessment in specified 
circumstances; and consider all needs during an assessment, 
irrespective of whether they can be or are being met [by others].370    
 
The principles of ‘person-centred approach’ and ‘viewing a person’s needs 
broadly’ proposed in the consultation are embedded here. 
 
Once needs are assessed, eligibility criteria are applied.  Again, guidance is 
replaced by regulations, this time setting out national eligibility criteria, 
supplemented by a Code of Practice specifying how criteria should be set at 
local level, including a minimum level of provision.371  
 
If, following assessment, no eligible needs are found, reasons must be given 
to the individual in writing.  Where eligible needs have been determined, the 
duty to meet them becomes an individual duty, enforceable through judicial 
review;372 and a care and support plan must be produced.  Its form and 
content will be prescribed in regulations, including a requirement that plans 
are set out in writing and signed on behalf of the local authority. 373  There is 
                                                 
367
 Law Commission, ‘Adult Social Care’ (LawCom 326, 2011) HC 941, Recommendation 9 
368
 Ibid para 8 
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no option of self-assessment, and no requirement for signature of agreement 
by the individual, though a copy should always be made available to them.374   
 
The proposed statute would provide for development of personal budgets 
and extension of Direct Payments to residential care.  The current Choice of 
Accommodation Directions,375 which require a local authority, under certain 
conditions,376 to accommodate a person at a place of their choice in England 
or Wales, would be replaced by regulations.  As Clements observes, the 
current Directions ‘constitute one of the few examples of genuine choice that 
individuals have in relation to their community care services’.377  Whether or 
not this duty was strengthened by being given a statutory basis would 
depend on the wording of the regulations.  Provision would also be made for 
regulations establishing a charging regime, including maintenance of existing 
exceptions.378 
 
Whilst these projections consolidate and strengthen aspects of the existing 
‘community care’ regime, particularly through the use of secondary legislation, 
the underlying ‘welfare’ discourse is unchanged.  In line with its objective, the 
Law Commission has proposed a coherent legal framework for the provision 
of services, with focus on individual well-being and outcomes, and capable of 
accommodating different policies and practices in the future.  Though tidier, 
the map has not essentially changed.   
                                                 
374
 The Law Commission ‘recognise the particular concern that service users are involved 
and, as far as possible, are able to take ownership of the care and support plan. In our view, 
this involvement would be encouraged in a number of ways. We recommend in 
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users should be fully involved wherever appropriate and possible. Second, we recommend 
above that the code of practice should provide further guidance on when it would be 
appropriate to authorise other individuals or organisations to produce the care and support 
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 Such as aftercare under s117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which is free. 
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The Independent Living Bill projects the same multi-dimensional social reality 
differently.   
 
 The Independent Living Bill 
Having established the holistic and inclusive reach of its legal order, the Bill 
sets out ‘general duties in relation to independent living’.379  At national level, 
the Secretary of State must prepare and implement a national independent 
living implementation plan, 380  setting out costs and benefits, a national 
resource allocation framework and a national workforce development plan.  
In doing so, the Secretary of State has a duty to consult and involve disabled 
people, older people, parents of disabled children, carers, organisations 
representing those people, representatives of local authorities and NHS 
bodies, statutory, voluntary and private service providers, and inspection 
bodies.  This is not designed to be a paternalistic, top-down process, but a 
hegemonic project involving a range of social actors, including disabled 
people and others whose support requirements are in issue. 
 
At local level, each local authority and NHS body has a duty to promote 
independent living for disabled people.381   Local authorities must secure, as 
far as reasonably practicable, the availability of a range of housing and 
support resources detailed in the Bill. 382  Like the Convention, this Bill is 
expanding its scale: national, medium-scale law is detailing the routes to be 
taken at local level to reach the required destination.  Here too, reasonable 
steps must be taken to involve disabled people and others, including service 
providers. 383  NHS bodies have similar duties, 384 and both local authorities 
and NHS bodies have a duty to cooperate with each other and with other 
                                                 
379
 Independent Living Bill, Chapter 1 
380
 Ibid, s4 
381
 Ibid, s5: communication support; independent advocacy; equipment and adaptations; 
advice, information and support, including to manage individual budgets; an appropriate and 
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providers of independent living services in their area, including those in the voluntary and 
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‘relevant partners’ to promote independent living; 385   to prepare and 
implement an independent living strategy;386 and to enhance capacity among 
local service providers. 387    These provisions are shored up through 
inspection and enforcement by independent regulatory bodies.388 
 
National and local duties combine to try to ensure that the holistic services 
and conditions for independent living are in place, and that all concerned 
have a role in designing and developing them.  Whilst the duties rest firmly 
on national and local statutory organisations, the experiences of disabled 
people and others, and of voluntary and private sector providers are an 
integral and respected part of the project. 
 
In contrast to the ‘welfare’ approach of the Law Commission, on this map 
statutory duties are matched by individuals’ rights.  Service users have a right 
to independent living, including rights to information, advice and assistance, 
to independent advocacy, and to holistic, self-directed assessment of their 
requirements.  The language here is not about ‘needs’ and ‘entitlements’, but 
‘requirements’, ‘assistance’ and ‘support’.  The responsible authorities have a 
duty to ensure that disabled people are ‘empowered to define [their] own 
requirements’,389  assisted by independent advocate and/or communication 
worker if required.  An individual approaching assessment must be informed 
of their rights and referred appropriately.  Assessments must be carried out 
within a specified time, by suitably trained staff; 390  interim arrangements can 
be made in urgent situations.   
 
Once arrangements to be made have been identified, the authority has a 
duty to provide, and the individual has the right to choose how they receive 
their allocation of resources: in the form of a direct payment, indirect 
payment,391 or in kind from the relevant authority.  As seen above, the Bill 
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provides a long, non-exhaustive list of the possible kinds of arrangements 
that might be made392 and the outcomes to be secured.393     
 
Part 4 of the Inedpendent Living Bill deals with housing.  Here, no disabled 
person should be placed in ‘a care establishment or other institutional setting’ 
unless 
(a)  the disabled person wishes to be admitted to such a setting,  
(b)  such arrangements best meet the requirements of the disabled 
person (as opposed to being expedient on financial grounds), and  
(c)  the proposed placement is not due to absence of accessible or 
supported (or both) housing options or alternative independent living 
services in the community.’394   
 
Here we find a strong reiteration of the anti-dependence element of the 
philosophy of independent living, as well as direct reflection of CRPD Article 
19(a).     
 
Though mapping the same terrain, these two approaches to legislative 
reform project very different pictures of the world.  On the Law Commission 
map, power rests in the hands of the local authority: apart from the making of 
regulations, central government has little part to play.  The checklist to 
protect the individual’s ‘well-being’ and contribution to the assessment 
process is hedged around with exceptions; the service user may sometimes 
not even be consulted, and their agreement to the assessment is not 
required.  This map reflects social reality as it stands today: although some 
language has changed, established oppressive assumptions of dependency 
are not far away, New Labour’s (and disabled people’s) understandings of 
co-production have almost slipped out of view, and rights remain invisible.  
This is law as reflecting dominant discourse, containing and regulating the 
existing social order. 
 
                                                 
392
 Including ‘any other matter which would enable the disabled person to enjoy independent 
living…’ See p236 above and Independent Living Bill s15(3) 
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 Ibid, s21.  In addition, the Independent Living Bill covers Local Housing Allowance for 
additional bedrooms (s31); the allocation of housing by local authorities, including for those 
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On the Independent Living Bill map, central as well as local government take 
ownership of a hegemonic project in which all stakeholders are involved, and 
which seeks to bring about fundamental change.  If this Bill were fully 
implemented, a new system of social relations would be established: the 
holistic services and conditions for independent living would be in place, and 
power relations between service user and provider would everywhere be 
reframed.  Article 19, the means to exercise of all Convention rights, would 
be on its way to realisation, and the CRPD myth on its way towards 
imaginary.   As Santos explains,  
while regulation guarantees order in society as it exists in a given 
moment and place, emancipation is the aspiration for a good order in a 
good society in the future… the success of emancipatory struggles 
resides in their capacity to transform themselves into a new form of 
regulation, whereby good order becomes order.395   
 
On this occasion, the emancipatory Independent Living Bill failed to bring 
about that transformation. 
 
Next steps 
At the time of writing,396 the Coalition’s White Paper and Social Care Reform 
Bill have not been published.  However, some insight may be gained into the 
government’s possible approach through its Response to the Law 
Commission’s consultation. 397   Here, the Coalition recognises that 
expectations have changed.398  They want to see  
a situation where people are empowered to make decisions and take 
responsibility for their own health and well-being. The system must 
support and encourage people to make choices and in taking control of 
their lives.  Professionals need to work in collaboration with each other 
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 Department of Health, ‘The Government Response to Law Commission Consultation 
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and the individual to get the best possible outcomes…This is about 
doing things with people, not for, or to, them.399  
This promises well for a reframing of relations between individual service 
user and provider away from a paternalistic ‘welfare’ model.  However, as we 
saw in Chapter 6, those relations are less between local authority and service 
user as between individual consumer and a market of independent and 
voluntary sector providers.400   
The Government states categorically that it does not ‘anticipate that there will 
be rights to specific services stated in the statute’, 401  though it does support 
the inclusion of statutory principles, whose purpose, in its view, ‘is to assist 
decision-makers in exercising their functions, rather than to establish 
enforceable legal duties’. 402   While describing the Law Commission’s 
suggested principles as ‘a good starting point’, the response refrains from 
suggesting alternatives. 
Several respondents felt that the Law Commission’s consultation was far too 
narrow in scope.403  The Government agrees:  
[i]t is… important that any list [of services] is broadly defined and not set 
in such a way that constrains the flexibility and innovation that has, for 
instance, been seen in the way that direct payments have been used for 
support and services beyond the traditional view of what constitutes 
community care services.  We prefer a focus on outcomes and a broad 
list of activities that could deliver desired outcomes (choice, control, 
independent living, etc).404   
As we have seen, the Law Commission’s final report conforms to the 
traditional list, with the addition of ‘or any other assistance’.   It does reflect 
the government’s focus on outcomes, but the outcomes chosen do not 
include choice, control or independent living.   
                                                 
399 Ibid, 5  
400
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The Government wants assessment to identify not only ‘needs that can be 
met by social care services’, but also more holistic needs; 405 and supports 
co-produced self-assessment.406  Production of the care plan, too, should be  
couched in terms of co-production with the individual and/or their 
representative.  It is also important that other key agencies, such as the 
NHS, play their full part in care planning to ensure that resulting 
services are joined up from the outset.407   
Interestingly, the government wants to consider further whether personal 
budgets are the best way to ensure that local authorities maximise 
individuals’ autonomy, or whether to ‘take a broader approach’ 
(undefined).408 
It is also concerned about language, finding the term and concept of 
‘community care services’ rather outdated, and that the term ‘social care 
needs’ does not reflect people’s experience or encourage innovative 
responses.409  It suggests that ‘we have the opportunity to modernise the 
language we use’,410 but again without offering alternatives.   
The Government’s position, then, appears to sit somewhere between the 
Law Commission’s proposals and the Independent Living Bill.  Although it will 
not enact rights-based legislation, it is not content either with the Law 
Commission’s cautious endorsement of the status quo.  The ILB’s strategic 
approach to wholesale social change is rejected: both Government and Law 
Commission agree that no strategic planning provisions should be included in 
the statute,411 and top-down regulation is anathema.  The focus instead is on 
individual autonomy and freedom to make choices, in line with the Coalition’s 
consumerist discourse, and regulation by market forces.  As we found in the 
policy field in Chapter 6, current Government thinking emphasises individual 
autonomy and choice while distancing itself from the collective elements of 
independent living discourse, resulting in partial understanding of the 
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requirements of Article 19.   However, the Government’s response also 
incorporates – at individual though not at strategic level -  elements of New 
Labour’s (and disabled people’s) discourse of co-production; understandings 
of the holistic nature of independent living; and recognition of the need for a 
change in social relations: to ‘doing things with, not for, or to’ disabled 
people. 
Again, there is no mention of the CRPD or of Article 19 in the government’s 
response to the Law Commission – along with economic, social and cultural 
rights more generally, they remain invisible. 
 
Conclusion 
CRPD Article 4(1) requires States Parties to adopt all appropriate legislative 
measures to implement Convention rights, 412  and to modify or abolish 
existing laws and regulations that discriminate against disabled people.413  
Where the hybrid Article 19 right to live independently and be included in the 
community is concerned, ‘appropriate legislative measures’ to implement civil 
and political rights to autonomy and participation require equally appropriate 
measures to implement the economic, social and cultural rights required for 
their exercise.  Current legislation relating to the socio-economic elements of 
Article 19 remains founded not in ‘rights’ but in ‘welfare’ thinking.  It is highly 
complex, out-dated, framed in offensive language, and is potentially 
incompatible even with civil and political European Convention rights.414  If 
the requirements of Article 4(1) are to be met, existing legislation must be 
modified or abolished, and ‘appropriate legislative measures’ put in its place.   
Though responding to internal pressures rather than CRPD requirements, 
Coalition government plans to enact new legislation provide an opportunity 
for CRPD Article 4(1) requirements to be met.  Santos describes forms of law 
as ‘revolving doors through which different forms of power and knowledge 
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circulate’415  at once reflecting and creating different forms of social reality.  
We have seen in Chapter 6 that a variety of understandings of independent 
living circulate in the domestic field of meaning: from established and still 
dominant assumptions of dependency, through New Labour’s (and disabled 
people’s) understandings of co-production, to the Coalition government’s 
consumerist interpretation and disabled people’s rights-based perspectives. 
How the drafters of the Social Care Reform Bill map their terrain will not only 
reflect the discursive elements and projections they choose, but will also 
impact on the ability of international disability/human rights discourse to 
influence domestic systems of social relations, and on the lives of disabled 
people through the social realities they create. 
 
This Chapter has examined two contrasting approaches to legislative reform 
which might shape the new legislation.  The Law Commission map offers a 
‘neutral’ centre based on a qualified principle of ‘well-being’, narrow 
boundaries reflecting the status quo, and projections which consolidate and 
strengthen aspects of the existing ‘community care’ regime whilst leaving the 
underlying oppressive ‘welfare’ discourse unchanged.  The Independent 
Living Bill, by contrast, takes respect for and promotion of disabled people’s 
human rights as its central objective, sets emancipatory and inclusive 
boundaries, and applies projections which set in train a participatory 
hegemonic project to bring about fundamental and holistic change in line with 
the terms, purpose and ethos of the CRPD.  
 
The government itself appears to favour an approach between the two.  On 
the one hand, it focuses on individual autonomy, supporting a change in 
individual relations towards co-production and holistic assessment.  At the 
same time, it rules out both rights-based and strategic approaches, to re-
balance responsibility for ‘welfare’ outcomes from the State to the individual.  
As in the policy field, the side-lining of State responsibility threatens equity 
and collective reciprocity, hampering any opportunity for the CRPD drafters’ 
hegemonic project to establish new systems of social relations in line with 
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disability/human rights understandings.  Indeed, the ‘revolving door’ through 
which such forms of power and knowledge are designed to circulate - the 
CRPD itself, with Article 19 and the economic, social and cultural rights  
essential for its implementation - remains closed.416  Whilst Article 19 rights 
to individual autonomy and choice are likely to be strongly supported in the 
forthcoming Social Care Reform Bill, the economic, social and cultural rights 
required for their exercise appear set to remain invisible, leaving the 
domestic legal map essentially unchanged.  The legal dimension of domestic 
independent living discourse, like its field of meaning, thus faces the CRPD 
drafters’ hegemonic project with a partial and unstable base for bringing 
about its ‘deep reconstruction’ of the world.   
 
‘Welfare’ policy and law are delivered to individuals through the 
administrative justice system.  It is here that social relations are at their most 
dynamic, as disabled people experience the decisions and interactions that 
affect their daily lives.    Chapter 8 examines administrative decision-making 
relating to independent living services in England.  It explores the potential 
for administrative power relationships, systems and practices in this setting to 
oppress or to emancipate, reflecting and influencing the identities of all 
concerned.  
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Chapter 8 
Independent Living in England: 
Decision-making  
Introduction 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities demands 
paradigm change.  In this thesis, paradigm change is conceptualised as 
coming about through hegemonic articulation and re-articulation of discursive 
elements to dominate the field of meaning, to influence social structures and 
relationships, and to shape the identities of social actors.  Part 1 of the thesis 
explains that disability/human rights discourse set a new agenda at 
international level.  The resulting hegemonic formation – the CRPD - 
sediments a new myth: a re-description of the world and of the place of 
disabled people in it.  In this new world, impairment is no longer seen as 
aberration but as universal human variation, disabled people no longer as 
dependent welfare recipients but as equal and valued holders of all human 
rights.  For that re-description to be transformed from myth to imaginary, 
disability/human rights discourse must succeed in setting a new agenda not 
only at international level, but also in domestic settings.    
 
Part 2 of this thesis considers the capacity or otherwise of the CRPD to 
support such hegemony in England.  Chapter 5 has highlighted the 
resistance of successive UK governments to recognition of the equal, 
indivisible and interdependent nature of all human rights, and to incorporation 
of economic, social and cultural rights into UK domestic law.  This has raised 
the question of how, if at all, such imbalance in human rights protection might 
affect the capacity of the CRPD to influence paradigm change in England.  
The question is explored through examination of the understandings, 
systems and identities circulating in the domestic field.  Taking Article 19, the 
right to live independently and be included in the community as ‘barometer’, 
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Chapter 6 has examined understandings in the field of meaning, as 
evidenced through independent living policy in England.   Focussing on law 
as one method of articulating and regulating systems of social relations, 
Chapter 7 has investigated how the various understandings of independent 
living circulating in the policy arena might be encapsulated in new legislation.   
 
Understandings, structures and identities are dynamic and interwoven 
components of any discursive process: as understandings shape structures 
and practices, so the identities of social actors are both influenced by and 
reflected in those understandings and structures.  The subject positions of 
everyone involved in the legal and political developments discussed so far 
are as important to those developments as are the understandings and 
systems of social relations themselves.  As Quinn observes, paradigm 
change requires ‘socialisation’: that actors adopt new beliefs and behavioural 
patterns, thereby becoming socialised to align policy (law and practice) with 
Convention values to bring about meaningful change.1 Independent living law 
and policy are delivered to individuals through the administrative justice 
system: the world of the citizen meets that of the household and community.  
While focussing on administrative decision-making, this Chapter attempts to 
draw out and to illustrate some ways in which the identities of individuals may 
be influenced by, and themselves influence, the possibility of meaningful 
change. 
 
The English administrative justice system has been defined as comprising 
‘the administrative decisions by public authorities that affect individual 
citizens and the mechanisms available for the provision of redress’. 2   
Administrative decisions are made by a large and varied number of public 
bodies: government, arms-length agencies, local authorities, NHS bodies, 
housing providers, private contractors exercising public functions and more.  
There is an equivalent variety of administrative redress processes available, 
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depending on the issue and the public (or private) body involved, ranging 
from internal complaints and appeals, through mediation, Tribunals, judicial 
review and the Ombudsman.  As we have seen in Chapter 5, it is these 
‘welfare’ procedures on which the UK relies for delivery and enforcement of 
its international economic, social and cultural rights obligations.   
 
The services required to support independent living under Article 19 are 
accessed through local authority social services departments via a three-
stage assessment process. 3   As Jackson J has commented, ‘[t]he 
environment in which local authorities operate in the field of adult care is not 
legally coherent and bristles with intricate regulation.’ 4    Moreover, care 
provision is in transformation towards ‘personalisation’, though that concept 
remains open to a variety of expectations,5 interpretations and dislocations;6 
and legislation which might help to clarify interpretation is as yet7 undrafted.8  
It is at the level of administrative justice, however, that the vast majority of 
disabled people experience the decisions and interactions that affect their 
daily lives. As Beresford et al identify, the practice of people who work face to 
face with service users  
is at the heart of social care.  It is where the aims and ideologies of 
agencies and policy-makers intersect with the lives, rights, needs and 
desires of service users.9  
 
If the emancipatory values and purpose of the Convention can achieve 
hegemony here, maybe resistance, re-articulation and dislocation at national 
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level will present the CRPD drafters’ project with less of a challenge.  After 
all, as Eleanor Roosevelt remarked, human rights begin 
in small places, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot 
be seen on any map of the world.  Yet they are the world of the 
individual person: the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or college 
he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works.  Such are the 
places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal 
opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination.  Unless these rights 
have meaning here, they have little meaning anywhere…10 
 
Pleasence et al identify that 
[t]he problems to which the principles of civil law apply today are not 
abstract ‘legal problems.’  They are not problems familiar only to 
lawyers, or discussed only in tribunals and civil courts.  They are for the 
most part the problems of ‘everyday life’ – the problems people face as 
constituents of a broad civil society…  [T]hese problems today involve 
numerous issues of basic social well-being.11   
 
In England, people experiencing illness or impairment are more likely than 
others to experience the kinds of problems that bring them into contact with 
the administrative justice system. 12   They experience more of those 
problems, and they are more likely to experience the kinds of spiralling 
‘clusters’ of problems that can undermine their quality of life, their 
independence, 13  and, as Carol Thomas suggests, their psycho-emotional 
wellbeing.14   How the administrative system responds to those problems will 
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14
 Thomas C, Sociologies of Disability, ‘Impairment’ and Chronic Illness: Ideas in Disability 
Studies and Medical Sociology (Palgrave 2007) 
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therefore have a substantial impact, one way or another, on realisation of 
disabled people’s Article 19 right to independent living under the Convention, 
and thus on realisation of all Convention rights.  This Chapter examines 
administrative decision-making in the field of independent living, before 
Chapter 9 turns to systems for redress where decision-making is challenged. 
 
Decision-making 
The concept of ‘administrative justice’ has been theorised in a number of 
ways.   Davis15  focuses on the discretion afforded to administrative officials 
in their day-to-day work.  He finds that the Dicey/Hayek versions of the rule of 
law express an ideal, ‘but none is based upon a down-to-earth analysis of the 
practical problems with which modern governments are confronted’. 16  
Moreover, their version of the rule of law is violated all the time: ‘a startlingly 
high proportion of all official discretionary action pertaining to administration 
of justice is illegal or of doubtful legality’,17 and the courts have neither the 
power nor, possibly, the will to substitute their own decisions.  In this situation 
what counts, Davis says, is power, not authority.18   Questions will often be 
decided on the basis of considerations other than justice, such as facts, 
policy, resources, politics, or ethics.19  Such exercise of discretionary power 
by the decision-maker is not always undesirable: it may be indispensable for 
individualised justice, and provides an important source of creativeness in 
government and law – but only when properly used.   Davis suggests that 
unnecessary discretionary power should be eliminated, and that the 
remainder should be confined, structured, monitored and selectively enforced 
to improve the quality of justice. 
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For Mashaw,20 the ‘justice’ element of administrative justice encompasses 
‘those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for acceptability 
of its decisions.’ 21   He suggests three models of administrative justice: 
bureaucratic rationality, professional treatment and moral judgement. 22  
‘Bureaucratic rationality’ is defined in factual and technocratic terms: the 
individual adjudicator assesses real facts, which are then processed not 
through that decision-maker’s personal preferences or intuitions, but through 
a managerial system structured by rules and checking.23  The ‘professional 
treatment’ model similarly includes collection of information, but also includes 
intuition, personal examination and counselling.  This model is seen as a 
service to the client/patient, to improve his well-being, with the organisation 
providing a more lateral network, rather than a hierarchical command 
structure.24  Under Mashaw’s ‘moral judgement’ model, the legitimating value 
is ‘fairness’: the decision-maker offers a neutral promise of a full and equal 
opportunity to obtain one’s entitlements. 25   It is tension between these 
competing models that provides the dynamics of programme development. 26   
However, it is bureaucratic rationality which dominates, with professional 
treatment and moral judgement in supporting roles.27   For Mashaw, such 
dominance is a good thing: bureaucratic rationality is a promising form of 
administrative justice, as it permits the effective pursuit of collective ends 
without inordinately sacrificing individualistic or democratic ideals.28 
 
The contributions of Davis and Mashaw have been influential in 
administrative justice theory.29  More recently, Adler30 has built on Mashaw’s 
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work to identify six models of administrative justice, each of which is 
associated with different legitimating values, primary goals, organisational 
structures and cognitive techniques – see Table 2 below.  In addition to 
Mashaw’s bureaucratic, professional and legal31 models, Adler identifies the 
rise in managerial, consumerist and market models of administration.  Here, 
legitimating goals are, respectively, efficiency gains, consumer satisfaction or 
profit making; modes of decision-making emphasise managerial autonomy, 
consumer participation or matching supply to demand; and accountability 
centres on performance indicators, consumer charters or 
owners/shareholders. 32    We may see reflected here the policy re-
articulations discussed in Chapter 6, from post-war top-down bureaucracy33 
to increased professionalism 34  to ‘New Public Management’, 35  co-
production36 and the Coalition’s ‘thriving social market’.37 
 
Like Mashaw, Adler understands these models as competitive, with trade-offs 
between them likely to result in the dominance of one model, though not to 
the exclusion of others.38  He assumes that  
groups in particular settings produce discourses that reflect their 
interests, and that discursive struggles lie at the heart of power 
struggles that are endemic in every setting.39    
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Table 2 Six Normative Models of Administrative Justice 
 
 
Model 
 
Mode of 
Decision-
Making 
 
Legitimating 
Goal 
 
Mode of 
Accountability 
 
Characteristic 
Remedy 
 
Bureaucratic 
 
 
Applying rules 
 
Accuracy 
 
Hierarchical 
 
Administrative 
review 
 
Professional  
 
Applying 
knowledge 
 
Expertise 
 
Interpersonal 
 
Second opinion 
or complaint to 
a professional 
body 
 
Legal 
 
Asserting 
rights 
 
Legality 
 
Independent 
 
Appeal to a 
court or tribunal 
(public law) 
 
Managerial 
 
Managerial 
autonomy 
 
Efficiency 
gains 
 
Performance 
indicators 
 
Publicity 
 
Consumerist 
 
Consumer 
participation 
 
Consumer 
satisfaction 
 
Consumer 
Charters 
 
“Voice” and/or 
compensation 
through 
Consumer 
Charters 
 
Market 
 
Matching 
supply and 
demand 
 
Profit-making 
 
To owners or 
shareholders 
 
“Exit” and or 
court action 
(private law) 
From Adler, M, ‘A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice’40 
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Dynamics between models will thus reflect the concerns, bargaining 
strengths and interests of institutional actors as they seek to construct an 
optimum mix for each particular administrative activity.  Hegemonic outcomes 
are importantly shaped and structured by these internal dynamics, as well as 
by external and contextual factors, such as national policy, legislation or case 
law.   
 
Thus we find an administrative justice system where more or less 
discretionary power is exercised by individual decision-makers, controlled 
and validated through a variety of competing models (or discourses) of 
administrative justice, each with its own legitimating values, goals, structures 
and knowledges.  The dynamics within and between such discourses as they 
operate in any one organisation will reflect not only the external influences of 
law and policy, but also the subject positions and bargaining power of the 
various institutional actors, setting up complex constellations of interlegality.  
Adler suggests that, whilst these discursive struggles always exist, they are 
particularly evident in periods of flux,41  such as the current ‘transformation’ of 
delivery of adult social care. 
 
Into this mix, in the context of the administration of Article 19 services, 
come(s) the concept(s) of ‘personalisation’.   We have seen that one source42 
of ‘personalisation’ in English independent living policy was the 2005 Life 
Chances Report, which in turn drew its understandings not from the CRPD 
but from the influences of the British disabled people’s movement. 43  An 
essential element of that discourse is anti-dependence as response to 
oppression,44 with its concomitant elements of ‘choice’, ‘control’ and inclusion 
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as resistance to dependency and exclusion, 45  and its social model 
understanding of disability.  Here, in line with disability/human rights 
discourse, independent living demands a change in social relations, as key to 
holistic restructuring of attitudes and environment – respect for difference and 
a ‘deep reconstruction of our world’. 46    As we saw in Chapter 6, the 
introduction of ‘personalisation’ and ‘choice’ into public service delivery may 
potentially enable at least partial progress towards hegemonic expansion of 
the CRPD myth.  It also directly challenges existing models of administrative 
justice, the subject positions of those who identify with them, and existing 
power relationships between the ‘service user’ and those, such as social 
workers, who have previously been key players in administrative service 
decisions.47   
 
Clarke, McDermont and Newman examine what happens when the logic48 of 
administrative justice encounters public service reforms based on a 
commitment to consumer or user choice.49  They argue that  
[a]s an organisational logic for public services… choice generates a 
number of political, policy and practice difficulties, [imposing] a 
framework for decision-making which – at best - runs counter to the 
principles and normative framework of administrative justice.50    
 
‘Service users’ are repositioned from passive recipients to self-directing 
consumers who expect their wishes to be satisfied.  Choice  
re-imagines the power relations of public service – and the sorts of 
knowledge that matter.  Consumers may be intrinsically knowledgeable 
                                                                                                                                          
policy’ (2005) Paper delivered at Cash and Care Conference, Social Policy Research Unit, 
University of York, 12-13
th
 April 2005  
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 See for instance Morris, J, Independent Lives: Community care and disabled people 
(Macmillan 1993) 21: ‘… people who are disabled by society’s reaction to physical, 
intellectual and sensory impairment and to emotional distress have the right to assert control 
over their lives…’ 
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 Stein MA, ‘Disability Human Rights’ (2007) 95(1) California Law Review 75 
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 Stevens et al (2011) 262 
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 Clarke et al’s use of the word ‘logic’ aligns with Laclau’s ‘discourse’ and Santos’ 
‘constellation’: ‘logics’ are heterogeneous; they interact, producing tensions in particular 
sites; are translated through active, dynamic processes.  Each is intrinsically imperfect, its 
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from other logics which bring with them other meanings or inflections that may not be 
suppressed or silenced.  Ibid 29 
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 Clarke J, McDermont M and Newman J, ‘Delivering Choice and Administering Justice: 
Contested Logics of Public Services’ in Adler (2010) 
50
 Ibid 26 
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(knowing about their own needs/desires/wants) or may be helped to 
become ‘well informed’ consumers.  Consumers are the empowered 
agents of the consumer choice logic while ‘service providers’… are 
subordinated to their demands.51 
 
Such logics ‘attempt to govern ‘conduct’ – the conduct of particular sorts of 
actors and the practices of the organisational setting that these actors 
inhabit’ 52   - including the ‘discursive struggles’ between models of 
administrative justice and their supporters identified by Mashaw and Adler as 
endemic to the administrative justice system.     We may recall, for instance, 
the initial resistance on the part of many local authorities to implementation of 
Direct Payments legislation.53 
 
Where the logic of consumer choice meets the logic of administrative justice, 
Clarke et al argue that ‘the contestation takes on a distinctive quality because 
the two logics share a commitment to deliver fairness and equality.’ 54   
However, particularly where available resources are insufficient to meet 
demand - such as in adult social care - choice cannot provide the only 
governing logic: it must be mediated and managed in a public service 
context.   This may lead to frustration, mistrust and perceived injustice, 
requiring restoration of the promise of equity and fairness through the 
alternative logic(s) of administrative justice.  Note, for instance, the tensions 
between the expectations raised by the ADASS questionnaire described 
below, and the Resource Allocation System used to determine levels of 
individual support funding.  According to Clarke et al, the contested co-
existence of these two logics 
produces instabilities, dilemmas and tensions for those involved in 
public services…  because they carry very different conceptions of the 
public, of how it is to be served, and of how equality, equity, fairness or 
justice might be realised.55   
 
We will see evidence of these instabilities below. 
 
                                                 
51
 Ibid 27 
52
 Ibid 28 
53
 See Chapter 6 above 
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 Clarke et al (2010) 42 
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 Ibid 43 
 260 
 
Introduction of CRPD disability/human rights discourse into this already 
complex picture demands even more of those attempting to take realisation 
of ‘personalisation’ forward, as they seek to construct an optimum mix for this 
administrative activity.  As we have seen in Part 1 above, the equality and 
autonomy which are its goal are not simply constituted through their standard 
liberal understandings.   Instead, disability/human rights discourse 
fundamentally challenges traditional liberal understandings of equality and 
autonomy.  Hill’s seven conditions for the exercise of autonomy cannot be 
assumed for those who have been excluded from the human franchise; 
‘persons with disabilities… are not autonomous in the same way as persons 
without disabilities’;56  formal equality and the limited positive obligations of 
the human rights framework 57  are insufficient to bring about the ‘deep 
reconstruction’ of understandings, structures and identities required to 
overturn oppression.  Even if the tensions identified by Clarke et al were to 
be resolved, as Stevens et al identify,  
the focus on choice of service and resources is at best insufficient and 
potentially counter to the overall goals of independent living and 
increased autonomy and rights as expressed… by… the Independent 
Living Movement.58   
 
The CRPD and Article 19 demand more.59 Realisation of the Article 19 right 
to live independently and be included in the community requires recognition 
of the durable nature of the economic, social and cultural rights necessary for 
its exercise, and their equal implementation in practice.60 
The current ‘transformation’ in the administration of adult social care thus 
poses both opportunities and very substantial challenges for implementation 
of the emancipatory values and purpose of the Convention and Article 19.  
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 Mégret (2008a) 
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 O’Cinneide C, ‘Extracting Protection for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities from Human 
Rights Frameworks: Established Limits and New Possibilities’ in Arnandóttir OM and Quinn 
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 Stevens et al (2011) 
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 See Chapter 2 above; Market-based ‘choice’ alone is insufficient to protect disabled 
people’s ability to participate and to realise their full potential on an equal basis with others 
(ESCR Committee General Comment 5); it fails to implement values of solidarity (Quinn and 
Degener 2002), reciprocity, inclusion and institutional trust (Taylor-Gooby 2009) and it may 
not, in practice, provide equity (Stevens et al 2011) 
60
 See for instance Ms Bras Gomes, Chapter 5 above 
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Hegemonic expansion of disability/human rights discourse here will depend 
not only on national legal and political ownership - which, as we have seen is 
not yet secured 61 - but also on the interplay of competing discourse(s) in 
each local organisation, and on the understandings, identities and actions 
there of individual players – their ‘socialisation’62 to align their practice with 
meaningful, Convention-compliant change. 
 
So how might these discursive contestations translate into practice?  How do 
social service departments tasked with delivering ‘personalisation’ 
understand their role? What administrative systems have they put in place?  
And how do those understandings and systems impact on the exercise of 
discretionary power, on the identities and relationships of decision-makers 
and disabled service users, on the ‘socialisation’ of individual players?  To 
what extent, if any, is there potential for realisation here of the change in 
social relations required for expansion of the CRPD myth in Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s ‘small places’ where human rights begin?   
 
Some examples of the exercise of discretionary power, and its influences on 
systems and identities are considered next. 
 
Discretionary power 
In 2005, the Life Chances Report identified ‘a welfare system which assumes 
dependency’ – an assumption reflected in the culture of health and social 
care structures, and leading to inadequate, even disabling, responses to 
need. 63   The Report made recommendations which, although not rights-
based, fit closely with the aims of the drafters of the CRPD and with the 
terms of Article 19.64  Here, the desired administrative model shifts from 
                                                 
61
 See Chapters 5-7 above 
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 Quinn (2009) 
63
 See also Council for Social Care Inspection, ‘Lost to the System? The Impact of Fair 
Access to Care’, CSCI 2008;  Hurstfield, J, Parashar, U and Schofield, K. SQW Ltd, ‘The 
Costs and Benefits of Independent Living’ (Office for Disability Issues 2007) 
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 See Chapter 6 above.  The  Report recommended involving disabled people in 
development and implementation of policy and in delivery of services; ‘personalising’ 
responses to individual need; enabling control, sharing power and acknowledging disabled 
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bureaucratic/professional towards a more consumerist/participative logic 
which involves and empowers the service user.  Welfare policy developments 
since 2005 have adopted, and then re-articulated, elements of the Life 
Chances Report’s discourse with a view to ‘transforming’ the delivery of 
welfare services.   
 
In 2008, the New Labour government invested effort and money65 into its 
Transforming Social Care agenda. 66   Local councils and their regional 
networks were required to ‘make real and measurable progress to achieve 
the systems changes that will deliver the transformation of social care for 
their local populations’67 by 2011.  First reports on progress68  found that 
workforces were being restructured and new job roles created.  Some 
authorities transferred staff or functions to independent organisations, 
including user-led organisations.69  New academic qualifications were being 
developed and new assessment and resource allocation systems designed 
and piloted.  As we saw in Chapter 6, the Coalition government has built on 
and accelerated aspects of this ‘transformation’ process, whilst re-articulating 
it to fit a strongly individualised and market-oriented agenda.  At the time of 
writing, councils are ‘generally making good progress’ towards providing 
personal budgets for all who qualify by 2013;70 and the administrative model 
looks set to shift again, towards management of supply and demand and 
legitimation through market competition, and away from public accountability.   
 
However, particularly in a fluctuating political, legal and economic climate 
such as that described above, and in the absence of a stabilising legal 
                                                                                                                                          
people’s expertise; holistically addressing all aspects of the person’s life; and providing 
access to high quality information and advice, with a user-led organisation in each locality by 
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 Including increase in core Revenue Support Grant of 1% a year 2008-2011; Social Care 
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 See Department of Health ‘Transforming Adult Social Care’ LAC(DH)(2008)1; Department 
of Health ‘Transforming Adult Social Care’ LAC (DH)(2009) 1 
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 ADASS, ‘Putting People First: Workforce Study’, June 2010 
http://www.puttingpeoplefirst.org.uk/_library/Resources/Personalisation/Localmilestones/Putti
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 London Borough of Richmond upon Thames and Essex County Council 
70 ADASS Report on Personalisation Survey September 2011 http://www.adass.org.uk/  
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framework which includes economic, social and cultural rights, the 
understandings underlying these developments ‘remain potentially 
unchecked and of liability’. 71   The discursive struggles endemic to 
administrative justice organisations are particularly evident in periods of 
flux;72 and whilst the exercise of discretionary power may have positive and 
creative impact when properly used, 73  oppressive structures, such as a 
welfare system that assumes dependency, have capacity to maintain and 
reproduce themselves through ‘the myriad power relationships in everyday 
life’.74  It is here at administrative level that these power relationships come 
most sharply into focus, both within and between organisations, and between 
organisations and their service users. 
 
Consider, for instance, the conduct of the local authority in the Neary case.75  
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 were introduced in response to the European Court of Human Rights’ 
ruling in Bournewood,76 specifically to protect the right of individuals not to be 
arbitrarily detained, and to put in place rights to advocacy and review. 77  
Hillingdon LBC, however, used a sequence of DOLS for precisely opposite 
ends: to prevent Stephen Leary’s return home to the care of his father, and to 
extend his detention, potentially indefinitely.  Although the actions of the 
Council were recognised by the judge as arising from misjudgement rather 
than from lack of commitment,78  they read as a catalogue of oppressive 
misuse of administrative discretionary power.79   
 
In Neary, the judge recognised within the Council ‘a disorganised situation 
where nobody was truly in charge and it was consequently possible for 
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 Hodgkins SL, ‘Discoursing Disability: the Personal and Political Positioning of Disabled 
People in Talk and Textwork’, PhD Thesis, University of Northampton, September 2008 
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 Adler (2011) 338-9 
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 Davis (1969) 
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 Charlton (2000) Chapter 3 
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  London Borough of Hillingdon v Steven Neary, Mark Neary and the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP) 9 June 2011.  See Chapter 9 below for 
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78
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nobody to take responsibility’ 80   - a situation allowing wide scope for use or 
misuse of discretionary power, and which continued even when the Council’s 
actions were under strong and public challenge.  The authority’s true position 
was kept from Stephen Leary’s father from the start,81 its tactic being rather 
to manage and to resist his opposition.82   Hillingdon’s approach became 
increasingly adversarial: life-changing professional decisions were withheld 
from Mr Neary, possibly to avoid further challenge;83 evidence of Steven’s 
unhappiness was misinterpreted as justifying detention, his psychologist’s 
opinion curtailed,84 and the validity of his father’s data undermined;85 and Mr 
Neary’s objections were omitted from administrative reports.86   When court 
action became a possibility, ‘a clear decision was taken not to allow Mr Neary 
to demonstrate that he could look after Steven at home with support’; 87 
reinstatement of Steven’s support package was refused; 88  and a 
psychologist’s report unfavourable to Hillingdon’s position was deliberately 
withheld for six weeks.89  It took the Council a further two months to action its 
decision to make an ‘extraordinarily wide-ranging’90  application to the Court 
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of Protection.  On the eve of the hearing, the Council circulated a ‘sorry 
document, full of contentious and inaccurate information, and creating a 
particularly unfair and negative picture of Steven and his behaviour.’91 
 
Hillingdon’s response to the Neary family’s request for assistance illustrates 
the potential for oppressive structures to ‘maintain and reproduce themselves 
through the myriad power relationships in everyday life’. 92   As the judge 
describes, the Council  
acted as if it had the right to make decisions about Steven, and by a 
combination of turning a deaf ear and force majeure, it tried to wear 
down Mr Neary’s resistance, stretching its relationship with him almost 
to breaking point.93   
 
Of course, not all local authorities respond in this way.   Indeed, until the 
events leading to this judgement, the relationship between the Neary family 
and Hillingdon LBC had been positive, with the Council providing ‘extremely 
high levels of support… as part of a genuinely cooperative partnership with 
the family’.94  There are many examples of good practice from around the 
country where such partnerships succeed in producing emancipatory 
outcomes.95  However, it must also be borne in mind that, as Davis identifies, 
‘a startlingly high proportion of all official discretionary action pertaining to 
administration of justice is illegal or of doubtful legality’, 96  and that the 
number of judicial review challenges is infinitesimal compared with the scale 
of administrative decision-making as a whole.  Moreover, challenging such 
oppressive behaviour, particularly by those directly affected, requires high 
levels of articulateness, physical stamina and psycho-emotional strength: not 
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everyone has Mr Neary’s perseverance. 97   As Jackson J remarks, 
Hillingdon’s approach  
might actually have succeeded, with a lesser parent than Mr Neary 
giving up in the face of such official determination.  Had that happened, 
Steven would have faced a life in public care that he did not want and 
does not need98 
 
in direct contravention of CRPD Article 19. 
 
Examples of the kinds of individual and organisational understandings of 
power relationships described above can also be found sedimented in 
administrative decision-making systems. 
 
Systems99 
CRPD Article 19 services are accessed through a community care 
assessment.  Under s47 NHSCCA,100 each local authority has discretion, 
within national guidance,101 as to the manner in which assessment is carried 
out, how eligibility criteria are applied, and whether, and how much, service-
users will be charged.  Each is also free to design its own assessment 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire will guide the first component of the 
assessment process: the gathering of information about the person’s 
‘community care needs’ so that a decision on eligibility can be made.  It will 
thus shape assessment and resource allocation.  How the questionnaire is 
framed will also shape the assessment experience, both for the care 
assessor and for the potential service-user.  That experience, again, may be 
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emancipatory or oppressive, as illustrated by the following comparison 
between two assessment questionnaires produced in response to the 
‘personalisation’ agenda. 102 
 
The Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS) has designed 
a ‘Personal Needs Questionnaire’ which, it suggests, might be used by 
councils as a tool for resource allocation. 103   According to ADASS, this 
questionnaire is based on principles of partnership, citizenship, the social 
model of disability, and the respectful, dignified and simple use of language; 
it is designed to be outcome-focussed, fair, transparent and sustainable.104   
  
The front page explains that:  
The aim of the questionnaire is to give an indication of how much 
money you may need to live your life as an equal citizen and achieve 
some or all of these general outcomes: 
 
1. to stay healthy, safe and well 
2. to have the best possible quality of life, including life with 
other family members, if this is what you choose 
3. to participate as an active citizen, increasing independence 
where possible 
4. to have maximum choice and control 
5. to live your life safely, free from discrimination or harassment 
6. to achieve economic well-being and have access to work 
and/or benefits if you choose to do so 
7. to keep your personal dignity and be respected by others.  
 
Although there is no reference here to the CRPD, these outcomes mirror the 
Convention’s central principles of respect for dignity, autonomy and 
independence, of non-discrimination, participation and choice, as well as 
                                                 
102
 See Appendix 2 for full copies of both forms. 
103
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some key Convention articles,105 including socio-economic rights and Article 
19. 
 
The front page also seeks to reassure the person concerned that this 
questionnaire is only a guide - the next stage will be to plan the support 
needed together - and that all information will be kept confidential.  The 
individual is thus encouraged to take part in the assessment process without 
fear of undue risk.  This is followed by 12 pages of short statements, clearly 
set out under those ‘outcome’ headings, for the person and/or the assessor 
to tick as appropriate.  There are just 4 or 5 statements per page, with plenty 
of space around them.   They include, for instance, 
2.1.d I always need support to keep myself safe 
4.c I often need support to make decisions and organise my life 
5.e I want to be part of my community and regularly need a lot of 
support to do this 
6.b I need occasional support with my parenting role 
9.1.d I always need support to manage my actions 
 
An unpaid carer providing support is also asked about the effects of caring on 
their daily life, ranging from 
11.1.a It causes me no concern in my daily life 
to 
11.1.d It has a critical impact on my daily life and affects my health and 
well-being 
 
This form comes across as accessible, positive and empowering.  It focuses 
on the support required to achieve independence, choice and control – in line 
with CRPD Article 19 - and to respect dignity and social relationships.  
Production of the questionnaire is informed by understandings of 
emancipation, co-production and shared expertise, in line with Adler’s 
consumerist/participatory model of administration, and with CRPD 
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 Such as Article 15 freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse; Article 25 right to 
health; Article 23 respect for home and family; Article 27 work and employment; Article 28 
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requirements for the active involvement of disabled people in the decisions 
that relate to them.106   
 
However, this questionnaire is not mandatory, and is not being used by at 
least one of the Councils involved in piloting the new ‘personalised’ service 
delivery.  This Council has developed a form of its own, headed, in the old 
style, as a ‘Community Care Assessment’.  The form runs to 23 pages, under 
16 headings such as ‘memory’, ‘feelings and behaviour’, ‘social functioning’, 
‘cooking’, ‘eating’ and ‘housework’, and so on.  Under each heading, it asks 
the person (or assessor on their behalf) to tick the phrase that best describes 
themselves.  One page may include up to 15 questions to tick or not tick.  
They include, inter alia:107 
 
B2.a.3 I need assistance to make even the simplest day to day 
decisions and plans.  Decisions are consistently poor and unsafe & 
support is needed at all times. 
 
E3.a I have been found wandering about for no apparent reason, or, I 
can suddenly ‘bolt’ and run away 
 
E3.d I have been told my behaviour in public has been causing concern 
and is thought to be inappropriate 
 
E1.f People are concerned that I look unhappy or worried 
 
and   
E3.e I have been resisting care 
 
By signing the form, the individual gives consent to their information being 
‘shared with professionals in other organisations, such as health services, 
housing services or voluntary organisations’ – they thus abdicate control of 
that often very personal knowledge.108  The back page contains a table of 
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eligibility needs that clearly shows that the Council will only fund needs that 
come into the critical or substantial criteria bands. 
 
This questionnaire is strongly informed by managerial (efficiency) / 
professional (we know best), models of administrative justice.  It offers no 
acknowledgement of or respect for the individual’s autonomy or dignity, no 
understanding of or reference to equality, participation or choice.  Moreover, 
this form is based in medical model understandings of disability.  It focuses 
on individual functioning, or ‘mal-functioning’: the failure to function ‘normally’.  
In filling in the form, not only does the person have to accept that ‘dis-abled’, 
excluded, ‘less’ identity,109 they have to repeatedly argue in its favour in order 
to qualify for support.   Some of the questions require them to reinforce that 
experience by reporting the negative attitudes of others towards them.  This 
exclusionary process is further highlighted by the concept of ‘resisting care.’  
Here we see blatant evidence of the questionnaire-writer’s view of relations 
of power between service provider and individual: ‘care’ is not something 
which is mutually agreed between equals, but is determined and imposed by 
the service provider.  Resistance by the individual constitutes negative 
behaviour to be controlled and disciplined.110 
 
These two forms exemplify the potential both for emancipatory and for 
oppressive regulation within the ‘transformation’ process.  The first presents 
as accessible and positive, focusing on emancipatory outcomes; the second 
as threatening, complicated and confusing, focusing on oppressive ‘mal-
function’, exclusion and discipline of the individual.    Their comparison 
illustrates something of the opportunities and challenges for CRPD discourse 
as it enters the administrative justice field.  Different people or organisational 
cultures may internalise and translate the same requirements in widely 
differing ways, to widely differing effect.  The ‘socialisation’ of individuals 
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required for reconstruction of our world in line with CRPD understandings is 
not yet fully accomplished in this arena. 
 
Once completed, however, whichever form is used, it will be ‘marked’.  
Eligibility criteria will be applied. The ticks will be allotted a numerical value 
and entered into a computerised Resource Allocation System.  This will 
produce a percentage, which will be converted into a sum of money.  The 
calculation will vary from one local authority to another, in line with their 
resources.  So we return abruptly from the logic of choice and consumer 
participation to the logic of administrative justice, with its dominant discourse 
of bureaucratic justice, and its liberal understandings of equity and fairness in 
the allocation of limited resources.  As Clarke et al conclude, ‘something 
always stands between choice and outcome’,111  including, inevitably, the 
question of resources.112 
 
Questionnaires such as those described above form the basis for face-to-
face113 meetings between the care assessor and the individual.  How they 
are framed, the understandings they reflect, the structures they impose, and 
the relationships they engender are key to the assessment experience, for 
both participants.  How that interaction proceeds will both reflect and shape 
the identities of all concerned.114 
 
Identities 
We have seen how oppressive assumptions rooted in the discourse of 
‘normality’ exclude the dis-abled individual, negating their identity; and how 
individuals internalise and respond to such exclusion in various ways, from 
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denial to open confrontation, self-blame or resignation.115  Disability studies 
researchers have developed a range of analytical positions116 which ‘focus 
on the psychological anxieties and distresses caused by the social relations 
of disability.’117  Goodley’s review of this literature118 describes the emotional 
labour of being a ‘good crip’ in the face of ‘everyday, mundane and relentless 
examples of cultural and relational violence’119 – when the self has to act in 
ways that fit the expectations of others; and the experience of ‘corpsing’, or 
freezing,120 when those expectations demand too much.  Coping with the 
daily indignities of exclusion is described as ‘psychologically draining’;121 and 
living in a hostile world as potentially leading to profound consequences, with 
repression of the pain of rejection manifesting in emotional self-invalidation 
and, at worst, self-harm.122  Here, we re-join Carol Thomas’s identification of 
the 
negative social reaction to biological, cognitive, sensory or 
psychological difference [as] a form of social oppression involving… the 
socially engendered undermining of [disabled people’s] psycho-
emotional well-being.123   
 
In this context, the process of assessment may be anticipated or experienced 
by the disabled individual as just one more highly intrusive and 
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118
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119
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Pilkington http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/24/fiona-pilkington-police-misconduct-
proceedings  accessed 6.8.11 
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A case study of mental health service users discourses’ (2006) 62 Social Science and 
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psychologically draining demand required to meet the expectations of service 
providers, with all the range of psycho-emotional responses that entails. 
 
It is also an experience that is likely to recur.  The Life Chances Report 
describes the experience of a 24-year-old wheel chair user moving into her 
first flat and starting her new job. In the first year she has to deal with six 
different assessments: for a wheelchair, for support at work, for adaptations 
to her flat, for social services support and the Independent living Fund, and 
for her liability to make financial contributions towards these services. 124  
Each of these assessments, along with any relating to social security 
entitlement or health care, is likely to be periodically reviewed, and will be 
further reviewed if her circumstances change.  Moreover, it is likely that the 
practitioners conducting each assessment will change over time, requiring 
new explanations and new relationships to be made. In some circumstances, 
such as discharge from hospital, the assessment may be ‘multi-disciplinary’, 
requiring the individual to deal with a range of different professionals at once.  
In these situations, one or more bad experiences may feed into the 
individual’s anticipation of and response to the next assessment, potentially 
building into a highly oppressive overall effect on identity and psycho-social 
wellbeing.125  Current work on ‘personalisation’ recognises some of these 
concerns. 126  
                                                 
124Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, ‘Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People’, January 
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nd
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(eds) Transforming Lives: law and social process (Legal Services Commission 2007).  
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See also Strathclyde Centre for Disability Research and Glasgow Media Unit, in association 
with Inclusion London, ‘Bad News for Disabled People: How the newspapers are reporting 
disability’, University of Glasgow, 2011 
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Care Institute for Excellence, ‘Keeping  personal budgets personal: learning from the 
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Another contributing factor to the potentially oppressive nature of the 
assessment relationship is unlikely to disappear, however ‘properly’ the 
assessment is conducted:  the possibility that assessment or review will 
result in refusal, reduction or withdrawal of the assistance the individual 
requires for his or her daily functioning.  For instance, Mr Neary found 
relations with his social worker ‘quite awkward’ since the idea of review of 
Steven’s support package was brought up: 
this fear remained "tattooed on [his] brain" and from that point on he 
was worried about the consequences of rocking the boat. Indeed, when 
he finally put his foot down… and directly asked for Steven's return, 
Hillingdon's immediate response was that the necessary support 
package would not be made available.  Mr Neary became 
understandably emotional when describing how powerless he had 
felt.127 (original emphasis) 
 
 As Jackson, J comments, ‘the suggestion that [Hillingdon] might withdraw its 
support for Steven at home was always likely to have a chilling effect.’128  
Moreover, such ‘chilling’ responses may not be confined to dispute situations, 
but may come about in the process of ‘routine’ review.  For example, Direct 
Payments may be retrospectively terminated without warning pending review 
of assessment, apparently without consideration for the practical or 
psychological implications for the service user themselves, or for their legal 
responsibilities towards the personal assistants they employ.129 
  
Beresford et al examine a range of research which has highlighted the 
qualities service users value in their interactions with social workers. 130  
These include approachability, honesty, understanding, reliability, helpfulness 
and time to listen; respect, treating with equality and being non-judgemental.  
The ideal social worker would be ‘[s]omeone who doesn’t regard you as a 
                                                                                                                                          
experiences of older people, people with mental health problems and their carers’, SCIE 
Report 40, February 2011 
127
 Neary para 146 
128
 Ibid para 155(2) 
129
 Such as redundancy procedures and payments.  ‘Please can you call our office on the 
above number at your earliest convenience.  Your Direct Payments ended on 01/03/2011 
and this cannot be renewed until a review has taken place.’  Dated 3.3.11, received 6.3.11 
by individual employing several part-time personal assistants 
130
 Beresford et al (2011) Chapter  8; see also Glynn M, Beresford P, Bewley C, Banfield F, 
Butt J, Croft S, Pitt KD, Fleming J, Flynn R, Parmore C, Postle K and Turner M ‘Person-
centred Support: what service users and practitioners say’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
2008) 
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client, but treats you as an ordinary human being and trusts you.’ 131  
According to Parton,  
[t]he central message that comes across time and time again is that it is 
not the particular model or technique used by the social workers but the 
quality and value of the experience.132   
 
However, we have seen that the co-existence of logics of administrative 
justice with the logic of consumer choice ‘produces instabilities, dilemmas 
and tensions’ for providers too, with conflicting ‘conceptions of the public, of 
how it is to be served, and of how equality, equity, fairness or justice might be 
realised.’133   Mr Neary’s social worker was also finding their relationship 
difficult, for different reasons.  As the worker most closely involved in direct 
discussions with Mr Neary, she expressed her discomfort with Hillingdon’s 
deceit,134 and eventually gave Mr Neary ‘a glimpse, but not a full view’135  of 
the Council’s thinking,  provoking tensions with more senior staff, who 
considered that they were ‘acting legally on everyone’s behalf.’136   We see 
here evidence of Adler’s ‘discursive struggles’ 137  reflecting the bargaining 
strengths and interests of Hillingdon’s institutional actors.  Mr Neary 
complained to his MP of encountering ‘institutionalised defensive practice’, 
feeling ‘backed into a corner’ and ‘frozen out’.138  
 
Social care practitioners responding to Beresford et al’s ‘change and 
development’ inquiry into person-centred support 139  also identify tensions 
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 De Winter and Noom (2003), quoted in Beresford et al (2011) 226 
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 Parton N, ‘Reconsidering professional practice’ (date?) 33(1) British Journal Of Social 
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 Clarke et al (2010) 43 
134
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learning about empowering approaches to support with a wider network; and explore 
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radical reform for a better system of support.  See Beresford et al  (2011) 
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between ‘person-centred’, bureaucratic/managerial and professional 
demands.140  They cite increasing bureaucratisation and complexity, and its 
effect on the nature of their relationship with the individual being assessed;141 
and express frustration at having to meet conflicting ‘top-down’ indicators.142  
Beresford et al find that  
[p]reoccupation with bureaucratic targets and other measures often 
conflict with the implementation of person-centred support and 
preventative approaches.  Measures employed are frequently 
inconsistent with moves to more independent living.143   
 
Nevertheless, ‘[s]ome services and practitioners have sought to develop 
‘softer’ more sensitive measures consistent with independent living’, 144 
reflecting changes in service culture which benefit service users and support 
them to achieve better outcomes.145  Thus we see in some areas, and within 
some statutory organisations, potential social actor identification with, and 
adaptation of administrative systems towards, more CRPD-compatible 
understandings, though still with no explicit recognition of their basis in 
human rights law or principles. 
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One organisational space where these tensions are less evident is found in 
Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) or CILs. 146   DPOs have long 
campaigned for and developed alternative approaches to delivery of service 
provision which offer relations of respect, equality and empowerment in place 
of disrespect, discipline and oppression.147  Since 2005, such organisations 
have begun to be recognised by policy-makers as playing an important role 
in the realisation of independent living.148  Under current policies, they have 
been acknowledged as offering ‘very individualised solutions’, and provided 
with additional funding.149  Local authorities are encouraged to give them a 
‘fair and proportionate’ chance to compete in the ‘social market’.150  Indeed, 
some authorities have already transferred staff or functions to user-led 
organisations in a spirit of co-production.151 
 
There has always been tension for DPOs between acceptance of public 
sector152  contracts necessary for financial survival and the independence 
required for political activism; and between coalitions of disabled people who 
focus only on that activism and those who also provide services.153   Current 
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government policies thus present both opportunities and threats to this widely 
varied group of organisations.154  Barnes and Mercer identify that  
for organisations of disabled people, user involvement risks being 
turned into an exercise to give legitimacy to budget-driven service 
reforms rather than a means of recognising disabled people’s rights as 
service users.155   
 
Just as the expansion of CRPD-compatible understandings depends on 
disabled people maintaining their hold on the meaning of ‘independent living’, 
so also the extent to which DPOs succeed in countering this threat to their 
established role in the current economic and political climate will help to 
determine the application of those understandings in practice.  If CRPD 
Articles 4(3) and 33(3) are to be realised, they must undoubtedly play a 
central role. 
 
Conclusion 
Disabled people are more likely than others to experience the kinds of 
problems which bring them into contact with the administrative justice 
system.  How that system responds to those problems will have a substantial 
impact on their Article 19 rights, and therefore on realisation of all Convention 
rights.  This Chapter has examined administrative decision-making in the 
field of independent living.  It has considered varying models of 
administrative justice identified by Davies, Mashaw and Adler, with their 
modes of decision-making, legitimating goals and modes of accountability; 
and has explored how these varying models might respond to concepts of 
‘personalisation’ and choice.   A dynamic discursive field is revealed, 
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influenced not only by external and contextual factors, but also by the 
concerns, interests and bargaining strengths of institutional actors.  
Moreover, tensions between competing models are particularly evident in 
periods of flux, such as the current transformation of adult social care 
delivery.  Concepts of personalisation and choice challenge traditional power 
relationships, whilst potentially leading to frustration for service users and 
further instabilities and dilemmas for service providers.  It has been argued 
here that CRPD understandings demand more: that realisation of the Article 
19 right to live independently and be included in the community requires 
recognition of the durable nature of the economic, social and cultural rights 
necessary for its exercise, and their equal implementation in practice.156  As 
O’Grady et al conclude, ‘a systematic change in direction at the wider, 
societal, level is… required.’ 157 
 
We have seen in previous Chapters that the CRPD-drafters’ rights-based 
understandings of independent living have encountered antagonism, re-
articulation, dislocation and regression in the domestic field of meaning; that 
the legal dimension of independent living discourse in England provides a 
partial and unstable base for bringing about its ‘deep reconstruction’ of the 
world; and that the CRPD itself, Article 19 and the economic, social and 
cultural rights essential for their realisation remain largely invisible in 
domestic discourse.   Administrative decision-makers function within these 
discursive surroundings, as well as within their own institutional settings and 
subject positions.  Nevertheless, if emancipatory CRPD discourse is to 
expand its hegemony in the ‘small places’ where human rights begin,158 it 
must bring about the ‘socialisation’ of those individual players and institutions 
to align their practice with meaningful, Convention-compliant change.   Only 
then will the administrative justice system offer a fertile space for expansion 
of the Convention-drafters’ project.  As Leandro Despouy recognised in 1993,  
[i]t might appear elementary to point out that persons with disabilities 
are human beings – as human as, and usually even more human than, 
the rest.  The daily effort to overcome impediments and the 
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discriminatory treatment they regularly receive usually provides them 
with special personality features, the most obvious and common of 
which are integrity, perseverance and a deep spirit of comprehension 
and patience in the face of a lack of understanding and intolerance.  
However, this last feature should not lead us to overlook the fact that as 
subjects of law they enjoy all the legal attributes inherent in human 
beings and hold specific rights in addition.159   
 
Individuals working in administrative decision-making exercise discretionary 
power. The various models of administrative justice discussed above seek to 
structure the use of that power and to ‘provide arguments for the 
acceptability’160 of their decisions.   Examination of some examples of the 
exercise of discretionary power helps to gauge the extent of ‘socialisation’ or 
otherwise of institutions and individual players in line with the emancipatory 
purpose of the Convention.   The Neary case has served to illustrate the 
potential for oppressive institutional power to maintain and reproduce itself 
through ‘the myriad power relationships of everyday life’, in direct 
contravention of Article 19.  Comparison of two assessment questionnaires 
has demonstrated the potential for both emancipatory and oppressive 
systems within the ‘transformation’ process, tempered always through the 
bureaucratic logic of resource allocation.  Examination of the process of 
assessment has traced potential for both oppressive and emancipatory 
experiences influencing identities of both service users and practitioners.   
 
These brief excursions show that, despite examples of good practice, the 
‘socialisation’ of institutions and individuals required for realisation of CRPD 
understandings is not yet accomplished in the field of administrative decision-
making.  The ‘small places’, where disabled people experience the 
interactions that affect their daily lives, continue to offer very substantial 
challenges for implementation of the emancipatory values of the Convention 
and Article 19.   
 
Finally, in line with CRPD Article 4(3) and 33(3), it has been argued that 
DPOs can offer their well-established expertise in providing alternative, 
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Convention-compliant, approaches to the design and delivery of services to 
resolve some of the tensions identified above and help to take the CRPD-
drafters’ hegemonic project forward. 
 
So far, Part 2 of the thesis has shown that, in the absence from domestic 
discourse of economic, social and cultural rights, CRPD understandings of 
independent living face re-articulation, dislocation and regression; legislative 
developments promise, at best, a partial and unstable base for the 
development of compatible systems of social relations; and administrative 
decision-making continues to oppress many of those it purports to serve.  
The development of CRPD-compatible understandings and systems, and the 
‘socialisation’ of organisations and individuals in line with Convention values 
are thus frustrated.    Chapter 10 will offer some recommendations to 
government on how to address these mis- and partial understandings of the 
law and its consequent mis- and partial implementation.  First, however, 
Chapter 9 considers whether existing redress systems might help to redefine 
the terms of the debate.   As the economic, social and cultural rights set out 
in Article 19 are understood in England not as rights, but as ‘welfare 
entitlements’ in the gift – or denial – of the State, their enforcement lies 
through a range of political and administrative channels.161   Potential for 
these systems to influence the domestic debate towards a new, Convention-
compatible, agenda is explored next.   
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Chapter 9 
Independent Living in England: 
Redress 
 
Introduction 
To recapitulate, States Parties are the primary duty-holders under the CRPD.  
They deliver their international law obligations through domestic policy, law 
and administration.  How they do so will be shaped by the constellations of 
power and knowledge already circulating in their national arenas.  Whether, 
or to what extent, the hegemonic project of the CRPD drafters succeeds in 
setting a new agenda will therefore depend on those domestic discourses in 
each ratifying State. 
 
Part 2 of this thesis has found that successive UK governments have 
rejected the international discourse of economic, social and cultural rights, 
choosing instead to re-articulate them as welfare entitlements. This failure to 
make the transition in understanding from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ has put in 
question domestic reception of the disability/human rights myth and thus 
implementation of the CRPD.  Taking Article 19 as case study, Chapters 6 to 
8 have found that, without the protection of an economic, social and cultural 
rights framework, understandings of independent living in England face re-
articulation and dislocation resulting in threat of regression; welfare-based 
legislation provides a partial and unstable base for reconstruction; and the 
administrative decision-making process through which policy and law are 
delivered to individuals continues, despite pockets of good practice, to 
oppress many of those it purports to serve.  In this national arena, therefore, 
the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project faces considerable challenge to its 
mission to bring about the ‘deep reconstruction’ required by the Convention. 
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The administrative justice system comprises not only decision-making, but 
also ‘the mechanisms available for the provision of redress.’1  Despite the UN 
Committee’s disapproval, it is on these procedures that the UK relies for 
enforcement of its international economic, social and cultural rights 
obligations.2  This Chapter explores the capacity of such mechanisms to 
influence policy, law and practice towards more CRPD-compatible 
understandings. 
 
An individual dissatisfied with a local authority social services decision has a 
number of possible options for seeking redress.3  They are: 
 the local authority complaints procedure 
 their local councillor or MP 
 the default powers of the Secretary of State 
 complaint to the Local Government Ombudsman 
 judicial review 
 action for damages 
 
Action for damages is likely to apply only in a small number of specific cases, 
and is unlikely to be successful.4  The default powers of the Secretary of 
State5 have never been used, although, as Disability Alliance suggests, a 
letter to the Department of Health alleging that the local authority has failed to 
comply with its statutory community care duties may prompt that authority to 
review its actions.6  A similar response may result from contact with the local 
councillor or MP, or from threat of judicial review or complaint to the 
Ombudsman.  Formal complaints, however, are generally channelled through 
local authority complaints procedures: it is normally necessary to exhaust this 
                                                 
1
 Nuffield 2007 
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 See Chapter 5 above 
3
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rd
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6
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internal process before complaining to the Ombudsman or applying for 
judicial review.  While human rights issues may be raised at any level, 7 
legally binding human rights decisions in this field are confined to judicial 
review.8  
 
This Chapter explores the contributions of local authority complaints 
procedures, judicial review, and the Local Government (LGO) and 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsmen (PHSO) to potential 
development of more CRPD-compatible domestic discourse. 
 
Local Authority Complaints 
Public sector complaints procedures came about, at least in part, 9  in 
response to the ‘Citizens’ Charter’ discourse of the early 1990s.  Individuals 
were seen as entitled to explanations, or apologies, when services went 
wrong, and service providers were expected to take action to put problems 
right.  In Adler’s terms,10 complaints draw on a ‘co-production/consumerist’ 
approach, to the extent that they involve, and give ‘voice’ to, the service user, 
and a ‘bureaucratic/managerial’ approach, as their ostensible aim is to 
improve service quality: they do not provide an opportunity to appeal against 
the merits of a local authority decision.  However, research has consistently 
suggested that even these limited administrative objectives have not been 
effectively met. 
 
Most people who are dissatisfied with decisions do not make a complaint, 
even if they want to.11  There are many reasons for this, identified, inter alia, 
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by Genn,12 Pleasence et al,13 and others.14  Users of social services are not 
‘willing consumers’ who can ‘exit’ if dissatisfied; they may have no access to 
information 15  or to independent advice or advocacy; 16  they may fear 
victimisation, or reduction or withdrawal of services; they may feel that there 
is no point in making complaints; 17  or may simply be too exhausted, 
discouraged or ‘psychologically drained’ 18  – or, in the worst cases, 
intimidated19 – to do so.  Moreover, the care provider or local authority may 
simply fail to respond, effectively blocking the complaint from entering the 
system.20   
 
The four research studies discussed by Preston-Shoot find that people rarely 
feel sufficiently ‘safe and encouraged’ to exercise their ‘right’ to complain.21  
Indeed, one might surmise that the more serious the potential complaint, the 
less likely the complainant may be to feel ‘safe and encouraged’ to complain.  
On the other hand, a minority feel empowered by using administrative 
redress procedures to ‘stand up for themselves’ or their relatives, 22 
                                                                                                                                          
health and social care’, HC835, session 2007-2008, 10 October 2008, Executive Summary, 
para 7 
12
 Genn (1999) 
13
 Pleasence et al (2006); O’Grady et al (2004) 
14
 Hurstfield et al (2004); Runswick-Cole (2007); Wood D ‘Acting on complaints about mental 
health service: implications of power imbalances’ (1996) 10(3) Journal of Management in 
Medicine 31; Sbaraini S and Carpenter J, ‘Barriers to complaints: a survey of mental health 
service users’ (1996) 10(6) Journal of Management in Medicine 36; Adler M and Gulland J, 
‘Tribunal Users’ Experiences, Perceptions and Expectations: a literature review’ (Council on 
Tribunals 2003) 
15
 ‘There was a strong sense in all four [focus] groups that people did not have enough 
information about what they might expect to receive and that this lack of knowledge limited 
their ability to complain’ Gulland J, ’Complaining, Appealing or Just Getting It Sorted Out’: 
complaints procedure for community care service users’, PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 2007, 301.  Most councils now have information about their complaints 
procedures online, though some service users may not have access to the internet 
16
 See for instance Lord Chancellor’s Department and Law Centres Federation ‘Legal and 
Advice Services: a Pathway Out of Social Exclusion’ (2001); Gee A and Holdsworth M (ed) 
‘Regeneration and Renewal: a good practice guide for London advice agencies’ (London 
Advice Services Alliance 2002); Benson/Waterhouse Consultancy with DIAL Waltham 
Forest, ‘Hidden Benefits: the value of DIAL advice work’ (DIAL UK 2003) 
17
 Gulland thesis (2007) 301 
18
 See Chapter 8 above;  and Goodley (2011) 
19
 Such as in situations of abuse, such as Winterbourne View: BBC Panorama ‘Undercover 
Care: the Abuse Exposed’ BBC1, Winterbourne View, Tues May 31 2011 
20
 Local Government Ombudsman, Office for Public Management, ‘Complaints about 
privately funded and arranged adult social care’ (2011) Executive Summary 3 
21
 Preston-Shoot (2001) 703 
22
 See, in the context of Special Education Needs Tribunals, Runswick-Cole (2007): ‘Despite 
the many negative aspects of pursuing a claim to the Tribunal, a minority of parents find the 
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demonstrating a social antagonistic challenge to the oppressive effect of 
negative experiences on identity and psycho-emotional wellbeing identified 
by Thomas.23  
 
Issues giving rise to complaints are many and varied.  LGO research 24 
identifies, inter alia, poor standards and quality of care, lack of continuity of 
care, staffing issues, poor communication with users or relatives, nutrition or 
medication, missing personal possessions and financial disputes.  This 
research particularly highlights problems with the conduct and actions of local 
authorities in relation to assessment for Direct Payments.25 
 
Once complaints are made, understandings vary as to their purpose.  
Complainant respondents to Gulland’s 2007 doctoral research study 26 
understood the act of complaining in different ways, partly according to what 
they were complaining about.  As noted above, the complaints procedure is 
not an appeal process: there is no formal right of appeal against the 
substance of a social services decision.  Nevertheless, some respondents 
thought of their complaints in ‘legal’ terms, as appeals against decisions.27   
Some wanted independent, adversarial adjudication. 28   Others saw 
                                                                                                                                          
process empowering, particularly in developing their advocacy skills. This sometimes has 
positive outcomes for the parents as they become more confident and pursue different life 
experiences, including career changes and advocating for others.’  See also, in the context 
of Employment Tribunals,  Hurstfield et al (2004); and in the context of Tribunals more 
generally, Adler and Gulland (2003) 
23
 See Thomas (2007), Goodley (2011) and Chapter 1 above 
24
 Local Government Ombudsman ‘Complaints about privately funded and arranged adult 
social care’ (2011) 2 
25
 Echoing again resistance within some organisations to the logic of choice and its attendant 
change in power relations.  See Chapters 6 and 8 above 
26
 Gulland thesis (2007) exploring  the earlier complaints procedure in Scotland.  See also 
Gulland J, ‘Complaints Procedures and Ombudsmen’ in Adler M, ed, Administrative Justice 
in Context (Hart 2010) 
27
 ‘A lot of people would just think ‘That’s it, they’ve made a decision you can’t do anything 
about it’.  They don’t know that they can appeal.  I told them right away that I was going to 
appeal and I did.’  Respondent, Gulland thesis (2007) 297 
28‘I think there should be somebody appointed who’s not beholden to social work in any 
shape or form…  Their job is to defend people against the state if you like. … I don’t know of 
anybody who will fight for people’s rights when the home help doesn’t do her job.’ Gulland 
ibid 296, quoting respondent Ian Grant; prior to their abolition  with introduction of the 2009 
Regulations, efforts had been made to address the lack of independence of social services 
complaints panels, including by moving their role to the then independent regulating body, 
the Commission for Social Care Inspection. See Health and Social Care (Community Health 
and Standards) Act 2003 for enabling provisions.  See also Williams C and Ferris K, 
‘Proposals to Transfer Complaints Panels to the Commission for Social Care Inspection – 
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complaining as a way of making their ‘voice’ heard – a more ‘consumerist’ 
understanding.29  And some, at least in part, saw it as an attempt to get the 
local authority to improve services for others – a more ‘managerial’ stance. 30  
Ferris31 confirms these mixed understandings, adding as motivation the wish 
to have a member of staff disciplined.  
 
By contrast, service managers or complaints officers taking part in both 
studies tended to focus on the ‘consumerist’ task of ensuring that the 
complainant’s ‘voice’ was heard.32  They were less concerned with enforcing 
rights, and, contrary to the expectations of complainants, they did not see the 
complaints procedure as an effective management tool.33  Gulland concludes 
that  
[t]his disjunction between the views of complainants, who expect their 
complaints to be fed into management decision making, and staff, who 
do not, creates problems for the effectiveness of the procedure… The 
differences in perceptions between complainants and staff as to the 
purpose of the procedure may exacerbate people’s sense of injustice.34    
 
                                                                                                                                          
Throwing the Baby out with the Bath Water?’ (2005) 27 Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 199 
29
 ‘Then this was ongoing and nobody was doing a thing, nobody was listening.  So I thought 
‘That’s it then’ and then I complained.’ Gulland thesis (2007) 289; As this quote suggests, 
complaints often have a ‘history’, involving long-term relationships between service user and 
provider and a series of incidents that culminate in a complaint: Simons K,  I’m Not 
Complaining,  But… Complaints procedures in social services departments’ (Joseph  
Rowntree Foundation 1995) 
30
 ‘If something needs sorted then I’ll do it.  It’s not just for me – there’s other people out 
there in the same position as I was in – so it’s for other people out there.’  Gulland thesis 
(2007) 292: see also Sullivan J in Bernard (discussed below) at para 39. 
31
 Ferris K, ‘An analysis of the complaints review panel under part III of the Children Act 1989 
and NHS & Community Care Act 1990.’ PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 2006, 250 
32
 ‘While the DCO cannot guarantee that the complainant will be satisfied with the actual 
outcome, they… can certainly try and make the process itself a satisfactory one.’ Ferris 
thesis (2006) 249 
33
 ‘They felt that complaints were too few in number to be significant, and that if complaints 
raised a more general problem, they would already be aware of it.’ Gulland thesis (2007) 
315; ‘There are clearly times when redress will be needed, but these can be reduced by 
learning from complaints and improving performance so that problems are tackled in the long 
term.  The problem is that some Local Authority Areas are not doing this, as they are 
resolving issues on an individual basis and not tackling the underlying causes. There is a 
danger that by having a complaints procedure they may inadvertently become complacent, 
thinking that they are doing all they can.’  Ferris thesis (2006) 266.  See also Phelps L and 
Williams A, ‘The Pain of Complaining: CAB ICAS Evidence of the NHS Complaints 
Procedure’ (Heswell Citizens Advice Bureau 2005); Centre for Public Scrutiny and Local 
Government Ombudsman, ‘Aiming for the Best: using lessons from complaints to improve 
public services’, July 2011, http://www.lgo.org.uk/publications/advice-and-guidance#focus  
accessed 15.1.12 
34
 Gulland thesis (2007) 315-6 
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Ferris agrees that  
[i]It is therefore of the utmost importance that… the DCO [Designated 
Complaints Officer] clarify the outcomes that the complainant is hoping 
to achieve.35 
 
Perhaps partly because expectations are so confused and potentially 
conflicting, and partly because of the instabilities and tensions underlying 
power relationships, 36  complaints can also exacerbate relations between 
complainant and provider.  While some complainants appear to see the 
social services department as a ‘mysterious bureaucracy’ making arbitrary 
decisions,37 they may themselves be seen negatively by managers as ‘serial 
complainers… who are looking to take it as far as they can, for a range of 
reasons.’38  These tensions can sometimes give rise to overtly oppressive 
behaviour, such as transfer of ‘blame’ to the complainant.39  When combined 
with difficulties for the complainant in navigating the complaints process,40 
and the frequent lack of availability of independent advice and advocacy,41 
such defensive response can defeat all but the most articulate and 
persistent.42  As LGO research confirms,  
[m]aking a complaint can be a difficult and daunting experience, which 
impacts on complainants’ emotions, health and wellbeing.  Some 
complaints [take] years to resolve.43   
 
                                                 
35
 Ferris thesis (2006) 249 
36
 See Clarke et al, Chapter 8 above 
37
 Gulland thesis 301 
38
 Social work manager respondent to Gulland thesis, 303 
39
 See National Audit Office (2008) para 11; Local Government Ombudsman ‘Complaints 
about privately funded and arranged adult social care’ (2011) 4: ‘The research identified 
many examples of poor practice in complaints handling.  These can be summarised as: 
failure to ‘take on’ the complaint; poor communication with the complainant; complainant 
experiencing negative repercussions as a result of complaining; failure to investigate/weak 
investigation; shunting of responsibility/lack of liaison with more than one organisation 
involved; lack of timescale/delays; lack of follow up/implementation of agreed actions 
resulting from complaint’ 
40
 National Audit Office (2008), Executive Summary, para 8; Abraham A, ‘The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman and Administrative Justice: shaping the next 50 years’,  Tom Sargant lecture 
(2011), http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/media-centre/ombudsmans-
speeches/2011/the-parliamentary-ombudsman-and-administrative-justice-shaping-the-next-
50-years2/1   accessed 11.3.12    
41
 National Audit Office (2008) supra para 9 
42
 Birkinshaw P, ‘Grievances, Remedies and the State – Revisited and Re-appraised’ in 
Adler M (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010) 357; House of Commons Select 
Committee on Public Administration, When Citizens Complain, Fifth Report session 2007-8, 
HC409; and Government  response, HC997 
43
 Local Government Ombudsman (2011) Executive Summary 5 
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Many complaints are successfully resolved through internal complaints 
procedures.44  However, there are no data on how many people withdraw 
from the complaints process despite being dissatisfied with the response they 
have received.45 
 
Local authority and health service complaints procedures were combined 
under new Regulations in 2009. 46   Under these provisions, each local 
authority must designate a ‘responsible person’ 47  to ensure statutory 
compliance and remedial action; and a ‘complaints manager’ to manage and 
promote the complaints process.48  Anyone receiving or affected by services 
from the authority 49  may make a complaint, 50  orally, in writing or 
electronically, 51   within a 12-month time limit. 52   The authority must 
acknowledge the complaint,53 and offer to discuss process and timescales 
with the complainant.54  The complaint must be investigated ‘speedily and 
efficiently’, keeping the complainant informed of progress.  On completion, a 
written response, signed by the ‘responsible person’, and explaining 
investigation, conclusions and any remedial action 55  must be sent to the 
                                                 
44
 For instance,  Sheffield City Council’s ‘Annual Report of complaints received about Adult 
Social Services’ for 2009-10 reports that 211 adult social care complaints were received 
during the year, of which 5 were withdrawn, 116 remained live, 1 progressed to review stage 
and 8 were investigated externally.  ‘Of the 90 concluded complaints: 47% had identified 
clear service failures which were remedied; 40% were resolved through negotiation with the 
customer; and 9% resulted in no action being necessary.’  63% of complainants reported 
that ‘the response fully addressed the complaint’. ibid 4-5 
45
 National Audit Office (2008) supra para 14; see also Gulland J ‘Independence in 
complaints procedures: lessons from community care’ (2009) 31(1) Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law, 59; Gulland J ‘Taking complaints seriously: the role of informality in 
complaints about public services’ (2011) 10(4) Social Policy and Society  
46
 Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) 
Regulations 2009, SI 2009/309; see also Department of Health ‘Listening, Responding, 
Improving: a guide to better customer care’ Gateway ref 11215, 26 Feb 2009; Gulland J 
‘Second-tier reviews of complaints in health and social care’ (2006) 14(3) Health and Social 
Care 206 
47
 In the case of a local authority, this should be the Chief Executive Officer of the authority: 
regulation 4(4)(a) 
48
 Regulation 4(1) and Regulation 16 
49
 Or their representative, for instance for a child or person who lacks capacity under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 
50
 Regulation 5 
51
 Regulation 13(1) 
52
 Regulation 12 
53
 Within 3 working days 
54
 Regulation 13(7) 
55
 Regulation 14 
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complainant, who must also be advised of their right to complain further to 
the Local Government or Health Service Ombudsman.56    
 
These Regulations streamline earlier separate health and local authority 
provisions, removing both an initial ‘local resolution’ stage and a third ‘panel 
hearing’ stage57 before completion of the internal process.58  On the face of 
the Regulations, they thus remove any statutory requirement for initial 
mediation, or for more ‘legal’ resolution before a Panel,59 leaving a purely 
‘bureaucratic’ exercise.  However, in practice, at least some local 
authorities60 have used the new Regulations to work more closely with their 
local health counterparts, and to introduce new ways of working that seek to 
‘make a complaint simpler, more user-friendly and far more responsive to 
people’s needs’.61  Approached in this way, the new provisions potentially 
allow for increased flexibility in how each complaint will be handled,62 and for 
a more supportive and ‘outcome-focussed’ process for the complainant, 
including through informal advocacy and mediation, and/or, if appropriate, the 
possibility of formal adjudication where other methods have failed.63      
 
                                                 
56
 Depending on the focus of the complaint.  See for instance the role of the Health Service 
Ombudsman in relation to health/local authority responsibilities following Coughlan – 
Chapter 8 above.   There are various provisions for co-operation and referral between 
authorities (Regulations  9, 10,11) and complaints must be recorded, monitored, and 
included in annual reports ( Regulations 17 and 18).  There is no requirement to inform the 
complainant of their right to apply for Judicial Review. 
57
 For details, see Williams C, Ferris K, Complaints Panels in Social Care (Russell House 
Publishing 2010).  Following introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, there were 
concerns that Complaints Panels were insufficiently independent of local authorities to 
comply with Article 6 ECHR.  Plans were made, later shelved, to transfer responsibility for 
such Panels to the then regulator, the Commission Social Care Inspection.  For discussion, 
see Williams C and Ferris K, ‘Proposals to Transfer Complaints Panels to the Commission 
for Social Care Inspection – Throwing the Baby out with the Bath Water?’ (2005) 27 Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law 199 
58
 Local Authority Social Services Complaints (England) Regulations 2006 
59
 For discussion of the history of social services complaints procedures, see Ferris thesis 
(2006) Chapters 1 and 9   
60
 Including Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council: Directorate of Adults and 
Communities, ‘Complaint and Compliments’, Annual Report 2010-2011, available from 
DMBC Complaints Manager www.doncaster.gov.uk  
61
 Ibid 3. These may include provision of information in accessible formats, support for 
service users in making a complaint, mandatory training for front-line staff and managers, 
and the development of systems for ‘capturing’ both complaints and compliments to 
encourage a ‘listening, learning culture’: ibid 4 
62
 Previous regulations set  statutory time limits on each stage of the process: these no 
longer apply, with timescales negotiated with each complainant 
63
 See for example Doncaster MBC, supra, Appendix 1 Complaints Procedure 
 291 
 
However, not all local authorities respond in the same way to such changes64 
- how they do so will depend on the discursive struggles and identities of 
social actors in each institution65 - and mechanisms for sharing learning from 
complaints between institutions, so that the same mistakes are not repeated 
again and again, are insufficient.66   Moreover, as Gulland describes,  
[p]olicy reviews of complaints procedures rarely address head on the 
issue of power relations between public services and ‘service users’…  
in the field of social care, the power relationships and expectations of 
both service users and staff are not simple….67   
 
A complaint may relate not to a one-off event, but to a long-term problematic 
relationship between the complainant and the service provider; may be part 
of a wider range of interlinked problems experienced by the complainant;68 
and/or may change over time, as new issues emerge or new events take 
place. 69  It may in turn be met by a closed, reactive, defensive response 
which resists real and sustained learning. 70   To what extent the new 
Regulations succeed in bringing about a responsive, outcome-focussed 
process which meets the varied expectations of complainants consistently in 
all of these circumstances and across all local authorities remains to be 
seen.71  As Buck et al identify, 
                                                 
64
 Sheffield City Council, for instance, has found introduction of the new Regulations 
‘challenging’.  Whilst describing the new system as ‘one-stage’, it reports that ‘[t]he majority 
of complaints are resolved by the service.  Some complaints are investigated by independent 
investigating officers who will make recommendations to senior managers.  Some appeals 
processes exist and are utilised for those complaints about decisions which meet the scope 
of the relevant appeal panel.  Mediation as an alternative form of resolution method is yet to 
be developed…  [and] an optional escalated stage’ has been introduced before approach to 
the Ombudsman. Sheffield City Council Annual Report of complaints received about Adult 
Social Care Services, Communities Portfolio, 1 April 2009 - 31 March 2010.  There is no 
mention in this Report of partnership with local health bodies, other than to note that they, 
not the Council, deal with mental health complaints.  Quality of complaint resolution, learning 
and service improvement and customer satisfaction are reported to have increased, but at 
the expense of response timescales: ibid 2  
65
 See Chapter 8 above 
66
 Abraham A, PHSO Report Responsive and Accountable? The Ombudsman’s review of 
complaint handling by government departments and public bodies 2010-11, 25 October 2011 
67
 Gulland J, ‘Complaints Procedures and Ombudsmen’ in Adler, M, ed, Administrative 
Justice in Context (Hart 2010) 462 
68
 See for instance Pleasence et al (2006); O’Grady et al (2004) 
69
 Pleasence et al (2006) 470 
70
 Abraham A, PHSO Report (2011) supra 
71
 At the time of writing (Feb 2012) no published research into implementation of the 2009 
regulations was found 
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‘users’ perceptions of dealing with government departments and other 
public authorities … are often experienced as a complex journey – 
sometimes a bumpy one – from one part of officialdom to another.72   
 
Complainants may be left frustrated and exhausted by the complaints 
system,73  and at the end of the day, resolution of their substantive problem 
may remain unresolved.   
 
The capacity of internal complaints procedures to influence local decision-
making towards more emancipatory, CRPD-compatible understandings thus 
relies, like the decision-making itself, on development of those 
understandings through national policy, law and the wider administrative 
justice system, as well as within each local institution.   As we have seen in 
Chapter 8, that transformation has not yet been accomplished. 
 
Two further options are available to a dis-satisfied complainant: complaint to 
the Ombudsman or, if appropriate, application to the High Court for judicial 
review.  Both bring the complaint to the national stage.  The following section 
considers the capacity for judicial review to influence policy, law and practice 
towards more CRPD-compatible understandings.  The corresponding 
capacity of the Ombudsmen is considered below. 
 
Judicial review74 
Judicial review provides the only ‘legal’ recourse for those seeking to 
challenge social care decisions in England.75   Its modern development as a 
                                                 
72
 Buck T, Kirkham R and Thompson B, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative 
Justice (Ashgate 2011) 59 
73
 Abraham A, PHSO Report (2011) 
74
 For a full discussion of judicial review and socio-economic rights in England, see Palmer E, 
Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2009); see also 
King JA, ‘United Kingdom: Asserting Social Rights in a Multi-layered System’ in Langford M 
(ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: emerging trends in international and comparative law 
(Cambridge University Press 2008); O’Cinneide C, ‘Socio-economic Entitlements and the UK 
Rights Framework’ (2005) Irish Human Rights Commission Conference on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Model of Enforcement, Dublin, 9/10 December 2005; Le Sueur A, 
Sunkin M and Murkens J, Public Law: texts, cases and materials (Oxford University Press 
2010) 
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mechanism for securing redress against the state took place over the second 
half of the 20th century, partly in response to growth of the welfare state.76 
Since 2000, the Human Rights Act has significantly enhanced the courts’ 
role,77 requiring judges  
to scrutinise a statute to conform to overarching normative principles 
such as dignity rather than simply to seek to find out what Parliament 
intended in a particular case.78    
This picture of judicial review is of ‘a process principally concerned with 
grand issues of principle’ 79  and with imposing the rule of law, including, 
latterly, European Convention law, on the executive.  As such it has played a 
central role in the development of administrative law, 80  and offers a 
potentially effective mechanism for hegemonic development of 
disability/human rights discourse in this field.81 
However, as Sunkin et al demonstrate, far from being a ‘more leisured 
engagement between citizen and authority in the High Court’, in practice 
judicial review is used,  
often by the most marginalised groups against some of the most hard-
pressed local authorities in relation to some of the most intractable 
resource allocation issues.82   
                                                                                                                                          
75
 A situation confirmed by the Law Commission in its proposals for adult social care 
legislation at Recommendation 16: see Chapter 7 above 
76
 For history, see for instance Le Sueur A, Sunkin M and Murkens J, Public Law: texts, 
cases and materials (Oxford University Press 2010); or Carroll A, Administrative & 
Constitutional Law, 5
th
 ed (Pearson-Longman 2009) 
77 In human rights cases, HRAs2: court must take into account ECHR jurisprudence; s3: court 
must interpret legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention rights; s4: court may 
make declaration of incompatibility.  Note also introduction of principle of proportionality into 
UK judicial reasoning. 
78
 Gordon R, QC ‘I am a mental health lawyer – how is the Human Rights Act helping my 
practice?  Human Rights developments in mental health law’ (Human Rights Lawyers 
Association 2005)  para 8 
79
 Sunkin M, Calvo K, Platt L, Landman T, ‘Mapping the Use of Judicial Review to Challenge 
Local Authorities in England and Wales’, [2007] Public Law 545, 567 
80
 See for instance Wade W and Forsyth C, Administrative Law, 10
th
 ed (Oxford University 
Press 2009), Craig P, Administrative Law, 6
th
 ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2008), Le Suer and 
Sunkin (2010), Bailey SH, Jones B and Mowbray AR, Bailey, Jones and Mowbray: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary on Administrative Law, 4
th
 Rev ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 
81
 See, for instance, Poole T, ‘The Reformation of English Administrative Law’ (2009) 1 
Cambridge Law Journal 142 
82
 Sunkin et al (2007) 
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The success of such marginal groups is by no means assured: as the UN 
ESCR Committee highlights, 83  there are many elements of the courts’ 
procedures and jurisprudence which factor against claimant satisfaction in 
this kind of judicial review case.   
One is the traditional ‘constitutional imperative of judicial self-restraint’84 or 
deference to Parliament.  Although the degree of such deference may have 
lessened over time, 85  and despite the courts’ new power to make 
Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act, 86   judicial 
deference remains an essential component of the constitutional balance of 
powers.87  It was this imperative which led to Lord Greene MR’s arguing in 
Wednesbury 88  that delegated discretion should only be challenged ‘in a 
strictly limited class of case’, and setting a very high standard for what 
constitutes irrational behaviour on the part of public bodies.89  Again, this 
high bar to interference by the court has lowered over time.90  Nevertheless, 
as O’Cinneide comments, it has had the effect of ‘essentially immunising 
large areas of public authority decision-making from any meaningful 
possibility of a successful judicial review’.91   
Where the case relates to socio-economic decisions, further constraints 
apply.  The area of ‘welfare’ decision-making is seen in England as the 
province of politicians rather than of judges;92 and the judges themselves 
                                                 
83
 See Chapter 5 above 
84
 Irvine H, ‘Judges and Decision-makers: the theory and practice of Wednesbury review’ 
[1996] Public Law 59 
85
 Griffith JAG, The Politics of the Judiciary, 2
nd
 ed (Fontana 1981); see also, for instance, 
Lord Bridge in Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] 1 All ER 
940: ‘where decisions might put the applicant’s life at risk, the court should apply ‘the most 
anxious scrutiny’ 
86
 Human Rights Act 1998 s4 
87
 For current debate on this issue see the exchange between Lord Sumption and Sir 
Stephen Sedley:  Sumption J, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-making: the uncertain 
boundary’, The F.A. Mann Lecture (2011); Sedley S, ‘Judicial Politics: Stephen Sedley on 
the separation of powers’ (2012) 34(4) London Review of Books 15 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n04/stephen-sedley/judicial-politics  accessed 17.2.12 
88
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 
89
 Where the body has considered all relevant, and no irrelevant factors, it is only if the body 
has nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could 
ever have come to it that the court can interfere. 
90
 See Lord Bridge in Bugdaycay, ftnote 85 above  – though see discussion below 
91
 O’Cinneide (2005); King (2008) 
92
 Because the allocation of public resources raises complex issues which impact on a wide 
variety of actors, and because there are different political views about the best way to 
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recognise the limitations in their competence to address ‘polycentric’ 
administrative issues. 93   In the absence of constitutional recognition of 
economic, social and cultural rights, they remain reluctant to interfere with 
public authority decisions involving substantial resource allocation, or to order 
the provision of ‘welfare’ services.94    
Moreover, like internal complaints discussed above, the process of judicial 
review concerns procedural rather than substantive issues.  The court’s focus 
is on the behaviour of the public authority: was that behaviour legal, rational, 
fair?  Was it compatible with European Convention rights?  If not, the court is 
unlikely to substitute its own decision,95 rather referring the issue back to be 
decided again through a legal/rational/fair/compatible process which may 
result in a repeat of the original substantive decision.   
Despite such constraints and frustrations for the claimant, 96  and despite 
considerable practical barriers to access to justice, 97  judicial review 
constitutes the closest expression in England of Adler’s ‘legal’ model of 
administrative redress, with its legitimating goal of legality, and independence 
and impartiality as its modes of accountability. 98    Judicial review cases 
                                                                                                                                          
allocate such resources: see United Kingdom Fifth Report to UN Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Committee, and Chapter 5 above 
93
 Griffith (1981); Munby J: ‘it is not the task of a judge when sitting judicially – even in the 
administrative court – to set out to write a textbook or practice manual or to give advisory 
opinions’, East Sussex (discussed below) para 163  
94
 Unlike their counterparts in some other parts of the world, such as India, where judges 
havedeveloped a system of public interest litigation; or South Africa, where the Constitutional 
Court has developed a ‘reasonableness’ jurisprudence to decide cases relating to socio-
economic rights.  As seen in Chapter 5 above, these are considered by the UK government 
to have gone ‘further than the UK would find acceptable’.  See also Langford (2008); 
O’Cinneide (2005); Palmer (2009).  For further, see Sumption (2011) and Sedley (2012)  
95
 See for instance  R (Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust, Secretary of State for 
Health [2006] EWCA Civ 392, where the Court of Appeal quashed the Primary CareTrust’s 
policy that led to refusal of funding for Ms Roger’s treatment as being irrational, but refused 
to order funding of her treatment. 
96
 See also O’Brien and Gooding, ‘Final Reflections’, DRC Legal Bulleting, Legacy Edition, 
(Disability Rights Commission 2007) 
97
 Including unavailability of legal aid – see Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012; lack of access to expert information and advocacy; and the high 
proportion of applications rejected at the permissions stage.  In 2011, 57.1% (6391) of 
applications were refused, 10.9% (1220) accepted, with 32% (3589) in progress. In that year, 
174 applicants, or 16 per 1000 decisions, won their case (Rogers S, ‘Judicial Review 
Statistics: how many cases are there and what are they about?’ Guardian Datablog 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/nov/19/judicial-review-statistics#data 
accessed 16.2.13) 
98
 See Chapter 8 above 
 296 
 
relating to independent living services have been brought before the courts, 
engaging both common law jurisprudence and the ‘civil and human rights’ 
guaranteed under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Human 
Rights Act 1998,99 thereby potentially ‘open[ing] the door to certain types of 
legal claim that could be described as involving an assertion of socio-
economic rights’.100  This section examines a selection of such cases.   
Common law 
Before introduction of the Human Rights Act in 2000, traditional common law 
jurisprudence, including such doctrines as Wednesbury unreasonableness 
and deference on socio-economic issues, prevailed.101   In 1995, the Court of 
Appeal stated categorically 102  that the decision on allocation of a limited 
health budget was ‘not a judgment which the court can make.’ 103  
Subsequent relaxation of the rules of standing, however, combined with 
refinement of the public law doctrine of exclusivity104 gradually led to greater 
readiness on the part of some judges to become involved in complex multi-
faceted politically sensitive disputes.105  
The Gloucestershire case106  provided important early clarification of local 
authority duties under the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (NHSCCA).107 
                                                 
99
 See Explanatory Memorandum on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities laid before Parliament on 3 March 2009, with the Command Paper 
containing the text of the Convention (Cm7564); and Chapter 4 above 
100
 O’Cinneide (2005); see also Massie B, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Judiciary in 
Enhancing or Restricting the Civil Rights of Disabled People’ (Disability Rights Commission 
2004) 
101
 See King (2008) 
102
 When considering the refusal on resource grounds of potentially life-saving treatment for a 
ten-year-old child: R v Cambridge Health Authority ex parte B [1995] 2 All ER 129 
103
 Ibid, Sir Thomas Bingham, MR at 133 
104
 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 excluded any alternative to judicial review as a form 
of litigation to secure redress against the State.  That rule was subsequently relaxed in 
Wandsworth LBC v Winder [1985] AC461 and Roy v Kensington & Chelsea Family 
Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624.  Arguments abound about the necessity for, and 
the scope of, this public/private divide.  See for instance Oliver D and Jowell JL (eds) The 
Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press 2000) 
105
 Palmer E, ‘Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights – Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial 
Control in Public Administrative Law’ (2000) 20(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 63; Syrett 
K ‘Of resources, rationality and rights: emerging trends in the judicial review of allocative 
decisions’ (2000) 1 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 
106
 R v Gloucester County Council ex parte Barry, [1997] 2 All ER 1(HL) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldjudgmt/jd970320/barry01.htm last 
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The case concerned the withdrawal on resource grounds108 of laundry and 
cleaning services from an older man, living alone.    The claimant argued that 
the authority had acted unlawfully in withdrawing services without having 
reassessed his needs, and requested a declaration that in carrying out the 
reassessment the Council was not entitled to take into account its resources.   
At first instance, McCowan J confirmed that s2 CSDPA109 created a duty 
specific to the individual rather than a more general ‘target’ duty; and that no 
reduction or withdrawal of services should take place without prior re-
assessment of the individual’s needs.110  However, it would be ‘impractical 
and unrealistic’ to expect the local authority not to take resources into 
account, though they should be ‘no more than one factor’ in the overall 
assessment.  McCowan J then recognised what might be considered a ‘core 
minimum’ similar to that required by the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 111  albeit dressed in common law arguments of 
‘reasonableness’: 
Certain persons would be at severe physical risk if they were unable to 
have some practical assistance in their homes.  In those situations, I 
cannot conceive that an authority would be held to have acted 
reasonably if they used shortage of resources as a reason for not being 
satisfied that some arrangement should be made to meet those persons’ 
needs.112 
The Appeal Court differed, holding113  that resources should not be taken into 
account; 114   but the House of Lords 115  overturned that decision, 116  
                                                                                                                                          
accessed 8.3.12; discussion here of this and following cases is supported by, inter alia, 
Clements L, Community Care and the Law, 4
th
 ed  (Legal Action Group 2007)  
107
 Implementation of the NHSCCA90 was delayed for three years to allow Councils time to 
prepare for the changes.  It came into force in April 1993.  
108
 Mr Barry was informed by letter that the service was being withdrawn because central 
government funding to the Council had been cut by £2.5m and there was ‘nowhere near 
enough to meet demand.’ 
109
 See Chapter 7 above 
110
 Following the court’s decision on this point, ‘the Council reassessed some 1,500 people in 
receipt of services under s2 of the 1970 Act.  As a result of the reassessment the number 
was reduced to 1,060.’  Lord Lloyd in Gloucestershire, House of Lords [1997] All ER 1 
111
 See Chapter 5 above 
112
 McCowan J  (1997) 1 CCLR 19 at 31G 
113
 By a majority of two to one:   Swinton-Thomas LJ and Sir John Balcombe -  Hirst LJ 
dissenting [1996] 4 All ER 421 
114
 ‘In assessing and reassessing whether it is necessary to make arrangements to meet [the 
applicant’s needs under s2], a local authority is not entitled to take account of the resources 
available to such local authority.’ [1997] AC 584 
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effectively collapsing the s2 ‘duty to provide’ into a discretionary power, albeit 
with McCowan J’s ‘core minimum’ unchallenged. 
Gloucestershire was criticised at the time, 117  and a line of subsequent 
judgements excluded consideration of resources from provision of education, 
disabled facilities grants, the duty to assess and charging for residential 
care,118 leading Palmer to conclude that  the courts might be moving towards 
a more ‘rights-based conception of public law’.119  However, Gloucestershire 
remains as precedent in the field of Article 19(b) services, as will be seen 
below.   
Disability discrimination law 
Disability discrimination law has also been called into play in the question of 
resources.  Local authorities have been required since 2003 to apportion 
                                                                                                                                          
115
 By a majority of three to two. [1997] 2 All ER 1.  Secretary of State for Health joined the 
proceedings.  As Lord Lloyd comments, ‘[i]t is as well that he [the Secretary of State] should 
be [joined] for it is the failure of central government to supply the funds necessary to enable 
the council to carry out what I regard as their statutory duty which, departing from the fine 
words contained in the government White Paper Caring for People: Community Care in the 
Next Decade and Beyond…, has put the council into what the Divisional Court called an 
impossible position; …even if the council wished to raise the money themselves to meet the 
need by increasing council tax, they would be unable to do so by reason of the government 
imposing rate-capping.’ Lord Lloyd in Gloucestershire, House of Lords [1997] All ER 1 
116
 At both appeal levels, Gloucestershire was a close decision. In the House of Lords, for 
instance, Lord Lloyd, finding for Mr Barry, considered that ‘[t]he passing of the 1970 Act was 
a noble aspiration.  Having willed the end, Parliament must be asked to provide the means’; 
whereas Lord Nicholls ‘can see no basis for reading into the section [CSDPA s2] an 
implication that…. cost is to be ignored’ and does ‘not believe Parliament intended that to be 
the position.’  Lord Nicholls refers the claimant back to Wednesbury unreasonableness as 
the ground for potential remedy. 
117
 Rayment B, ‘Ex parte Barry in the House of Lords’ and ‘Clements L, ‘The Collapsing 
Duty’, both in (1997) 2(3) Judicial Review; Palmer E and Sunkin M ‘Needs: Resources and 
Abhorrent Choices’ (1998) 61(3) Modern Law Review 401 
118
 A differently constituted House of Lords in Tandy found the majority’s reasoning in 
Gloucestershire ‘very doubtful’, (R v East Sussex County Council ex p Tandy [1998] 2 All ER 
769) upholding a mandatory obligation under s298 of the Education Act 1993 to deliver 
home tuition services to a sick child unable to attend school, irrespective of the resources 
available to the authority at the time. The Court of Appeal took a similar line in Sefton, (R v 
Sefton MBC ex p Help the Aged [1997] EWCA Civ 2265 [1997] 4 All ER 532) when it 
quashed the authority’s policy of ignoring statutory capital disregards when charging for 
residential care under s21 NAA48 and National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) 
Regulations 1992.  Other judges followed suit, excluding the consideration of resources from 
the allocation of mandatory disabled facilities grants (Dyson J in R v Birmingham CC ex p 
Taj Mohammed [1998] 3 All ER 788) and from the duty to carry out an assessment (Scott 
Baker J in R v Bristol CC ex p Penfold (1998) 1 CCLR 315) 
119
 Palmer E, ‘Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights – Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial 
Control in Public Administrative Law’ (2000) 20(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 63 
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services in line with four bands of eligibility: critical, substantial, moderate and 
low.120  As resources have become stretched, and particularly since the 2010 
Spending Review, councils have increasingly raised the threshold of eligibility 
for Article 19(b) services, leaving many assessed needs unmet.121  From 
2006, however, the Disability Equality Duty (DED) 122  required all public 
bodies to take a proactive123 and comprehensive stance towards disability 
equality in everything they do.124  This general public sector duty has been 
applied in the courts to challenge cuts in eligibility.125 
 
Under DDA s49A,126 public authorities must ‘have due regard’127 to the need 
to eliminate discrimination and promote equality.    The Courts began by 
establishing that failure to meet this duty could be challenged as a 
freestanding legal issue through judicial review. 128    They then took a 
                                                 
120
 See Chapter 6 above.  The criteria may be broadly summarised as follows: ‘critical’ 
means that life is at risk, or there is great risk of serious illness or harm; ‘substantial’ covers 
situations of abuse or neglect, and/or where the majority of personal care routines, work or 
education, social relationships and/or family responsibilities cannot be sustained; the inability 
to sustain several of these personal, work and social routines and responsibilities constitute 
the ‘moderate’ band; and ‘low’ eligibility applies where one or two such roles or 
responsibilities cannot be undertaken. 
121
 In June 2012, ADASS reported 83% of Councils operating at ‘Substantial’ and above 
eligibility level 
122
 Disability Discrimination Act 2005, inserting Part 5A (ss 49A-49F) into DDA1995 
123
 Or ‘anticipatory’: see Lawson A, Disability and Equality Law in Britain: the role of 
reasonable adjustment (Hart 2008) 
124
 DDA 1995 s49A(1) required the authority to ‘have due regard’ to the need to:  
 eliminate discrimination and harassment;  
 promote equality of opportunity, including more favourable treatment;  
 promote positive attitudes; and 
 encourage disabled people’s participation in public life.   
‘Public authorities’ for this section are defined as ‘any person certain of whose functions are 
functions of a public nature’, a definition echoing that of the Human Rights Act 1998, s6.  
Enforcement of the ‘specific’ public sector duty was set out in the Disability Discrimination 
(Public Authorities)(Statutory Duties) Regulations 2005  
125
 The following section focuses on cases relating to independent living.  For discussion of 
the use of Public Sector Equality Duties to challenge funding decisions through judicial 
review more generally see Fredman S, ‘The Public Sector Equality Duty’ (2011) 40(4) 
Industrial Law Journal 405 
126
 Now subsumed, with changes, into Equality Act 2010 s146 
127
 Because this phrase is somewhat vague, ‘both discrimination and administrative lawyers 
were initially sceptical about the duties’ potential to make a difference for their clients’: 
Halford J, ‘Paying Attention to Inequality: the Development of the Positive Equality Duties’ 
(2009) Judicial Review 21, para 2 
128
 R (Kaur & Shah) v London Borough of Ealing [2008] EWHC Admin 2026 para 27; the 
specific equality duty could only be enforced by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
under Equality Act 2006, ss 20-24A, by means of compliance notice enforceable in the 
County Court, with ultimate sanction of contempt of court 
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purposive approach to its interpretation:129 where a public body is found to be 
in breach of its statutory equality duties, the court may quash a decision or 
action.130  This was the result in Chavda,131 where Harrow LBC decided to 
restrict provision of community care services to those in ‘critical’ need only: 
the Council’s decision was unlawful as it had not drawn the particular legal 
duties imposed by DDA s49A to the attention of the decision-makers.   
 
Two further aspects of the DED were identified in Brown. 132   Public 
authorities must have due regard to both the need to take account of the fact 
of disabled people’s impairments and the need to recognise that this might 
involve treating disabled people more favourably.  The duty, however, was to 
have ‘due regard’, not to take steps or to achieve results.  Boyejo 133 
continued this line of reasoning in the context of challenge to Barnet’s 
decision to replace sheltered accommodation on-site wardens with 
peripatetic support and alarm systems.  Here, the Council did not have 
sufficient regard to the impact on disabled residents or to the possible need 
for more favourable treatment.134 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 Domb135 raised the question of whether or not a local authority could rely on 
a budgetary deficit to modify its level of service provision.136  The issue came 
to the fore again as the public sector funding cuts in the 2010 Spending 
Review began to bite.137   In 2011, Birmingham City Council138  took the 
                                                 
129
 See Halford (2009)   
130
 As in, for example, R(C) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 882 
131
 R (Chavda & Others) v Harrow LBC [2007] EWHC 3064; Chavda also held that it could 
not be argued on this basis that withdrawal of services from people with substantial needs 
involved a breach of Article 8: the Council was ‘clearly right that questions of violation of 
[European] Convention rights arise not when the Council takes its decision but when an 
applicant contends for a violation… So at this point there can be nothing in the claimants’ 
ECHR claims.’ 
132
 R (Brown)v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA 3158 (Admin) 
133
 R (Boyejo) v Barnet LBC [2009] EWHC 3261 (Admin) 
134
 ibid para 63 
135
 R (Domb and others) v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 941 
136
 The Court of Appeal considered the Council’s decision to introduce charges for its 
domiciliary services, after it had decided for electoral purposes to reduce its Council tax by 
3%.  Here the Court found no evidence that the Council had failed to consider its equality 
duties, but Sedley J recognised ‘a major question of public law: can a local authority, by tying 
its own fiscal hands for electoral ends, rely on the subsequent budgetary deficit to modify its 
performance of its statutory duty?’ ibid para 80 
137
 As we have seen, the Coalition Government’s 2010 Spending Review cut local authority 
budgets by 26% over a four-year period, and funding is no longer ring-fenced, leaving local 
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decision to reduce eligibility for social care to those with ‘critical’ needs 
only.139   Four disabled people, with assessed needs including ‘substantial’ 
and ‘critical’, challenged the Council’s decision, arguing, inter alia, breach of 
the Council’s public sector duty under s49A DDA.   
 
In Birmingham, 140 Walker J described the move to funding for critical only as 
‘potentially devastating’.141  In a long and detailed judgement, he found that 
although the Council gave consideration to how to address disabled people’s 
needs, they did not ask themselves whether the impact of the move to 
‘critical only’ ‘was so serious that an alternative which was not so draconian 
should be identified and funded to the extent necessary by savings 
elsewhere.’142   The challenge succeeded.   Birmingham City Council chose 
not to appeal, instead welcoming the judgement as giving ‘greater clarity’ 
regarding the DDA.  It proposed to re-run the consultation and decision-
making process in line with s49A, at the same time warning that ‘there is no 
new money’ and that ‘hard choices about meeting growing needs with fewer 
resources will have to be made’.143 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
authorities free to cut their social care budgets in real terms as part of their search for 
savings.  With social care spending constituting a significant proportion of local authority 
expenditure, a number of authorities have considered either increasing charges or reducing 
services by tightening eligibility criteria, or both.   
138
 Under pressure from unexpectedly deep funding cuts: a reduction in grant to the authority 
as a whole of £330 million, as opposed to the expected £57.9 million; Birmingham, infra, 
paras 49-51 
139
 It proposed to use the ‘new’ social care funding to ‘smooth’ the reductions by new 
approaches, to build capacity in community and third sectors, and to increase productivity by 
‘doing things very differently’. Birmingham, infra, para 64 
140 R (on the application of W) v Birmingham City Council; R (on the application of M, G and 
H) v Birmingham City Council [2011] EWHC 1147 (Admin).  Similar challenges to ‘critical 
only’ decisions were lodged against Lancashire County Council, the Isle of Wight, and at 
least one London Borough. 
141 Birmingham para 183 
142
 Ibid 
143
 BBC News, ‘Birmingham City Council care funding cuts unlawful’ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-13455068  accessed 20.5.2011.  At 7 
August 2012, Birmingham City Council was continuing to provide at substantial and critical 
levels.  
http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/cs/Satellite/EligibilityCriteria?packedargs=website%3D4&rend
ermode=%27  accessed 7.8.12 
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Here we see a graphic example of judicial review used  
by the most marginalised groups against some of the most hard-
pressed local authorities in relation to some of the most intractable 
resource allocation issues.144 
 
We also see one of the weaknesses of judicial review as a means of 
enforcing socio-economic rights.  However ‘potentially devastating’ the judge 
considers a decision to move to ‘critical only’ provision would be, the Council 
remains free to reconsider its decision in line with s49A procedures and 
reach the same decision.  A case such as Birmingham may help to protect 
some existing services, 145   but, as the Council highlights, the underlying 
problem remains. Furthermore, the DDA equality duty under which 
Birmingham146 failed to act has now been overtaken by the new, less taxing, 
general equality duty under the Equality Act 2010.147  From April 2011, public 
authorities must ‘have due regard’ to the need to eliminate unlawful 
discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations 
across all ‘protected characteristics’.148 There is nothing in these new duties 
requiring ‘due regard’ to be taken of the fact of disabled people’s 
impairments, or to recognise that this might involve treating disabled people 
more favourably.  It remains to be seen how Councils and courts will respond 
to that change. 
 
Neither Chavda nor Birmingham considered human rights to be relevant in 
the context of the authorities’ s49A decision-making. 149   However, other 
                                                 
144
 Sunkin M, Calvo K, Platt L and Landman T, ‘Mapping the Use of Judicial Review to 
Challenge Local Authorities in England and Wales’ [2007] Public Law 545 
145
 There have been several further successful challenges to decisions to cut social care 
funding, including R(JM & NT) v Isle of Wight Council [2011] EWHC 2911; R on the 
application of (1) The Sefton Care Association (2) Melton Health Care Limited (3) Westcliffe 
Manor Nursing Home (4) Benbridge Care Homes Limited (5) Craignare Care Home v Sefton 
Council [2011] EWHC 2676 (Admin).  A case brought against Lancashire County Council -  
R (JG and MB ) v. Lancashire County Council [2011] EWHC 2295 (Admin)  - was 
unsuccessful, but that Council reportedly responded by undertaking a full and positive 
review, involving disabled people, of its service provision   
146
 And the respondent councils in the cases discussed here 
147
 Equality Act 2010 s149, in force 1 April 2011; see Chapter 7 above. 
148
 Age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and 
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation.  Equality Act 2010 s4 
149
 In Chavda, the claimants raised both Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, arguing on the basis of 
dignity, supported by Botta and East Sussex.  However, Mackie J held that questions of 
violation of Convention rights arise not when the Council takes its decision but when rights 
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cases have allowed the courts to develop domestic human rights law in the 
context of independent living services, particularly under ECHR Articles 3 
(prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment), and 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life). 
Human rights law 
An early case following HRA implementation 150  concerned allocation of 
suitable housing by the local authority. The Bernard151 family lost their fully-
adapted property, and were re-housed by the local authority in inaccessible 
accommodation.152  Despite repeated assessments, the family’s requests for 
rehousing in suitable adapted property went unanswered. 153   The family 
argued that their ECHR Articles 3 and 8 rights had been breached and 
sought damages.154   Because Article 3 is an absolute right, allowing no 
qualification or exception, the European Court of Human Rights has 
established that, for the right to be engaged, ill-treatment must attain a 
minimum level of severity.155   One issue in Bernard was therefore whether or 
not the treatment of the claimants had reached that level.  Although Sullivan 
                                                                                                                                          
are allegedly breached as a result of that decision.  The human rights arguments, in that 
case, were held to be ‘premature’.  In Birmingham, Walker J agreed with the claimants that 
‘relevant articles in the European Convention on Human Rights did not add in substance to 
the heads of challenge already advanced.’  para 190 
150
 The judges began to consider individuals’ ECHR rights before the HRA came into force.  
For instance, see Coughlan (R v North East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan, QB 
47 BMLR 11 Dec 1998) where High Court and Court of Appeal considered the residents’ 
rights to a home under Article 8 ECHR. The Appeal Court further recognised that a purpose-
built environment may mean even more to a disabled person than a home does to most 
people, and that an enforced move would be emotionally devastating and seriously anti-
therapeutic.  In doing so, they confirmed both the lowering of the Wednesbury bar on 
interference with delegated discretion in human rights cases and its particular application in 
the context of disability. 
151 R (on the application of Bernard and another) v Enfield London Borough Council. 
 [2002] All ER (D) 383 (Oct) 
152
 Mrs Bernard was unable to use her wheelchair, and was confined to a downstairs lounge 
in which she lived, ate and slept, sharing it with her husband and two youngest children.  
She was unable to go out, to access the kitchen or upper floor to help care for the family, or 
to get to the bathroom without assistance, with the result that she frequently soiled herself.  
The front door of the property opened directly into the lounge, which also contained the 
stairway to the upper floor, depriving her of any privacy.   
153
 As Sullivan J reports, ‘[f]or some unexplained reason the recommendation of the 
defendant’s Social Services Department was not acted on by the defendant’s Housing 
Department,’ which at one point threatened the family with eviction, a threat withdrawn only 
after initiation of judicial review proceedings 
154
 Under s8 of the Human Rights Act 
155
 A v UK [1998] 27 EHRR 661, para 20 
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J found the issue to be ‘finely balanced’, he was not satisfied that the 
threshold had been met.  The issue under Article 8, by contrast, was not 
finely balanced.  Article 8 imposes positive as well as negative duties: to 
refrain from unwarranted interference, but also to take positive action, 
including the provision of suitably adapted accommodation.  Therefore, not 
only was the Council in breach of its statutory housing duty under 
s21NAA48,156 its failure to act on assessments was also incompatible with 
the claimants’ rights under Article 8 ECHR.  Although Article 3 was not 
engaged in this case, it was not excluded from consideration; and Bernard 
confirmed that Article 8 could be relied on to give rise to a substantive right to 
community care services.   
 
East Sussex157 further developed Article 8 jurisprudence.  Here, two sisters in 
their twenties challenged their local authority’s handling policy, which banned 
manual lifting158 and thereby curtailed the sisters’ ability to take part in all but 
the most basic activities.   The judge had to balance the local authority’s 
Article 8 duty towards the sisters against its responsibility for the health, 
safety and welfare of their carers. 159   Munby J held that the Article 8 
guarantee of ‘physical and psychological integrity’ 160   embraced two 
important concepts:  human dignity and the right to participate in community 
life.   He describes human dignity as the core value of our society, of the 
common law,161 and of the European Convention. 162  When someone is so 
disabled as to be critically dependent on the help of others for the basic tasks 
of daily living, there is a positive obligation 163  to try to ameliorate and 
                                                 
156
 See Chapter 7 above 
157
 R (A,B, X and Y) v East Sussex County Council (No 2) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) 
158
 Requiring a hoist to be used at all times 
159
 Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
160
 Intended to ‘ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of 
each individual in his relations with other human beings’. Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 
para 32. Munby J considers not only the ECHR, but also the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  This Charter had been adopted by the EU in 2000, but at the time of East Sussex 
was not binding on Member States. It became binding insofar as it gives effect to EU law 
with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 
161
 Munby J quotes, inter alia, the Bible (Matthew chapter 7, verse 12), Lord Chesterfield, and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
162
 As confirmed in A v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 661, Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 913 and 
Price v UK (2001) 34 EHRR 1285; see also McCrudden C ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655 
163
 Marckx v Belgium(1979) 2 EHRR 330 PC 
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compensate for such disabilities; and as protection of human rights improves, 
increasingly high standards are required in provision for disabled people if 
their human dignity is not to be impaired. 164  Positive obligations towards 
disabled people also ‘require appropriate measures to be taken’ to ensure 
access to  
essential economic and social activities and to an appropriate range of 
recreational and cultural activities… the crucial factor is the extent to 
which a particular individual is so circumscribed and so isolated as to be 
deprived of the possibility of developing his personality.165    
 
Therefore, protection of the health and safety166 of the carer must be  
commensurate with the best interests of the disabled person, their 
dignity and the promotion of their independence and their [European] 
Convention rights.167   
 
That balance must be struck in a way that is proportionate.  Introduction of 
the principle of proportionality168 enables Munby J to focus not only on the 
rationality of the local authority’s actions but also on the rights of the sisters 
and the extent to which restriction of those rights is justified.   This change in 
focus in effect repositions disabled people and rebalances relations between 
them and the authority.  Moreover, Munby J’s focus on dignity and 
participation complies with the subsequent requirements of CRPD Article 19 
and the Convention’s wider purpose. 
 
                                                 
164
 Relying on Lord Hoffman in Birmingham City Council v Oakley [2001] 1 AC 617 at 631G; 
R (ota Smeaton) v Sec of State for health [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin) 
165
 Munby J’s arguments for access and participation are drawn from Botta v Italy (1998) 26 
EHRR 241, where a physically disabled man was claiming breach of his Article 8 rights 
because he was unable to gain access to a beach.  Although the European Court of Human 
Rights held in Botta that Article 8 was not engaged, the European Commission on Human 
Rights had also considered his case.  This quote is from the opinion of Mr N Bratza. 
166
 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, s 2: employer’s duty to protect the health and safety 
of employees ‘as far as reasonably practicable’ 
167
 East Sussex para 127 
168
 The principle of proportionality was introduced into English common law through the 
Human Rights Act s2 requirement that domestic courts take into account Strasbourg 
jurisprudence when considering human rights cases.  That jurisprudence holds that ‘inherent 
in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights.’ (Soering v UK, 11 EHRR 439 para 89; see also Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2
nd
 ed (Oxford University 
Press 2009) 10).  Proportionality is particularly germane to interpretation of qualified rights, 
such as Article 8. 
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However, this initial expansion of CRPD-compatible discourse was curtailed 
in Anufrijeva v Southwark LB.169  Here, the Court of Appeal argued that 
Article 8 positive duties to provide welfare support such as those found in 
Bernard and East Sussex should only be imposed in extreme circumstances, 
such as those which engage Article 3. 170   As King comments, 171  this 
suggests a stricter approach by the domestic courts than that taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights, which does not equate the level of severity 
required to engage Article 8 with the high level required to engage Article 
3.172   The result is imposition of a high bar to engagement of Article 8 which 
threatens to side-line many human rights arguments in CRPD Article 19 
cases,173 as was the outcome in MacDonald.    
 
MacDonald174 concerned a dispute over whether to meet assessed night-
time care needs through provision of a night-time carer or through the use of 
incontinence pads.  The Council argued that the latter would provide the 
claimant with greater safety, independence and privacy, besides reducing the 
cost of her care by some £22,000 per annum.  Ms MacDonald was not 
incontinent, her needs had not changed, and she considered the Council’s 
proposal to be ‘an intolerable affront to her dignity’.175  In the Supreme Court, 
Lord Brown refers to Gloucestershire, 176  taking it as read that the local 
authority can take into account its resources both in making eligibility 
decisions and in deciding how to meet eligible needs.177  Moreover, citing the 
high bar to engagement in Anufrijeva,178 he concludes that there has been no 
                                                 
169
 [2004] QB 1124 
170
 By this criterion, Bernard would have been wrongly decided, as Article 3 was found not to 
have been engaged. 
171
 King (2008) 
172
 In Mazari v Italy ((1999) 28 EHRR CD 175, 179-180) the ECtHR held that ‘a refusal of the 
authorities to provide assistance… to an individual suffering from a severe disease might in 
certain circumstances raise an issue under article 8 of the Convention because of the impact 
of such a refusal on the private life of the individual’.  The European Court makes no 
reference to Article 3.  Langford (2008) 179-180 
173
 See also R (Kiana) v SSHD [2010] EWHC 1002 (Admin), and R (MS) v Oldham BC [2010] 
EWCA 802 (Admin) 
174
 R (on the application of MacDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea CA: 
[2010] EWCA Civ 1109; SC: [2011] UKSC 33 6 July 2011 
175
 Ibid, Lord Brown, Para 1 
176
 See above 
177
 MacDonald, para 8 
178
 See above 
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interference with Ms MacDonald’s Article 8 rights.  Arguments under equality 
legislation179 are also dismissed as ‘hopeless’.180   Baroness Hale dissents. 
Relying on Sefton,181 she argues that as NAAs21 gives rise to individual 
entitlement to residential care,182 it follows that NAA s29 (welfare provision) 
should also, logically, give rise to individual rights.183  Gloucestershire was 
therefore wrongly decided: resources should not be relevant to the Council’s 
considerations.  Baroness Hale also raises issues of dignity,184 but without 
reference to ECHR Articles 3 or 8.  However, concerns about dignity are 
brushed aside, 185   Baroness Hale’s Gloucestershire argument is not 
addressed, and Ms MacDonald’s appeal is dismissed by a majority of four to 
one.   
 
Both the collapse of the CSPDA s2 duty into a power in Gloucestershire, and 
the high bar to breach of Article 8 in Anufrijeva are thus reaffirmed in a 
judgement binding on the lower courts.  Resource arguments may still justify 
denial of all but a ‘core minimum’ of service provision; and the incipient 
development of links between socio-economic entitlements, dignity and 
participation and positive obligations under ECHR Articles 3 and 8 in Bernard 
and East Sussex are side-lined, to reappear in future only in the most 
extreme cases.186 
 
MacDonald was decided in 2011, two years after UK ratification of the CRPD.  
As we have seen in Part 1, respect for inherent dignity is a fundamental 
requirement of the Convention, featuring in its purpose, in its Preamble, in 
                                                 
179
 DDA s21 (duty of providers of services to make adjustments), and s 49A (public sector 
equality duty) 
180
 MacDonald, paras 22 and 24 
181
 See above 
182
 MacDonald, para 64       
183
 Lady Hale refers to the Law Commission’s 2011 review of adult social care as 
recommending that there should be an enforceable right to all the community care services 
required to meet the individual’s eligible needs.  MacDonald, para 65.  What is more, she 
argues, s2 CSPDA was intended to create an individual right to services if its criteria were 
met; and NHSCCA s47 and the 1986 Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and 
Representation) Act provide a right to assessment. 
184
 MacDonald, para 78 
185
 Lord Walker: ‘the Council is well aware of Ms MacDonald’s right to have her dignity 
respected…’ (not mentioning Art 8) MacDonald, para 29 
186
 See contributions of Munby LJ and Richard Gordon QC at Legal Action Group ‘What Price 
Dignity’ Conference, November 2011  
http://www.lag.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=94024 accessed 5.3.12 
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individual articles and as the first of its general principles under Article 3.  The 
services required under Article 19(b) are designed to enable disabled people 
to exercise autonomy and participation without which all other Convention 
rights are compromised.  Despite CRPD Article 3(a) 187  being raised in 
argument by Ms MacDonald’s advocate,188 the Convention and Article 19 
feature nowhere in the Supreme Court’s judgement.189   
 
Moreover, the future of judicial review itself as channel for redress in 
independent living disputes seems uncertain, given the current marketisation 
of Article 19(b) provision.190  Under the Human Rights Act s6(1), it is unlawful 
for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a European 
Convention right.  ‘Public authority’ is defined under s6(3)(b) as including ‘any 
person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’.191   When 
this definition was debated in 1998, the government stated clearly that s6 
was intended to include  
private bodies, such as companies or charities [that] have come to 
exercise public functions that were previously exercised by public 
authorities.192    
 
The courts, however, have not always supported that view. 
 
Over 90% of residential care places in England and Wales are currently 
provided by private, voluntary or charitable sector organisations,193 raising 
                                                 
187
 Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s 
own choices, and independence of persons 
188
 At the Court of Appeal, [2010] EWCA Civ 1109, para 63 
189
 Article 19 was cited, prior to ratification, by Silber J in R (Harrison) v Secretary of State for 
Health [2009] EWCA 574 (Admin) (a case about cash payments from the NHS); and  by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Glor v Switzerland (Application no 13444/04), 30 April 
2009 – and see Postcript below 
190
 See Chapter 6 above 
191
 Other than either House of Parliament or persons exercising functions in connection with 
proceedings in Parliament. 
192
 The wording of s6 was described as ‘a statement of principle to which the courts could 
give effect’, as it was not possible to list all of the bodies to which it might apply.   HC 
Debates, 16 Feb 1998, col 773 
193
 Since the 1980s, s26 NAA has allowed local authorities to arrange residential care ‘with a 
voluntary organisation or with any other person who is not a local authority…’. The number 
of adults in residential care in 2009-10 was 215,000, of which 78 per cent were aged 65 and 
over.  http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/social-care/adult-social-care-
information/community-care-statistics-social-services-activity-england-2009-10-further-
release       accessed 1.9.11. For discussion of the potential applications of European Unio 
law in this area, see Hervey T, Stark A, Dawson A, Fernandez J-L, Matosevic T and McDaid 
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the question of protection of residents’ rights under the HRA. 194   YL v 
Birmingham City Council195 was the latest in a line of cases196 addressing the 
definition of ‘public authority’ under HRA s6 in this context, and the first such 
case to reach the House of Lords 
 
The action in YL was brought by an 84-year-old woman placed by her local 
authority in a home run by a private provider, Southern Cross Healthcare 
(SCH).  The preliminary question was whether or not SCH was fulfilling public 
functions for the purposes of HRAs6(3).  The five Law Lords split three to 
two, their various legal arguments drawn variously from ‘welfare’, ECHR and 
free market neo-liberal understandings.  Lord Bingham considers that the 
state’s ‘last resort’ social welfare responsibility for accommodation and care 
of ‘the poor, the elderly and the infirm… can hardly be a matter of debate’.197  
Baroness Hale agrees, arguing also that care home providers must be 
covered by Article 6 HRA under the state’s ECHR Article 13 duty to provide a 
domestic remedy for breach of human rights.198  The opposite view, however, 
prevails, with the majority holding that SCH is not exercising public functions.  
Their reasoning is summed up by Lord Scott:199 
                                                                                                                                          
D, ‘Long-term care for older people and EU law: the position in England and Scotland’ (2012) 
34(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 105 
194
 See Collingbourne T, ‘Collision and Fall-out? The legal position of publicly-funded 
residents in private residential/nursing care’, Masters Dissertation, University of Essex, 2001; 
Joint Committee on Human Rights ‘The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights 
Act’, Seventh Report of Session 2003-04 HL Paper 39, HC382; DIAL UK ‘The: evidence of 
DIAL UK to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ April 2003, appended to JCHR Seventh 
Report, ibid 
195
 YL (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 
27 
196
 R v Servite Houses and London Borough of Wandsworth Council ex p Goldsmith and 
Chatting [2001] LGR 55; R v Leonard Cheshire Foundation and HM Attorney General ex p 
Heather and others [2001] QBD CO/4727/00, 15 June 2001; Donoghue v Poplar Housing 
and Regeneration Community Association Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 595, 27 April 2001; R 
(Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366; for further discussion see 
Collingbourne (2001); DIAL UK  ‘The: evidence of DIAL UK to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights’ April 2003, supra; Donnelly CM, ‘Leonard Cheshire Again and Beyond: 
Private Contractors, Contract and section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act’ [2005] Public Law 
785; Oliver D, ‘Functions of a Public Nature under the Human Rights Act’ [2004] Public Law 
329; Sunkin M ‘Pushing Forward the Frontiers of Human Rights Protection: The Meaning of 
Public Authority under the Human Rights Act’ [2004] Public Law 643; Landau J, ‘Functional 
public authorities after YL’ [2007] Public Law 630 
197
 YL para15 
198
 ECHR Article 13 
199
 YL para 26 
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Southern Cross is a company carrying out a socially useful business for 
profit.  It is neither a charity nor a philanthropist.  It enters into private 
law contracts with the residents in its care homes and the local 
authorities with whom it does business.  It receives no public funding, 
enjoys no special statutory powers, and is at liberty to accept or reject 
residents as it chooses…and to charge whatever fees in its commercial 
judgement it thinks suitable.  It is operating in a commercial market with 
commercial competitors. 
 
Lord Neuberger suggests that if the legislature considers it desirable for 
residents in privately owned care homes to be given Convention rights 
against the proprietors, it should ‘spell it out in terms’.200  The legislature 
obliged, enacting s145 of the 2008 Health and Social Care Act.201 However, 
s145 constitutes only partial resolution of the problem.  It provides no 
protection for those receiving domiciliary, as opposed to residential, care 
from private or voluntary sector providers,202 or for those using their personal 
budgets to purchase services in a ‘thriving social market’. 203   While YL 
remains as precedent, their ECHR Article 13 right to an effective remedy in 
the courts for breach of their European Convention rights remains in 
question.204  
 
Furthermore, judicial review itself has developed as a mechanism for redress 
against the State: its remit is limited to review of the actions of public 
                                                 
200
 YL para 171 
201
 (1) A person… who provides accommodation, together with nursing or personal care, in a 
care home for an individual under arrangements made… under the relevant statutory 
provisions [(2)(a) in relation to England and Wales, section 21(1)(a) and 26 of the National 
Assistance Act 1948] is to be taken for the purposes of subsection (3)(b) of section 6 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998… to be exercising a function of a public nature in doing so. 
202
  1.46 million in 2009-10 [though not all would be receiving services from private or 
voluntary sector providers]. Of those service users receiving community based services, 65 
per cent were aged 65 and over.  In 2009-10, 557,000 service users received home care, 
512,000 service users received equipment and adaptations, 445,000 service users received 
professional support, 195,000 service users received day care services and 100,000 service 
users received meals. There were 166,000 service users in receipt of new/ existing direct 
payments and or personal budgets.  http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-
collections/social-care/adult-social-care-information/community-care-statistics-social-
services-activity-england-2009-10-further-release accessed 1.9.11 
203
 The number of service users receiving direct payments has continued to rise steadily 
since 2004-05, with only 24,000 users receiving direct payments in 2004-05, compared to 
107,000 in 2009-10.  http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/social-care/adult-
social-care-information/community-care-statistics-social-services-activity-england-2009-10-
further-release   accessed 1.9.11; and see Chapter 6 above 
204
 See below for discussion of the Ombudsman’s role in this context 
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bodies.205  Its role in the context of Article 19(b) thus seems likely to diminish 
in the context of the Coalition’s free-market vision of social care unless the 
government accepts the Law Commission’s proposal206 that ‘community care 
entitlements’ should be enforced by this means. 
 
It would seem, then, that despite some initial expansion following introduction 
of the Human Rights Act, and some purposive application of equality duties,  
the capacity of  judicial review to influence independent living  policy, law or 
practice towards more CRPD-compatible understandings is at best limited, 
and is currently in retreat. 207 Whilst common law, equality duties or ECHR 
rights may provide minimal protection, 208  the overall trend following 
MacDonald and Anufrijeva is one of retraction from any rights-based 
understanding of independent living service provision.   Even in this ‘legal’ 
setting, the CRPD,  Article 19 and economic, social and cultural rights remain 
invisible; equality protections are reduced; the ‘socio-economic’ potential of 
civil and political rights under the European Convention on Human Rights is 
confined to the most extreme cases; and the future of judicial review itself as 
a redress mechanism in the context of the ‘social market’ is uncertain.  
Indeed, successful use of judicial review as a redress mechanism in Article 
19 cases is set to become even less likely following enactment of the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  This Act removes 
availability of legal aid for advice, assistance or representation in the majority 
of ‘community care’ cases.209 
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 See for instance Wade W and Forsyth C, Administrative Law 10
th
 ed (Oxford University 
Press 2009);  Carroll A, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 5
th
 ed (Pearson-Longman 
2009) part 5; Bailey SH, Jones B and Mowbray AR, Bailey, Jones and Mowbray: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary on Administrative Law, 4
th
 Rev ed (Sweet & Maxwell 2005) part 
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 See Chapter 7 above 
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 Palmer identifies an ‘untutored allegiance of senior judges to the ascendancy of private 
economic power over fundamental human rights values.’  Palmer E, Judicial Review, Socio-
Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2009) Preface to the paperback edition, x.  
See also Palmer’s conclusions at pp240 and 254, 274-6 and Afterword 
208
 Such as the ‘core minimum’ recognised by McCowan J in Gloucestershire, or delay in 
restriction of services to critical needs only in Birmingham 
209
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, ss 8 and 9 and Schedule 1 
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Van Beuren insists that ‘both the symbolism and the practical potential of 
courts ought not to be underestimated.’ 210   However, as O’Cinneide 
concludes,  
it is obvious that the UK legal system still lacks a set of legal tools and 
an adequate legal or policy language to address issues of socio-
economic rights deprivation.  The polycentric nature of litigation 
involving socio-economic issues means that courts will often only be 
prepared to intervene where a definitive and distinct state actor has 
clearly denied basic support.  Outside such cases… alternative 
methods of upholding socio-economic rights should be sought. 211   
 
Lord Woolf in Anufrijeva agrees that alternative methods should be sought, 
but on grounds of cost and proportionality.212  In an apparent reversal of the 
established presumption that Ombudsmen should not investigate where the 
complainant has a legal remedy,213 Lord Woolf refers prospective claimants 
to the complaint procedures of the Parliamentary or Local Government 
Ombudsmen, ‘at least in the first instance’,214  as they ‘are designed to deal 
economically… and expeditiously with claims for compensation for 
maladministration.’ 215   Importantly, he also recognises that the 
‘maladministration’ the Ombudsmen are empowered to address, depending 
                                                 
210
 Beuren G van, ‘Including the Excluded: the Case for an Economic, Social and Cultural 
Human Rights Act’ [2002] Public Law 465; see also Gearty C and Mantouvalou V, Debating 
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211
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mediation and judicial review see Bondy V and Mulcahy L, ‘Mediation and Judicial Review: 
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Woolf’s response, follow-up seminar 2009. 
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Approach to Administrative Justice?’ in Adler M (ed) Administrative Justice (Hart 2010).  
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on its extent and the severity of its impact, might constitute infringement of 
human rights.216 
 
So can the Ombudsman ‘enterprise’ 217  contribute to a more CRPD-
compatible approach to Article 19 socio-economic rights? 
 
The Ombudsman 
The role of Ombudsman was introduced to England in the 1960s,218 as a 
means of countering State abuse or misuse of power at the expense of the 
individual.219  It was designed to be  
impartial, open, informal, and of high reputation, guided by principles 
not rules and committed to norms based on what is fair and reasonable 
rather that a strict test of legality.220   
 
Today, the Ombudsman concept has penetrated a variety of public and 
private fields.221  Most relevant to Article 19 services is the Commission for 
Local Administration comprising two Local Government Ombudsmen (LGOs) 
each covering different areas of England, and the Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman (PHSO).222  Whilst each has their distinct remit, they 
conduct joint investigations when appropriate.223  All are Crown appointees, 
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 See Buck et al (2011) 
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independent of central and local government.  They focus on individual 
dispute resolution, whilst also providing advice and guidance on complaint 
handling to public bodies, and reporting on wider issues224 as a means of 
driving improvement in public service provision.225  They thus serve both 
‘consumer’226 and ‘managerial/bureaucratic’ models of administrative justice. 
227    
 
Although the Ombudsmen have some powers equivalent to those of the 
courts,228 their approach to dispute resolution is fundamentally different.  As 
the PHSO describes, ‘[t]he Ombudsman asks different questions from those 
asked in court and looks at different issues.’229  Their emphasis is on being 
open and accessible, and their service is free.  Their investigations are 
inquisitorial and flexible in contrast to the courts’ formal and adversarial 
proceedings.  They make non-binding recommendations 230  rather than 
enforceable legal judgments, and may recommend individual remedies or 
systemic changes which are not available through the legal process. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
womanfully to operate in the best interests of our mutual complainants – but which I can only 
describe in polite company as ‘challenging’.’ 
224
 For example the PHSO Report on Complaints about Disability Issues, 12 October 2011 
225
 See Abraham (2011), and Buck et al (2011) for discussion of the ‘novel techniques’ (ibid 
125) being developed in this area 
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 ‘Understanding expectations: customer satisfaction research for the LGO 2010’ Ipsos 
Mori  Social Research Institute, October 2010 
227
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within the overarching purpose of ‘setting it right’ underlying the wider administrative justice 
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‘getting it right’ first time by feeding back to public authorities knowledge and advice on good 
administration. 
228
 Such as a power to summon witnesses, and to obtain information and documents in the 
course of their investigation: for instance under the Local Government Act s29 
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 PHSO ‘Report by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman on complaints about 
disability issues’,   HC1512, 11 October 2011, 7 
230
 It is unusual for these recommendations not to be complied with: the Ombudsman’s 
findings of fact are binding on the authorities being investigated: R v Local Commissioner for 
Administration ex p Eastleigh BC [1988] 1 QB 855, see Birkinshaw P, ‘Grievances, 
Remedies and the State – Revisited and Re-appraised’ in Adler M (ed) Administrative 
Justice in Context (Hart 2010) 362; and the status of Ombudsman recommendations was 
enhanced following R (Bradley and Others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2007] EWCA 242 (Admin), where the Court of Appeal held that their findings should not be 
dismissed without good reason.  The Law Commission sees recommendations as 
‘essentially part of the political process’: Law Commission Report on Public Services 
Ombudsmen 2011, Summary, 5 
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The Ombudsmen investigate complaints about ‘maladministration’ and/or 
alleged ‘failure of service’. 231   ‘Maladministration’ is interpreted broadly and 
flexibly, to include delay, failure to follow procedures, inadequate consultation 
or record-keeping, or misleading or inaccurate statements. 232   For an 
investigation to result in a Report and/or remedy, maladministration by the 
public body must have caused ‘injustice’, such as hurt feelings, distress, 
worry or inconvenience, loss of right or amenity, not receiving a service, or 
financial loss. 233  Like internal complaints and judicial review, complaint to 
the Ombudsman is not an appeal on the merits of a substantive decision: the 
closest the complainant may get to overturning a decision would be a finding 
of ‘failure of service’.  However, the Ombudsman ‘enterprise’ is increasingly 
recognised as a developing constitutional alternative to the courts.234    
 
While the PHSO investigates complaints against government departments 
and the NHS, the LGOs investigate local authority action, including their 
provision of adult social care.  As ‘last resort’ redress mechanisms 235  in 
health and social care, disability-related complaints make up a substantial 
proportion of the Ombudsmen’s workload; 236  and in this context, they 
increasingly work together.  For instance, ‘Six Lives: the provision of public 
services to people with learning disabilities’237 was a joint investigation by 
LGO and PHSO in response to complaints brought by MENCAP238 on behalf 
of the families of six people with learning disabilities who died while in NHS 
or local authority care. This was a high-profile investigation, which concluded 
that at least one, possibly two of the deaths resulted from ‘significant and 
distressing failures in service across health and social care’, some of which 
                                                 
231
 Local Government Act 1974 s26(1)(b) and (c); Health Service Commissioners Act 1993 
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 A dis-satisfied complainant may request a further internal review or, if appropriate, apply 
for judicial review of the Ombudsman’s decision. 
236
 Around a third of the PHSO’s workload 
237
 Report on complaints 07B06309, 07B06077 & 07B09453 issued jointly with the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman: laid before Parliament on 23 March 2009   
238
 MENCAP is an independent organisation which supports people with a learning disability, 
and their families and carers. http://www.mencap.org.uk/about-us  last accessed 10.3.12 
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were for disability-related reasons; and that ‘many organisations responded 
inadequately to the complaints made against them, leaving family members 
feeling drained and demoralised.’239  Remedies included apology, financial 
compensation, recommendations to the bodies concerned to put in place 
service improvements, and ringing calls from both LGO and HSO for stronger 
leadership in health and social care professions to improve quality of care for 
people with learning disabilities.240 
 
Since October 2010, 241  the LGOs’ social care remit has expanded to 
consider complaints from people who arrange and fund their own care, thus 
bringing the independent care sector242 also under the LGOs’ scrutiny.  This 
gives the LGOs currently a wider remit than the human rights jurisdiction of 
the courts,243 although awareness of this new role is as yet low.244  The 
PHSO similarly has power to address complaints relating to private 
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LGO’s new remit.’ LGO ‘Complaints about privately funded and arranged adult social care’ 
2011, Executive Summary, 6.  The issue of ‘self-funders’ and access to/quality of care had 
been highlighted by CSCI in its 2008 report ‘Lost to the System? The Impact of Fair Access 
to Care’ 
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contractors in the NHS.245  As Buck et al comment, these Ombudsmen - 
unlike the courts - are ‘well placed to deal with the practice of transferring 
public functions to the private sector’.246   
 
As public authorities, the Ombudsmen must act compatibly with European 
Convention rights,247 although, unlike the courts, they are not required to 
‘take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence.248  Nor do they create or follow 
precedent.  Instead, they have developed overarching principles relating to 
good administration, complaint handling and remedy against which to assess 
the actions and decisions of public bodies.249   According to these Principles, 
good administration requires the authority to be customer-focused, open and 
accountable, to act fairly and proportionately, to put things right when they go 
wrong, and to seek continuous improvement.  It also requires them to ‘get it 
right’ in the first place by complying with law and guidance, including human 
rights and equality law, and having regard for the rights of those concerned.    
However, the Ombudsmen are careful to distance themselves from the court-
based legal process: 
[t]he Ombudsman is not empowered to determine whether the law has 
been breached.  The Ombudsman system of justice provides an 
alternative to taking a case to court but it is not a surrogate court… 
Although the Ombudsman does not determine or enforce the law she is 
nevertheless helping to give force to the principles that underpin the law 
as they affect the circumstances of the individual concerned. 250 
(emphasis added) 
 
As O’Brien comments, this distinction between enforcing the law and ‘giving 
force to’ the principles that underlie it demonstrates a measure of 
ambivalence. 
On the one hand, there is clear and understandable intention to 
distance the role of the ombudsman from overt determination of matters 
                                                 
245
 ‘Investigate any action taken by or on behalf of a government department’ Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1967, s5(1) (emphasis added): Buck et al (2011) 108 
246
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247
 HRA s6 
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 Birkinshaw P, ‘Grievances, Remedies and the State – Revisited and Re-appraised’ in 
Adler M (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010) 364 
249
 http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/improving-public-service/ombudsmansprinciples accessed 
11.4.12 
250
 PHSO ‘Report by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman on complaints about 
disability issues’,   HC1512, 11 October 2011, 7-8 
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of human rights law.  On the other hand, the reports themselves come 
very close to making findings that effectively depend upon the sort of 
human rights adjudication that is in principle being banished.  To say, 
for example, that the “basic human rights” of dignity and privacy have 
been “denied” or that there has been “a failure to live up to human rights 
principles” is to come very close to active adjudication of the human 
rights issues at hand.251 
 
Nevertheless, this conceptual sleight of hand allows the Ombudsmen to take 
a much broader and more flexible approach to human rights and equality 
than that we have seen above in the context of judicial review.   This 
approach can be seen in the 2011 ‘Report by the Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman on complaints about disability issues’ (the 2011 
Report).252 
 
The 2011 Report suggests that the three Principles of Good Administration 
most likely to come into play in relation to complaints about unfair treatment 
or poor services provided to disabled people are: ‘getting it right’, being 
customer focussed, and acting fairly and proportionately. 
 
‘Getting it right’ incudes  
acting in accordance with the law and with regard for the rights of those 
concerned….  In this context… the Disability Discrimination and 
Equality Acts, together with the Human Rights Act, are of particular 
relevance, forming a specific element of the overall standard… 253 
(original emphasis) 
 
Where rights under that legislation are engaged, the public body is expected 
to take account of those rights in their decision-making and in carrying out its 
functions throughout provision of services to the complainant.  The 2011 
Report illustrates this principle through the case of Miss W, a 40-year-old 
woman with learning disabilities and epilepsy, whose (mis)treatment in 
hospital included medication without consent and lack of basic nursing care.  
Here, the Ombudsman found 
                                                 
251
 O’Brien (2009) 474 
252
 PHSO ‘Report by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman on complaints 
about disability issues’,   HC1512, 11 October 2011 
253
 Ibid 8 
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minimal evidence which demonstrated that either doctors or nurses had 
regard to the law or any guidance relating to the provision of services 
for people with disabilities when they planned and delivered Miss W’s 
care, or that Miss W’s rights under disability discrimination law were a 
relevant consideration in their decision making about Miss W’s care or 
the way that care was provided.  Therefore we concluded that in 
providing care to Miss W, the Trust did not have regard to its obligations 
to her under disability discrimination law.  The Trust’s failing in this 
respect was so serious as to constitute service failure.254  
 
The public body is also expected to have 
had regard to and have taken account of core human rights principles of 
fairness, respect, equality, dignity and autonomy.255   
 
These ‘FREDA’ principles have been central to the development in England 
of a ‘human-rights-based approach’ to public service provision: 256  they 
supported the New Labour government’s objective of creating a ‘human 
rights culture’ in the UK.257   Under the Ombudsman Principle of ‘getting it 
right’, failure to demonstrate compliance not only with the law but also with 
FREDA principles may contribute to maladministration or service failure.  For 
instance, in the Six Lives case, as well as focusing on Articles 2, 3 and 14 
ECHR, the Disability Discrimination Act, 258  and relevant policy, the 
Ombudsmen found that eight of the public bodies investigated failed to live 
up to human rights principles, including equality, dignity and autonomy.259 
 
‘Being customer focused’ requires the public body to ensure ease of access 
to its services, and to treat each individual with sensitivity bearing in mind 
their individual needs and responding flexibly to the circumstances of the 
                                                 
254
 Ibid 24 
255
 Ibid 
256
 promoted by, amongst others, the British Institute of Human Rights in its work with the 
health care sector, http://www.bihr.org.uk/projects/human-rights-in-healthcare  accessed 
11.4.12; see for instance Butler F, Human Rights: Who Needs Them? (Institute for Public 
Policy Research 2004) 
257
 ‘What I mean … when I talk about a culture of human rights is to create a society in which 
our public institutions are habitually, automatically responsive to human rights considerations 
in relation to every procedure they follow, in relation to every practice they follow, in relation 
to every decision they take, in relation to every piece of legislation they sponsor.’  Lord 
Irvine, Lord Chancellor, 2001 
258
 ‘Equality for people with disabilities does not mean treating them in the same way as 
everyone else. Sometimes alternative methods of making services available to them have to 
be found in order to achieve equality in the outcomes for them. The focus is on those 
outcomes.’ Six Lives, Part 1   
259
 Six lives, part 1, 3 
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case;260 while ‘acting fairly and proportionately’ means understanding and 
respecting diversity, treating people equally regardless of their background or 
circumstances, and ensuring that decisions and actions are proportionate, 
appropriate and fair.261  The aim is to ensure equality of outcome.262  Again, 
where such standards have not been met, this may contribute to a finding of 
maladministration or service failure.  The 2011 Report refers to the case of 
Mr L, a 21-year-old man with severe learning disabilities, whose hospital 
consultant blamed the failures in his treatment which led to his death on his 
‘being a poor historian… [He] was mentally subnormal…’ 263   Here, the 
Ombudsman found it ‘extraordinarily inappropriate’ that the consultant should 
use such language, and ‘astonishing’ that he expected Mr L to be capable of 
providing the relevant history.  ‘Mr L’s rights under discrimination law were 
engaged and should have been a relevant consideration in the Trust’s 
decision-making,’264 but they failed to ‘get it right,’ resulting in service failure.  
 
Rights under the HRA and Equality Act, however, are limited to European 
Convention rights and non-discrimination.  Here, as in the Courts - and 
despite the clearly disability-related and socio-economic nature of these 
complaints - economic, social and cultural rights, the CRPD and Article 19 
remain invisible.  However, as Abraham argues,  
[t]he greater subtlety and persuasive nature of the ombudsman 
technique make it ideally placed to deal with disputes that touch upon 
the most sensitive areas of social and economic rights…. The 
orthodoxy is that such rights are not areas suitable for court-based 
adjudication.  Yet internationally agreed commitments to social and 
economic rights still remain, and citizens will regularly feel let down by 
the actions or lack of action by public authorities in areas such as the 
provision of social housing, health care, disability and social services.  
Precisely because ombudsmen already deal with complaints that touch 
upon dignity and rights in a range of public services, they are well 
placed to develop these themes as matters of good administrative 
standards, flexibly applied and improved over time, rather than 
enshrined in hard-edged legal standards.265 
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In practice, then, the Ombudsmen recognise their role in the progressive 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.  Moreover, scrutiny of 
the Ombudsman Principles as applied to complaints about disability issues 
reveals parallels between the Ombudsmen’s approach and that of the CRPD.  
Both emphasise respect for dignity, autonomy and equality; and the 
continuous application of these principles throughout the provision of 
services to the disabled person. 266   Both require planning, design and 
delivery of services to ensure that disabled people can access them easily; 
and that individuals be treated with sensitivity, ‘bearing in mind their 
individual needs and responding flexibly to the circumstances of the case’.267  
Both require respect for difference and acceptance of people with disabilities 
as part of human diversity, with equal access and treatment regardless of 
their background or circumstances to ensure equality of outcome.268   
 
Furthermore, Ombudsman investigations frequently prompt actions 
conforming to CRPD requirements.  For instance, in Miss W’s case, the NHS 
Trust agreed to prepare an action plan to share lessons learnt with its clinical 
teams and to avoid a recurrence, in line with CRPD Article 4(d).    In Mr L’s 
case, the Trust set up a Learning Disabilities Focus and Task Group, in line 
with CRPD Article 4(3),269 undertook training programmes in line with CRPD 
Article 4(i),270 and commissioned an external review of their care for people 
with learning disabilities in line with CRPD Article 4(c).   Recommendations 
from the Six Lives Report include not only remedial action by the relevant 
public bodies,271   but also that all NHS and social care organisations in 
England urgently review the effectiveness of their systems for understanding 
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 CRPD Article 3, general principles/Ombudsman Principle ‘getting it right’ 
267
 CRPD Articles 9, accessibility and 19(c) equal access to services, responsive to 
needs/Ombudsman Principle ‘being customer focused’, PHSO (2011) 9 
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and meeting the needs of people with learning disabilities; that those 
responsible for the regulation of health and social care services check that 
their frameworks and monitoring systems ensure effective protection; and 
that the Department of Health  ‘promote and support the implementation of 
these recommendations, monitor progress against them and publish a 
progress report within 18 months of the publication of this report’.272  The 
Department of Health duly produced a progress report in October 2010, 
setting out (including in accessible format) a range of improvements and 
remaining problems, with priorities for further work.  The Ombudsmen’s 
recommendations have thus – at least potentially - influenced not only the 
outcomes for the complainants, but also the awareness and actions of the 
individual public bodies, of those who work in them, and of the wider health 
and social care system, in line with CRPD Article 3, general principles; Article 
4, States’ general obligations; Article 8, awareness-raising; Article 9, 
accessibility; Article 19(b) & (c) services to support independent living; and 
Article 25, right to health.  They thus help to influence understandings, 
systems and identities at all levels towards a more rights-based 
understanding of the economic, social and cultural rights required for the 
exercise of Article 19 and other CRPD rights.  The Ombudsmen’s stated 
objective is ‘to change underlying attitudes and behaviour on a lasting 
basis,’273  though they ‘do not underestimate the challenges involved’.274   
 
In a domestic setting which excludes economic, social and cultural rights, 
there are thus at least six aspects of the Ombudsman ‘enterprise’ that make 
it particularly apt as a forum for Article 19 socio-economic rights adjudication 
in line with CRPD understandings.  Its accessibility, its distancing from the 
‘legal’ forum of the courts, its focus on ‘giving force to’ principles rather than 
enforcing the law, its flexibility of remit and of process, the persuasive nature 
of its recommendations and the wide scope of available remedies all allow for 
a ‘softer’ approach to implementation of Article 19 socio-economic rights.  
However, these developments constitute a move away from a ‘legal’ model of 
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administrative justice towards a ‘consumer’(giving people a voice)/ 
‘managerial’(improving public services)275 approach which, though potentially 
more acceptable in dominant domestic discourse, runs counter to the 
international economic, social and cultural rights discourse promoted by the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.276   
 
Moreover, opportunities to exercise the Ombudsman approach are limited.  
The complaint must first have exhausted available internal complaint 
mechanisms:277   as we have seen, complaints reaching this level of the 
administrative redress hierarchy represent the tip of the iceberg.278  Whether 
or not the Ombudsmen’s developing confidence has an impact on the 
effectiveness of first tier complaints remains to be seen. 279   Resource 
constraints dictate that the Ombudsmen concentrate on the more difficult and 
time-consuming cases, referring others back to the public body concerned for 
more ‘proportionate dispute resolution’,280 where they may or may not receive 
adequate consideration. 281   Furthermore, there is no statutory recognition of 
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the Ombudsman’s role in the implementation of economic, social and cultural 
rights,282  and visibility of the service remains low.  Nevertheless, while the 
courts are retreating from involvement in this field, the Ombudsmen are 
expanding their role in a way that may contribute, however incrementally, to a 
more CRPD-compatible understanding of socio-economic rights in the 
context of Article 19.  Some observers call for current restraints to be eased 
through introduction of an ‘own initiative’ power of investigation, 283  and 
through more formal recognition of the Ombudsman’s constitutional place as 
part of an integrated and coherent administrative justice system.284   
 
The development of such a system, however, seems far from assured.   The 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) set up in 2007285 to 
further that goal looks set to be abolished.   According to Abraham, the AJTC 
seemed at last to reaffirm Whyatt’s vision of an integrated 
administrative justice system. If it is abolished, any such hope can only 
evaporate. The supposition that the Ministry of Justice, with its historic 
emphasis on civil justice and its current preoccupation with criminal 
justice, might fill the gap is surely fanciful. The reality sadly is that with 
the disappearance of the AJTC the prospect of an administrative justice 
system worthy of the name is as remote as ever.286 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter concludes Part 2 of the thesis, which has explored the potential 
for expansion of the CRPD-drafters’ project in England.  It has examined the 
UK’s international dialogue with the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and domestic implementation of CRPD Article 19.  Chapter 5 
concluded that the UK has not yet made the transition in understanding from 
‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ that the CRPD requires. Chapters 6 to 8 have explored 
some effects of this mis-understanding on implementation through policy, law 
and practice in England of CRPD Article 19, the right to live independently 
and be included in the community.  Alongside a strong and expanding civil 
and political discourse built on concepts of individual autonomy and choice, 
these Chapters found continuing invisibility of the economic, social and 
cultural rights essential for their exercise.   With the CRPD and Article 19 also 
invisible, the lack of any international human rights framework to guide 
implementation of the socio-economic rights involved provides opportunities 
for regression, instability, and continuing oppression in ‘welfare’ policy, law 
and administration.   
 
Chapter 9 has investigated the potential of internal complaints procedures, 
judicial review and complaint to the Ombudsman to counter this imbalance in 
domestic human rights protection.  It has found that the capacity of internal 
complaints procedures to influence wider policy, law or administration 
towards more CRPD-compatible understandings remains negligible.  
Interpreted positively, new regulations allow for a more flexible and outcome-
focussed approach.  However, that interpretation will depend on the 
discursive struggles within each institution and on the subject positions of the 
various actors. Economic, social and cultural rights, the CRPD and Article 19, 
which might offer guidance and coherence, remain invisible.  Moreover, the 
‘consumer’/’managerial’ focus on procedure rather than substance means 
that even the most positive interpretation of the new regulations may leave 
the complainant’s substantive problem unresolved and the complainant 
frustrated and exhausted, with judicial review or complaint to the 
Ombudsman as their  potential ‘last resort’ options for redress. 
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Exploration of judicial review has examined the judges’ application of 
common law, disability equality law and European Convention jurisprudence 
in the context of Article 19 service provision.  Whilst a ‘core minimum’ of 
provision is recognised in common law, the courts’ insistence that public 
resources may be taken into account effectively reduces any incipient 
individual ‘right’ to service provision to a discretionary power.  Application of 
disability equality law has, in some cases, 287  challenged the raising of 
eligibility for services to those with ‘critical’ need only.  However, the public 
authorities challenged remain free to reconsider their decision in a 
procedurally correct manner and reach the same decision.  With 
consolidation of the disability equality duty into the Equality Act’s new, less 
stringent, public sector duty, such cases may become less effective.  
Introduction of the Human Rights Act prompted some judges to interpret 
Strasbourg jurisprudence expansively, in line with subsequent CRPD Article 
19 requirements, particularly in relation to ECHR Article 8 rights to suitably 
adapted accommodation, dignity and participation.  However, such 
expansion was swiftly reversed, with the imposition of a higher bar to 
engagement of Article 8 than that imposed in Strasbourg.   
 
As a result, resource arguments may still justify refusal of all but a ‘core 
minimum’ of provision; arguments relating to dignity, participation and 
positive human rights obligations are confined to the most extreme cases.  
Here too, the CRPD and Article 19 remain invisible. Case law thus reflects 
rather than alters dominant exclusionary understandings: the capacity of 
judicial review to influence policy, law or administration towards more CRPD-
compatible understandings appears remote. 288   Moreover, the future of 
judicial review itself as a redress mechanism in the context of Article 19 looks 
uncertain in the context of increasing privatisation of the ‘social market’, and 
of Lord Woolf’s signposting of such cases to the Ombudsman. 
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Examination of the Ombudsmen’s role reveals potentially more promising 
developments for expansion of a CRPD-compatible discourse.  Unlike the 
courts, the service of PHSO and LGOs is free and accessible, their 
investigations inquisitorial and flexible, their brief to counter public sector 
‘maladministration’ broad and unfettered by precedent, and their remit 
inclusive of private sector providers. As public bodies themselves, they must 
act compatibly with the European Convention.  The principles they have 
developed to guide their work reflect this duty, requiring the public authorities 
concerned to comply both with European Convention and disability equality 
law as ‘standards’, and with human rights principles of fairness, respect, 
equality, dignity and autonomy.  Whilst not ‘enforcing’ the law itself, they see 
themselves as ‘giving force to’ the principles that underpin the law.  This 
conceptual sleight of hand enables the Ombudsmen to take a much broader 
and more flexible approach to human rights and equality than the courts, 
while the non-binding (though influential) nature of their recommendations 
encourages co-operation and incremental change on the part of the public 
bodies concerned at both local and national levels.  Although the CRPD and 
Article 19 so far remain invisible here, in practice the Ombudsmen recognise 
their role in the progressive implementation of economic, social and cultural 
rights.  The capacity of LGOs and PHSO to influence policy, law and practice 
relating to Article 19 services towards a more CRPD-compatible approach is 
therefore promising.   However, such promise is not without its challenges, 
including reliance on exhaustion of internal complaints procedures, resource 
constraints, lack of visibility and lack of statutory recognition of the 
Ombudsmen’s constitutional role in the implementation of all human rights.   
 
Rather than countering the imbalance in domestic human rights protection to 
encourage a more CRPD-compatible discourse, available redress systems 
generally engage complex and labyrinthine systems of social relations which 
reflect dominant exclusionary understandings and may intensify rather than 
counter oppression.   As O’Grady et al conclude,  
[t]he disabling nature of society as it is currently structured places 
disabled people in a particularly vulnerable situation as regards the 
experience of justiciable problems.  This vulnerability is, we argue, yet 
another facet of the social exclusion of disabled people from society. 
Disabled respondents to the [Legal Services Commission Civil and 
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Social Justice] survey demonstrated their action-orientated approach to 
dealing with justiciable problems. It is highly problematic however, that 
disabled people should have to rely primarily on their own actions and 
strategies to combat the disabling outcomes of society. Legal and 
advice services are important means through which social injustices 
can be addressed. However, increasing access to legal and advice 
services cannot, on its own, bring about social justice for the disabled 
population. Only concerted action to address the ways in which society 
disables people can do this.289  
 
Chapter 10 brings the thesis to a close, and offers recommendations 
towards development of more CRPD-compliant understandings, and thus 
applications, of the law.    
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
 
Introduction  
As noted in Chapter 1, this research project springs from the writer’s long 
standing engagement in the field of disability rights, combined with an 
interest in the capacity of administrative and human rights law to bring about 
emancipatory change.  The international disability/human rights discourse, 
with the hegemonic project it has spawned, is one with which the writer 
identifies.  It is also one that has been encapsulated in international human 
rights law to which the UK government is committed. Both aspects are 
reflected in the thesis: it is positioned within both the discipline of law and the 
discipline of disability studies.  Whilst its focus has been firmly on the law, its 
ethos has been that of emancipation.   
 
In examining international treaties, national legislation and case law, the 
thesis has employed classical legal doctrinal methods, reflecting its basis in 
the discipline of law.  The text of the CRPD has been discussed in the light of 
its context, object and purpose, its preamble and travaux préparatoires, and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in line with the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.1  Domestic legislation, case law and administration relating 
to Article 19 have been described and analysed employing standard 
administrative law techniques. 
 
                                                 
1
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Articles 31 and 32 
 330 
 
However, in the world of political discourse theory, everything has meaning: it 
is not possible to stand outside the social space to take a ‘neutral’ position.  
On that basis, this thesis has argued that law is not neutral.  Legal 
cartographers choose to project their multi-dimensional political social reality 
into a two-dimensional legal map not only according to technical factors, the 
map’s purpose and its cultural context but also according to their own 
ideologies.  Their projection decisions inevitably distort reality, and because 
choices need to be made, that distortion will never be neutral.2   Equally, it is 
argued here, academic research functions within a complex and dynamic 
socio-political context, influenced by a multitude of discursive 
understandings, systems and identities, 3 including those of the researcher.4  
The planning, research and writing of a thesis constantly require choices to 
be made, and those choices will never be neutral.5   
 
In the field of disability, the ‘positioning’ of the researcher becomes 
particularly crucial.  As we have seen throughout the thesis, here too 
everything has meaning: it is not possible to take a neutral position.  While 
much mainstream disability research founded in the discourse of ‘normality’ 
has contributed to the objectification of disabled people, researchers 
identifying with the academic discourse of disability studies attempt to 
counter such objectification and to contribute to inclusive understandings and 
practices. 6  Just as Laclau describes his work as a ‘viewpoint from which to 
think politics’, 7  so disability studies perspectives can be understood as 
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short theory of knowledge, distance and experience (Citizen Press in association with 
Shaping Our Lives, 2003): ‘much social research, including social policy research is 
concerned with people facing discrimination, disadvantage and exclusions.  By emphasising 
the value of neutrality we are downgrading the value and validity of their direct experience.  
We are adding to oppression and discrimination by routinely treating their knowledge as less 
valid and less reliable.’ 
5
 ‘Ways of viewing disability, of developing research questions, of interpreting research 
results, of justifying research methodology, and of putting policies and programmes in place 
are as much about ideology as they are about fact…’ Rioux MH ‘Disability: the place of 
judgement in a world of fact’ (1997) 41(2) Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 102, 
abstract 
6
 See Chapter 1 above 
7
 Laclau (1990) and see Chapter 1 above 
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‘particular knowledge positions from which to address and refute disablism.’8  
The choice of these discursive understandings as basis for the projection 
decisions taken in the course of planning, researching and writing this thesis 
inevitably reflects the ideological identity, practical experience and interests 
of the writer.  However, it is the law as entrenched in the CRPD by its drafters 
that binds the UK government and demands paradigm change.  Whilst it is 
hoped that the analyses set out in the thesis contribute to understanding that 
process of change, the recommendations below offer more concrete 
suggestions for overcoming some of the current obstacles to realisation of 
disability rights in England in conformity with the legal requirements of the 
CRPD. 
 
This Chapter brings the thesis to its conclusion.  It summarises the thesis’ 
approach, findings and conclusions before making recommendations to help 
engender a more CRPD-compliant discourse in domestic policy, law and 
practice.  Recommendations are directed to government,9 as it is there that 
international legal obligations rest.  Finally, it suggests further related areas 
for research from a political discourse theory perspective. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
To recapitulate, this thesis is about understandings, about how those 
understandings shape the law, and about how the law helps to shape those 
understandings.  Its first premise is that law is formed and functions within a 
complex and dynamic socio-political context from which it is inseparable.10  
The argument has been made through the prism of political discourse theory, 
enabling analysis of the processes by which such understandings come 
about, how they ‘shift’, and how they become sedimented in social structures 
and norms and in the realities of people’s lives.  The social world is 
understood as consisting of ever-changing and dynamic discourses, forming 
and attempting to expand themselves by incorporating some discursive 
                                                 
8
 Goodley (2010) 10 
9
 Of any political persuasion 
10
 See for instance O’Cinneide, C (2009) 168 
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elements and excluding others.  The negation of identity essential for 
expansion of a discourse gives rise to social antagonism, whereby those 
excluded challenge and seek to undermine the discourse(s) from which they 
have been excluded.  There is no possible ‘final’ resolution of these dynamic 
tensions, but that does not prevent us from wishing, and working, for such 
resolution through promotion of the hegemony of those discourses with which 
we identify.11   The laying down of ideas and practices in legal text, the 
interpretation and implementation of those legal texts through legal and 
administrative systems, is one collection of social practices through which a 
political discourse may seek to dominate the field of meaning.  As the law 
reflects and influences social understandings, structures and identities, it may 
contain and regulate a dominant social order or contribute to development of 
emancipatory social change.12 
 
From this perspective, Part 1 of the thesis traced some discursive elements 
whose partial convergence gave rise to a new international disability/human 
rights discourse; and the hegemonic project to sediment that discourse in the 
text of a new legal order.  It described the unique participatory drafting 
process which gave rise to the CRPD; the reshaping of the human rights 
framework to reflect and embrace the experience of disability; and the 
Convention’s provisions for continuation of the international hegemonic 
project to drive implementation.  The myth embedded in the CRPD pictures 
an accessible and welcoming world, where impairment is accepted as 
universal human variation, and disabled people are no longer excluded 
recipients of welfare, but active, valued and equal rights-holders.  Key to this 
‘paradigm change’ from welfare to rights is the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights: the CRPD text melds together civil, cultural, economic, political 
and social rights into an integral legal order which highlights new angles of 
the human rights framework and challenges basic human rights assumptions.  
Through this ‘revolving door’, the drafters’ hegemonic project seeks to 
circulate its forms of power and knowledge so as to redefine the terms of the 
                                                 
11
 For instance, this thesis has been situated within both the discipline of law and the 
emancipatory ethos of disability studies (see above and Chapter 1) 
12
 Chapter 1 above, and see Santos (2002) 
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political debate and set a new, transformative agenda within national settings 
around the world.   
 
Whether, or to what extent, that project succeeds will depend not only on the 
power of the CRPD itself to drive implementation, but also on the reception, 
antagonisms or dislocations it encounters in the domestic sphere.  Part 2 of 
the thesis turned to the UK to assess potential for expansion of the CRPD-
drafters’ project here.  Chapter 5 highlighted the reluctance of successive UK 
governments to recognise and implement international economic, social and 
cultural rights standards.  It concluded that UK governments have not yet 
fully made – indeed that they resist - the transformation in understanding 
from ‘welfare’ to ‘rights’ that the CRPD demands.  The remainder of Part 2 
explored the impact of this mis-understanding on implementation in England 
of Article 19, the right to live independently and be included in the 
community.   
 
With continuing invisibility of economic, social and cultural rights,  of the 
CRPD and of Article 19 in domestic independent living discourse, and thus 
with no recourse to the international human rights framework which might 
provide stability and coherence, Chapters 6 to 8 identified re-articulation, 
antagonism and regression in the policy field, partial and unstable legislative 
development, and an administrative system in flux, prey to conflicting logics 
and oppressive dynamics for decision-makers and service users alike.  The 
CRPD-drafters’ hegemonic project faces considerable challenges in this 
English domestic setting - in the field of meaning, in systems of social 
relations and in the formation of actor identities.  Chapter 9 explored the 
capacity of available redress systems to influence independent living 
discourse towards more CRPD-compatible understandings.  It concluded 
that, rather than advancing the CRPD drafters’ emancipatory project, redress 
systems generally reflect dominant exclusionary understandings, and may 
intensify rather than countering oppression. 
 
Article 19 is a hybrid right: realisation of its socio-economic provisions is a 
pre-requisite for exercise of its civil and political rights to autonomy and 
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participation.    How these socio-economic provisions are implemented 
therefore has a determinative effect on its implementation.  Part 2 of the 
thesis has argued that the UK’s reluctance to acknowledge economic, social 
and cultural rights results in mis- and partial understandings, and thus in mis- 
or partial application, of Article 19.    Article 19 is also an ‘enabling’ right: 
without the actual choice, control and freedom it requires, the exercise of all 
other rights is compromised.  Part 2 of the thesis argues that mis- and partial 
application of Article 19 in turn undermines implementation of the Convention 
as a whole.  
 
Moreover, Article 19 is emancipatory law par excellence.  It is designed to 
contest oppression by bringing about a ‘new political relationship’13 between 
the experiences and expectations of both disabled and ‘non-disabled’ people, 
and to stabilise those expectations on a new and more demanding level.  For 
this reason, Article 19 was chosen in Part 2 of the thesis as a ‘barometer’ for 
progress – or otherwise - of the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project in 
England.    Examination of implementation of Article 19 in England through 
policy, law and administration has identified re-articulation and dislocation in 
the field of meaning, instability and regression in systems of social relations, 
and continuing oppression in some areas of practice, demonstrating 
frustration of the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project in the English domestic 
sphere. 
 
The UK states that it ‘will not ratify a treaty unless the Government is satisfied 
that domestic law and practice comply.’14   On ratifying the CRPD, the UK 
undertook to ‘ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights’15 – 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social – for all disabled people in its 
jurisdiction.  At the same time, successive governments continue to insist that 
economic, social and cultural rights cannot be incorporated in a meaningful 
                                                 
13
 Santos (2002) and see Chapter 2 above 
14
 UK Report to UN Periodic Review 2008; see also Anne McGuire, Minister for Disabled 
People, Statement to Parliament Tuesday 6 May 2008 
15
 CRPD Art 4(1) 
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way within the British legal system,16 with the result that such rights remain 
invisible in domestic social, legal and political discourse.  This thesis has 
argued that this contradiction in terms results in key elements of international 
disability/human rights discourse not being absorbed into the domestic 
sphere.  In consequence, the UK has not made the transition from welfare to 
rights thinking that the CRPD requires, understanding and realisation of 
Article 19 in England are partial, realisation of other Convention rights is 
compromised, and expansion of the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project is 
undermined.   For international disability/human rights discourse to be 
translated from myth to imaginary in England – to represent a ‘default’ 
system of meanings that underlies and structures our society – and for 
domestic law and practice to comply with international requirements, 
domestic discourse must absorb those key elements of international 
disability/human rights understandings which so far remain excluded.  Some 
such elements have been identified in Chapters 5 – 9, and are discussed, 
with recommendations for government,17 below. 
 
Discussion and recommendations 
Nothing about us without us 
From the earliest days of the international disabled people’s movement, the 
demand not only to be heard but to be actively involved in decision-making, 
to share power, has formed a strong discursive element. 18   It may be 
understood as antagonistic response to the ‘dependency born of 
powerlessness, poverty, degradation and institutionalisation’ described by 
Charlton 19  which has resulted from the dominance of the ableist, 
exclusionary liberal discourse of ‘normality’.20   Chapter 2 traced the growing 
influence of disabled people at international level: in establishing the question 
                                                 
16
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Fifth Periodic Report to the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, July 2007, para 74 
17
 As noted above, these recommendations are directed to government (regardless of 
political persuasion) as it is there that international legal obligations lie 
18
 See Hurst’s account of the 1981 RI conference in Winnipeg in Chapter 2 above: ‘we are 
the people you are talking about, we must have a substantial voice in what you’re saying.’ 
19
 Charlton (2000) 3 
20
 See Chapter 1 above 
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of disability as a human rights issue, in shaping the ten-year UN World 
Programme of Action and in drafting and monitoring the Standard Rules.  
Growing acknowledgement of their expertise in issues of identity, survival 
and dignity is further reflected in the hegemonic practice of negotiating the 
CRPD, as it adopts a holistic and participatory approach that takes the views 
and lived experience of disabled people as its principal point of departure.  
Relations of difference prevail to enable stable compromise and discursive 
expansion.   This participatory approach is reflected not only in the text of the 
CRPD21 but also in the emphasis placed there on the ongoing participation of 
disabled people and their organisations throughout its implementation and 
monitoring at all levels.   
 
In the English domestic sphere, however, Chapter 6 has found a very 
different social space.  English disabled people’s organisations have often 
struggled to survive and to have their voices heard.22  Current government 
policies 23  present such organisations both with opportunities to assert 
disabled people’s rights and with threats of serving merely to legitimise 
budget-driven reforms.  Moreover, respect for disabled people’s experience 
and expertise regarding identity, survival and dignity cannot be assumed 
here.  Incipient systems of coproduction24 and involvement25 have been re-
articulated or dismantled, resulting in reversal of earlier moves towards 
hegemonic expansion of disabled people’s discourse.  Relations of difference 
are replaced by relations of equivalence,26 and the hegemony of exclusionary 
liberal discourse is strengthened. 
 
                                                 
21
 For example in Articles 4(3) and 33(3) 
22
 Disability LIB ‘Thriving or Surviving: Challenges and Opportunities for Disabled People’s 
Organisations in the 21stCentury’ (Scope 2008) 
23
 Coalition government, 2012 
24
 As understood in New Labour policy: see Chapter 6 above 
25
 Such as the requirement for involvement of disabled people and their organisations in the 
formulation and monitoring of the Disability Equality Duty: see Chapter 6 above 
26
 Such as media hype against disabled people and consequent harassment. See for 
instance Strathclyde Centre for Disability research and Glasgow Media Unit, in association 
with Inclusion London, ‘Bad News for Disabled People: How the newspapers are reporting 
disability’, University of Glasgow, 2011; and  Walker P, ‘Benefit cuts are fuelling abuse of 
disabled people, say charities’ Guardian 5 February 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/feb/05/benefit-cuts-fuelling-abuse-disabled-people  
accessed 27.3.12  
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Recommendation 
All activities recommended below should be planned, executed and 
monitored with the full and active involvement of disabled people and 
their representative organisations at all levels.27 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights and CRPD 
implementation 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has worked 
over several decades to clarify the norms contained in the ICESCR.  
Economic, social and cultural rights have now been incorporated in most 
countries through a variety of legal systems, 28  and they are increasingly 
adjudicated around the world.29  The Committee’s General Comments and 
other supporting declarations30 provide internationally agreed and developing 
standards which form a framework within which States Parties, law-makers, 
practitioners and individuals can undertake and measure progress in their 
implementation.   
 
In England, that framework is invisible.  Examination of the ‘constructive’ 
dialogue between the UK and the UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Committee reveals disagreement on incorporation, progressive realisation, 
justiciability, the Optional Protocol, the content of Bills of Rights, and 
awareness-raising/visibility – that is, on all key aspects of Covenant 
implementation.  The rights themselves continue to be understood in England 
as principles and guidelines, not as rights but as welfare entitlements subject 
to the gift (or denial) of the State.  Lack of recognition by successive UK 
governments of international economic, social and cultural rights standards, 
and the consequent absence of those standards from domestic discourse, 
impact in many ways on the understandings, systems and identities essential 
for implementation in England of the CRPD.  
                                                 
27
 CRPD Article 4(3) and Article 33(3) 
28
 See Chapter 5 above 
29
 Langford (2008); INTERIGHTS Commonwealth and International Human Rights database, 
http://www.interights.org/commonwealth-and-international-law-database/index.html  last 
accessed 30.8.12 
30
 Such as the Limburg Principles and Maastricht Guidelines 
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Understandings 
The interdependence of civil and political rights with economic, social and 
cultural rights has been a key element in development of the disability/human 
rights discourse encapsulated in the Convention.   In 1993, Leandro Despouy 
identified that ‘[d]isability is perhaps the area in which the importance of 
recognizing the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights…is most 
evident and sharp.’31  The 2002 Quinn Report which helped to trigger the 
Convention drafting project advised that  
[t]he need for a holistic approach to disability is consonant with the 
postulate that civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, 
social and cultural rights, on the other, are interdependent and 
interrelated. Tangible material support is necessary to convert formal 
freedoms into real freedoms for people with disabilities. This is not the 
freedom of welfare, which places people with disabilities in gilded cages 
and locks them into cycles of dependency and despondency. It is 
economic, social and cultural justice, which liberates people with 
disabilities so that they can play their part in – and contribute their share 
to – inclusive societies… the drafting of a convention relating to 
disability without thinking creatively about marrying the two sets of 
rights is inconceivable.32 (emphasis added) 
 
Hegemony ‘involves the expansion of a particular discourse of norms, values, 
views and perceptions through persuasive re-descriptions of the world’.33  UK 
governments’ resistance to acknowledgement of economic, social and 
cultural rights and of their importance in the context of disability fatally 
undermines the Convention drafters’ hegemonic purpose.  Without that 
acknowledgement, the drafters’ particular discourse of norms, values, views 
and perceptions cannot expand in the domestic sphere; the transition in the 
field of meaning from welfare to rights understandings that is their goal 
cannot begin to take place.   
 
Recommendations 
 acknowledge economic, social and cultural rights as rights, and 
their equal importance to, interdependence with and indivisibility 
from civil and political rights 
                                                 
31
 Despouy L, ‘Human Rights and Disabled Persons’, Human Rights Studies Series, number 
6 (UN Centre for Human Rights 1993) para 31  
32
 Quinn and Degner (2000) para 13.5 
33
 Torfing (1999) 302 
 339 
 
 incorporate international economic, social and cultural rights 
understandings into domestic social, legal and political 
discourse 
 acknowledge the particular importance of interdependence and 
indivisibility of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights 
in the context of disability 
 
Systems 
Law is one method of articulating and regulating systems of social relations.  
Disability/human rights discourse has been sedimented into the text of the 
CRPD.  Economic, social and cultural rights as rights are integrated 
throughout, including, for instance, in the Convention’s preamble, 34  its 
purpose, 35  its definition of discrimination, 36  the obligations of ratifying 
States,37 and projection of the rights themselves.38  The particular routes to 
realisation mapped in through larger-scale drafting emphasise the key 
function these rights play in enabling and driving the realisation of the 
Convention’s purpose.  They are a central element in the repositioning of 
disabled people in the new world of disability/human rights discourse, and in 
the all-permeating change in systems of social relations that entails.  Yet, 
as Ms Bras Gomes noted in Geneva, despite UK governments’ protestations 
in the international arena that ‘economic, social and cultural rights are as 
important as civil and political rights’,39 within the UK they are not indivisible 
at practical level.    
 
                                                 
34
 (c) Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms… 
35
 ‘The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and 
equal enjoyment of all fundamental rights and freedoms…’ Article 1 
36
 ‘… any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose 
or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis 
with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, scial, 
cultural, civil or any other field…’ Article 2 
37
 ‘… to take measures to the maximum of its available resources…. With a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of [economic, social and cultural rights], without prejudice to 
those obligations contained in the present Convention that are immediately applicable 
according to international law.’  Article 4(2). See Chapters 3 and 5 above for further 
discussion. See also, for example Article 9 
38
 See discussion in Chapter 3 above 
39
 For instance, UK Fifth Periodic Report to the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Committee, July 2007, para 75 
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Political projects attempt to ‘weave together different strands of discourse in 
an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as to fix the identities 
of objects and practices in a particular way’.40   Economic, social and cultural 
rights as rights are integrated into the Convention text to help to bring about 
the change in social relations necessary to fix identities of objects and 
practices in line with the CRPD drafters’ vision.  Failure to acknowledge that 
role in practice prevents the realisation of that vision through the social 
structures and practices of everyday life.  Without recourse to the 
international human rights framework to provide meaning, stability and 
coherence, domestic policy, law and administration fail to comply with CRPD 
requirements; the repositioning of disabled people in the real world at 
practical level cannot begin to take place.  
 
Recommendations 
 incorporate economic, social and cultural rights into domestic 
law 
 ensure that they are justiciable, and provide effective remedies 
for breach41 
 adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other 
measures for the implementation of all – civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social - CRPD rights42  
 
Identities 
Understandings, structures and identities are dynamic and interwoven 
components of any discursive process: as understandings shape structures 
and practices, so the identities of all concerned are both formed by and 
reflected in those understandings and structures.  For the CRPD-drafters’ re-
description of the world to be realised, domestic actors must be ‘socialised' to 
adopt its beliefs and behavioural patterns, to align law, policy and 
administration with Convention values and bring about meaningful change.43   
                                                 
40
 Howarth et al (2000) 2, and see Chapter 1 above 
41
 See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 22 May 2009 
42
 CRPD Article 4(1)((a) 
43
 Quinn (2009) 219 
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The UK argues that raising awareness of economic, social and cultural rights 
would not be of ‘practical benefit’ to lawyers, to service providers or to the 
general public.44  However, where economic, social and cultural rights are 
rendered invisible, law-drafters, policy-makers, administrators and individuals 
alike are unaware of their rights.  Individual beliefs and behaviours remain 
unchanged, unable to reflect or to influence the structures within which they 
function towards more CRPD-compatible practice.  The ‘socialisation’ of 
individuals cannot begin to take place, and the opportunity to make the 
‘paradigm change’ from welfare to rights which is the fundamental goal of the 
Convention is lost.  
 
Recommendations 
 Take all effective measures to increase awareness of economic, 
social and cultural rights – as justiciable rights and not merely 
rights as part of the Welfare State45 - among politicians, public 
servants, lawyers, service providers and the general public, 
including disabled people 
 Take all effective measures to increase understanding of the 
equal importance, indivisibility and interdependence of civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights in the context of 
disability among politicians, public servants, lawyers, service 
providers and the general public, including disabled people  
 
Flóvens suggests that  
in those States in which economic, social and cultural rights have not 
been sufficiently implemented until now, there may arise some 
problems in implementing the Convention as a whole.46 
 
Mis-understanding of international economic, social and cultural rights 
standards by successive UK governments, and their consequent mis-
application in domestic law and practice, frustrates expansion of the CRPD 
myth in England at all levels. 
                                                 
44
 See constructive dialogue, chapter 5 above 
45
 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 22 May 2009, para 15 
46
 Flóvens (2009) 26 
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Moreover, this thesis has argued that the CRPD is expressive/emancipatory 
law: a hegemonic formation, seeking to function as a ‘revolving door’ through 
which the various elements of international disability/human rights discourse 
can circulate around the world to redefine the terms of the political debate.  In 
England, however, not only does the key discursive element of economic, 
social and cultural rights remain invisible, leading to mis- and partial 
understandings and application of the law, but the CRPD itself has received 
minimal attention.    Here, as yet, the revolving door is barely open, the 
opportunity for the CRPD to influence the political debate negligible: the 
drafters’ re-description of the world has yet to find a foothold in domestic 
social, legal or political discourse.47  
 
Recommendations 
 Take all effective measures to increase awareness of the CRPD 
among politicians, public servants, lawyers, service providers 
and the general public, including disabled people  
 Adopt immediate, effective and appropriate measures to raise 
awareness and to foster respect throughout society for all of the 
rights – civil, cultural, economic, political and social – of disabled 
people48 
 
Implementation of Article 19 
Part 2 of the thesis has examined some effects of the situation discussed 
above on implementation in England of CRPD Article 19.  Although some 
CRPD drafters were keen to distance themselves from disabled people’s 
independent living movement, it has been argued in Chapter 4 that the 
concept of independent living as understood by that movement is so deeply 
ingrained that it is impossible to extract it from the Convention myth.  
Changing the perception by others that disabled people need to be 
segregated from society, to be institutionalised - with the systems of 
knowledge, power and identities that perception has established - is central 
to the drafters’ hegemonic project.  For many disabled people, to exercise 
                                                 
47
 But see Postscript below 
48
 CRPD Article 8(1)(a) 
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their autonomy and to participate on an equal basis as full members of 
humanity requires more than the limited positive obligations of standard 
human rights law: it requires fundamental transformation – a re-description of 
the world.  Anti-dependence and non-institutionalisation featured strongly 
throughout the Convention negotiations:  they are encapsulated in Article 19 
together with the economic, social and cultural rights required to translate 
them into the reality of people’s lives.   
 
In English domestic rhetoric, however, whilst individual civil and political 
rights to autonomy, choice and participation ride high, the economic, social 
and cultural rights essential for their exercise continue to be excluded.  
Indeed, during CRPD negotiations, the UK argued against inclusion of Article 
19(b), which provides for the social support to function autonomously in one’s 
chosen home and to participate in community life, to prevent isolation and 
segregation.  Moreover, as the CRPD and Article 19 have also remained 
invisible in domestic discourse, independent living itself has continued to be 
(mis-)understood not as a right but as a welfare entitlement to be granted or 
denied by the State.  The concept of independent living remains open to mis-
understanding and to mis-appropriation by other, more powerful, discourses.  
The result, as described in Chapters 6 to 8 above, has been re-articulation 
and regression in the policy field, partial and unstable legislative development 
and an administrative system prey to conflicting logics and oppressive 
dynamics for decision-makers and service users alike: mis- and partial 
understandings of the context in which the law has been formed results in 
mis- and partial application of the law itself.  
 
Article 19 is a hybrid right, an enabling right and an emancipatory right.  It is 
fundamental to the Convention’s goal of paradigm change, 49  and to the 
exercise of all other Convention rights.  Mis- or partial application of Article 19 
results in failure to implement the Convention as a whole, and frustration of 
the drafters’ hegemonic project.  ‘For a State which took part in drafting and 
                                                 
49
 Don McKay, Chair of the ad hoc negotiating committee, Daily Summary 7
th
 session, 19 
January 2006 afternoon session 
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has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a 
human-rights based approach to all of the rights set out in Article 19 should 
be the starting point for promoting, protecting and ensuring the full and equal 
enjoyment by all disabled people of their Article 19 right to independent 
living.’50 
 
Recommendations 
Policy  
 understand the right to live independently and be included in the 
community as set out in CRPD Article 19, in line with its context, 
object and purpose, its travaux préparatoires and the 
circumstances of its drafting51 
 explain and disseminate government strategy for realisation of 
Article 19, with benchmarks for progressive realisation of the 
economic, social and cultural rights involved to the maximum of 
available resources 
 raise awareness of all of the above among politicians, public 
servants, lawyers, service providers and the general public, 
including disabled people 
 
Law 
 acknowledge the basis of the right to live independently and be 
included in the community in international human rights law, 
including the law and jurisprudence relating to economic, social 
and cultural rights 
 enact rights-based independent living legislation, including its 
economic, social and cultural elements, in conformity with CRPD 
and ICESCR requirements52 
                                                 
50
 Collingbourne T, ‘Protecting the right of disabled people to independent living’, 
Memorandum to Joint Committee on Human Rights, April 2011 
51
 As required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 Articles 31 and 32.  If 
in doubt ask/listen to disabled people (Article 4(3)) 
52
 CRPD Article 4(1)(a) and (b); ICESR Article 2(1) and Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 9; and see discussion of Independent Living Bill, Chapter 
7 above 
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 raise awareness of all of the above among politicians, public 
servants, judges, lawyers, service providers and the general 
public, including disabled people 
 
Administration 
 provide clear and consistent rights-based guidance to those 
tasked with delivering independent living law and policy to 
individuals 
 promote the training of all those working in the administrative 
justice system in the right to independent living, including its 
economic, social and cultural elements53 
 foster a rights-based culture in the administrative justice system: 
promote the socialisation of all involved to adopt CRPD-
compatible beliefs and behavioural patterns to bring about 
meaningful change 
 
Redress 
As Ms Riera observed in Geneva,54 a right which cannot come to court is not 
a right.  Chapter 9 of the thesis has argued that available redress systems in 
England provide little remedy for the individual complainant, and generally 
resist rather than support the expansion of disability/human rights discourse.  
The capacity of internal complaints procedures to influence wider policy, law 
or administration towards more CRPD-compatible understandings remains 
negligible. Judicial review precedent reflects dominant exclusionary 
understandings,55 and its future as a redress mechanism in this field looks 
increasingly uncertain.  The work of the Ombudsman service offers 
potentially more fertile ground for expansion of the CRPD myth, but lacks 
visibility, statutory recognition and resources. 
   
Recommendations 
                                                 
53
 CRPD Article 4(1)(i) 
54
 See Chapter 5 above 
55
 But see Burnip v Birmingham, Postscript, below 
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 put in place accessible, affordable, impartial and effective legal 
remedies for those whose Article 19 rights, including their 
economic, social and cultural elements, have been breached56   
 ensure availability of a range of accessible and affordable 
information, advice and representation through standard 
independent legal and advice channels and Disabled People’s 
User-Led Organisations 
 raise awareness of such remedies and support services among 
disabled people, service providers, lawyers, advice workers, 
advocates, and the general public through publicity, guidance 
and training  
 
Conclusion 
In 2009, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights strongly 
reminded the UK of its legal obligation to fully realise the international treaties 
it ratifies, to give economic, social and cultural rights full domestic legal 
effect, to ensure that Covenant rights are justiciable, and to provide effective 
remedies for breach.57  This thesis has argued that the UK is not meeting 
those obligations.  The UK’s reluctance to fully understand, acknowledge or 
implement international economic, social and cultural rights standards in 
domestic law goes to the heart of CRPD implementation.  It undermines 
expansion of the Convention drafters’ hegemonic project in the English 
domestic sphere, and leads to mis-understanding and mis- or partial 
application of the Convention’s terms.   The Article 19 right to live 
independently and be included in the community does not have full domestic 
legal effect, its terms are not justiciable and effective remedies for breach are 
not available.  Moreover, reluctance to fully implement economic, social and 
cultural rights, with consequent mis- and partial implementation of Article 19, 
undermines realisation of all Convention rights, calling into question the UK’s 
Article 4(1) undertaking as State Party to the Convention to ‘ensure and 
                                                 
56
 CRPD Articles 12 and 13 
57
 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 22 May 2009 
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promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all disabled people’. 
 
Further areas for research from a political 
discourse theory perspective 
For reasons of manageability, this thesis has concentrated on the dynamics 
between international and UK/English understandings.  The UK, however, is 
a member of the European Union, and the EU helped to negotiate and, as a 
‘regional integration organisation’, acceded to the CRPD in 2010.  Chapter 4 
above described how the Convention’s implementation and monitoring 
provisions are designed in such a way as to promote the continuation of the 
drafters’ hegemonic project.  As noted there, the presence of regional 
integration organisations as Parties to the Convention brings new 
perspectives to the discussion, including their history and experience as a 
regional body, their institutional, legal and political relationships with their 
Member States, and, in the case of the EU, their established role in the 
international development field.  Legal and political dynamics relating to the 
CRPD abound within and between Member States, 58  between Member 
States and the EU, 59  and between Europe, its Members and the UN, 60 
providing rich fields of interlegality for political discourse analysis at both 
European and international levels.61   
 
A further interesting topic for political and legal discourse analysis might be 
found in the relationship between the English Ombudsmen and their 
European counterparts.  Chapter 9 above described the English 
                                                 
58
 Not all of which have ratified the Convention at the time of writing 
59
 See, for instance, Hervey T, Stark A, Dawson A, Fernandez J-L, Matosevic T and McDaid 
D, ‘Long-term care for older people and EU law: the position in England and Scotland’ (2012) 
34(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 105 
60
 See, for instance, Ferri, D, ‘The Implication of the UNCRPD for EU Law’, presentation to 
ERA (Academy of European Law) Seminar on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, Madrid, 15-16 December 2011.  Also Waddington L, ‘Breaking New Ground: 
The Implications of Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities for the European Community’ in Arnandotir and Quinn (2009) 
61
 See, for instance, Howarth D and Torfing J, Discourse Theory in European Politics 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 
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Ombudsmen’s approach to resolving disputes, including those that touch on 
‘the most sensitive areas of social and economic rights’.62  In the absence of 
domestic economic, social and cultural rights protection, their work in this 
area relies on a conceptual sleight of hand, distancing itself from the courts 
as ‘giving force to’ human rights principles rather than ‘enforcing’ human 
rights law.  At European level, the picture appears to be very different.  Here, 
the European Social Charter and the socio-economic rights set out in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 63  are visible, and European Ombudsmen 
(including their English colleagues) are encouraged by the Council of Europe 
to cooperate with human rights institutions and to get involved in human 
rights disputes.64  The interplay between these two discursive settings for the 
Ombudsmen’s enterprise might yield interesting legal and political discourse 
analyses. 
 
 
                                                 
62
 Abraham (2008) cited in Buck et al (2011) 38 
63
 Chapter IV – solidarity.  See Chapter 5 above for application in United Kingdom law 
64
 O’Brien (2009) 
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Postscript 
Subsequent developments 
 
This thesis has covered developments to April 2012.  The following section 
considers subsequent developments relating to implementation of Article 19 
in England.   These include the Government Response to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) Report on Implementation of the Right 
of Disabled People to Independent Living;   the long-awaited White Paper on 
social care reform; a draft Care and Support Bill; and a ‘progress report’ on 
social care funding.    
 
Government Response to JCHR Report 
Chapter 6 of the thesis identified elements of resistance to the invisibility of 
economic, social and cultural rights and of the CRPD itself, including Article 
19, in domestic policy discussion.  This resistance was bolstered in March 
2012 by a strong JCHR Report on Implementation of the Right of Disabled 
People to Independent Living. 1   The Report regrets that the Convention has 
not been incorporated into UK law and notes the lack of domestic legislative 
underpinning of Article 19.  It suggests recognition of the right to independent 
living in any Bill of Rights for the UK, and argues for free-standing, rights-
based legislation, as the existing matrix of human rights, equality and 
community care legislation is not sufficient.  In concludes, inter alia, that  
[t]he CRPD is hard law, not soft law.  The Government should fulfil their 
obligations under the Convention on that basis…2   
 
                                                 
1
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Implementation of the Right of Disabled People to 
Independent Living’, Twenty-third Report of Session 2010-12, HL Paper 257, HC 1074, 1 
March 2012; see Chapter 6 
2
 Ibid Conclusions and Recommendations, para 1 
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The Government, by contrast, holds that the existing matrix of legislation 
helps deliver independent living.  Its Response3 echoes the UK’s stance in 
the constructive dialogue with the ESCR Committee:4 
the Convention imposes legal obligations on the UK Government.  The 
UK fulfils these obligations through existing domestic legislation, such 
as the Equality Act 2010, and through policy and programmes that 
impact upon the lives of disabled people.  In this way, the rights in the 
Convention have practical effect.5  
The JCHR is also concerned that the CRPD, and Article 19 in particular, 
‘does not appear to have played a central role in the development of policy’.6  
The Government’s forthcoming Disability Strategy should cover all aspects of 
the Convention, including the right to independent living; and include clear 
milestones, monitored by an independent body to aid measurement and 
transparency.7   The Government promises that its Strategy will ‘reflect what 
disabled people themselves have said are the important issues’. 8  
Importantly, the Government promises that its Disability Strategy will be 
based on the Convention. 
The JCHR Report then focuses on the impact of a range of current reforms 
which, in the Committee’s view, present individually and together a serious 
risk of retrogression in the realisation of Article 19.  They include cuts in local 
authority funding,9  restrictions in eligibility criteria to critical-only,10  a range 
of reforms to housing benefit and social security benefits11 and the closure of 
the Independent Living Fund.  The Government merely promises to monitor 
disabled people’s experience of the impact of these reforms and ensure that 
mechanisms are in place to address any issues arising.   
                                                 
3
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Second Report, Implementation of the Right of 
Disabled People to Independent Living: Government Response to the Twenty-third Report of 
Session 2010-12’ HL Paper 23/ HC429, 2 July 2012 
4
 See Chapter 5 above 
5
 Government Response, 6 
6
 JCHR (2012) para 19 
7
 Ibid para 12 
8
 The ODI will consult disabled people on how the Strategy should be monitored, and will, ‘for 
example, capture first hand the lived experiences of disabled people to inform an 
understanding of what impact the Strategy is having.’ Government Response, 10 
9
 JCHR (2012) para 30 
10 Giving rise to individual breaches of Art 19(b): ibid, para 32 
11
 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ‘21
st
 Century Welfare’ ( Cm 7913, 2010); 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 
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Where adult social care is concerned, the JCHR welcomes the government’s 
espousal of personalisation. However, it states that further monitoring and 
regulation is needed to ensure that the goal of increasing choice and control 
is in fact realised in both domiciliary and residential settings. 12   The 
Government, however, shifts primary responsibility for outcomes from central 
to local government:  
Local authorities are not performance managed on a national basis, and 
are primarily accountable to their own population for the performance of 
services and the outcomes achieved for local people.13  
Access to information, advice and advocacy, including that provided by 
Disabled People’s User Led Organisations, is recognised by the JCHR as 
being critical for all disabled people to benefit from personalisation.  
Moreover, it recommends that the Disability Strategy should include action to 
ensure disabled people’s access to redress and justice.14 The impact on the 
right to independent living of withdrawal of legal aid from many key areas of 
welfare law under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Bill15  should be monitored.  In response, proposals to improve availability of 
information and advice are promised in the forthcoming White Paper.16  The 
Government is also ‘developing a range of approaches to improve its 
evidence base on legal aid clients, including those with a disability’.17 
The Government thus maintains its dualist approach to implementation of 
international treaties.18  Whilst it promises to base its Disability Strategy on 
the CRPD, there is no evidence at this stage of any specific benchmarks or 
independent monitoring, or of any recognition of the role of economic, social 
and cultural rights.  The Government expresses satisfaction with the current 
legislation as a means of delivering independent living, and distances itself 
from responsibility, delegating to local authorities primary accountability for 
                                                 
12
 JCHR (2012) paras 40 and 45 
13
 Government response, 23 
14
 Ibid para 52 
15
 Royal Assent 1 May 2012; for potential effects on disabled people’s access to specialist 
advice see for example http://www.disability-equality.org.uk/news/a-message-from-our-ceo--
/n69  accessed 11.8.12 
16
 See discussion below: this consists of advice in developing a support plan, online national 
and local information 
17
 Government response, 29 
18
 See Chapter 5 of the thesis 
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services and outcomes.  Faced with allegations of a serious risk of 
retrogression, it merely offers to monitor the impact of reforms and address 
any issues.     
On 11 July 2012, the government published three further documents: the 
long-awaited White Paper on social care, a draft Care and Support Bill and a 
‘progress report’ on funding reform. 
 
Social care reform 
The White Paper 
Chapter 6 of the thesis examined independent living policy in England for 
signs of re-organisation of the field of meaning in line with the CRD myth.  It 
found widely varied understandings of independent living circulating in the 
policy field, where the CRPD drafters’ hegemonic project faced re-
articulation, dislocation and regression.  Despite strong emphasis on 
individual civil and political rights to autonomy and choice, the economic, 
social and cultural rights essential for their exercise remain contested, putting 
the hegemonic project at serious risk. 
The 2012 White Paper19 recognises that ‘[o]ur system of care and support is 
broken and in desperate need of reform’.20  The Paper presents a myth21 to 
fill this ‘lack’, describing a world where people have ‘far better support’ and 
are in control; where they are treated with respect, their independence and 
wellbeing promoted, and their potential fulfilled.  22 
                                                 
19
 Department of Health, ‘Caring for our future: reforming care and support’ (Cm 8378, 2012 ) 
20
  Ibid, Foreword,  3 
21
 ‘Myth is defined as a principle of reading of a given situation.  The condition of emergence 
of myth is structural dislocation, and the function of myth is to suture the dislocated space by 
means of constructing a new space of representation.’  Torfing (1999) 303; and see Chapter 
1 above. 
22
 Executive Summary, 9 
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This myth is to be realised through two ‘core principles’: prevention23 and 
control.  Additionally, society needs to understand that ‘people with care 
needs very much have something to offer.  Care and support should not just 
be about making people comfortable but about helping them to fulfil their 
potential, whatever their circumstances.’24  Like the New Labour Government 
before it, the Coalition proposes ‘ambitious transformation’ 25  through ‘a 
genuinely collaborative endeavour’. 26   This time, ‘transformation’ involves 
dissolving the boundaries between the third sector, private organisations, 
local authorities and individuals;27 and listening, particularly to ‘the voices of 
those using care and support, their carers, their families and their friends.’28  
Although the CRPD remains invisible here, these ambitions appear 
compatible with its purpose: expansion of a discourse which, though not 
rights-based, recognises and respects the autonomy and contributions of 
disabled people and is encouraged through relations of difference and 
paradigm change. 29   
When it comes to the practicalities, however, the Government’s proposals 
seem less sure.  The project will happen in stages over the next ten years.  
There is additional funding for specialised housing to increase housing 
options in line with Article 19(a). 30    Beyond this, the Paper suggests 
encouraging better support in communities through ‘time banks, time credits 
and other approaches that help people share their time, talents and skills with 
others in the community’; 31  involving communities in commissioning 
                                                 
23
 ‘The first is that we should do everything we can – as individuals, as communities and as a 
Government - to prevent, postpone and minimise people’s need for formal care and support.’ 
Executive Summary, 9 
24
 ibid 
25
 New Labour’s ‘transformation’ agenda is technically still running to 2013, and see Think 
Local, Act Personal http://www.thinklocalactpersonal.org.uk/  accessed 23.9.12 
26
 ibid 
27
 Ibid, 3-4; according to the Paper, thousands of people who use or work in care and support 
took part in the Government’s consultation ‘engagement’ which shaped its plans. Executive 
Summary, 7 
28
 Ibid 
29
 Transformation of the system requires ‘a real shift in the way that everyone – the 
Government, local authorities, the NHS, care users and their families, care providers, 
voluntary organisations, care workers, and communities – approaches care and support.  
Change will be the shared responsibility of leaders at every level of the system, from chief 
executives to registered managers to personal assistants…. Together with our partners, we 
will now make this ambitious reform a reality.’ Executive Summary, 11 
30
 Worth £200 million over 5 years 
31
 Executive Summary, 10 
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decisions; and developing new ways of investing in services, such as Social 
Impact Bonds.  Entitlement to a personal budget will be enshrined in 
legislation, access to independent advice in developing a support plan 
improved, and direct payments will continue.32  A new national website is 
proposed, and local authorities will develop online information.  This, with 
new feedback websites, will empower people to make informed decisions 
with their personal budget, and ensure development of a diverse range of 
high quality care services through market forces. The ‘care workforce’ will be 
provided with increased training; ‘dignity and respect’ will be ‘at the heart’ of a 
new code of conduct; and a Chief Social Worker will be appointed to provide 
leadership and to ‘drive forward social work reform’.33 
As described in Chapter 6 of the thesis, New Labour’s transformation agenda 
continues, re-articulated through the individualistic and market-driven 
discourse of the Coalition government.  The myth put forward in the White 
Paper appears compatible with the Convention-drafters’ purpose, 
emphasising respect for disabled people and holistic paradigm change.  
However, it offers little in the way of practical implementation or of central 
government accountability, and fails to mention redress.  In the absence of a 
rights agenda, the concept of independent living remains open to further re-
articulation and dislocation.   
The Coalition’s Disability Strategy, however, is still to come, and the Minister 
for Disabled People has promised the JCHR that it will be based on the 
CRPD.  The first papers are expected in September 2012, with an action plan 
in early 2013.34   
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 And be piloted in residential care settings 
33
 Executive Summary, 11 
34
 Minutes from Joint APPG meeting on the Disability Strategy (APPG = All-Party 
Parliamentary Group), 12 June 2012,  Action plan early 2013 (Maria Miller, Minister for 
disabled people)  accessed via Disability Rights UK e-Newsletter, issue 4, July 2012 
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The Draft Care and Support Bill 
One way of bringing about paradigm change is through law.  The draft Care 
and Support Bill35 published alongside the White Paper promises ‘an historic 
reform of care and support legislation’.36 
The Law Commission’s Report on Adult Social Care, the basis for this Bill, 
was discussed in Chapter 7 of the thesis, where it was contrasted with the 
2006-2009 Health and Social Care (Independent Living) Bill.  Unlike the 
CRPD-compatible Independent Living Bill, the Law Commission’s proposals 
were found to offer a ‘neutral’ centre based on a qualified principle of ‘well-
being’. Its narrow boundaries reflect the status quo and its projections 
consolidate and strengthen aspects of the existing ‘community care’ regime 
whilst leaving the underlying oppressive ‘welfare’ discourse unchanged.  It 
was suggested in Chapter 7 that the Government might favour an approach 
between the two, focusing on individual autonomy and supporting a change 
in social relations towards co-production and holistic assessment, while at 
the same time ruling out both rights-based and strategic approaches to 
rebalance responsibility for ‘welfare’ outcomes from the State to the 
individual.   
The Government’s Response to the Law Commission’s proposals (the 
Response)37 was published at the same time as the Draft Care and Support 
Bill.38  They are discussed together here. 
The Government accepts the Law Commission’s recommended structure of 
primary legislation, regulations and statutory guidance.39  It also accepts the 
proposal for a statement of principles, and that the single overarching 
                                                 
35
 Cm 8386, July 2012 
36
 Foreword to the Bill, 4; ‘[u]nderpinning many of our proposals will be the comprehensive 
modernisation of care and support law.  By changing the law, we will place people’s needs 
and goals at the centre of how care and support will work in the future, and will ensure that 
local authorities work for the wellbeing of everyone in their area, not just the few.’ Executive 
Summary, 11 
37
 ‘Reforming the law for adult care and support: the Government’s response to Law 
Commission report 326 on adult social care’, Cm 8379, July 2012 
38
 Draft Care and Support Bill, Cm 8386, July 2012 
39
 Though not repeal of the additional ability for Ministers to respond on occasion with 
proportionate, binding requirements on local authorities, under Local Authority Social 
Services Act 1970, s7A; or the Law Commission’s proposal for a Code of Practice.  
Government response para 2.9  
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principle should be that of individual ‘well-being’, undefined, but supported by 
a list of outcomes and a list of ‘factors to be considered’.40   
Outcomes listed in the Draft Bill include  
(a) physical and mental health and emotional well-being; 
(b) protection from abuse and neglect; 
(c) control by the adult over day-to-day life (including over the care and 
support provided to the adult and the way in which it is provided); 
(d) participation in work, education, training or recreation; 
(e) social and economic well-being; 
(f) domestic, family and personal relationships; 
(g) the adult’s contribution to society.41 
 
Factors to which a local authority must ‘have regard’ include: 
(a) the importance of beginning with the assumption that the adult is 
best placed to judge the adult’s well-being; 
(b) the adult’s views, wishes and feelings; 
(c) the need to ensure that decisions about the adult are made having 
regard to all the adult’s circumstances (and are not based only on the 
adult’s age or appearance or any condition of the adult’s or aspect of 
the adult’s behaviour which might lead others to make unjustified 
assumptions about the adult’s well-being); 
(d) the importance of the adult participating as fully as possible in 
decisions relating to the exercise of the function concerned and being 
provided with the information and support necessary to enable the adult 
to participate; 
(e) the importance of achieving a balance between the adult’s well-
being and that of any friends or relatives who are involved in caring for 
the adult; 
(f) the need to protect people from abuse and neglect; 
(g) the need to ensure that any restriction on the adult’s rights or 
freedom of action that is involved in the exercise of the function is kept 
to the minimum necessary for achieving the purpose for which the 
function is being exercised. 
                                                 
40
 Government Response, section 3: Statutory Principles 
41
 Clause 2 
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Although independent living is not chosen as the ‘over-arching principle’, 
these outcomes and factors resonate compatibly with CRPD discourse and 
Article 19.  In particular, there is much emphasis on mental and physical 
integrity, on individual control of services, on participation and on changing 
traditional assumptions of dependency.  However, the Response makes it 
clear that neither the well-being principle nor the supporting outcomes or 
factors are intended to be directly enforceable or individual rights.42  Instead, 
the principle ‘should carry indirect legal weight, as a general duty where a 
local authority’s failure to have regard may be challenged through judicial 
review’.43   
The Draft Bill contains no definition of disability or disabled person.  Instead, 
a person is eligible for services if they have an assessed eligible need 
determined through the assessment process.44  Services are defined through 
a short, open list of categories, designed to act as a guide without restricting 
innovation.45  This list46 reflects the services covered by existing legislation, 
although the wording of the Draft Bill 47  suggests that other, ‘innovative’ 
examples are possible.48  
In the Draft Bill, local authorities have two levels of duty.49  At the ‘universal’ 
level, they must provide information and advice;50 shape the market of care 
and support providers;51 prevent, reduce or delay the onset of needs for care 
and support; 52  and cooperate with local partners in the integration of 
services.53  At the level of individual ‘targeted’ provision, a single ‘duty to 
                                                 
42
 Ibid para 3.9, 3.13 
43
 Ibid para 3.9 
44
 Including carers, to give them ‘a right to support for the first time to put them on the same 
footing as the people for whom they care.’ Draft Bill Summary para 2.6 
45
 Government Response 8.10 
46
 Like that of the Law Commission, see Chapter 7 of the thesis, but with ‘goods and facilities’ 
substituted for ‘financial or any other assistance’, and information added to advice 
47
 Clause 8 (1): ‘The following are examples of what may be provided to meet needs…’ 
48
 Services are further defined negatively by exclusion of those provided by health or housing 
authorities: Draft Bill clauses 21 and 22 
49
 In line with Law Commission recommendations 
50
 Draft Bill Clause 2 
51
 Draft Bill Clause 3 
52
 Draft Bill Clause 7 
53
 Draft B ill Clauses 4, 5 and 6 
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assess’ offers the sole means by which eligibility for services is determined.54  
The low qualifying threshold for assessment remains, regardless of the 
authority’s view of the level of the person’s needs or of their financial 
resources.55   The assessment must include the outcomes the person wishes 
to achieve and how the care and support will contribute to those outcomes.56  
Regulations will set out in more detail how assessment should be carried 
out.57   
Allocation of services will be supported by a national eligibility framework58 
set out in regulations and supported by statutory guidance. This framework is 
not yet fully developed:59 Clause 13 of the Draft Bill promises regulations 
here too.  Once eligibility is determined, the local authority must prepare a 
care and support plan, tell the individual which eligible needs may be met by 
direct payments, and help them to decide how the needs should be met.60  
The Government’s approach to care and support plans is non-directive: it 
prefers to set out ‘the few, high-level items’61 relating to care and support 
plans in legislation without defining further in regulations.62  However, the 
basic assessment framework remains unchanged. 
Personal budgets are a ‘critical element’63 of Government policy.  Here, the 
Response goes further than the Law Commission, proposing to set out in 
primary legislation entitlement to a personal budget for all who quality for 
services.64  Clause 25 of the Draft Bill, however, merely defines a personal 
budget as a statement specifying the assessed cost of meeting the person’s 
                                                 
54
 ‘This duty would have a similar effect to s47(1)(b) of the NHS and Community Care Act 
1990’: Government Response to Law Commission, para 6.11 
55
 an effort to counter some local authorities’ current excuses for unlawful
 
(under NHSCCA90 
s47, see Chapter 7 of the thesis) delay or refusal of assessment  
56
 Draft Bill Clause 9 
57
 Draft Bill Clause 12 
58
 As the Law Commission recommends; also recommended by the Dilnot Report, July 2011, 
and promised in the White Paper 
59
 Government Response para 6.14 
60
 Draft Bill Clause 23; if no eligible needs are identified, the individual should receive a copy 
of the assessment and any financial assessment, and advice on action to prevent 
development of any needs in the future. 
61
 Government Response para 8.17 
62
 Nevertheless, Clause 24 of the Draft Bill contains 12 quite specific sub-clauses and 
promises further regulations: Clause 24(12) 
63
 Government Response para 8.19 
64
 With limited exceptions, specified in regulations see Government Response para 8.22 
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needs, and where that money is to come from65 – it says nothing about 
control. 
Apart from the promise of a national eligibility framework, and a change in 
focus for local authorities at universal level, the Draft Bill, pending 
regulations, changes little  on a practical individual level.  While the outcomes 
and factors supporting the ‘well-being’ principle resonate with CRPD 
discourse, the Draft Bill’s projections simply confirm the current legal map of 
needs assessment, eligibility decision and care plan, with only minor 
adjustments such as entitlement to a personal budget statement.   
In its White Paper and legislative plans, the Government has gone further 
than the Law Commission in its focus on individual autonomy and on wider 
change in social relations towards co-production and holistic assessment at 
individual level.   At the same time, it has failed to follow the CRPD-
compatible Independent Living Bill, ruling out both rights-based and strategic 
approaches.66  Nothing in the Draft Bill is intended to constitute an individual 
right, or to be directly enforceable,67 hence the principle of well-being merely 
carries ‘indirect legal weight’ in judicial review.68    Despite ratification and the 
JCHR Report,69 there is no mention of the CRPD or of Article 19.  The right 
to live independently and be included in the community remains invisible 
here, together with the economic, social and cultural rights essential for its 
exercise.  The opportunity to enact Convention-compatible legislation in line 
with Article 4(1) and Article 19(b) appears to have been missed.70  
The courts, however, may take a different view.  In Burnip v Birmingham City 
Council, 71 Kay LJ, considered a challenge to changes in Housing Benefit 
                                                 
65
 i.e. the person themselves (25(1)(b)), the local authority (25(1)(c)) or other public sources 
(25(2)) 
66
 See Chapter 7 of the thesis for comparison 
67
 White Paper, para 3.9, 3.13 
68
 Ibid para 3.9 
69
 See above 
70
 So far: at the time of writing (August 2012) the Bill has yet to be debated 
71
 Burnip v Birmingham City Council, Trengrove v Walsall Metropolitan Council, Gorry v 
Wiltshire Council [2012] EWCA Civ 629, 15 May 2012; see also AH v West London MHT 
[2011] UKUT 74 (AAC): ‘it seems to us that once the threshold tests…for establishing a right 
to a public hearing have been satisfied, article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (re-enforced by article 13 of the CRPD) requires that a patient should have the same 
or substantially equivalent right of access to a public hearing as a non-disabled person who 
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(HB) rules affecting disabled people. The claimants relied on ECHR Article 
14 in connection with Article 1, Protocol 1 (protection of property), and on 
Articles 5(3) 72  and 19 of the CRPD.  Kay LJ agreed that the CRPD 
provisions, including Article 19, ‘resonate in the present case, even though 
they do not refer specifically to the provision of a state subsidy such as HB’.73  
He remarked (obiter) that  
[i]f the correct legal analysis of the meaning of [ECHR] Article 14 
discrimination in the circumstances of these appeals had been elusive 
or uncertain (and I have held that it is not), I would have resorted to the 
CRDP and it would have resolved the uncertainty in favour of the 
appellants. It seems to me that it has the potential to illuminate our 
approach to both discrimination and justification.74 
It may thus be that, in the absence of Government interest, it is the courts 
that draw the terms of CRPD and Article 19 into domestic legal discourse, 
including in socio-economic contexts.  
 
The ‘progress report’ on funding reform 
This thesis has been about understandings.  It has consciously avoided 
discussion of resources, 75  which is a major topic worthy of a separate, 
different study.  However, the understandings discussed here also shape the 
resource decisions relating to the socio-economic rights set out in CRPD 
Article 19(b).  
 
As noted in the thesis, 76  at international level, both ICESCR and CRPD 
require progressive realisation of Article 19(b) to the maximum of available 
resources.77  In international law, the UK has given unqualified undertakings 
                                                                                                                                          
has been deprived of his or her liberty, if this article 6 right to a public hearing is to be given 
proper effect.’ para 22 
72
 Article 5(3) ‘In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall 
take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided. 
73
 Burnip para 20 
74
 Ibid para 22 
75
 Although see Chapter 6 ‘dislocation’ 
76
 Chapters 2, 3 and 5 above 
77
 ICESCR Article 2; CRPD Article 4(2) 
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to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps 78  towards meeting such 
socio-economic rights obligations.  To avoid breach of these undertakings, at 
least minimum essential levels of each right must be met;79 and failure to 
progressively respect, protect and fulfil each right constitutes violation.  The 
Government is expected to act in a way reasonably calculated to achieve 
specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard. 80   Any 
retrogressive measures must be fully justified.81   
 
In England, this international framework is unavailable to guide 
implementation.  Article 19(b) is not recognised as a right, and no specific 
government targets exist for its realisation against which to measure 
progression or retrogression.82   However, there is ample evidence that social 
care funding has been increasingly inadequate for a number of years, and 
that the system is in crisis as a result.83  For instance, in June 2012, the 
Association of Directors of Social Services (ADASS) reported a £890 million 
shortfall in adult social care funding,84 constituting a cumulative reduction in 
adult social care budgets of £1.89 billion over two years, at a time when 
pressure from the number of older and disabled adults is growing at 3 per 
                                                 
78
 General Comment 3 ‘’The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par.1)’ CESCR 
14/12/90 
79
 General Comment 9 ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ 03/12/98, 
E/C.12/1998/24, CESCR, para 10 
80
 Maastricht Guidelines, para 7 
81
 General Comment 3, supra, para 9 
82
 The closest is the Office for Disability ‘Roadmap 2025’ 
(http://odi.dwp.gov.uk/docs/res/annual-report/roadmap-full.pdf  accessed 23.9.12) and work 
of the ODI Independent Living Scrutiny Group, both of which have been on the back burner 
since 2010, awaiting the Coalition government’s forthcoming Disability Strategy.  Neither is 
rights-based. 
83
 For example Disability Rights Commission ‘Policy Statement on Social Care and 
Independent Living’ 2002; Council for Social Care Inspection, ‘Lost to the System? The 
Impact of Fair Access to care’, CSCI 2008; Campbell, J, ‘Social Care as an Equality and 
Human Rights Issue’, National Centre for Independent Living, ‘Independently’ Newsletter, 
Feb 2008; Learning Disability Coalition ‘Social care – the continuing crisis: from the 
perspective of local authorities in England’ (The Learning Disability Coalition Local Authority 
Survey 2011); Age UK ‘Care in Crisis 2012’ http://www.ageuk.org.uk/get-
involved/campaign/poor-quality-care-services-big-q/care-in-crisis-2012-report  accessed 
30.7.12 
84
 ADASS Adult Social Care Budget Survey 2012-13 
http://www.adass.org.uk/images/stories/Press12/ADASS_BudgetSurvey2012Summary.pdf 
accessed 30.7.12 
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cent per year.85  The majority of those reductions86 have been met from 
service re-design, efficiency or increased charges,87 but front-line services 
have also been cut. 88   ADASS predicts that, unless a new, sustainable 
funding system is put in place, the percentage of overall savings made by 
directly reducing services will increase.89  This situation also impacts more 
widely.  A recent NHS Confederation survey90 found that funding shortfalls in 
local authority spending had resulted in more delayed discharges from 
hospital; 91  greater demand for community services; 92  more demand for 
mental health services;93 more acute admissions to hospital;94 more A&E 
attendances;95 and more emergency readmission,96  with all the concomitant 
negative impacts on those people’s lives and their rights to independent 
living.  
 
The debate surrounding the funding of social care has been underway in 
England for a number of years.97  Most recently,98 the Coalition launched a 
                                                 
85
 ADASS ‘A new system for care funding: “now is the time to act” ’ 
http://www.adass.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=813&Itemid=470 
accessed 30.7.12 
86
 Over 85 per cent - £688 million 
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88
 Saving £113 million – 12.7%; ADASS reports 83% of Councils operating at ‘Substantial’ 
and above eligibility level 
89
 Sarah Pickup, President of ADASS, 12 June 2012, 
http://www.adass.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=813&Itemid=470 
accessed 30.7.12.  ‘This balancing between budget reductions and significant growing 
demographic pressure is not sustainable and reiterates the urgent message calling for a long 
term funding solution for adult social care.’  ADASS Adult social care budget 2012-13 
90
 ‘Social care funding crisis impacting on NHS patients now, says head of the NHS 
Confederation’, http://www.nhsconfed.org/PressReleases/Archive/2012/Pages/Social-care-
funding-crisis-impacting-on-NHS-patients-now.aspx  accessed 3.8.12 
91
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97
 A Royal Commission on Long Term Care reported in 1999 (‘With respect to old age: long 
term care - rights and responsibilities’, Cm 4912-1, 1 March 1999).  It recommended that the 
costs of long-term care should be split between living costs, housing costs and personal 
care, with free personal care paid for from general taxation and the rest means-tested.  The 
New Labour government rejected this proposal, though it was implemented in Scotland 
through the Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act 2002. See also Robinson JE (ed) 
Towards a New Social Compact for Care in Old Age (King’s Fund 2001) 
98
 20 July 2010 
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Commission on Funding of Care and Support, which reported in July 2011.99  
The Dilnot Report recommended a cap on individuals’ contribution to their 
social care,100 beyond which they would be eligible for full state support; an 
increase in the means-test threshold; 101  and free state support without 
means-test for all those entering adulthood with care and support needs.   
 
Rather than responding directly to these recommendations, the Government 
issued a ‘progress report’ on funding reform, 102  published alongside the 
White Paper and Draft Bill.  Here, the Government supports the Dilnot 
Commission’s approach and intends to base a new funding model on them.  
However, it states there are ‘important questions’ about how the 
Commission’s approach could be applied, which need further consultation.103    
Because of the current economic situation, the government is ‘unable to 
commit to introducing the new system at this stage’.104  Rather, it will wait 
until the next Spending Review,105 as yet undated.   Many commentators 
echoed the response of the NHS Confederation: 
We can no longer afford the political debates and academic 
discussions about social care funding. This is a real issue that is 
having a detrimental impact on people's lives, now, today. This is the 
time for action.106   
 
It seems, however, that action will not take place until at least 2015.  In the 
meantime, local authorities continue to implement the cumulative 2010 
Spending Review cuts107 while facing rising demand for services combined 
with heightened expectations of prevention and ‘personalisation’ raised by 
the myth set out in the White Paper.  As we have seen in Chapter 8 of the 
                                                 
99
 The Dilnot Report: Department of Health,‘Fairer Care Funding’, 4 July 2011, 
http://www.dilnotcommission.dh.gov.uk/2011/07/04/commission-report/  accessed 12.8.11;  
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100
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national minimum eligibility threshold will be in place from April 2015.   
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 Health Minister Andrew Lansley, 11 July 2012 
106
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 See Chapter 6 of the thesis 
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thesis, such tensions give rise to frustration for service users and further 
instabilities and dilemmas for service providers. Further delay raises the 
imminent risk of continuing and compounding retrogression in the 
implementation of Article 19. 
 
In its report, 108  the JCHR recognises the exceptional economic 
circumstances facing the UK and the challenges involved in implementing 
‘stringent’ spending cuts, but reminds the Government that it must 
nevertheless ‘give due attention to [its] obligations under international law’.109   
Those obligations, as argued in this thesis, include full implementation of 
CRPD Article 19, including both civil and political rights, and the economic, 
social and cultural rights essential to their exercise.  
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109
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Appendix 1 
Observation Notes 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: examination of United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Session 42, Geneva, 12 – 14 May 
2009, 14th meeting, 12 May 
 
Examination of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights took place at the 
Palais Wilson, Geneva on Tuesday 12 May and Wednesday 13 May 2009, 
as part of the Committee’s 42nd session.  There were three public meetings in 
all between the Committee and representatives of the UK government:  one 
on Tuesday afternoon, and two on Wednesday (am and pm).  Whilst a full 
official record of the public sessions on Wednesday is available on the 
Committee’s website, at the time of researching and writing this thesis no 
official record of the Tuesday meeting was available.   
The observation notes set out below are those taken during the Tuesday 
meeting by the writer.  They form the basis for discussion of that meeting in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
 
Tuesday 12 May 2009, 3 – 6pm (14th meeting of 42nd session) 
The 23 members of the UK delegation were welcomed by the Chair.1  The 
Committee were impressed by the number and expertise of the delegation 
and by the UK’s Fifth Periodic Report, which was described as specific, up-
to-date, and ‘outstanding’.  However, a face-to-face dialogue was also 
needed. 
Mr Vijay Rangarajan, Head of the UK delegation made an opening 
statement, a draft of which2 reads as follows: 
1. Mr Chairman, members of the Committee, ladies and gentlemen, good 
afternoon.  I am Dr Vijay Rangarajan – leader of the UK delegation. 
2. I am the Constitution Director in the United Kingdom Ministry of Justice.  The 
Ministry of Justice leads the development of policy on human rights for the 
UK and has lead responsibility for the UK’s obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. We 
prepared the UK’s 5th Periodic Report under the Covenant, which we 
submitted to you in July 2007. 
                                                 
1
 Mr Marchan Romero (Ecuador) 
2
 Copy available on the day, in the writer’s posession 
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3. On behalf of the UK delegation, I warmly welcome the opportunity to discuss 
with you the UK’s fulfilment of its obligations under the Covenant, and the 
Government’s achievements and ambitions. 
4. I emphasise at the outset the high value which the United Kingdom places 
on the work of this Committee and of other UN treaty monitoring bodies.  The 
UK views the monitoring process led by expert committees as an essential 
element in the promotion and protection of rights internationally, and a 
catalyst for achieving meaningful change.  The UK Government respects 
your advice on the implementation of the Covenant and gives it serious 
consideration in the development of UK policy on matters concerning 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
5. We gave careful consideration to the Committee’s concluding observations 
and recommendations following the previous examinations in 2002.  The 
action we have taken in response to the Committee’s concerns and 
recommendations is summarised in our 5th Report.  But of course, we 
continue to bear the Committee’s recommendations in mind as we develop 
policies and monitor performance on delivery of the rights within the 
Covenant.  
6. In preparing the Report, we consulted with members of civil society in the 
UK, including Non-Governmental Organisations, National Human Rights 
Institutions, academia and individuals concerned about rights.  We took on 
board suggestions as to how the report could be improved and are confident 
that the process of consultation strengthened the report and continues to 
enhance the monitoring process more generally.  We have noted a real 
appetite from NGOs for a more systematic and structured approach to 
collaboration for this and our other international commitments, and we will 
take action on this. 
7. Mr Chairman, for this examination the Committee has raised an important 
range of issues on which we are pleased to respond.  We sent you a 
preliminary written response addressing all these issues on 17 February this 
year.  On these responses, too, we consulted with members of civil society. 
8. Meanwhile, we have studied carefully the parallel reports submitted to you by 
UK NGOs.  Within the NGO reports, there is positive recognition of steps the 
UK Government has taken since the previous examination in 2002.  These 
include the recently launched consultation on a UK Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities; the Equality Bill; progress in improving overall levels of 
health; action to reduce child poverty; flexible working reforms, and pension 
reform. 
9. The UK is fully committed to a vigorous development of economic, social and 
cultural policy.  It has consistently pursued a progressive agenda, largely 
through the ‘Welfare State’, and can point to sustained progress on social 
inclusion and increased funding for education and healthcare, as well as 
measures to eradicate child poverty, as evidence of its commitment to 
domestic realisation of the rights set out in the Covenant. 
10. While there has been significant progress, we acknowledge that there is 
room for improvement.  We continue to set challenging targets for 
improvement in those areas which still pose difficulties, and to pursue a 
range of measures including legislation, policies and programmes which 
advance the principles and objectives set out in the Covenant.  The 
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Government believes that its progressive social policy ensures that the rights 
in the Covenant are being delivered. 
11. The Government sees provision of these rights as a progressive endeavour.  
It notes that different jurisdictions take different approaches depending on 
their constitutions, their history and their social and economic conditions.  It 
is the Government’s clear view that, for the UK, democratically elected 
representatives are better placed than are the judiciary to make politically 
sensitive decisions on resource allocation.  Parliamentary sovereignty 
remains the cornerstone of the UK constitution.  Our approach to social and 
economic rights reflects the fact that although some rights require immediate 
realisation, the obligation under the Covenant is one of progressive 
realisation. 
12. The Committee should be in no doubt about the UK’s commitment both to 
meet this obligation, especially in the current economic climate.  Indeed, the 
economic situation has heightened the need to ensure that people’s basic 
economic and social needs are fulfilled.  The UK is taking action 
internationally, nationally and locally to help people and businessed to cope 
with the financial downturn.  In the recent Budget, the Chancellor announced 
that households and families are receiving support including increases in tax 
allowances and child benefits; pensioners have received one-off payments 
and increased pension credits; over £8 billiion is being invested in social 
housing from 2008-11, including further support for homeowners with 
mortgage payments where they have lost their jobs.  There is also a £1.6 
billion per year ‘Supporting People Programme’, which funds housing related 
support for 1.2 million vulnerabl people.  When people are made redundant 
in the UK our flexible labour market allows for innovative measures to 
combat unemployment.  Extra resources in job centres have helpd to get 
1.2m (75% of) people off benefits and back to work since last November and 
all 18-24 year olds who have been out of work beyond 12 months are now 
guaranteed jobs or training.  In the international context, the UK remains 
committed to providing overseas aid and working towards its Millenium 
Development Goals, at a time when developing countries are more than ever 
in need of assistance. 
13. In the domestic context, the UK has continued to make progress in key 
socio-economic areas since the last reporting session in 2007.  Its 
commitment to the ICESCR objectives has been notably reinforced by the 
establishment of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which came 
into operation on 1 October 2007.  The Commission’s brief is to eliminate 
discrimination, reduce inequality, protect human rights and build good 
relations, ensuring that everyone has a fair chance to participate in society.  
The new commission brings together the work of three previous equality 
commissions and takes on new equality responsibilities in relation to age, 
sexual orientation and religion or belief.  Together with the Scottish Human 
Rights Commission, brought into operation 2008 with a mandate to promote 
all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural – and the 
already established Northern Ireland Commission on Human Rights, the UK 
now enjoys a full complement of human rights Commissions for its various 
jurisdictions.  This is in accordance with the Concluding Recommendations 
of the Committee in 2007. 
14. The UK’s record on addressing discrimination goes back 40 years to the first 
Race Relations Act in the 1960s.  Our approach is tailored to the UK context.  
We have more to do and are taking our work forward in the Equality Bill, 
which was recently introduced to Parliament.  This Bill will extend the 
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protection against discrimination from gender, race and disability 
considerations to age, sexual orientation, religion or belief, gender 
reassignment and pregnancy/maternity.  It will also streamline the current, 
complex web of equality legislation, making it more accessible and 
understandable to those who will benefit from it and those who need to 
comply with it.  The Bill reflects the Government’s determination to prioritise 
equality issues.  The Committee may wish to note a number of further 
initiatives in this field.  A newly established Judicial Diversity Panel is working 
with the senior judiciary, Judicial Appointments Commission, legal 
professions and equality and diversity sector to produce recommendations 
for reform by November 2009.  In Parliament, a Speaker’s Conference is 
under way to consider, and make recommendations for rectifying, the 
disparity between the representation of women, ethnic minorities and 
disabled people in the House of Commons and their representation in the UK 
population at large.  A Panel on Fair Access to Professions has also been 
set up to focus on identifying barriers to entering the professions for people 
from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. 
15. Meanwhile, the UK labour market is increasingly designed to encourage 
women, parents, older workers and those with disabilities to be economically 
active.  Its flexibility enables businesses to respond quickly to changes in the 
market place, but also ensure that there are fair standards and support for 
people when they need to move between jobs.  The UK Government works 
closely with trade unions, business organisations and other interested parties 
on employment law and policy issues and will continue to bring forward 
measures to ensure that the legal framework remains up to date, that the 
rights of employees are adequately protected and that all workers who 
should be aware of and benefitting from these rights are doing so.  Since 
2007, the minimum annual entitlement to paid leave has been increased to 
28 days; working mothers’ Statutory Maternity Pay, Statutory Adoption Paay 
and Maternity Allowance have been increased; since October 2008, over 1 
million workers have benefitted from increases in National Minimum Wage 
rates, around two thirds of them women; the right to request flexible working 
has recently been extended to parents of children aged 16 and under.  The 
UK Government is also taking action in relation to vulnerable workers, having 
embarked upon a programme to combat abuse of worker rights and ensure 
that all workers, including migrant workers, have access to their rights and 
an improved enforcement framework. 
16. Clear progress is being made in health and education reforms across the 
UK.  Education standards have risen at all levels and across all major ethnic 
groups since the last UK report.  The achievement gaps are closing between 
most of the historically under-performing ethnic groups and the national 
average.  While UK Governments continue to focus on those ethnic minority 
groups such as Gypsy, Roma and Traveller children who under-perform at 
school, there is also renewed focus on poor children, those with special 
educational needs and children looked after by a local authority.  In health, 
there has been major progress in terms of the 12-month ‘Next Stage 
Review’, led by 2,000 clinicians and staff across the country and which 
involved 60,000 patients, public and staff.  The policy plans which emerged 
from the Review are set to give patients more choice and information, reward 
hospitals and clinics that offer both the highest quality of care, and provide 
the most responsive services.  Meanwhile, the new National Health Service 
Constitution brings together, for the first time, the principles, values, rights 
and responsibilities that underpin the NHS.  It is designed to renew and 
secure commitment to the enduring principles of the NHS, making sure that 
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the NHS continues to be relevant to the needs of patients, the public and 
staff in the 21st century. 
17. Of course, in all the UK Government’s dealings with economic, social and 
cultural rights, it is important to bear in mind that we have multiple 
jurisdictions and the constitutional context with regard to the UK’s Overseas 
Territories, Crown Dependencies and Devolved Administrations.  Each is 
able to a great extent (whether through self-Government or wide legislative 
competence) to prioritise its various concerns in this field and tailor its 
legislation and practice accordingly.  Devolution has been a major 
achievement and important constitutional reform.  The degree of self-
determination accorded to each administration allows for innovative 
measures to ensure progressive realisation of the Covenant rights in a way 
which reflects local culture and needs.  My colleagues will be happy to 
advise on variations in areas such as the health service, education and child 
wellbeing as you proceed with your questioning. 
18. The issue of cultural variance more generally is central to the UK 
Government’s policy agenda.  The United Kingdom is home to a rich 
diversity of communities, faith groups and cultures.  The Government 
positively encourages the freedom of these communities to express 
themselves in a creative and free environment.  The Olympic and Paralympic 
Games 2012 will present a unique opportunity to promote our cultural 
diversity and the value we attach to this as a society.  As a delegation we 
also welcome any considerations the Committee wish to highlight as UK 
preparations continue for this major event on the world stage. 
19. Finally, I wish to draw the Committee’s attention to an initiative which we 
believe will enhance awareness of, and civic participation and engagement 
with, economic, social and cultural rights in the UK.  The UK Government 
has recently launched a public consultation on a UK Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities, following publication of its Green Paper ‘Rights and 
Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework’.  The Paper 
explores a range of entitlements which we enjoy as members of UK society 
and which go beyond the civil and political rights in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (as incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1998).  These 
entitlements sit, as part of our well established welfare state, firmly in the 
sphere of social and economic rights.  The Government proposes that 
including provisions in a new constitutional document which point to key 
aspects of our welfare state, such as NHS entitlements; victims’ rights; 
equality; good administration; children’s wellbeing and principles of 
sustainable development in relation to our environment, could help to paint a 
fuller picture of the rights and responsibilities we share in the UK.  A formal 
public engagement exercise has begun, with the aim of involving all parts of 
UK society in discussions on what is potentially a major constitutional reform.  
Meanwhile, progress continues on a potential Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland.  The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has provided 
statutory advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the scope 
for defining in UK legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European 
Convention on Human Rihts to reflect the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and 
experience.  The advice is under consideration and the UK Government will 
ensure that the public debate around a UK instrument does not detract from 
the process relating to a potential Bill for Northern Ireland. 
20. In advance of this examination the UK delegation has answered questions 
on issues covering the general overarching provisions [Articles 1-5] of the 
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Covenant and its specific sunstantive provisions [Articles 6-15], all of which 
raise questions of Government policy that continue to fuel debate in the UK.  
We value the opportunity to extend that debate today and my colleagues will 
now be pleased to answer your questions. 
21. Mr Chairman, with that I conclude this bief overview of recent developments 
in the UK and look forward to hearing your views and advice. 
 
The opening statement was followed by a number of questions and 
comments from Committee members: 
Mr Riedel (Germany): 
1. You mention there is appetite from NGOs for more collaboration.  
What action are you taking? 
2. You have ratified [the ICESCR] but saying bound at international level 
only, not domestic, implementation progressive only, Parliament 
best…  Role of Committee is not instead of Parliament (General 
Comment 3).  You are misrepresenting the role of this Committee.  
When it comes to resources, it is about reasonableness, 
proportionality (see our Optional Protocol discussions) 
3. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has commented 
on the Fifth Report, and Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 
has had an input.  But your Bill of Rights and Responsibilities 
consultation is about civil and political rights, not economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
4. Will the UK sign the ICESCR Optional Protocol? 
 
Mr Pillay (Mauritius):  
1. The JCHR has made proposals [in its report on a British Bill of 
Rights?3].  Have those proposals been implemented, or is their report 
a dead letter? 
2. ‘Very disappointed’ with UK response to Committee’s list of issues 
(issue 1 – increasing awareness of ESC rights) that ‘awareness is 
already high’. 
3. ESCR not justiciable? UK still holds on to inflexible approach – not 
seen as rights (see Bill of Rights Green Paper).  JCHR says judicial 
review is not adequate for vulnerable groups. 
4. Human Rights Commissions require a roadmap, holistic, indivisibility 
of rights.  UK government has not changed at all: example of children 
and punishment, nothing done so far.  Talking about Covenant 
obligations but not being implemented or taken seriously. 
5. Northern Ireland Bill of Rights includes ESCR.  NI Human Rights 
Commission has mandate in favour of ESCR being 
justiciable/enforceable.  Will UK government enact this Bill of Rights 
and include ESCR also in UK Bill of Rights? 
                                                 
3
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘A Bill of Rights for the UK?’ Twenty-Ninth Report of 
session 2007-08, HL 165-I/HC 150-I. 10 August 2008 
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Mr Schrijver (Netherlands): 
1. Impact of counter-terrorism measures on ESCR, e.g. non-
discrimination, migrant workers, ethnic minorities etc – opportunity for 
judicial review/ effective remedy?  If yes, comfortable to sign up to 
Optional Protocol? 
2. Fifth Report section on action of companies operating overseas.  What 
about asylum-seekers and healthcare: England denies healthcare, 
Wales, Scotland & N Ireland not denied. 
3. Covenant Article 2: UK international development policy.  To what are 
human rights embedded in your development policy?  Please say 
something specific about ESCR. 
 
 Mr Kedzia (Poland): 
1. Social rights are applicable in admin or courts only if spelled out in 
domestic legislation.  Lack of direct applicability of international law to 
domestic law should not affect ratification of Optional Protocol or 
incorporation. 
2. People in difficult situations have double bind: difficulty of situation and 
difficulty of getting redress.  Access to legal remedies? 
 
Speaker (female): 
1. Revised European Charter: why not ratified? Are you going to ratify? 
2. Jersey etc and employment: reservation? Discrimination? men and 
women? 
3. Most countries apply and implement ESCR all over the world.  
Optional Protocol – a right which cannot come to court is not a right.  
UK reasons for non-incorporation in its Fifth Report don’t make sense: 
you do not wish domestic courts to enforce, raises questions about 
ratification.  Needs to change over time. 
 
Mr Abdel-Moneim (Egypt): 
1. What measures applied to rights of people who come under anti-
terrorism laws? 
2. ESCR of inhabitants of overseas territories: how reported here? 
3. Table of reservations and declarations, Fifth Report pp30-31: still 6 
reservations – in line with Vienna Declaration max number of 
reservations?  Declaration re Art 1.3: any conflict between Covenant 
and UN Charter, UN Charter will prevail.  How do you envisage such a 
conflict?... 
 
Ms Bras Gomes (Portugal): 
You disagree with the Committee on a number of issues. 
1. Para 75 of Fifth Report: agree that rights are indivisible and 
interdependent.  But ESCR part of Welfare State, not ‘rights’.  Bill 
of Rights consultation focusses on civil and political rights, not 
ESCR as rights.  Why not indivisible at practical level? 
2. How do you see ESC obligations? No reference to ‘fulfilment’. 
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3. Housing in Belfast: meaningful consultation? 
4. British companies re overseas activities – obligations to ‘protect’ 
 
Speaker (male): 
1. Best report submitted by developed countries, but very long! 
2. Report p 119: ILO Conventions 8, 9 & ? not ratified: why? 
 
Mr Sadi (Jordan): 
1. Introductory speech provocative: ‘we appreciate your advice’.  Use 
stronger word? Recommendations of the Committee are not just 
‘advice’. 
2. What does consultation with civil society mean? 
3. UK Bill of Rights and responsibilities?  Is purpose to draw balance 
between individual and collective rights? 
4. You accept some rights for immediate implementation, some 
progressive.  Which are which? 
5. You have various Human Rights Commissions.  Do you need some 
kind of national one?  What is the relationship between them? 
6. Fifth Report para 14 re Equality Bill, list of ‘strands’ includes race, why 
not national/ethnic origin? 
 
Ms Bondoan-Dandan (Philippines): 
1. Clarify protection of migrant agency workers such as Philippino 
sailors, hired by Philippino companies, working for UK companies 
2. Where are Chagos islanders now, and how is UK government 
protecting their rights? 
 
Ms Barahona Riera (Costa Rica): 
1. Legal framework: Art 1 para 3 of Covenant, self-determination and 
declaration re UN Charter priority over Covenant?  Non-ratification of 
Optional Protocol?  Is there a legal problem related to international 
position of UK? 
2. International development assistance: what resources, given credit 
crunch?  Any changes? 
3. What is UK position re ILO Convention 169?  Indigenous population… 
4. Equality Bill: why referring to maternity/pregnancy?  What are 
provisions to address? 
 
Speaker ?? 
1. Equality Bill: how presented from legal point of view?  Mandatory or 
recommendations? Law or ‘Charter’? 
2. Cultural diversity: can different people actually occupy high level posts 
in UK government? 
3. ESCR in development policies? Commitment, not obligatory 
4. What do you mean, ESCR not justiciable?  Justiciability of ESCR 
contributes to good government.  Do you see the State as Messiah?  
How can you do that? 
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Mr Martinov (Belarus): 
1. Unfortunate insistence on reservations 
2. Art 10: Bermuda/Falklands and maternity care 
 
 
The UK delegation was given 10 minutes to group the questions, with option 
to defer some until the next day. 
Dr Vijay Rangarajan (Ministry of Justice) (Head of UK delegation): 
Mr Sadi’s question about ‘advice’.  Maybe ‘advice’ doesn’t carry the right 
connotations, but we take it extremely seriously. 
Rosemary Davies (Ministry of Justice): 
On incorporation: this is a common theme, and we did anticipate the 
questions.  UK doesn’t incorporate, ECHR is exception.  EU law has some 
effect re some ESC rights.  ICESCR = international commitment to 
progressive realisation.  Committee’s regret in 2002 and General Comment 
9: some UK arguments against incorporation may have lost their force, such 
as vagueness of Covenant language. 
Need to look at what UK has achieved, and the future.  UK has been 
committed since foundation of welfare state, race discrimination since 1960s, 
also e.g. NHS, education…  May not be expressed in terms of ICESCR.  
Accept we could do more to raise awareness. 
Resources are matter for elected Parliaments not judges.  Internationally, 
some judges have gone further than UK would feel acceptable, e.g. India, 
South Africa.  Where do you draw the line re allocation of resources? 
UK law does impose obligations on public authorities.  System of Tribunals, 
e.g. social security, employment, mental health, asylum.  Unifying Tribunal 
system.  Also judicial review: significant public law challenges on ESCR 
including health, housing etc. 
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities Green Paper is consultation only, might 
include some ESC rights.  Government’s view has been: don’t see directly 
enforceable rights as appropriate – because we have so many already. 
John Kissane (Ministry of Justice): 
How we promote ESCR and Optional Protocol.  Over last 6 years: how best 
to educate everyone about human rights, controversial, opposition to human 
rights.  Programme in Ministry of Justice to educate officials: 150 copies of 
guidance.  Trying to counteract myths in Press, with BIHR, Amnesty etc: new 
part of education syllabus partly about Rights of the Child. 
Practical evidence of understanding their rights.  General public doesn’t know 
list of rights in this Covenant, but they do know, e.g. use of Tribunals.  Social 
security: 240K cases, mental health 23K, employment 99K.  Activity, 
cheaper, simpler than through Court.  But more to be done.  Not going to 
stop educating public, including putting response to ESCR Committee on 
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website.  Please advise on how to publicise rights to allow everyone to know 
where to look for rights.  
Three National Human Rights Institutions: major role, willing to work together, 
not a weakness. 
Helen Nelthorpe and Louise Constantine (Foreign & Commonwealth Office) 
Responses re overseas territories and reservations 
Annette Warrick (Dept for Children, Schools and Families) 
Corporal punishment.  Banning smacking is not the way to achieve aim.  
Parenting classes to encourage other ways to discipline their children.  
Children Act 2004 increases protection: no ‘reasonable punishment’ defence. 
John Luxton (Welsh Assembly) 
Booklets for parents, also informing children of their rights, ways to avoid 
physical punishment. 
Jeremy Oppenheim (Home Office) 
Counter-terrorism.  Committee has nothing to fear.  Appeal rights, judicial 
review.  Subject to detention: conditions independently monitored.  Right to 
work: once accepted can work like anyone else.  Seafarers: if employer 
based in UK, national and local powers to take decisive action. 
Tony Strutt (Government Equalities Office) 
Equality Bill.   Separate to immigration law.  Maternity rights extended to 
goods and services.  Also public sector duty.  Positive action extended, also 
to address imbalance in public life, e.g. women only shortlists.  Bringing in 
proposals. 
Status of the Bill: when enacted, force of law.  Guidance will be provided, and 
enforcement channels. 
Vijay Rangarajan (Ministry of Justice) 
Supplementary points on Equality Bill.  Other things happening too, e.g. 
1. Speaker’s conference in Parliament re minority representation (report 
by end 2009) 
2. Judicial Appointments Commission, independent panel to change 
whole system to improve diversity 
 
John Kissane (Ministry of Justice) 
Optional Protocol.  UK not against on principle, took part in drafting, but not 
convinced of practical use.  Committees are not courts.  Individuals can use 
courts and Tribunals.  But UK wants to test out process: 2004 CEDAW OP 
ratification, 2 cases, both inadmissible.  Reviewed process, report end 2008, 
very little take-up by civil society.  Report concludes not enough empirical 
evidence, more needed.  In meantime, will consider other OPs, including 
CRPD to provide database of evidence. 
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Not static/intransigent, just trying to work it out. 
 
Consideration of remaining issues was adjourned until the following day.  
There is a full official record of the Wednesday morning meeting 
(E/C.12/2009/SR.15) at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/425/11/PDF/G0942511.pdf?OpenElement  
last accessed 10.10.12; and of the public content of the Wednesday 
afternoon meeting (E/C.12/2009/SR.16) at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/423/73/PDF/G0942373.pdf?OpenElement 
last accessed 10.10.12. 
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Appendix 2 
Assessment Forms 
 
1. Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, 
Common resource allocation framework,  
Personal Needs Questionnaire and Scoring Sheet 
 
2. Local authority Community Care Assessment 
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Common resource allocation framework 
Personal needs questionnaire 
 
This is your personal needs questionnaire. It includes a number of questions for you to answer.   
 
The aim of the questionnaire is to give an indication of how much money you may need to live your life as an equal citizen and achieve 
some or all of these general outcomes: 
  
1. To stay healthy safe and well 
2. To have the best possible quality of life, including life with other family members, if this is what you choose  
3. To participate as an active citizen, increasing independence where possible  
4. To have maximum choice and control  
5. To live your life safely, free from discrimination or harassment  
6. To achieve economic well-being and have access to work and/or benefits if you choose to do so 
7. To keep your personal dignity and be respected by others  
 
For each question a number of points will be allocated depending on your answer. These will be used to work out if, and how much, 
money you could be offered as part of your personal budget. Under some of the sections there are examples for you.  Please tick the 
statement that best describes your situation. The exact support you may need will be discussed at the next stage, which is when you 
will plan your support. 
 
This is only a guide. The aim is for you to work out what support you may need.   
 
You can complete the questionnaire by yourself or with the support of someone else.  
 
All information provided will be kept confidential.  
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1.1 Meeting Personal Care needs 
 
This part is about the support / encouragement I need with things like personal hygiene, dressing, taking medication and moving 
around my home in order to do such tasks. This could also include supporting me to get in and out of bed. 
 
Outcome: I am able to meet my personal care needs  My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I do not need any support with my personal care   
B) I need occasional support / encouragement with my personal care 
(e.g. once or twice a week) 
  
C) I need some support / encouragement with my personal care  
(e.g. at least once a day) 
  
D) I often need  support / encouragement with my personal care 
(e.g. at least twice a day) 
  
E) I need frequent support / encouragement with my personal care 
(e.g. several times a day) 
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1.2 Meeting Personal Care needs (day and/or night and support) 
 
If you answered B, C, D, or E above please indicate when you 
need support (day, and/or night) and how many people you 
may need to support you at these times. Please select either 
day or night, or both. 
My view Assessors View 
 During the 
day 
During the 
night 
During the 
day 
During the 
night 
A) I need 1 person to support me with my personal care ...     
 
OR 
 
  
B) I need 2 people to support me with my personal care ...     
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2.1 Keeping myself safe 
 
This part is about keeping safe inside and outside of my home. Staying safe means different things to different people.  
 
Outcome: I am able to keep safe My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I am able to keep myself safe all of the time   
B) I need occasional support to keep myself safe   
C) I often need support to keep myself safe    
D) I always need support to keep myself safe   
 
2.2 Keeping myself safe (day and/or night and support) 
 
If you have answered B, C or D above, please indicate when 
you need support.  Please select either day or night, or both. 
My view Assessors View 
 During the 
day 
During the 
night 
During the 
day 
During the 
night 
A) I need support to help me keep safe ...     
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3. Eating and drinking 
 
This part is about the support / encouragement I need to eat, drink and prepare my meals. 
 
Outcome: I am able to eat drink and prepare my meals  My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I am able to eat, drink and prepare my meals without support   
B) I often need support to eat, drink and / or prepare my meals 
(e.g. at least once a day) 
  
C) I always need support to eat, drink and / or prepare my meals 
(e.g. several times a day) 
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4. Making decisions and organising my life 
 
This part is about who decides important things in my life. Things like where I live, who supports me, who decides how my money is 
spent. 
 
Outcome: I am able to make decisions and organise my life My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I can make decisions and organise my life without support.   
B) I need occasional support to make decisions and organise my life.   
C) I often need support to make decisions and organise my life.   
D) Other people always make decisions and organise my life    
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5. Being part of my community 
 
This part is about doing things in my community, like using the library, going to the cinema, community centre, or place of worship, or 
meeting up with friends 
 
Outcome: I am able to be part of my community My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I am able to participate in my local community as much as I want to   
B) I need occasional support to be part of my local community   
C) I often need support to be part of my local community 
(e.g. at least once a week) 
  
D) I frequently need support to be part of my local community 
(e.g. several times each week) 
  
E) I want to be part of my community and regularly need a lot of support to do this  
(e.g. daily or several times each day) 
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6. My role as a parent or carer  
 
This part is about the support I need to care for someone else e.g. child, parent, partner 
 
Outcome: I am able to play my full role as a parent or carer  My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I am not a parent / carer 
 
Or 
 
I am able to fulfil my parenting / caring role without support 
 
  
B) I need occasional support with my parenting / caring role   
C) I need some support  with my parenting / caring role 
(e.g. at least once a day) 
  
D) I often need support with my parenting / caring role 
(e.g. at least twice a day) 
  
E) I frequently need support with my parenting / caring role 
(e.g. several times a day) 
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7. Running and maintaining my home 
 
This part is about the support I need to manage day to day tasks e.g. housework, shopping, gardening, routine maintenance and 
paying bills 
 
Outcome: I am able to run and maintain my home My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I am able to run and maintain my home without support   
B) I need occasional support to run and maintain my home   
C) I often need support to run and maintain my home 
(e.g. at least once a week) 
  
D) I frequently need support to run and maintain my home 
(e.g. several times each week) 
  
E) I regularly need support in all aspects to do with running and maintaining my 
home 
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8. Having work and learning opportunities 
 
This part is about working and learning. The work may include voluntary work or paid work that I choose to do. This part is also about 
learning opportunities at a local college or community centre or anywhere else I choose to attend 
 
Outcome: I am able to have work and learning opportunities if I choose to My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I do not require support with work or learning opportunities currently   
B) I need occasional support to work or learn or both 
(e.g. once a week) 
  
C) I often need support to work or learn or both 
(e.g. several times each week) 
  
D) I would like to work or learn or both and regularly need support to do this. 
(e.g. daily or several times each day) 
  
 
 438 
 
9.1 Managing my actions 
 
This part is about how my actions may affect other people and the support I might need to manage this.  It can be about forgetfulness, 
lack of understanding, or any other factors that may have an impact on the safety of others. 
 
Outcome: I am able to manage my actions My view 
Assessors 
View 
A) I do not need any support with this   
B) I need occasional support to help me to manage my actions   
C) I often need support to help me manage my actions   
D) I always need support to help me manage my actions     
 
9.2 Managing my actions (day and/or night and support) 
 
If you have answered B, C or D above, please indicate when 
you need support.  Please select either day or night, or both. 
My view Assessors View 
 During the 
day 
During the 
night 
During the 
day 
During the 
night 
A) I need support to help me manage my actions ...     
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10.1 Informal support 
 
This part is about the support I get which is unpaid – for example from family, friends and neighbours   
 
Outcome: I am able to draw on support from friends and family without placing 
an undue burden on them 
My view 
Assessors 
View 
I have family members or friends who provide unpaid support 
 
Yes / No Yes / No 
 
10.2 Informal support (continued) 
 
If you answered yes above, please choose one of the 
following options: 
 
My view Assessors View 
A) My family and friends can provide all of the support I 
need  
  
B) I am able to get much of the support I need from family 
and friends and have or need occasional paid support 
  
C) I am able to get only some of the support I need from 
family and friends and need significant paid support. 
  
D) I get little support from family or friends   
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11.1 Family carer and informal support  
This part is for an unpaid carer (this is often a family member or close friend) who is currently providing informal support. Please tell us 
how providing this support affects your life.  
 
 My view Assessors View 
A) It causes me no concern in my daily life   
B) It causes some concern and has some effect on my 
daily life 
  
C) It causes significant concern and has a significant 
impact on my daily life 
  
D) It has a critical impact on my daily life and affects my 
health and well-being. 
  
 
11.2 Family carer and social support (continued) 
 
You have the right to a carer’s assessment. This is a chance to talk about these issues and find out what support is 
available.  
A) I would like to receive a carer’s assessment.  
B) I don’t want a carers assessment  
C) I have already had a carer’s assessment  
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12. Signatures 
 
My comments  
 
My signature 
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Assessors 
comments 
 
 
Assessors 
signature 
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Common resource allocation framework 
Questionnaire scoring sheet 
 
Question 1: Meeting Personal Care Needs 
 
A = 0, B = 3, C = 5, D = 8, E = 13 
 
A (During the day) = 0. A (During the night) = 3 
B (During the day) = 6. B (During the night) = 9 
 
Question 7: Running and maintaining my home 
 
A = 0, B = 1, C = 3, D = 4, E = 6 
 
Question 2 Keeping Myself Safe 
 
A = 0, B = 4, C = 7, D = 13 
 
A (During the day) = 0. A (During the night) = 4 
 
Question 8: Having work and learning 
opportunities 
 
A = 0, B =1, C = 2, D = 5 
 
Question 3 Eating and Drinking 
 
A = 0, B = 6, C = 10 
 
Question 9: Managing my Actions 
 
A = 0, B = 3, C = 7, D = 12 
 
A (During the day) = 0. A (During the night) = 4 
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Question 4: Making Decisions and organising 
my life 
 
A = 0, B = 2, C = 4, D = 8 
 
Questions 10 and 11 : Informal support 
 
Multiply the indicative allocation by the figure in 
the table below  
(0% = no allocation, 100% = full allocation) 
 
Q11: A B C D 
 
 
Q10 
A 0% 40% 70% 100% 
B 40% 40% 70% 100% 
C 70% 70% 70% 100% 
D 100% 100% 100% 100% 
No unpaid 
support 
100% 
 
Question 5: Being part of my community 
 
A = 0, B = 2, C = 4, D = 5, E = 6 
Question 6: My role as a parent or carer 
 
A = 0, B = 2, C = 5, D = 7, E = 10 
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